By Luke Maloney

Introduction

With significant disparities in internet access, Latin America finds itself as one of the centers of internet infrastructure investment from foreign technological firms due to its untapped markets. Many governments in the region seek the most advantageous agreements for their countries. This typically means the lowest-cost, most uniform, and most efficient approaches to raising living standards. Chinese firms like Huawei and ZTE tend to be highly competitive regarding internet infrastructure. Unlike many of their competitors, such as Verizon or Samsung, these companies produce a full array of 5G equipment without the need to outsource production or purchase large amounts of hardware from other enterprises.[i]

In addition to the lack of internet infrastructure, Latin America is burdened with some of the highest crime rates in the world. Many leaders, national and local alike, are willing to go to great lengths to combat crime at times at the expense of individual freedoms or by looking the other way on human rights abuses.[ii] For this reason, Latin American countries have been seen as the perfect testing ground for Chinese surveillance equipment under the guise of fighting crime. Municipalities in Ecuador, Bolivia, and Venezuela have invested in large quantities of video cameras and advanced surveillance equipment under the “Safe Cities” initiative.[iii]

However, these investments are not as transparent as they seem at first glance. Under China’s National Intelligence Law, the state may “request relevant organs, organisations, and citizens provide necessary support, assistance, and cooperation.”[iv] This wide sweeping law means that all companies based in the People’s Republic of China are subservient to the state and compelled by law to share data with the government if pressed. This severe privacy risk threatens any individual or government that uses hardware made by a Chinese company. In addition, risks are posed due to the lack of ethical practices demonstrated by some of the companies’ leadership. For example, Meng Wanzhou, the chief financial officer of Huawei, was detained in Canada at the request of the United States and openly admitted to making false statements surrounding Huawei’s connection with Skycom, intending to intentionally mislead HSBC, an American bank, putting them at risk of violating US sanctions against Iran.[v]

Additionally, it is critical to see this issue through the lens of what some consider to be the Second Cold War, the great power competition between the United States and China that impacts political-economic issues globally. While the United States strongly supports democracy worldwide, China rejects it and often supports autocratic governments to expand economic opportunities and find allies. In addition to the apparent economic competition within the region, it is worth noting that Latin America is notorious for cases of democratic backsliding. Whether it occur in Venezuela or Nicaragua, China is always ready to step in where the United States pulls back.[vi] Recently, Nicaragua, a former staunch supporter of Taiwan, signed an extensive free trade agreement with China, further solidifying its transition to the Chinese sphere of influence.[vii] Concerning Safe Cities, the Chinese initiative to create advanced surveillance systems utilizing large amounts of cameras and Artificial Intelligence algorithms to combat crime, China has not discriminated against countries that have abused surveillance technologies to target political enemies in authoritarian ways. Furthermore, the Chinese government has gained notoriety for its willingness to send state police to foreign countries in attempts to spy on or detain dissidents.[viii] This blatant disregard for international norms and state sovereignty means it is not unreasonable to assume that the People’s Republic of China could utilize its internet infrastructure and Safe Cities network to aid their search or surveil dissidents without the host country’s consent.

Despite both geopolitical and privacy concerns, U.S. companies are unlikely to be able to supply the same cheap infrastructure and low-cost products that Chinese companies offer; likewise it is unrealistic to expect governments to give up these types of opportunities that raise local standards of living.[ix] For that reason, it is vital to elucidate the risks of overreliance on Chinese technological infrastructure to provide Latin American leaders the information necessary to make wise decisions regarding their future development. In Brazil, for example, Huawei became the country’s largest network equipment supplier in 2014.[x] In addition, the company also “cooperates with universities and scientific research institutions in Brazil to establish joint laboratories, network technology colleges, and project cooperation.”[xi] Huawei’s successful and thorough investment in the Brazilian market offers considerable, long-term benefits to Brazil in terms of tax revenue, employment, and technological improvement; however, these gains come at the expense of relinquishing the potential to choose another investor. Due to its deep ties with Huawei and investment from China, Brazil is now in a place where a rejection of Huawei or a shift away from Chinese internet infrastructure would be met with harsh economic consequences in the form of retributive economic policies and a lower willingness to cooperate from China and its companies. This risk of retribution was exemplified when, in 2021, Sweden banned Huawei for security reasons. Following the ban, the Swedish telecom firm Ericsson lost over 70% of its market share within the Chinese market from backlash.[xii] This threat leaves Brazil trapped on the path that it has chosen, and it seems that the current administration is more than willing to double down with China.[xiii] It is crucial to assist other countries in the region from making this mistake and to provide them with a viable alternative.

Chinese Internet Infrastructure in Latin America

Latin America is full of emerging economies and, thus, economic opportunities for Chinese tech firms. Across the region, 38% of the population lacks basic telecommunications technology and requires significant infrastructure upgrades to utilize 4G and 5G networking.[xiv] However, Chinese foreign investment in internet infrastructure is only partially run by its companies. Trade between China and Latin America trade grew 26-fold between 2000 and 2020 and Chinese foreign direct investment has seen a sharp increase between 2015 and 2021.[xv] The Digital Silk Road (DSR) acts as the digital version of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The DSR includes investments worldwide in “fiber optic cables, 5G networks, satellites, data centers, smart city projects, and devices that connect to these systems, all of which in turn can support the information and communications technology business.”[xvi] This will quite literally bring more markets online for Chinese firms. Latin America also has much to gain from this investment. The internet penetration rate lags behind many other developing regions, especially outside urban centers. Services such as mobile payments, online shopping, and e-commerce are still unavailable to most people in Latin America. Furthermore, the availability of 4G technology varies significantly within the region, from “high levels in Peru (83 percent coverage) and Mexico (80 percent coverage) to lower levels in Costa Rica and Ecuador, where 66 and 57 percent of those populations have access to 4G, respectively.”[xvii] Notably, the benefits of providing Internet access to broader segments of the population are great. The World Bank estimates that, in Latin America, “a 10% increase in mobile and fixed broadband penetration can trigger 1.7% growth in GDP.”[xviii] This possibility is broadly appealing in a region that desperately desires to modernize.

In Mexico, Huawei has become a major player. With its assistance, the Mexican government built the most extensive public Wi-Fi network in Latin America.[xix] Additionally, the company provided technical support for the country’s strategy to help bridge the deep digital divide. Further investment from Huawei also led to the construction of a fiber-optic cable connecting the states of Sinaloa and Baja California Sur.[xx] In dealing with the region’s largest power, Brazil, China has installed a fiber-optic cable in the Atlantic Ocean that runs from Fortaleza, Brazil to the Kribi Deep Sea Port in Cameroon. This connection has the largest data transmission capacity between South America and Africa, and the intercontinental cable’s importance cannot be understated. Interestingly, when presented with an even larger possibility, Chile rejected Huawei’s plan to construct a Trans-Pacific fiber-optic cable between Santiago and Shanghai.[xxi] However, this only occurred after a visit from then Secretary of State Mike Pompeo—a vocal critic of China’s DSR. After this meeting, Chile elected the Japanese firm NEC and built the connection to Sydney, Australia instead, likely due to security risks elucidated by the United States.[xxii]

Many countries in the West, such as the Five Eyes (the U.S., UK, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada), have fully or partially banned Huawei over national security reasons, while others have expressed personal privacy concerns.[xxiii] Due to China’s record of surveillance, censorship, and intellectual property theft, it remains a question whether countries participating in the DSR will be taken advantage of by Chinese intelligence services. There is a concern that the Chinese government will utilize backdoors in networking and other equipment to spy on foreign countries. Many of those concerned simply point to the contents of China’s National Intelligence Law. Approved in 2017, this law raises serious doubts about the reliability and trustworthiness of Chinese telecommunication companies operating abroad. Article 7 of the law states, “‘Organizations and citizens are obliged to support, assist and cooperate with [PRC] intelligence organs,’ and Article 14 authorizes the intelligence organs to demand assistance from institutions, organizations and citizens.”[xxiv] This means that it would be illegal for Chinese companies, such as Huawei and ZTE, to reject any demand for information from the nation’s intelligence agencies. Reports show that confidential data on the network of the Chinese-built African Union headquarters was diverted from Ethiopia to servers in China from 2012 to 2017.[xxv] With privacy abuses like this already coming to light, it is only a matter of time before similar abuses are uncovered in Latin America.

The Safe Cities Initiative

In addition to internet connectivity, Chinese telecommunication technology has been used to combat the high crime rates that are endemic in Latin America. As of 2021, 38 of the world’s 50 most violent cities could be found in the region.[xxvi] Due to this, many people in the region are more than okay with surrendering some freedoms in exchange for a safer life, even at the expense of due process or individual rights.[xxvii] This is best exemplified by President Nayib Bukele’s emergency crackdown on crime in El Salvador. Crime rates have dropped staggeringly, and the president’s approval rating rose to over 90% as of March 2023; however, this has been accompanied by worrying levels of incarceration and the overuse of pretrial detention and harsh prison sentences.[xxviii] In many other countries, the solution is not so simple. Whether due to a stronger attachment to human rights or a lack of resources, Bukele’s policies, although certainly appealing to a wide range of Latin American politicians, are infeasible. Huawei, alongside the Chinese Communist Party and the People’s Republic of China, champions the Safe Cities initiative as the future of crime fighting. No longer is it necessary to patrol the streets hoping to catch a robber in the act; instead, officials can surveil the community from afar through the help of hundreds, or often thousands, of cameras.

Importantly, Huawei is entirely transparent about its unwavering and passionate support for the creation of surveillance states. In a 2016 publication, Huawei outlined its vision of creating cities with “nowhere to hide.”[xxix] Using the crime drama “Person of Interest” as inspiration, Huawei explained that its goal was to shrink, and eventually eliminate, the “shadow map,” areas that are not under camera surveillance and create “breeding grounds for crime.”[xxx] The publication explained that there are thousands upon thousands of cameras in most modern cities. In a lamentable tone, however, the article stated that one of the most prominent issues is that authorities do not have unlimited access to privately run cameras. In addition to this roadblock is the conflict between individual privacy and public safety. The article asserts that “many countries ban cameras on residential roads to protect privacy, meaning that undisputable [sic] visual evidence is lacking if a crime occurs.”[xxxi] However, they contend that it is necessary to surveil these areas since a crucial part of building a safe city is reducing the number of areas that are out of view of the cameras. When constructing safe cities, the goal is that various municipal departments will be able to share information and build integrated systems that create an environment in which “all areas with street lighting can be placed under surveillance.”[xxxii] Mass video surveillance does present a serious problem, however. Due to the large amount of footage collected, it would be impossible for a human to review all of it. For that reason, Huawei proposes the incorporation of artificial intelligence (AI) recognition technology in the cameras themselves that is capable of carrying out facial recognition of everyone captured on video and analyzing behaviors to alert police to potential criminal activity: “by analyzing people’s behavior in video footage and drawing on other government data such as identity, economic status, and circle of acquaintances, AI could quickly detect indications of crimes and predict potential criminal activity.”[xxxiii]

Though Safe Cities claims it is an effective program, the benefits are often difficult to verify and tend to show inflated statistics. For example, “A Huawei presentation claims that an unnamed city (“XX Safe City”) experienced a 15 percent reduction in violent crime; a 45 percent increase in the case clearance rate; a reduction in emergency response time from 10 minutes to 4.5 minutes; and most incredibly, an increase in “citizen satisfaction” from 60.2 percent to 98.3 percent.”[xxxiv] The above claims are unverifiable due to the lack of a location, time frame, and sources provided. Over-the-top claims like these are commonplace in Huawei promotional materials that boast significant improvements in emergency response times and drastic decreases in crime rates.

Despite the lacking and, at times, spurious evidence, leaders in many Latin American countries are willing to try almost anything to combat crime. For this reason, Huawei has found the perfect trial ground for more “aggressive experimentation, combined with controversial private data protection regulations.”[xxxv] Bolivia, notable for its anti-Western foreign policy and socialist economic policies, jumped at the opportunity to implement a Safe City project in one of its most dangerous municipalities, Cochabamba. The terms for Cochabamba Segura (Safe Cochabamba) were agreed upon in November 2016, and it was the largest Safe City project ever conducted at the time.[xxxvi] Interestingly, municipal authorities signed the agreement instead of the national government. The first phase of the plan consisted of the installation of 420 security cameras, the construction of telecommunications towers, and the implementation of handheld GPS devices for the police force.[xxxvii] After the initial phase, local authorities favored a long-term collaboration with Huawei to turn Cochabamba into a showcase as one of the safest cities in the region by utilizing the new Safe City initiative. By the end of 2019, ZTE had provided Bolivia with 600 cameras equipped with facial recognition technology to augment the 2,000 units already in use.[xxxviii] Besides the obvious threats to individual privacy caused by mass surveillance, a prolonged partnership with Chinese surveillance firms leads to deepened concerns.

In addition to personal privacy violations, China’s willingness to sell surveillance technology to authoritarian regimes has harmed human rights in many countries and contributed to democratic backsliding in Latin America. After the China National Electronics Import & Export Corporation (CEIEC) supplied equipment to the Maduro regime in Venezuela, the CEIEC was met with sanctions from the United States. In an official press release, the U.S. Embassy in Caracas asserted that CEIEC has provided software, training, and technical expertise to the regime’s entities: “It provides cyber support and technical experts to state-run telecommunications provider Venezuelan National Telephone Company (CANTV) which controls 70 percent of internet service in Venezuela and frequently blocks online independent newspapers and speeches by opposition members.”[xxxix] Due to its assistance in restricting internet service and the digital surveillance of political opponents, CEIEC has supported the Maduro regime in its fight against human rights and the restoration of representative democracy in Venezuela. Additionally, ZTE has helped the Maduro regime build a national identification database to help the government crack down on dissent. ZTE and the Maduro government have implemented a smart-card ID known as the “Fatherland Card” that transmits data about cardholders to servers supplied by ZTE and has been linked by the government to subsidized food, healthcare, and other social programs.[xl] These cards will help fill Safe Cities databases in Venezuela and will, without a doubt, make organizing opposition to the Maduro regime more challenging.

Ecuador at Risk

Ecuador, the traditionally peaceful and stable Andean nation, once ruled by the left-wing autocrat Rafael Correa, has found itself in a tumultuous situation. One of the earliest proponents of the Safe Cities initiative in Latin America, Ecuador may have already laid the groundwork for the mass surveillance and loss of privacy for its urban population. The original push for implementing a surveillance system occurred under President Rafael Correa. After returning from the 2008 Beijing Olympics, he was impressed by the effectiveness of the Safe City constructed in the Chinese capital. By early 2011, Ecuador received a Chinese-designed surveillance system financed by Chinese loans. In exchange for the equipment, Ecuador provided its main export, oil, and the money necessary for the cameras and computing services flowed straight to CEIEC and Huawei.[xli] Since then, the two companies have built a surveillance system of more than 4,000 cameras.[xlii] Ecuador’s program, called ECU-911, promised to get the staggering rates of murder and drug-related crime under control. However, similar to the system’s use in Venezuela, it had a dual-use aspect. President Correa abused the surveillance network to support the National Intelligence Secretariat, or Senain, a group notorious for keeping tabs on political opponents and spying on its citizenry. Senain’s leader at the time, Jorge Costa, confirmed the suspicions that the domestic intelligence group had access to a mirror of the Chinese-built surveillance system.[xliii] Furthermore, there have been reports of video cameras linked to ECU-911 being installed directly outside the homes of political opponents presenting a full view into their houses through its windows.[xliv] In addition to domestic spying, it was nearly impossible for locals to push back since Chinese companies operate with less scrutiny and regard for corporate social responsibility than their Western counterparts: “Activists in Ecuador say that while they have succeeded in working with civil society groups in Europe and America to oppose sales of surveillance technologies, similar campaigns in China have not been possible.”[xlv]

By 2014, after substantial drops in crime rates, President Correa and the Chinese state-run media championed the program as a shining success.[xlvi] Ironically, ECU-911 has not been effective at stopping crime. Many Ecuadorians asserted that, though the system’s installation paralleled a period of falling crime rates, muggings and attacks were still occurring in front of the cameras without a police response.[xlvii] Many cameras do not work, and due to staffing shortages, nobody may actually be watching at any given time. Quito has over 800 cameras, but according to the New York Times, only 30 police officers were on duty to check the footage during their visit to the headquarters.[xlviii] In addition to surveilling the cameras, officers must work in the control room as dispatchers. This means that the vast majority of the time, no one is watching.

In addition to the Safe Cities initiative, Ecuador has coupled the program with the Ciudades Inteligentes, or Smart Cities, program. The federal government has pushed for a spider web of networks to connect emergency services with public transit, airports, high schools, universities, clinics, and the civil registry office.[xlix] In the wrong hands, and by using tech infrastructure manufactured by Chinese companies, these networks could seriously jeopardize the data of millions of Ecuadorians. Interestingly, the extensive 2017 report on these Smart Cities neglected to discuss any possible security risks posed by using Chinese firms.[l]

While it may appear that Ecuador’s Safe Cities have failed, it is crucial to note that the underlying infrastructure remains and the state may resume its mass surveillance at any time. This, coupled with the possible data collection from Smart Cities, raises serious concerns if an autocrat comes to power—as is the trend in the region during crises. Notably, Ecuador is in the midst of the most significant crisis since the Correa administration. With skyrocketing murder rates, public cartel and gang-led executions, and an overall rise in violent crime, the coastal provinces, including Ecuador’s largest city, Guayaquil, have been under a zona de excepción, a state of emergency, since April 2022.[li] The government enforces strict curfews and thousands of soldiers have been sent to the coast to enforce peace. Ecuador’s homicide rate increased faster than any other country in Latin America in 2021, and the violence does not appear to be abating.[lii] With opposition parties winning in crucial local and departmental elections in 2023, the population is becoming more desperate, even leaning towards the party of the autocrat Rafael Correa. To further exemplify the state of insecurity, in April 2023, then-President Guillermo Lasso authorized the use of firearms by civilians, an almost unprecedented act in a last-ditch effort to combat violent crime and protect the citizenry.[liii]

Ecuador is quickly becoming the perfect storm for an autocratic figure to rise to power and revive and expand the surveillance state with the help of China.

Possible Alternatives and Solutions

With Huawei’s ownership of 45% of all 5G patents worldwide and China’s pervasive footprint in the region’s internet and telecommunications infrastructure, there must be ways to protect citizens currently using Chinese technology from privacy abuses and provide attractive alternatives.[liv] Latin American governments have a duty to protect the privacy of their citizens even as they become more integrated with the DSR. Sadly, most governments in the region appear to be blinded by the economic possibilities provided by high-speed internet infrastructure and foreign investment from China. As a solution, heavily dependent countries could pass legislation banning foreign companies from developing backdoors to networking technology and from using these backdoors to intercept data. While this would be difficult to enforce due to the multinational nature of companies like Huawei and ZTE, it would be a step in the right direction. Furthermore, this is a great initiative that less-dependent countries could take preemptively. Additionally, many nations in the region have an excellent opportunity to negotiate deals with U.S. companies to manufacture internet hardware in their own countries. Due to the U.S. shift towards the near-shoring and friend-shoring of supply lines, that is, the relocation of strategic industries to nearby or allied countries, this is an attractive option. Investment from U.S. companies will provide jobs and the ability to produce crucial parts of internet hardware at home, improve relations with the United States, and offer a viable and attractive alternative to China.

One solution from outside the region could come from the United States and its allies. The lack of a U.S. alternative is a primary reason why the United States has struggled to persuade countries to refrain from using Huawei equipment. This is because “the United States does not and will not have a company that is competitive in the full stack of 5G equipment.”[lv] One solution would be collaborating with counterparts in Finland, South Korea, and Sweden, three other leaders in the race, for 5G coverage to share the burden of financing Nokia or Samsung’s 5G projects. While this solution may not be quite as efficient as Huawei’s vertical integration, it could help lower the cost of adopting these networks and make them more competitive alternatives. While none of the solutions discussed are perfect or universally applicable, they all could contribute in varying degrees to address privacy concerns and reduce dependence on Chinese tech firms.

The solution may be more difficult in countries such as Brazil, which are already incredibly dependent on Chinese investment and infrastructure. While placing partial restrictions or an outright ban on Chinese technological firms, such as Huawei, would signal Brazil’s commitment to the rules-based international order and the Western coalition on security and commercial issues, Brazil would submit itself to acute economic and developmental setbacks. However, widespread restrictions seem almost impossible at the moment, let alone a total ban. Besides the fact that Chinese technology is cheaper for Brazilians, “China is also building and financing the Salvador SkyRail line, electrifying the bus and metro systems in São Paulo state, helping create railroad networks in the Amazon, and supporting other public transportation projects throughout the country.”[lvi] Strict limits on Chinese tech firms would likely be met immediately with a retributive halt to a wide range of investment projects as a result. Additionally, Brazil has received R$250 million (approximately $50 million) in research and development funding from Huawei and has had a strong partnership with the company for 25 years.[lvii] Besides retribution from the Chinese state, it is unlikely that Brazil would want to destroy that relationship without first having an acceptable replacement. Unless the West is willing to take over the financing of these projects and completely replace China for the time being, Brazil would be severely hurt economically by a ban. While not ideal for Brazil, these harsh actions could be more effective in countries that lack massive Chinese investment and serve as preemptive measures to avoid long-term abuse.

Conclusion

           Due to the lack of internet infrastructure in Latin America and high crime rates, countries in the region are susceptible to abuse by Chinese companies. While it may seem logical to pursue the cheapest, most efficient options for development, it is crucial to weigh the non-monetary costs and understand that Chinese companies are subservient to the state. The decision to rely on these companies puts the data of millions of people at risk and the CCP may use it to conduct unlawful data collection and digital surveillance. To combat crime, the Orwellian Safe Cities must be avoided, not just simply due to the Chinese government’s legal authority to access recordings and live feeds from their tech firms, but also to avoid autocratic abuse. These systems have been exploited across Latin America and are incredibly dangerous and undemocratic in the wrong hands.

           Latin American countries must carefully weigh the risks of using Chinese technological infrastructure and be open to alternative solutions to their problems. It is possible and economically viable for these countries protect themselves through foreign investment, security cooperation, and stricter data security regulations. It is imperative that solutions take into account the long-term risks and strive to create a more democratic and economically developed hemisphere.

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[i] Andrew Braverman, “ICT Investment in Latin America and the Caribbean Pt. I: Economic Competition Spills into the Region: Strategic Technologies Blog,” CSIS, April 11, 2022, https://www.csis.org/blogs/strategic-technologies-blog/ict-investment-latin-america-and-caribbean-pt-i-economic.

[ii] “El Salvador: Sweeping New Laws Endanger Rights,” Human Rights Watch, April 8, 2022, https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/04/08/el-salvador-sweeping-new-laws-endanger-rights.

[iii] Jorge Malena, “The Extension of the Digital Silk Road to Latin America: Advantages and Potential Risks,” Council on Foreign Relations, https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/pdf/jorgemalenadsr.pdf, 11.

[iv] “China’s Intelligence Law and the Country’s Future Intelligence Competitions,” Government of Canada, May 17, 2018, https://www.canada.ca/en/security-intelligence-service/corporate/publications/china-and-the-age-of-strategic-rivalry/chinas-intelligence-law-and-the-countrys-future-intelligence-competitions.html.

[v] “Huawei’s Meng Wanzhou Flies Back to China after Deal with US,” BBC News. BBC, September 25, 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-58682998.

[vi] “Democracy Index 2022,” Economist Intelligence Unit, September 28, 2023, https://www.eiu.com/n/campaigns/democracy-index-2022/, 41.

[vii] “China, Former Taiwan Ally Nicaragua Sign Wide-Ranging Free Trade Deal,” Reuters, August 31, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/china-former-taiwan-ally-nicaragua-sign-wide-ranging-free-trade-deal-2023-08-31/.

[viii] “Two Arrested for Operating Illegal Overseas Police Station of the Chinese Government,” The United States Department of Justice, April 19, 2023, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/two-arrested-operating-illegal-overseas-police-station-chinese-government.

[ix] Ilaria Mazzocco, “Evolving South American-China Relations: Challenges and Opportunities for Washington: Trustee China Hand,” CSIS, August 24, 2022, https://www.csis.org/blogs/trustee-china-hand/evolving-south-american-china-relations-challenges-and-opportunities.

[x] Jorge Malena, “The Extension of the Digital Silk Road to Latin America,” 8.

[xi] Ibid.

[xii] Supantha Mukherjee, “Ericsson Plans Cut in China Ops on Huawei Backlash, Flags Supply Chain Issues,” Reuters, October 19, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/technology/ericsson-plans-cut-china-ops-huawei-backlash-flags-supply-chain-issues-2021-10-19/.

[xiii] Austin Ramzy and Samantha Pearson, “China’s Xi Jinping, Brazil’s Lula Take United Stance against U.S.,” The Wall Street Journal, April 14, 2023, https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-xi-jinping-brazils-lula-take-united-stance-against-u-s-e8e55c1c.

[xiv] “Connectivity Gaps in Latin America – GSMA,” GSMA Latin America, March 30, 2023, https://www.gsma.com/latinamerica/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/FINAL-Brechas-de-conectividad-en-America-Latina_-SHORT-report-ENGLISH-DIGITAL.pdf.

[xv] Werner Raza and Hannes Grohs, Trade aspects of China’s presence in Latin America and the Caribbean, November 2022, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2022/702572/EXPO_BRI(2022)702572_EN.pdf., 2-5.

[xvi] Jorge Malena, “The Extension of the Digital Silk Road to Latin America,” 2.

[xvii] Ibid, 8.

[xviii] Andrew Braverman, “ICT Investment in Latin America and the Caribbean Pt. I.”

[xix] Jorge Malena, “The Extension of the Digital Silk Road to Latin America,” 8.

[xx] Ibid.

[xxi] Jorge Malena, “The Extension of the Digital Silk Road to Latin America,” 10.

[xxii] Ibid.

[xxiii] Joseph Bouchard, “Should Brazil Ban Huawei?” The Diplomat, June 21, 2022, https://thediplomat.com/2022/06/should-brazil-ban-huawei/.

[xxiv] Jorge Malena, “The Extension of the Digital Silk Road to Latin America,” 4.

[xxv] Ibid.

[xxvi] Chris Dalby, “Why Does Latin America Dominate the World’s Most Violent Cities List?” InSight Crime, March 24, 2022. https://insightcrime.org/news/latin-america-stranglehold-world-most-violent-cities-list/.

[xxvii] Alexandria Panehal, “Worrisome Trends in Latin America,” American Foreign Service Association, May 2018, https://afsa.org/worrisome-trends-latin-america.

[xxviii] Stephany Echavarría, “Nayib Bukele Tiene Una Aprobación Del 91 % En El Salvador, Según Encuesta,” El Tiempo, March 15, 2023, https://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/latinoamerica/nayib-bukele-tiene-una-aprobacion-del-91-en-el-salvador-segun-encuesta-750513.

[xxix] Cao Zhihui, “Nowhere to Hide: Building Safe Cities with Technology Enablers and AI – Huawei Publications,” Huawei. HuaweiTech, July 2016, https://www.huawei.com/en/huaweitech/publication/winwin/AI/nowhere-to-hide.

[xxx] Cao Zhihui, “Nowhere to Hide: Building Safe Cities with Technology Enablers and AI”

[xxxi] Ibid.

[xxxii] Ibid.

[xxxiii] Ibid.

[xxxiv] Jonathan E. Hillman, “Watching Huawei’s ‘Safe Cities,’” CSIS, November 4, 2019, https://www.csis.org/analysis/watching-huaweis-safe-cities.

[xxxv] Alvaro Artigas, “Beneath the Surface of the Safe City: Surveillance in the Times of Chinese Supremacy?” SciencesPo, SciencesPo Cities and Digital Technology Chair, January 2019, https://www.sciencespo.fr/ecole-urbaine/sites/sciencespo.fr.ecole-urbaine/files/2019_01%20-%20Artigas_0.pdf, 29.

[xxxvi] Ibid, 30.

[xxxvii] Alvaro Artigas, “Beneath the Surface of the Safe City,” 30.

[xxxviii] Jorge Malena, “The Extension of the Digital Silk Road to Latin America,” 11.

[xxxix] U.S. Embassy Caracas, “U.S. Sanctions Ceiec for Supporting the Illegitimate Maduro Regime’s Efforts to Undermine Venezuelan Democracy,” U.S. Embassy in Venezuela, March 10, 2021, https://ve.usembassy.gov/u-s-sanctions-ceiec-for-supporting-the-illegitimate-maduro-regimes-efforts-to-undermine-venezuelan-democracy/.

[xl] Jorge Malena, “The Extension of the Digital Silk Road to Latin America,” 12.

[xli] Paul Mozur, “Made in China, Exported to the World: The Surveillance State,” The New York Times, The New York Times, April 24, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/24/technology/ecuador-surveillance-cameras-police-government.html.

[xlii] Jorge Malena, “The Extension of the Digital Silk Road to Latin America,” 11.

[xliii] Paul Mozur, “Made in China, Exported to the World.”

[xliv] Paul Mozur, “Made in China, Exported to the World.”

[xlv] Paul Mozur, “Made in China, Exported to the World.”

[xlvi] Zhang Fan, “China’s Tie with Latin America Expands to Security,” China Daily, China Daily Information Co., October 25, 2014, http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2014-10/25/content_18802731.htm.

[xlvii] Paul Mozur, “Made in China, Exported to the World.”

[xlviii] Ibid.

[xlix] 35.  “Catálogo de Casos de Estudio de Ciudades Inteligentes en el Ecuador,” Ministerio de Telecomunicaciones y de la Sociedad de la Información, March 31, 2017, https://observatorioecuadordigital.mintel.gob.ec/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/CATALO1.pdf, 71.

[l] Ibid, 59-60.

[li] “Ecuador Declares Emergency over Gang Crime,” BBC News, BBC, April 30, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-61281422.

[lii] Ibid.

[liii] Oliver Griffin, “Ecuador’s Lasso Authorizes Civilian Use of Guns, Citing Insecurity,” Edited by Bill Berkrot. Reuters, Thomson Reuters, April 2, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/ecuadors-lasso-authorizes-civilian-use-guns-citing-insecurity-2023-04-02/.

[liv] Jorge Malena, “The Extension of the Digital Silk Road to Latin America,” 3.

[lv] David Sacks, “China’s Huawei Is Winning the 5G Race. Here’s What the United States Should Do to Respond,” Council on Foreign Relations. Council on Foreign Relations, March 29, 2021. https://www.cfr.org/blog/china-huawei-5g.

[lvi] Joseph Bouchard, “Should Brazil Ban Huawei?”.

[lvii] Miriam Aquino, “Huawei Já Investiu R$ 250 Mi Em P&D No Brasil,” TeleSíntese, March 1, 2023. https://www.telesintese.com.br/huawei-ja-investiu-r-250-mi-em-pd-no-brasil/.