A Comparative Study of Singapore and Panama
By Ryan Sullivan
Introduction
This paper is a study of Singapore and its status as a globalized city-state that provides the most advanced linkages in international commerce. As one of the proclaimed “Asian Tigers,” Singapore has been an example for social scientists that exalt the city-state’s ability to transform from a colonized entrepôt port city to a global gateway city-state. It has maintained an ideal geographic position at one of the most critical global maritime choke points. As globalization has shifted the centers of gravity for supply chains to the Asia-Pacific region, Singapore has benefited from its location despite its size and complex demographics. But although Singapore has independently reached the status of an advanced, developed economy, geography is not destiny. In this study, I look beyond prior research on Singapore’s rise, which focused on governmental actions and institutions that fostered economic growth, using the development of stable economic growth as a marker for a successful outcome of the modern state.
Singapore had to overcome significant challenges to legitimize its authority as a sovereign state. Independence from prior British colonialism was initially worrisome for the city-state since it meant that the new nation would lose the external protection and bureaucratic structure that kept the colony functioning. Furthermore, Singapore was in the midst of a national identity crisis in 1959 that would affect the new government’s ability to create a cohesive society that complied to state domination. Singapore also lacked a hinterland to provide crucial economic resources. Upon decolonization, the island state was absorbed into Malaysia in hopes of benefiting from the peninsula’s resources. However, after almost two years, it was forced out of the Malaysian arrangement. In 1965, a newly independent Singapore would have to chart its own path to maintain its position as a commercial trading hub.
Since independence, Singapore has been dominated by a single political party – the People’s Action Party (PAP). During much of this time (1965-1990), Singapore was led by British-educated Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew who set out on an ambitious mission to address the governance challenges outlined above. Lee developed an organization focused on an elite strategy and structural development formalized through legal mechanisms. The method that emerged was a top-down approach to governance.
Singapore’s early state-building strategy was influenced by their vulnerability to external powers that may have attempted to absorb the country or suppress it. Due to the city-state’s size and strategic position, this existential threat served as a catalyst that bonded the interests of the state elites. Under the charismatic leadership of Lee Kuan Yew, emphasis on an effective coercive organization was key to counter external threats.
The interests of this research lie in understanding how the Singaporean state has produced rapid and effective results regarding economic and societal development. I also explore how colonial British institutions provided a model for the structuring of the new coercive organization.
Finally, I use Panama to add a comparative dimension to this research paper. Proclaimed as the “Bridge of the World,” the nation is defined mostly by the Panama Canal. However, Panama has not achieved the economic or political success that is seen in Singapore. The maritime nation suffers from corruption and economic inequality and has failed to invest in industry that could employ its larger population.
The following comparative case study of Singapore and Panama provides further literature that employs state-building theories. The research will emphasize theories that have been observed in the development of these two postcolonial states and the advantages and drawbacks their policies have produced in their respective societies and economies. Specifically, this study can be used by scholars and practitioners in international affairs to identify sustainable state-building practices and institutions that can create a fertile environment for development. Additionally, the commercial state is a critical connection applicable for comparison, worthy of further consideration in our globalized economy. I give particular attention to Singapore and Panama’s locations at major trade chokepoints in their respective regions, since these unique positions would seem to suggest the ability to facilitate large flows of capital and contribute to supply chains, fostering a globalist, intellectual mindset within society.
Literature Review
As a starting point to any discussion regarding the state, Max Weber’s definition of the state is worth consulting. In Weber’s words, the state is “a compulsory political organization with continuous operations… as its administrative staff successfully upholds the claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of its order.”[i] Furthermore, critical to this research is Weber’s definition of domination cited as “the probability that a command with a given specific content will be obeyed by a given group of persons.”[ii] Weber stresses the importance of the administrative state being the key to an effective ruling organization to avoid the pitfalls of rule grounded in tradition or charisma.[iii]
Samuel Huntington takes Weber’s concept of the administrative state a step further by defining a political organization as “an arrangement for maintaining order, resolving disputes, selecting authoritative leaders, and thus promoting community among two or more social forces.”[iv] He argues that political institutions are critical for heterogeneous and complex societies. The procedures and organization inherent in institutions provide a neutral forum for resolving disputes. This is consistent with Weber’s administrative state where authority is de-personalized and tied to the law. Huntington ultimately believes, “the most important political distinction among countries concerns not their form of government but their degree of government… effective bureaucracies, well-organized political parties, a high degree of popular participation in public affairs, working systems of civilian control over the military, extensive activity by the government in the economy, and reasonably effective procedures for regulating succession and controlling political conflict.”[v] Therefore, the social elements of government are meant to complement the administrative state for further efficacy.
Building on the discussion of the leader-staff component of the administrative state, creating political organization in heterogeneous states is complex. As mentioned, Huntington points to political institutions as the solution to the dilemma. While this provides structure, there is a need to analyze how loyalty is produced within the structure. Harris Mylonas provides the best explanation for understanding non-core groups’ roles in a political organization with a strong majority party.[vi] State policies can either take the form of assimilationist, accommodating, or exclusionary policies.[vii] In the succeeding case studies, the assimilation of non-core group members will have a profound impact on political order.
To understand state motivations for development, the external and internal pressures dictating the direction of the state will be examined. In studies of the European state-building experience, the development of economic might was a necessity for states in need of resources to conduct war. By this argument, the external environment drives coercive organizations to become effective resource extractors. The social scientist Charles Tilly lays out an argument that outlines general conditions that apply to the external threat argument: “(1) the availability of extractible resources; (2) a relatively protected position in time and space; (3) a continuous supply of political entrepreneurs; (4) success in war; (5) homogeneity (and homogenization) of the subject population; (6) strong coalitions of the central power with major segments of the landed elite.”[viii] For the small maritime states analyzed in this paper, the availability of extractable resources is limited. However, we find that this is supplemented by Tilly’s second condition: their geographic position at commercial chokepoints. Among the other conditions, Singapore set itself apart with their ability to fulfill the last condition listed – developing a strong coalition.
Similarly, internal threats have a profound effect on the development of a state. If the state fails to project domination, it is highly vulnerable to collapse under popular pressure. This is especially true in the context of a postcolonial state. The mobilization of popular movements has historically stunted business activity and the delivery of public services. To protect against contentious internal politics, protection pacts developed by state elites can direct a concerted action toward strengthening state power and tightening authoritarian control.[ix] Authorizing an authoritarian approach has been justified for economic incentives and through a shared sense of a “fear of enemies” that would disrupt a desired way of life.[x]
Furthermore, there is skepticism of the modern state designing political processes around the goal of “industrial development,” “affluence,” or “economic growth.”[xi] Gianfranco Poggi believed that these justifications perpetuate strong state action. Weber’s theory views the state as a means to use domination to produce and enforce laws that increase the state’s role in shaping societal interests. Aspirations for “economic growth” are argued to be more technical than ideological.[xii] The consequence for implementing policy with the above end state is a more concentrated decision-making organization. Poggi argues that pursuing these objectives diminishes democratic institutions.
Two key features define the development experiences of Singapore and Panama. First is the two countries’ position in the global economy. The term entrepôt has historically been used to describe these international commercial centers, as in J.R. Smith’s citing of Venice, Amsterdam, and London as significant entrepôts in global history. At the time of his research, he stated, “this new intercontinental trade has reached such great proportions that it would be physically impossible for one port to distribute.”[xiii] Smith was recognizing a shift away from trade structures that represented a linear path of back-and-forth trade between markets of raw goods and a market of finished goods with an exclusive entrepôt that the facilitated transactions.
The emergence of global supply chains has applied a new structure that appears less hegemonic and one of vast networks of suppliers. Thomas Sigler introduces relational cities as “a subset of cities… with a focus on mediating flows of cognitive-cultural capital and regional re-exports of finished products, as part of advanced contemporary global production networks, rather than bulk commodities and raw materials.”[xiv] Some social scientists prefer the term global or gateway cities which function as regional headquarters that employ knowledge generation and logistics networking capability.[xv]
As previously discussed, both Singapore and Panama had the potential to emerge as entrepôts by virtue of their advantageous geography. I therefore devote the greatest attention to the second core feature of analysis, the colonial legacies of each state. Scholars have focused on linkages of former colonial states to their political, economic, and societal development as independent states. Jeffrey Herbst’s study of state-building on the African continent connects weak institution building by colonizing nations on their colonies with the postcolonial state’s inabilities to develop.[xvi] James Mahoney’s method of analyzing colonizer institutions and levels of colonialism assesses factors examined in this paper. According to Mahoney, colonizer institutions can be categorized as either mercantilist or liberal institutions.[xvii]
The notions of colonial positioning and economic might merge in the mercantilist model, state authorities pursue an economy that is self-sufficient and protectionist to maximize wealth. Institutions perpetuate restrictions on trade, property ownership, and economic and political participation. This was exercised in natural resource-rich Latin America by the Spanish and Portuguese in the early stages of the colonial era. In the liberal model, state authorities pursued policy that allowed economic actors to activate the economy by assuming use and control of surplus capital. This fostered an economic environment where entrepreneurial investment and property rights were encouraged. Liberal colonialism became common after the seventh century (even by Spain and Portugal) as Britain became the hegemonic power in Europe.[xviii] As a result, Mahoney believes that states that experienced mercantilist institutions had a higher level of postcolonial development when exercised with a lower level of colonialism. Whereas the liberal institutions experienced the opposite where higher levels of colonialism resulted in better postcolonial development outcomes.[xix]
Case Studies
Singapore
Singapore, with a total area of 728 km2, was recognized as the 38th largest economy by nominal GDP in 2020.[xx] Despite its size, Singapore has thrived as a port city at the center of global commerce. Geographically, it is an island positioned at the end of the Malaysian Peninsula. Their location adjacent to the Strait of Singapore puts the country squarely between the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea. The Atlantic reported almost 100,000 vessels pass through the strait every year, making up about a quarter of traded goods in the world.[xxi] Endowed with deep-water ports, Singapore has become a transshipment hub that services the region and distributes goods to the global market. However, a commercial state’s position at a global commerce chokepoint is not enough to explain Singapore’s economic success. This will be explained in Singapore’s development through the influence of their colonial legacy, elite cohesion due to external threats, and the state’s methods of confronting internal challenges.
Singapore’s Colonial Legacy
Singapore was established as a British base on January 30, 1819. Sir Stamford Raffles, an official of the British East Indian Company, reached an agreement with a local chieftain of the Johor Empire to secure the base. At the time, geopolitical tensions between the British and the Dutch were at a fever pitch over dominance of the trade lanes in Asia. Raffles chose the “deserted island” to establish control at this critical chokepoint. Singapore achieved rapid growth as a British trading post. In 1819, the population numbered close to 1,000 inhabitants of Malay indigenous background. In 1821, the population increased to 5,000 inhabitants, with the majority being Malays and more than 1,000 Chinese, 500-600 Bugis (originating from Indonesia) and various other ethnicities from Asia and Europe. By 1824, the population expanded further to roughly 11,000 with Malays and Chinese continuing to dominate.[xxii] Population figures coincide with the expansion in trade figures of that time. In 1819, $400,000 worth of trade flowed through Singapore. By 1825, that figure rose to $22 million.[xxiii]
In the early years of the trading post, British administration of Singapore was minimal, due to the Dutch dispute over Britain’s claim. In 1824, two treaties solidified British control of the island. First, the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of London ended the territorial disputes between the British and Dutch in the region. Second, a Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between the East India Company and the local chieftains wrested control of the city from the Johor Empire. The formative years from 1819 to 1824 set the tone that would define the direction for Singapore into the future. The trading post preached free market economics, not proselytism by Catholic missionaries. Slavery was banished which helps to explain the growth in population. And early administration focused resources toward public services and developing secure storehouses for the utilization of merchants. These decisions differentiated the British experience from the Dutch experience in Southeast Asia.
A second wave of development in the late nineteenth century occurred because of three critical factors: 1) the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869; 2) Singapore becoming a British protectorate; and 3) the shift from sail to steam power. As Singapore continued to strengthen its connection to the world economy, immigration and investment continued to increase. As an official British colony, a British political system was adopted featuring a Colonial Governor and supportive Executive and Legislative Councils.[xxiv] While these institutions were hardly representative of the diversity of the colony, the overall goal was to establish order to maintain its position as a critical link in the “Maritime Silk Road.” In 1864, a civil service was created where nominees sat for an examination to gain entry. This was later opened to the general public in 1882.[xxv]
The Queen’s scholarship was first established in 1889, sending select Singaporeans to England for higher education, creating a westernized Chinese elite class. Under colonial rule, education policies differed along cultural lines. The Chinese communities instituted effective primary and secondary programs, whereas the Malay and Tamil communities did not promote education past primary school. The Colonial Office instituted an Education Code in 1902 that established English-medium primary and secondary schools. Receiving an English language education was the only way to progress into a higher class in Singaporean society since it was the language of business.[xxvi] In postcolonial Singapore, the state elite were primarily English educated. State policy stressed the importance of building human capital in a state where natural resources and land were lacking. Statistics by the World Bank show that 28% of government expenditures were allocated to education.[xxvii] Initially, newly independent Singapore allowed education to be taught in all four major languages present in the state: English, Malay, Chinese, and Tamil.[xxviii] The government reversed course as years passed because minority groups continued to lag in education and labor opportunities.[xxix] In 1987, English became the standard language taught in all schools in tandem with the requirement of taking courses in “mother tongue” languages.
In the early twentieth century, the colonial government assumed control of the Singapore port zone to implement development projects and corporate restructuring reflective of the boom in maritime trade.[xxx] This had long term infrastructure benefits and cemented the importance of Singapore’s entrepôt trade to the economy. While the modern commercial state of Singapore prescribes to free market capitalism, they have been a direct or indirect participant in private firms, especially in industries such as shipyards and shipping. As former Deputy Prime Minister Goh Keng Swee stated, “the government has to be the planner and the mobilizer of the economic effort… the free enterprise system, correctly nurtured and adroitly handled, can serve as a powerful and versatile instrument of economic growth.”[xxxi] The state’s involvement in commercial infrastructure development has been an institutional priority as a colony and later as an independent nation.
One of the signature British institutions that remained after Singapore’s independence is the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB). As Samuel Huntington noted “corruption is… one measure of the absence of effective political institutionalization.”[xxxii] CPIB is an example of a leftover British institution that was maintained by independent Singapore to maintain loyalty and cohesion within the bureaucracy in Singapore. Colonial Singapore experienced rampant corruption as expected of a remote trading outpost. The Colonial Office established the Prevention of Corruption Ordinance (POCO) in 1937. Initially weak, it was later reinforced in 1946, allowing police more authority to act against corruption. However, the Ordinance did little to prevent corruption in the ranks of the police. In 1952, POCO was renamed to the CPIB. Quickly after Singapore became an internal self-government, the Prevention of Corruption Act was introduced into law. In Lee’s own words, “We had established a climate of opinion that looked upon corruption in public office as a threat to society.”[xxxiii] Applying anti-corruption as an institutional pillar in a city with abundant capital and goods flowing has been a cornerstone of the country’s reputation.
External Threats
From the time of Singaporean self-government in 1959 to the withdrawal of British troops in 1971, Singapore grappled with their delicate position in the world. Singaporeans feared either the collapse of their economy or a challenge of force by an adversary. Due to Singapore’s size, it has always felt disadvantaged in its ability to project force on an external enemy. First, the commonly held belief by political economists was that the Singaporean economy would not be able to survive without a hinterland. The city-state’s existence had been established on the back of entrepôt trade of resources from Malaysia. Moreover, the withdrawal of the British meant a loss of spending that accounted for twenty percent of the country’s GDP.[xxxiv] Second, British forces have always provided a sense of security for Singaporean citizens and business. With the departure of the Western nation, Singapore was left to develop an organic military force from scratch and fend for itself.
In the case of Singapore, state leadership handled external and internal threats as interrelated issues. If the government was unable to control internal dissent and division, it would make the state vulnerable to their external environment, therefore, a threat to their existence. As previously noted, Singapore’s ability to project power outwardly centered around linkages with the globalized economy which allied the business interests of Western nations to the survival of Singapore. To maintain these linkages, Singapore had to be a stable and desirable destination for foreign investments which would be achieved through elite cohesion.
When trying to understand the mindset of Singapore’s leadership during this time, Prime Minister Lee’s view of government action is helpful for our understanding. He precisely evaluates the existential challenges, observing, “You cannot have a strong defence [sic] unless you have a strong finance. And you cannot have a strong defence and strong finance unless you have a strong, unified, well-educated and increasingly cohesive society. They are all part of one whole.”[xxxv] His assessment was that the young nation’s security was grounded in smoothing over existing divisions in Singaporean society. He later states, “back then, survival was key. So I was able to change the laws… I knew enough about the law to know that this was a chance to reformat the framework and give us scope to rebuild Singapore and give everybody a stake. It was social and legal engineering that we did.”[xxxvi] This could only be accomplished through a one-party state which was controlled by the People’s Action Party.
Michael Barr takes a more critical view of the PAP in his book The Ruling Elite of Singapore. He argues that Singapore is driven by a select few that have had overwhelming control of decision-making capacity. At the center of this elite structure was Prime Minister Lee who formed a template for autocracy.[xxxvii] Barr challenges the dreary picture that the Prime Minister describes, stating, “he became Singapore’s Jeremiah, identifying challenges and threats with monotonous regularity… so that there would be a ready supply of ‘challenges’… Lee’s attention to elite education, elite selection and social engineering more broadly hinged on his presumption of a creative elite’s almost-infinite capacity to adapt to new challenges and new environments, and was driven by his fear of the ruptures that would follow an episode of elite failure.”[xxxviii] This is echoed in Singapore’s ranking as “partly free” in Freedom House’s Freedom in the World 2021.[xxxix] The rank reflects a common held aversion of the single party politics that operates in the country. As echoed in Poggi’s writings, economic development came at a cost for Singapore – a cost of political rights and civil liberties.
Internal Pressures
One of the hallmarks of a global city is the transfusion of cultures, thought, and ideology through a heterogeneous society. This has contributed to the nation’s growth and ability to derive linkages with economies beyond Singapore. However, the country suffered from a national identity crisis at the time of independence. At that time, 75% of the population was of Chinese descent, followed by Malayans as the largest minority group, followed by Indian and Eurasians.[xl] The British Colonial Office did little to smooth over racial tensions. Much of the Colonial Office’s policies were said to contribute to the problems by segregating neighborhoods by racial composition. In addition, a communist movement was attempting to establish their foothold in Singaporean politics through the threat of accentuating divisions in society.
Prime Minister Lee sought to overcome these issues for the sake of national security and order. Among the options that Mylonas delineates in his writings on policy toward heterogeneous societies, Lee initially sought accommodation policies that were heavily concentrated on equality in education and multi-ethnic representation in government jobs.
Language accommodations were based on an individual’s mother tongue at the onset of self-governance. However, it became apparent in the 1980’s that the key to ascension in Singaporean society was an education in the English language. This became state policy in 1987. When asked why English became the national language of Singapore, Prime Minister Lee said, “First, internal stability. Everybody on an equal basis: we all have to learn English, a foreign language. Nobody gets an advantage. Second, it’s the language of international commerce.”[xli] Therefore, a unitary language education was a national priority for cohesion of society and the ability for equal upward mobility.
The former Prime Minister frequently discussed his desire to form the state elite, civil service, military, and national police representative of the diversity within the state. The obstacle that impeded this desire was the inequality in education outcomes by the various ethnic groups in those foundational years. Barr has a more critical view of the structure, which he entitles a “Chinese family business.”[xlii] Prime Minister Lee’s rhetoric has often reflected a discriminatory nature toward Malays and Indians.[xliii] Ultimately, the political organization would adopt a more assimilationist policy that favored the Chinese elite with an English-medium education.
Panama
Panama provides an interesting comparison to the case of Singapore. The 82 km, man-made Panama Canal has established the Central American nation as a maritime-centric, commercial state with similar advantages to Singapore. Despite Panama’s larger size, with an area of 75,417 km2 (compared to Singapore’s 728 km2) they have the 87th largest economy by nominal GDP in 2020. However, what is most pronounced is the difference in their GDP per capita figures when set alongside Singapore’s. GDP per capita in Panama was $12,269 in current USD compared to $59,798 in Singapore.[xliv] This research will briefly cover differences that underlie my argument for the critical advantage in colonial legacy, presence of external threats, and policies on internal pressures.
First, Panama fell under the sphere of Spanish colonialism that was focused on the extraction of resources for the benefit of the distant crown, fitting with Mahoney’s mercantilist model. In conjunction with the extractive nature of the colonial relationship, Catholic missionaries proselytized the indigenous society to further subjugate the isthmus. Mahoney neglects to speak much on Panama in his analysis of colonial comparisons in Latin America. However, he does mention that Panama was used as a homeport for slave raiders[xlv] and a trading post in the region.[xlvi] Much like Singapore’s earliest colonial days, the remote outpost was subject to high levels of crime and corruption. The main difference was that very little institutional capacity was developed under Spanish rule and corruption persists to this day.
Second, the external threat environment for Panama varied drastically from the Singaporean experience. With the support of the United States, Panama became independent from Colombia in 1903. Due to the arrangement established between the U.S. and Panama in the effort to construct the Panama Canal, the U.S. military established their own security apparatus to protect the Canal Zone until the last day of the twentieth century. After experiencing a military dictatorship from 1968 to 1989, Panama’s new civilian executives and U.S. officials agreed that Panama should abolish their standing army.[xlvii] For Panama, political stability was not tied to national security in the way that Lee Kuan Yew promoted these fears to secure solidarity among the state elites. Since civilian control of the government resumed in 1990, Panama has had multi-party elections that incorporate viewpoints relevant to the varying interests of Panamanian society.
Lastly, the internal pressures that Panama has experienced are entirely different than Singapore’s heterogeneous society. In 2010, the racial make-up consisted of 65% Mestizo (mixed Amerindian and white), 12% indigenous, 9% black, 7% mulatto, and 7% white.[xlviii] However, the mesh of races on the isthmus have assimilated to the official language of Spanish. This has made communication more cohesive in Panamanian society in comparison to Singapore. However, an interesting social stratification was developed as a result of the Panama Canal Zone. After the construction of the Canal and surrounding zone, the U.S. citizens that resided in the zone clearly delineated a separate subculture protected by steady employment in the zone and security of the U.S. military. This resulted in a vastly different world experienced within the borders of the same country. Panama may not have had the cultural issues present in Singapore, but economic inequalities have developed divisions in Panamanian society.
To conclude the comparative study, Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi’s World Governance Indicators is helpful in reflecting the divergence between Panama and Singapore. As one could predict, Singapore has excelled in Political Stability (97%), Government Effectiveness (100%), Rule of Law (98.56%), and Control of Corruption (99%) compared to Panama’s respective scores of 54.25%, 56.73%, 46.63%, and 33.17%.[xlix] These figures reflect a reality that has plagued Panama’s ability to see progress in development. In Lee’s assessment, “the single decisive factor that made for Singapore’s development was the ability of its ministers and the high quality of the civil servants who supported them.”[l] The one indicator Panama excels at compared to Singapore was in the category of Voice and Accountability where they scored 63.77% compared to Singapore’s 38.16%. Panama also boasts a higher rating in Freedom House’s Freedom in the World 2021 as a “free” nation. As stated before, Singapore has created political stability at the cost of political freedoms.[li]
Conclusion
Both Singapore and Panama will continue to thrive as chokepoints of international commerce. This study, however, demonstrates that these countries’ positions along global trading routes does not equate to success as a state. Instead, the tactics each state took in their efforts of state-building were mostly decisive in their outcomes today. First, Singapore had an entirely different colonial experience than Panama. The establishment and development of political institutions in Singapore set the groundwork for the state elite. The country’s focus on education, development of industry and infrastructure, and control on corruption played a crucial role in the nation’s ability to facilitate trade and produce quality goods in the global market. External threats in a contentious Southeast Asian environment required political stability and cohesion. To set itself apart, Singapore took action to make the city-state a destination for foreign investment. The linkages made with other developed nations created a sense of security, at the cost of a dominating one-party rule. Finally, internal pressures initially drove policy in Singapore to accommodate the various cultures and languages present in the global city. However, progress would be made after the PAP consolidated and established their coercive capability to push assimilationist policy. Panama’s tumultuous history has produced different results. The lack of institutional structure in their colonial history, the lack of external threats, and the preservation of economic inequalities have allowed for political instability. While both these nations play a pivotal role in international commerce, the methods of state-building practices defined their degree of success.
Endnotes
[i] Weber, Max, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology (Berkeley: Univ. of California, 1978), 54.
[ii] Ibid, 53.
[iii] Ibid, 54.
[iv] Huntington, Samuel, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1958), 8-9.
[v] Ibid, 1.
[vi] Mylonas, Harris, The Politics of Nation-Building: Making Co-Nationals, Refugees, and Minorities (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 17
[vii] Ibid, 21-22.
[viii] Tilly, Charles, Reflections on the History of European State-Making. In Tilly’s The Formation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975), 40.
[ix] Slater, Dan, Ordering Power: Contentious Politics and Authoritarian Leviathans in Southeast Asia (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 5.
[x] Ibid, 12.
[xi] Poggi, Gianfranco, The Development of the Modern State (Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1978), 133.
[xii] Ibid, 141.
[xiii] Smith, J. Russell, “The World Entrepôt,” Journal of Political Economy 18, no. 9 (1910): 704.
[xiv] Sigler, Thomas J, “Relational Cities: Doha, Panama City, and Dubai as 21st Century Entrepôts,” Urban Geography 34, no. 5 (2013): 612-613.
[xv] Hutchinson, Francis E, “In the Gateway’s Shadow: Interactions between Singapore’s Hinterlands,” Growth and Change (2021): 72.
[xvi] Herbst, Jeffrey, States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000).
[xvii] Mahoney, James, Colonialism and Postcolonial Development: Spanish America in comparative Perspective (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 20-23.
[xviii] Ibid, 21-22.
[xix] Ibid, 28.
[xx] “United Nations Statistics Division – National Accounts.” https://www.unstats.un.org
[xxi] Calamur, Krishnadev. “High Traffic, High Risk in the Strait of Malacca.” The Atlantic. August 21, 2017. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/08/strait-of-malacca-uss-john-mccain/537471/
[xxii] Turnbull, C.M., A History of Singapore: 1819-1988, 2nd Ed. (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1989), 1-27.
[xxiii] Baker, Jim, Crossroads: A Popular History of Malaysia & Singapore (Singapore: Times Books International, 1999), 92.
[xxiv] Turnbull, 78.
[xxv] Ibid, 84.
[xxvi] Ibid, 116-117, 140-142.
[xxvii] World Bank, “Education Statistics (EdStats): Country at a Glance – Singapore.” World Bank Group. https://datatopics.worldbank.org/education/country/singapore
[xxviii] Chang, David W., Nation-Building in Singapore, Asian Survey Vol. 8, no. 9 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1968), 764
[xxix] Turnbull, 325.
[xxx] Ibid, 93-94; Baker, 207.
[xxxi] Turnbull, 312.
[xxxii] Huntington, Samuel, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1958), 59.
[xxxiii] Yew, Lee Kuan, From Third World to First: The Singapore Story: 1965-2000, 1st Ed (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2000), 162.
[xxxiv] Turnbull, 294.
[xxxv] Yew, Lee Kuan, et al., Hard Truths to Keep Singapore Going (Singapore: Straits Times Press, 2011), 32.
[xxxvi] Ibid, 51.
[xxxvii] Barr, Michael D., The Ruling Elite of Singapore: Networks of Power and Influence (London: I.B. Tauris, 2014), 32.
[xxxviii] Ibid, 3-4.
[xxxix] Freedom House. “Freedom in the World 2021.” Freedom House. https://freedomhouse.org/country/singapore/freedom-world/2021
[xl] Chang, 761.
[xli] Yew, et al., 34.
[xlii] Barr, 108.
[xliii] Ibid, 24.
[xliv] World Bank. “GDP per capita (current US$) – Singapore, Panama.” World Bank Group. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=SG-PA
[xlv] Mahoney, 96.
[xlvi] Ibid, 99.
[xlvii] Conniff, Michael L. and Bigler, Gene E., Modern Panama: From Occupation to Crossroads of the Americas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 75.
[xlviii] CIA.gov. “The World Factbook – Panama.” Central Intelligence Agency. https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/panama/
[xlix] Kaufmann and Kraav, Worldwide Governance Indicators: Interactive Data Access n.d.
[l] Yew, 664.
[li] Freedom House. “Freedom in the World 2021.” Freedom House. https://freedomhouse.org/country/panama/freedom-world/2021
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