By Helen K. McHenry
Executive Summary
Belarus, a former Soviet republic located between Russia and Europe, has been led by President Alexander Lukashenko for the past 27 years. Lukashenko has built a police state plagued by corruption and a weak rule of law; the vast majority of the state’s power resides in the executive branch, enabling him to use state resources at his personal discretion.[i] Lukashenko has maintained the coercive apparatus Belarus inherited from the Soviet Union, which has helped him preserve an absolute monopoly on the use of force.[ii] His use of the security forces to suppress the opposition prevented a viable alternative elite from forming until Svitlana Tikhanovskaya created the Coordination Council in 2020.[iii]
Cohesion between Lukashenko and his staff is based on personal loyalty and material incentives. He has prevented the creation of a Belarusian oligarchy by controlling privatization of the economy, constraining the ability of political elites to challenge his power.[iv] Despite the vast extent of his command, Lukashenko is dependent on the security forces, the bureaucracy, and Russia to stay in power. Security and political officials constitute his core staff, while Belarus is dependent on Russia because of its economic and military support.[v] Even after an unprecedented level of protests following the 2020 election, continued support from the security elite, political elite, and Russia has allowed him to maintain the presidency.
The Coordination Council represents the first real opportunity for political change in Belarus. The Council’s goal is to organize new elections, paving the way for democratization and a depoliticized state apparatus.[vi] To create a depoliticized Belarusian state, the United States must assist the Coordination Council in encouraging defection among political and security elites through covert financial support. Elites can be incentivized to defect because their loyalty to Lukashenko is based on their salary.[vii] The Council must offer security officials amnesty for their participation in the violent repression of the 2020 protests and encourage them to maintain communication with their Russian counterparts for the policy to succeed. The United States has an interest in assisting the Council because improved US-Belarusian relations have the potential to ease East-West tensions. The situation is further complicated since the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, creating a need for additional research on the future of US-Belarusian relations.
Background
The Problem in Context
Alexander Lukashenko uses the state to advance his personal objectives, exacerbating East-West tensions. While his presidency is considered illegitimate by many Western nations, continued support from Russia helps him maintain power.[viii] Lukashenko’s politicization of the state is enabled by his control over the majority of Belarus’s state resources.[ix] Depoliticizing the Belarusian state will require the removal of Lukashenko because it is unlikely that he will reduce his own power.[x]
Belarus’s Geostrategic Importance
Belarus occupies a critical location between Russia and Europe, bordering Russia, Ukraine, Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia. The country plays a significant role in transporting Russian goods to the West and other post-Soviet states.[xi] For example, the Yamal-Europe gas pipeline runs through Belarus and transports up to 32.9 billion cubic meters of gas annually.[xii] Belarus has yet to realize its potential to play a more important role in East-West relations, currently acting as a buffer between Russia and Europe.[xiii] Belarus’s reliance on Russia constrains its ability to engage with Europe. This reliance has created a zero-sum game in which expanding relations with Europe harms its relationship with Russia and vice versa.[xiv]
The 2021 Migrant Crisis
Alexander Lukashenko has navigated Belarus’s location ineffectively thus far. He recently created a humanitarian crisis on Belarus’s border with Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia to create conflict within the European Union (EU).[xv] The Belarusian government began advertising short-term visas and transportation to EU borders in June 2021.[xvi] These advertisements attracted thousands of migrants, primarily from the Middle East, but Poland and the Baltics prevented them from crossing their borders.[xvii] Lukashenko aimed to pressure the EU into acknowledging the legitimacy of his presidency, but his attempts have not been successful: the West and even Russia have criticized him for creating this crisis.[xviii]
Belarus: A Politicized Police State
Figure 1: The Rule of Law in Belarus, 2015-2021
| Year | 2015 | 2016 | 2017-2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 |
| Score | 0.53 | 0.54 | 0.51 | 0.52 | 0.51 | 0.48 |
The Belarusian state is politicized because Lukashenko uses the state apparatus to further his personal goals; state officials are loyal to him, not to the state.[xx] Belarus’s adherence to the rule of law illustrates this politicization. The World Justice Project’s Rule of Law Index combines data on corruption, human rights, and justice to determine how well a country adheres to the rule of law. The closer a score is to 1, the better the rule of law is in that country. As shown in Fig. 1, Belarus’s overall score remained around 0.5 between 2015 and 2021, which indicates neither a weak nor a strong adherence to the rule of law. These mid-range values are explained by the dichotomy between Belarus’s high level of security and lack of constraints on government powers. In 2021, Belarus received a score of 0.8 for security and a score of 0.27 for governmental constraints; while Lukashenko’s control of the state apparatus minimizes constraints on his power, his command of the security sector maintains order in the country as a whole.[xxi] The state will not be depoliticized while Lukashenko is president because he is unlikely to lessen his own power.[xxii]
Belarus is a police state, meaning that the state has high capacity but low quality. State capacity refers to a government’s ability to implement policy, while state quality refers to a government’s impartiality when implementing policy.[xxiii] This is shown in Fig. 2, which demonstrates that in 2019, Belarus was slightly above the median in both corruption scores and government expenditure as a percentage of GDP. Government spending is a measurement of state capacity because it indicates the extent to which policies are implemented.[xxiv] Corruption impedes the impartiality of government operations, lowering their quality.[xxv]
Belarus’s Coercive Capacity
Belarus’s coercive capacity can be measured by its monopoly on the use of force, the minimal requirement for statehood.[xxvii] The Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index (BTI) has measured this monopoly since 2006. Across the entirety of the data set, Belarus has received the highest score possible for its monopoly on the use of force.[xxviii] The state inherited its coercive apparatus from the Soviet Union, which was known for its extraordinary capacity to monitor its population.[xxix] This monitoring capacity spreads distrust, hindering the ability of citizens to discuss and organize ideas that run counter to those of the regime.[xxx]
Coercive power is instrumental in supporting authoritarian regimes when the leader uses it at his own discretion.[xxxi] Lukashenko can do this because there are so few constraints on state power.[xxxii] Furthermore, the large scale of the state security forces enabled him to prevent a serious opposition movement from forming until 2020.[xxxiii] He fragmented the opposition through selective repression, arresting or exiling opposition figures who posed a threat directly after elections.[xxxiv]
Lukashenko and the Belarusian State
Lukashenko Consolidates Power
Alexander Lukashenko legitimately won the 1994 presidential election on a centrist platform of prosperity and stability. The incumbent leaders were unprepared to form a functioning, sovereign state after the fall of the Soviet Union. As they attempted to maintain the status quo, Belarus’s economy and living standards declined while crime rose.[xxxv] Lukashenko’s populist campaign promised to build a sovereign Belarus; he formed a loyal electorate by giving gifts to politicians and listening to citizens’ grievances.[xxxvi] 1994 was Belarus’s only free and fair election.[xxxvii]
Unlike Armenia or Tajikistan, Belarus was largely free from internal conflict as it built a sovereign state.[xxxviii] Lukashenko was therefore able to focus the early years of his presidency on absorbing independent and opposition elements of society into his regime.[xxxix] This process was so successful that the state, particularly the executive branch, holds almost complete control over the political arena.[xl] Lukashenko practically eliminated the separation of power between the branches of government.[xli] After 199 members of the legislature attempted to impeach him in 1996, he used a referendum on symbolic issues to increase presidential power at the expense of the other branches. The number of deputies in parliament decreased from 260 to 110, and presidential decrees were given higher authority than law.[xlii] As a result, the legislature’s role has become more bureaucratic than political; its main function is to pass bills drafted by the executive branch.[xliii]
Belarus’s Political Economy
The Belarusian state today controls over 70% of the economy, a legacy from the Soviet period. This control has helped Lukashenko preempt the emergency of an oligarchy able to constrain his power.[xliv] The Belarus Network, an investigation funded by Canal France International and the Journalism Fund, revealed the full extent of his control. Much of Belarus’s private businesses remain under Lukashenko’s influence. For example, he transferred a state-owned vitamin plant to one of his friends, Nikolay Vorobey. Because this transfer was free of charge, Vorobey did not gain any political power. Andrew Wilson, author of Belarus: The Last European Dictator, coined the term “minigarch” to describe these people because they lack the political power of the oligarchs in Russia and Ukraine. In addition, many of these “private” companies are based outside Belarus in places such as the British Virgin Islands, which limits the net impact of EU sanctions on Lukashenko.[xlv]
Sources of Lukashenko’s Strength
Lukashenko is dependent on the support of Belarus’s security and political officials and Russia to stay in power. His security officials suppress dissent, while political elites provide the labor needed for the state to function. Finally, Belarus receives economic and military security from Russia in exchange for remaining in Russia’s orbit, a buffer between Russia and the West.
The Security Apparatus
The basis of cohesion between Belarus’s security forces and Lukashenko is material incentives. The security apparatus resides in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which manages the police and other domestic security forces, and the Ministry of Defense, which oversees the military. Security positions are lucrative; not only is Lukashenko willing to pay for loyalty, but officials can expect an additional informal salary.[xlvi] In 2017 alone, Lukashenko increased police and military salaries by 40%.[xlvii] These positions also offer stability, housing assistance, and early retirement.[xlviii] Incentivizing loyalty through pay encourages competition, enhancing divisions among officials.[xlix]
The basis of cohesion is not a shared identity because Lukashenko has focused on expanding the scope of the state over increasing the cohesion of his staff.[l] He regularly relocates security officials to prevent factionalization, preventing the formation of communal ties among security forces and making the security apparatus more susceptible to defection.[li] In addition, Lukashenko has no consistent ideology, constraining his ability to build a shared identity.[lii] Early in his presidency, he stressed close relations with Russia to address the widespread Soviet nostalgia among Belarusians. However, he stopped encouraging this pro-Russian identity after the 2014 annexation of Crimea and has focused more on Belarusian sovereignty since.[liii]
After the violent repression of the 2020 protests, security forces are also reliant on Lukashenko for protection. Between August and November 2020, the police and Belarusian special forces detained at least 25,000 of their fellow citizens. Security officials tortured hundreds of protesters during detainment via beatings, electric shocks, and at least one case of rape. The result was multiple severe injuries, including broken bones and brain trauma.[liv] This violent coercion has increased loyalty to Lukashenko; the security officials who committed violence know they are protected from prosecution as long as Lukashenko is in power.[lv]
The Political Elite
Like the security apparatus, material incentives are also the basis of cohesion between Lukashenko and the bureaucracy. He built his political base on charismatic authority, attracting politicians and citizens alike with charm and gifts.[lvi] Since then, he has formed a new political elite that is completely dependent on him for survival.[lvii] State employees are hired based on loyalty to Lukashenko in return for easier access to healthcare and education in comparison to regular citizens.[lviii] This reliance incentivizes the elite to keep Lukashenko in power, regardless of whether or not they view him as a legitimate leader. State officials have formal power from their positions as well as informal power from their proximity to Lukashenko.[lix]
Lukashenko’s inconsistent ideology has also impacted the cohesion of both the security and political elite. Consolidating power has been his only consistent policy; otherwise, he changes his policies as needed to stay in power.[lx] Lukashenko is not a member of a political party; as the Soviet Union was a single-party system, this set the precedent for a weak party system in Belarus.[lxi] Most parliamentary deputies come from the executive branch, which constrains the ability of parties and civil society organizations to have an impact.[lxii] In 2019, for example, only 21 out of 110 deputies (19%) belonged to a political party.[lxiii]
Although material incentives alone are generally ineffective at maintaining elite cohesion in times of crisis, most state officials have remained loyal in the face of the fraudulent 2020 election and the subsequent protests.[lxiv] A few Belarusian diplomats, including those in Slovakia and Spain, have spoken out in favor of the opposition. The former ambassador to France and Poland, Pavel Latushko, even defected and became an opposition leader.[lxv] However, these defections are rare.
Russia
Belarus is located to the west of Russia, sharing a 1312-kilometer border.[lxvi] The two states signed a treaty in 1999 with the ultimate goal of uniting Belarus and Russia into a confederation.[lxvii] Lukashenko has resisted this political union thus far, but his leverage has waned since the 2020 protests began.[lxviii] It is unlikely that even a post-Lukashenko Belarus will be able to cut ties with Russia because Belarus’s economy and security are dependent on its neighbor.[lxix] Russia and Belarus increased the integration of their militaries in 2021.[lxx] They held multiple joint training exercises, and Lukashenko has stated that Russia will provide Belarus with 1 billion US dollars of arms by 2025. Russian troops have constituted a “regular presence” in Belarus since 2020.[lxxi]
Figure 3: Amount of Russian Development Aid, 2012-2019
| Year | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 |
| Aid | 0.080 | 1.043 | 1.998 | 3.526 | 3.619 | 2.350 | 2.866 | 5.890 |
Fig. 3 and 4 show the amount of Country Programmable Aid Belarus received from Russia between 2012 and 2019. Amounts given in millions of 2019 US dollars. Table compiled by author with data from OECD.[lxxii]
Belarus conducts about half of its trade with Russia.[lxxiii] Between 1994 and 2014, subsidies from Russia accounted for 10-20% of GDP each year. After the annexation of Crimea, sanctions from the West and a decline in global oil prices significantly decreased these subsidies. As a result, Belarus experienced an average annual GDP growth rate of 0.[lxxiv] Gazprom, a Russian state-owned gas company, owns the Yamal-Europe pipeline that runs through Belarus.[lxxv] Energy subsidies from Russia are necessary for the continuation of public services in Belarus.[lxxvi] Belarus receives Russian gas at a discounted price and makes a profit by selling this discounted gas to Europe.[lxxvii] Particularly as the European market for gas and oil changes, Russia has begun to doubt the utility of favoring Belarus, further souring relations between the states.[lxxviii] Belarus also receives amounts of Russian development aid that amounts to millions of US dollars annually; Fig. 3-4 show an overall increase of over $5 million in Russian aid between 2012 and 2019.
Russia is unlikely to directly intervene in Belarus as long as the country remains in its geopolitical sphere of influence.[lxxix] Putin has even publicly stated that he believes Lukashenko needs to talk directly with the opposition.[lxxx] A 2020 Chatham House poll showed that 26% of respondents in Belarus approved of continued close relations with Russia.[lxxxi] However, most citizens in both Russia and Belarus disapprove of absorbing Belarus into the Russian Federation.[lxxxii]
Lukashenko and the Coordination Council
The Emergence of an Opposition
By 2020, Lukashenko had lost his ability to prevent viable alternative candidates from gaining popularity.[lxxxiii] Three opposition candidates emerged, but the state prevented all three from running. The Central Election Commission refused to register Sergei Tikhanovsky and Valery Tsepkalo; Tikhanovsky was arrested and Tsepkalo fled the country.[lxxxiv] The final candidate, Viktar Babaryka, was arrested for tax evasion and bribery, charges he claims are false.[lxxxv] Babaryka’s short-lived candidacy demonstrates that Lukashenko does not maintain perfect loyalty from the political elite: before he tried to run for president, Babaryka was chairman of the board of Belgazprombank, a state-owned bank.[lxxxvi]
The Coordination Council as a Rival Elite
Tikhanovsky’s wife, Svitlana, ran against Lukashenko in her husband’s place; Lukashenko underestimated her popularity and allowed her to run. After he announced victory in the election, protests erupted across the country, rejecting the results.[lxxxvii] Tikhanovskaya created the Coordination Council in response as an attempt to resolve the crisis through organizing new elections.[lxxxviii] Currently, the Coordination Council operates in exile from Lithuania, working to gain support from the international community.[lxxxix]
Despite massive protests against the regime, Lukashenko is still in power. In a poll conducted by Chatham House after the first few weeks of the protests, 70% of the respondents indicated that they believe Lukashenko stole the election.[xc] The size of the protests was unprecedented, and yet they failed to oust him.[xci] This demonstrates the strength of the three forces keeping Lukashenko in power: the security apparatus, the political elites, and Russia. Because of this, the Coordination Council must gain the support of one or more of these groups, establishing itself as a rival elite, before it can organize new elections.
US Interests in Belarus
The creation of a depoliticized Belarusian state aligns with the United States’ foreign policy objectives and capabilities. The promotion of democracy abroad is consistent with US values and security interests.[xcii] Belarus is particularly relevant to US security because positive relations between these states have the potential to decrease tensions between Russia and the West.[xciii] Because the United States is a world leader for democracies, it has the responsibility to support the Coordination Council’s efforts to democratize Belarus.[xciv]
The United States also has a responsibility to intervene because of the human rights crisis Lukashenko has orchestrated on Belarus’s borders with the EU.[xcv] Upholding human rights abroad is an essential aspect of US democratization policy.[xcvi] Additionally, Poland and the Baltics are fellow members of NATO, which means that the United States is obligated to maintain their security.[xcvii] Lukashenko’s actions are exacerbating East-West tensions and threatening regional stability. While the migrant crisis is not cause to invoke Article 5 of the NATO Charter, it is still within the United States’ interests to support its allies.
The United States can support a policy to depoliticize the Belarusian state, as the country commits over two billion dollars annually to support democracy abroad.[xcviii] However, covert action may be a more viable alternative because Russia is likely to feel threatened if the United States intervenes openly.[xcix] Covert support is codified in US law; it is within the White House’s mandate to approve covert action and within the CIA’s mandate to carry it out. This support may take many forms, including financial assistance and direct intervention.[c]
The Coordination Council is Belarus’s best option for depoliticizing the state apparatus. The Council is aligned with US interests because it aims to bring democracy to Belarus. The United States can trust that the Council will uphold the rule of law, thereby depoliticizing the state, because the Council has stated that it will not violate the constitution to meet its goals. Rather than seeking power for itself, the purpose of the Council is to organize new elections.[ci] The United States can therefore trust that the Council will not use the state’s resources for its personal ends.
Policy Criteria
The goal of this policy is to create a depoliticized Belarusian state. The policy must align with the United States’ mandate and capabilities while effectively addressing the problem. Specifically, it must:
- Depoliticize the state apparatus,
- Maintain the state’s monopoly on the use of force,
- Not provoke Russia, and
- Not be traceable back to the US government, if the policy involves direct interference in Belarusian affairs.
If the policy involves encouraging elite defections, it also must:
- Provide higher material incentives than Alexander Lukashenko offers and
- Offer amnesty to participants in violent repression.
Policy Options
Status Quo
Alexander Lukashenko has politicized the Belarusian state, using its resources for his own personal gain.[cii] State employees and security forces alike are chosen based on personal loyalty to Lukashenko and made dependent on him for their material survival and social standing.[ciii] Lukashenko is ineffective at balancing relations between Russia and the West, particularly through his orchestrated migrant crisis on the border with the European Union.[civ]
The status quo only fulfills two of the three relevant criteria: maintaining the state’s monopoly on the use of force and not provoking Russia. If the status quo continues, Belarus is likely to continue destabilizing East-West relations through actions like the migrant crisis. Because the state apparatus is politicized, nothing is preventing Lukashenko from using the state’s resources at his personal discretion.
Policy Option 1: Encourage Security Elite Defection
The United States can provide covert financial assistance to the Coordination Council to support its efforts in encouraging defection among the security elite. Elite defections would strengthen the Coordination Council as a rival authority to Lukashenko, eventually forcing him to resign. Defections among the security apparatus led to the ousting of President Ali Abdullah Saleh in Yemen in 2012. Yemen’s security elite network was built on material incentives and personal loyalty to Saleh, similarly to Belarus.[cv] This system was susceptible to defection, and the opposition exploited this vulnerability and convinced enough security officials to defect that Saleh was forced to resign.[cvi] Unlike Yemen, Belarus is unlikely to fall into a civil war because the Coordination Council will organize defections. Once the Council has a monopoly on the use of force, it will be able to organize new elections and transfer power to a democratically-elected leader.
Encouraging security force defections satisfies at least four of the six criteria. This option would depoliticize the state apparatus because authority will shift from Lukashenko’s regime to the Coordination Council. Because the security elite determines a state’s coercive capacity, the monopoly on the use of force will also shift from the regime to the Coordination Council. The aid would be classified and therefore not appear in any public budgets, so it is untraceable back to the US. The United States has the capacity to provide higher material incentives than Lukashenko currently offers: in 2019, Belarus collected a total of 17.92 billion BYN in tax revenues, or around $7 billion, while the United States collected $2.15 trillion (World Bank, 2020). The policy has the possibility of provoking Russia and will not necessarily offer amnesty to participants in violent repression.
Policy Option 2: Encourage Political Elite Defection
The United States could also direct this financial assistance to encourage defection among the political elite. Elite defections and a viable opposition movement led to the collapse of an authoritarian regime in Georgia in the early 2000s. Eduard Shevardnadze maintained the Citizen’s Union of Georgia (CUG) primarily through material incentives; these proved to be inadequate when popular discontent against the regime grew. Members of the CUG began defecting to the opposition, including high-profile elites, such as Mikheil Saakashvili, the justice minister.[cvii] Two-thirds of the legislature eventually defected, leading Shevardnadze to resign in 2003.[cviii]
Encouraging elite defection satisfies at least three out of five relevant criteria. Since these officials would defect to the Coordination Council, this would pave the way for a depoliticized state. The aid will be untraceable back to the US and of an amount larger than Lukashenko provides. This policy may or may not provoke Russia, depending on whether Russia feels threatened that the Coordination Council is trying to integrate Belarus into the West. Finally, the policy does not maintain the state monopoly on the use of force; just because state employees defect does not guarantee that the military and police will.
Policy Option 3: Support a Coup
The White House could also authorize a covert operation to support a military coup in Belarus. The military carries out the state’s coercion, so it has the resources to depose Lukashenko while maintaining the state’s monopoly on the use of force. The CIA would provide the finances, weapons, and training necessary for the military to overthrow Lukashenko. A coup recently installed military rule in Myanmar. Senior General Min Aung Hlaing ousted de-facto leader Aung San Suu Kyi, who was placed under arrest.[cix] In February 2021, the military claimed that recent elections were fraudulent because they were unhappy with how their party had performed.[cx] Belarus’s weak party system means that the military, with the means to maintain the monopoly on the use of force, can establish itself as a rival elite.[cxi]
Supporting a coup in Belarus would fulfill at least two out of four relevant criteria if successful. Military leadership would depoliticize the state because the United States would only approve of a leader they trust to do so. If the coup is successful, the military will maintain the state’s monopoly on the use of force. Because the US is engaging directly with the Belarusian military, it will be harder to guarantee that the country’s role will be hidden. However, the installation of a US-backed military leader is sure to provoke Russia.
Tradeoffs
Figure 5: Summary of Policies with Regards to Criteria
| If Interfering: | If Encouraging Defections: | |||||
| Depoliticize State | Maintain State Monopoly on Use of Force | Avoid Provoking Russia | Be Untraceable Back to US | Give Higher Material Incentives than Lukashenko | Offer Amnesty to Participants in Violent Repression | |
| Status Quo | – | + | + | n/a | n/a | n/a |
| Security Defection | + | – | +/- | + | + | n/a |
| Political Defection | + | + | +/- | + | + | +/- |
| Coup | + | + | – | +/- | n/a | n/a |
Fig. 5 summarizes how well each policy aligns with the policy criteria. Table compiled by author.
As Fig. 5 shows, none of the options guarantee fulfillment of all relevant criteria. The status quo avoids provoking Russia but will not depoliticize the state, while a coup will depoliticize the state but provoke Russia. The other two options both involve encouraging defections. Both will depoliticize the state, be untraceable back to the United States, and give higher material incentives than Lukashenko. Encouraging defection among political elites will not maintain the state’s monopoly on the use of force. Encouraging defection among security officials will, but it is not guaranteed that this policy will avoid provoking Russia or offer amnesty to participants in violent repression.
Policy Recommendation
The United States must provide covert financial support to the Coordination Council to support its efforts in encouraging elite defection to depoliticize the Belarusian state.
The Proposal for a Depoliticized Belarus
The Proposal for a Depoliticized Belarus combines policy options 1 and 2, encouraging defections among the security and political elites. Under the proposal, the United States will provide covert financial assistance to the Coordination Council to help them gain the support of the Belarusian elite. The United States will promise continued financial and strategic support in organizing elections if the Council agrees to two conditions:
- The Coordination Council must offer military and police officials a place in their state regardless of their role in the repression of the 2020 protests, and
- Defectors, particularly high-level military officers, must be encouraged to communicate their desire to maintain close relations with Russia.
This policy will enable the Council to gain the support of Belarus’s security forces, state officials, and Russia.
Support from the Security Apparatus
Because Lukashenko has prized personal loyalty over a shared identity, police and military officials are vulnerable to defection for material benefit.[cxii] As an increasing number of officials defect, the incentives to join the Coordination Council will grow for two reasons:
- The Coordination Council will begin to function as a viable alternative elite to Lukashenko’s system, and
- Lukashenko’s capacity to punish defectors will diminish because he will no longer hold a monopoly on the use of force.[cxiii]
Support from the Political Elite
State employees are likely to follow the security officials’ example, increasing the Coordination Council’s staff. The reasons for this are the same as for the security forces: Lukashenko’s absolute power will be in question, creating uncertainty as to whether the political elite is still dependent on him. Because defections started in the security apparatus, Lukashenko’s enforcement capabilities will be diminished, weakening the elite network.[cxiv]
Support from Russia
Finally, one condition of the aid is that defectors must be encouraged to signal to their Russian counterparts that they are interested in maintaining close relations. This condition is necessary for the policy’s success because if Russia is not assured that the Coordination Council will keep Belarus in its geopolitical sphere, it is likely to feel threatened by the Council. If Russia thinks Belarus is aligning itself with the West, it is likely to intervene, potentially by military means. Additionally, much of the population remains pro-Russian, so this condition is likely to increase defections.[cxv] This aspect of the policy will open relations between Russia and the Coordination Council, adding to its legitimacy as the true representatives of Belarus. Lukashenko will lose his final source of support, meaning that there will be little preventing the Council from organizing new elections.
A Stronger Basis of Cohesion
This policy will succeed because Lukashenko cares more about maintaining control than building a resilient system. However, it will also strengthen the Belarusian state against similar defections. The Coordination Council will democratize Belarus, enabling multiple interest groups to enjoy representation in the government. Institutionalizing free and fair elections will gradually replace Lukashenko’s system of patronage with a party system; political parties are founded on ideology, which will replace salary as the basis of cohesion.
The Timeline
The United States must be prepared to support the Proposal for a Depoliticized Belarus for a minimum of two fiscal years. Because defections build upon each other, power is likely to shift to the Coordination Council rapidly once this policy is put into effect. The timeline of two fiscal years reflects the nature of the US aid process and includes time for evaluating the policy’s success. Additionally, the United States will be expected to assist the Coordination Council in organizing elections if the Council follows the conditions of the aid. The second fiscal year ensures that the United States is prepared to fulfill its obligation.
Fulfilling the Criteria
The Proposal for a Depoliticized Belarus fulfills all six criteria. Like policy option 1, security defections, the proposal will depoliticize the state, maintain the state’s monopoly on the use of force, be untraceable back to the United States, and provide higher salaries than Lukashenko. The specific conditions for the aid satisfy the final two criteria. First, the Coordination Council will offer amnesty to security officials who committed violence against protesters. This condition increases the policy’s likelihood of success, as officials who committed violence are unlikely to defect without this offer. Second, defectors will maintain relations with Russia. Russia is likely to interfere if it thinks Belarus is pivoting away from it, so assuaging Russia’s fears fulfills the final criteria: not provoking Russia.
Monitoring
The United States can monitor the policy’s success by measuring:
- The percentage of elites that have defected,
- The composition of defectors (high-level vs. low-level officials), and
- Lukashenko’s monopoly on the use of force.
This data can be retrieved from the Coordination Council and Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index on the monopoly on the use of force.
Evaluation
The Proposal for a Depoliticized Belarus may be evaluated via the following:
- Has Lukashenko lost his monopoly on the use of force to the Coordination Council?
- Has the Coordination Council refrained from using the state apparatus for its own gain?
- Have relations between Belarus and Russia changed significantly? If so, how?
- Have relations between Belarus and the West changed significantly? If so, how?
Works Cited
[i] Andrei Kazakevich, “The Belarusian Non-Party Political System: Government, Trust, and Institutions, 1990-2015,” in Stubborn Structures: Reconceptualizing Postcommunist Regimes, ed. Bálint Magyar, 353-370 (Central European University Press, 2019); Brian D. Taylor, State Building in Putin’s Russia: Policing and Coercion After Communism (Cambridge University Press, 2011); Transparency International, “Corruption Perceptions Index,” Transparency International (2021), https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2020/index/nz
[ii] BTI, “Methodology,” Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index (2020), https://bti-project.org/en/methodology
[iii] Konstantin Ash, “The election trap: the cycle of post-electoral repression and opposition fragmentation in Lukashenko’s Belarus,” Democratization 22, no. 6 (2015): 1030-1053, https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2014.899585
[iv] Anastasiya Valeeva, “Inside the Belarus Network,” France 24 (2015), https://webdoc.france24.com/inside_belarus_networks/
[v] Adam Reichardt and Maciek Makulski (executive producers), The Story of Belarus , Talk Eastern Europe (2020), https://neweasterneurope.eu/2020/11/25/the-story-of-belarus/; Brian Whitmore, “Russian-Belarusian military merger accelerates on NATO’s eastern flank,” Atlantic Council (2021), https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/belarusalert/russian-belarusian-military-merger-accelerates-on-natos-eastern-flank/
[vi] Coordination Council, “Coordination Council,” Rada Vision (2021), https://rada.vision/en; Yauheni Preiherman and Thomas Graham, “Don’t Put Belarus in the Middle,” Foreign Affairs (2020), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/2020-10-02/dont-put-belarus-middle
[vii] Michael Makara, “Coup-Proofing, Military Defection, and the Arab Spring,” Democracy and Security 9, no. 4 (2013), doi: 10.1080/17419166.2013.802983
[viii] Mark Galeotti, “How Migrants Got Weaponized: The EU Set the Stage for Belarus’s Cynical Ploy,” Foreign Affairs (2021), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2021-12-02/how-migrants-got-weaponized
[ix] Artyom Shraibman, “The House That Lukashenko Built: The Foundation, Evolution, and Future of the Belarusian Regime,” Carnegie Moscow Center (2018), https://carnegieendowment.org/files/CP328_Shraibman_Belarus_FINAL.pdf
[x] Yuliya Brel-Fournier and Minion K.C. Morrison, “The Predicament of Europe’s ‘Last Dictator,’” International Area Studies Review 24, no. 3 (2021): 169-192, https://doi.org/10.1177%2F22338659211018326
[xi] Oleg Nemensky, “Poslednij sojuznik»: Rossijsko-belorusskie otnoshenija na sovremennom jetape [The Last Ally: Russian-Belarusian Relations at the Present State],” Kontury global’nyh transformacij 9, no. 5 (2016): 24-40), doi: 10.23932/2542-0240-2016-9-5-24-40
[xii] Gazprom, “Yamal-Europe: Russian gas supplies to Western Europe,” Gazprom (2018), https://www.gazprom.com/projects/yamal-europe/
[xiii] Oleg Nemensky, “Poslednij sojuznik»: Rossijsko-belorusskie otnoshenija na sovremennom jetape [The Last Ally: Russian-Belarusian Relations at the Present State],” Kontury global’nyh transformacij 9, no. 5 (2016): 24-40), doi: 10.23932/2542-0240-2016-9-5-24-40
[xiv] J. Á. López Jiménez, “Bielorrusia existe: Equilibrio inestable entre una política exterior multivectorial y el tratado de unión con Rusia [Belarus Exists: Unstable Balance Between a Multivector Foreign Policy and the Union Treaty with Russia],” Revista Española de Derecho Internacional 72, no. 2 (2020): 61-88.
[xv] Drew Hinshaw and James Marson, “What’s Happening on the Belarus-Poland Border? A diplomatic and humanitarian predicament stems from a standoff between Belarus, EU over fate of thousands of migrants stranded at the Poland-Belarus border,” Wall Street Journal (2021), https://www.wsj.com/articles/belarus-poland-border-migrant-crisis-11636739895
[xvi] Mark Galeotti, “How Migrants Got Weaponized: The EU Set the Stage for Belarus’s Cynical Ploy,” Foreign Affairs (2021), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2021-12-02/how-migrants-got-weaponized
[xvii] Rick Gladstone, “The clash over the Belarus-Poland border crisis spills into the UN Security Council,” New York Times (2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/11/world/europe/un-security-council.html
[xviii] Mark Galeotti, “How Migrants Got Weaponized: The EU Set the Stage for Belarus’s Cynical Ploy,” Foreign Affairs (2021), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2021-12-02/how-migrants-got-weaponized
[xix] World Justice Project, “WJP Rule of Law Index,” World Justice Project (2021), https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/country/Belarus
[xx] Artyom Shraibman, “The House That Lukashenko Built: The Foundation, Evolution, and Future of the Belarusian Regime,” Carnegie Moscow Center (2018), https://carnegieendowment.org/files/CP328_Shraibman_Belarus_FINAL.pdf
[xxi] World Justice Project, “WJP Rule of Law Index,” World Justice Project (2021), https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/country/Belarus
[xxii] Yuliya Brel-Fournier and Minion K.C. Morrison, “The Predicament of Europe’s ‘Last Dictator,’” International Area Studies Review 24, no. 3 (2021): 169-192, https://doi.org/10.1177%2F22338659211018326
[xxiii] Brian D. Taylor, State Building in Putin’s Russia: Policing and Coercion After Communism (Cambridge University Press, 2011).
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[xxvii] Max Weber, Economy and Society, ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978).
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[xxxii] World Justice Project, “WJP Rule of Law Index,” World Justice Project (2021), https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/country/Belarus
[xxxiii] Lucan A. Way and Steven Levitsky, “The dynamics of autocratic coercion after the Cold War,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 39, no. 3 (2006): 387-410, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2006.07.001
[xxxiv] Alena Ledeneva (ed.), “Control: instruments of informal governance,” The Global Encyclopaedia of Informality: Understanding Social and Cultural Complexity 2 (2018): 420-486 (UCL Press), https://doi.org.proxyau.wrlc.org/10.2307/j.ctt20krxgs.13; Konstantin Ash, “The election trap: the cycle of post-electoral repression and opposition fragmentation in Lukashenko’s Belarus,” Democratization 22, no. 6 (2015): 1030-1053, https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2014.899585
[xxxv] Andrei Kazakevich, “The Belarusian System: Morphology, Physiology, Genealogy,” Crossroads Digest 1 (2006): 67-98 (European Humanities University); Adam Reichardt and Maciek Makulski (executive producers), The Story of Belarus , Talk Eastern Europe (2020), https://neweasterneurope.eu/2020/11/25/the-story-of-belarus/
[xxxvi] Adam Reichardt and Maciek Makulski (executive producers), The Story of Belarus , Talk Eastern Europe (2020), https://neweasterneurope.eu/2020/11/25/the-story-of-belarus/
[xxxvii] Andrew Wilson, Belarus: The Last European Dictator (Yale University Press, 2021).
[xxxviii] Verena Fritz, State-building: A Comparative Study of Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, and Russia (Central European University Press, 2007).
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[xl] Andrei Kazakevich, “The Belarusian Non-Party Political System: Government, Trust, and Institutions, 1990-2015,” in Stubborn Structures: Reconceptualizing Postcommunist Regimes, ed. Bálint Magyar, 353-370 (Central European University Press, 2019).
[xli] Yuliya Brel-Fournier and Minion K.C. Morrison, “The Predicament of Europe’s ‘Last Dictator,’” International Area Studies Review 24, no. 3 (2021): 169-192, https://doi.org/10.1177%2F22338659211018326
[xlii] Adam Reichardt and Maciek Makulski (executive producers), The Story of Belarus , Talk Eastern Europe (2020), https://neweasterneurope.eu/2020/11/25/the-story-of-belarus/; Artyom Shraibman, “The House That Lukashenko Built: The Foundation, Evolution, and Future of the Belarusian Regime,” Carnegie Moscow Center (2018), https://carnegieendowment.org/files/CP328_Shraibman_Belarus_FINAL.pdf
[xliii] Andrei Kazakevich, “Parliament: Changes Without Consequences?” Belarusian Yearbook (2017), http://nmnby.eu/yearbook/2017/en/page4.html
[xliv] Verena Fritz, State-building: A Comparative Study of Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, and Russia (Central European University Press, 2007); Andrei Makhovsky, “‘$500 for everyone’: Belarus leader’s Soviet-style economy wears thin for some voters,” Reuters (2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-belarus-election-economy/500-for-everyone-belarus-leaders-soviet-style-economy-wears-thin-for-some-votersidUSKCN25118Q; Anastasiya Valeeva, “Inside the Belarus Network,” France 24 (2015), https://webdoc.france24.com/inside_belarus_networks/
[xlv] Anastasiya Valeeva, “Inside the Belarus Network,” France 24 (2015), https://webdoc.france24.com/inside_belarus_networks/
[xlvi] Transparency International, “Corruption Perceptions Index,” Transparency International (2021), https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2020/index/nzl
[xlvii] Yuliya Brel-Fournier and Minion K.C. Morrison, “The Predicament of Europe’s ‘Last Dictator,’” International Area Studies Review 24, no. 3 (2021): 169-192, https://doi.org/10.1177%2F22338659211018326
[xlviii] Belsat, “Lukashenko podnjal silovikam zarplaty na 40% [Lukashenko raised salaries for security officials by 40%],” Belsat (2017), https://belsat.eu/ru/in-focus/lukashenko-podnyal-silovikam-zarplaty-na-40/
[xlix] Michael Makara, “Coup-Proofing, Military Defection, and the Arab Spring,” Democracy and Security 9, no. 4 (2013), doi: 10.1080/17419166.2013.802983
[l] Lucan A. Way and Steven Levitsky, “The dynamics of autocratic coercion after the Cold War,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 39, no. 3 (2006): 387-410, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2006.07.001
[li] Yuliya Brel-Fournier and Minion K.C. Morrison, “The Predicament of Europe’s ‘Last Dictator,’” International Area Studies Review 24, no. 3 (2021): 169-192, https://doi.org/10.1177%2F22338659211018326
[lii] David R. Marples, “Europe’s Last Dictatorship: The Roots and Perspectives of Authoritarianism in ‘White Russia,’” Europe-Asia Studies 57, no. 6 (2005): 895-908, https://www.jstor.org/stable/30043929
[liii] Adam Reichardt and Maciek Makulski (executive producers), The Story of Belarus , Talk Eastern Europe (2020), https://neweasterneurope.eu/2020/11/25/the-story-of-belarus/
[liv] Human Rights Watch, “Belarus: Events of 2020,” Human Rights Watch (2020), https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2021/country-chapters/belarus#
[lv] Yuliya Brel-Fournier and Minion K.C. Morrison, “The Predicament of Europe’s ‘Last Dictator,’” International Area Studies Review 24, no. 3 (2021): 169-192, https://doi.org/10.1177%2F22338659211018326
[lvi] Adam Reichardt and Maciek Makulski (executive producers), The Story of Belarus , Talk Eastern Europe (2020), https://neweasterneurope.eu/2020/11/25/the-story-of-belarus/; Max Weber, Economy and Society, ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978).
[lvii] Adam Reichardt and Maciek Makulski (executive producers), The Story of Belarus , Talk Eastern Europe (2020), https://neweasterneurope.eu/2020/11/25/the-story-of-belarus/; Dan Slater, Ordering Power: Contentious Politics and Authoritarian Leviathans in Southeast Asia (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
[lviii] Artyom Shraibman, “The House That Lukashenko Built: The Foundation, Evolution, and Future of the Belarusian Regime,” Carnegie Moscow Center (2018), https://carnegieendowment.org/files/CP328_Shraibman_Belarus_FINAL.pdf; Yuliya Brel-Fournier and Minion K.C. Morrison, “The Predicament of Europe’s ‘Last Dictator,’” International Area Studies Review 24, no. 3 (2021): 169-192, https://doi.org/10.1177%2F22338659211018326
[lix] Gerald M. Easter, Reconstructing the State: Personal Networks and Elite Identity in Soviet Russia (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
[lx] David R. Marples, “Europe’s Last Dictatorship: The Roots and Perspectives of Authoritarianism in ‘White Russia,’” Europe-Asia Studies 57, no. 6 (2005): 895-908, https://www.jstor.org/stable/30043929
[lxi] Britannica, “Government and Society,” Britannica (2021), https://www.britannica.com/place/Belarus/Government-and-society
[lxii] Andrei Kazakevich, “Parliament: Changes Without Consequences?” Belarusian Yearbook (2017), http://nmnby.eu/yearbook/2017/en/page4.html
[lxiii] ElectionGuide, “Election for Belarusian Chamber of Representatives 2019,” ElectionGuide (2021), https://www.electionguide.org/elections/id/3262/
[lxiv] Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, Beyond Patronage: Ruling Party Cohesion and Authoritarian Stability, Paper presentation, American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Washington, DC, 2010.
[lxv] Sergei Kuznetsov, “5 reasons why Lukashenko may hang on to power in Belarus,” Politico (2020), https://www.politico.eu/article/5-reasons-why-alexander-lukashenko-may-hang-on-to-power-in-belarus/
[lxvi] CIA, “The World Factbook: Belarus,” CIA (2021b), https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/belarus/#geography
[lxvii] United Nations, “Treaty Series: Treaties and international agreements registered or filed and recorded with the Secretariat of the United Nations,” United Nations 2121 (2003): 13-110, https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/UNTS/Volume%202121/v2121.pdf
[lxviii] Anais Marin, “Under Pressure: Can Belarus resist Russian coercion?” European Union Institute for Security Studies (2020), https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep25026
[lxix] J. Á. López Jiménez, “Bielorrusia existe: Equilibrio inestable entre una política exterior multivectorial y el tratado de unión con Rusia [Belarus Exists: Unstable Balance Between a Multivector Foreign Policy and the Union Treaty with Russia],” Revista Española de Derecho Internacional 72, no. 2 (2020): 61-88.
[lxx] George Barros, “Belarus Warning Update: Moscow and Minsk Hold Simultaneous Combat Readiness Exercises in Kaliningrad, Mainland Russia, and Belarus,” Institute for the Study of War (2021), https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep28894
[lxxi] Brian Whitmore, “Russian-Belarusian military merger accelerates on NATO’s eastern flank,” Atlantic Council (2021), https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/belarusalert/russian-belarusian-military-merger-accelerates-on-natos-eastern-flank/
[lxxii] OECD.Stat, “Country Programmable Aid (CPA),” OECD.Stat (2019), https://stats.oecd.org/#
[lxxiii] Cory Welt, “Belarus: An Overview,” Congressional Research Service (2021), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10814
[lxxiv] Sergei Guriev, “The Political Economy of the Belarusian Crisis,” Intereconomics 55, no. 5 (2020): 274-275, https://www.intereconomics.eu/contents/year/2020/number/5/article/the-political-economy-of-the-belarusian-crisis.html
[lxxv] Gazprom, “Yamal-Europe: Russian gas supplies to Western Europe,” Gazprom (2018), https://www.gazprom.com/projects/yamal-europe/
[lxxvi] Antoaneta Dimitrova, Dimiter Toshkov, Honorata Mazepus, Klaudijus Maniokas, Maxim Boroda, Tatsiana Chulitskaya, Oleg Grytsenko, Natallia Rabava, Ina Ramasheuskaya, and Kataryna Wolczuk, “Statehood, State Capacity and Limited Access Orders: Comparing Belarus and Ukraine,” The EU and Eastern Partnership Countries: An Inside-Out Analysis and Strategic Assessment (2018), https://ec.europa.eu/research/participants/documents/downloadPublic?documentIds=080166e5bbd3b631&appId=PPGMS
[lxxvii] Adam Reichardt and Maciek Makulski (executive producers), The Story of Belarus , Talk Eastern Europe (2020), https://neweasterneurope.eu/2020/11/25/the-story-of-belarus/
[lxxviii] Margarita M. Balmaceda, Living the High Life in Minsk: Russian Energy Rents, Domestic Populism and Belarus’ Impending Crisis High (Central European University Press, 2014).
[lxxix] Yuliya Brel-Fournier and Minion K.C. Morrison, “The Predicament of Europe’s ‘Last Dictator,’” International Area Studies Review 24, no. 3 (2021): 169-192, https://doi.org/10.1177%2F22338659211018326; David R. Marples, “Belarus’ Susceptibility to Russian Intervention,” American Enterprise Institute (2017), https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep03284
[lxxx] Mark Galeotti, “How Migrants Got Weaponized: The EU Set the Stage for Belarus’s Cynical Ploy,” Foreign Affairs (2021), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2021-12-02/how-migrants-got-weaponized
[lxxxi] Ryhor Astapenia, “What Belarusians Think About Their Country’s Crisis,” Chatham House (2020), https://www.chathamhouse.org/2020/10/what-belarusians-think-about-their-countrys-crisis
[lxxxii] Ryhor Astapenia, “What Belarusians Think About Their Country’s Crisis,” Chatham House (2020), https://www.chathamhouse.org/2020/10/what-belarusians-think-about-their-countrys-crisis; David R. Marples, “Belarus’ Susceptibility to Russian Intervention,” American Enterprise Institute (2017), https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep03284; Adam Reichardt and Maciek Makulski (executive producers), The Story of Belarus , Talk Eastern Europe (2020), https://neweasterneurope.eu/2020/11/25/the-story-of-belarus/
[lxxxiii] Andrew Wilson, Belarus: The Last European Dictator (Yale University Press, 2021).
[lxxxiv] Human Rights Watch, “Belarus: Events of 2020,” Human Rights Watch (2020), https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2021/country-chapters/belarus#; Adam Reichardt and Maciek Makulski (executive producers), The Story of Belarus , Talk Eastern Europe (2020), https://neweasterneurope.eu/2020/11/25/the-story-of-belarus/
[lxxxv] Human Rights Watch, “Belarus: Events of 2020,” Human Rights Watch (2020), https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2021/country-chapters/belarus#
[lxxxvi] Tony Wesolowsky, “Five Belarusian Opposition Figures: Where They Are, What Fates They Face,” Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty (2021), https://www.rferl.org/a/belarus-opposition-profiles-kalesnikava-babaryka-tsapkala-tsikhanouski/31256642.html
[lxxxvii] Adam Reichardt and Maciek Makulski (executive producers), The Story of Belarus , Talk Eastern Europe (2020), https://neweasterneurope.eu/2020/11/25/the-story-of-belarus/
[lxxxviii] Tony Wesolowsky, “What Exactly Is the Coordination Council and What Are its Plans to Oust Belarus’s Leader?” Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty (2020), https://www.rferl.org/a/30802198.html
[lxxxix] Adam Reichardt and Maciek Makulski (executive producers), The Story of Belarus , Talk Eastern Europe (2020), https://neweasterneurope.eu/2020/11/25/the-story-of-belarus/
[xc] Ryhor Astapenia, “What Belarusians Think About Their Country’s Crisis,” Chatham House (2020), https://www.chathamhouse.org/2020/10/what-belarusians-think-about-their-countrys-crisis
[xci] Adam Reichardt and Maciek Makulski (executive producers), The Story of Belarus , Talk Eastern Europe (2020), https://neweasterneurope.eu/2020/11/25/the-story-of-belarus/
[xcii] US Department of State, “Policy Issues: Human Rights and Democracy,” US Department of State, https://www.state.gov/policy-issues/human-rights-and-democracy/
[xciii] Yauheni Preiherman and Thomas Graham, “Don’t Put Belarus in the Middle,” Foreign Affairs (2020), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/2020-10-02/dont-put-belarus-middle
[xciv] US Department of State, “Policy Issues: Human Rights and Democracy,” US Department of State, https://www.state.gov/policy-issues/human-rights-and-democracy/
[xcv] Mark Galeotti, “How Migrants Got Weaponized: The EU Set the Stage for Belarus’s Cynical Ploy,” Foreign Affairs (2021), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2021-12-02/how-migrants-got-weaponized; Rick Gladstone, “The clash over the Belarus-Poland border crisis spills into the UN Security Council,” New York Times (2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/11/world/europe/un-security-council.html; Drew Hinshaw and James Marson, “What’s Happening on the Belarus-Poland Border? A diplomatic and humanitarian predicament stems from a standoff between Belarus, EU over fate of thousands of migrants stranded at the Poland-Belarus border,” Wall Street Journal (2021), https://www.wsj.com/articles/belarus-poland-border-migrant-crisis-11636739895
[xcvi] US Department of State, “Policy Issues: Human Rights and Democracy,” US Department of State, https://www.state.gov/policy-issues/human-rights-and-democracy/
[xcvii] US Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “About NATO,” US Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, https://nato.usmission.gov/about-nato/
[xcviii] Marian L. Lawson and Susan B. Epstein, “Democracy Promotion: An Objective of U.S. Foreign Assistance,” Congressional Research Service (2019), https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/R44858.pdf
[xcix] Yuliya Brel-Fournier and Minion K.C. Morrison, “The Predicament of Europe’s ‘Last Dictator,’” International Area Studies Review 24, no. 3 (2021): 169-192, https://doi.org/10.1177%2F22338659211018326; David R. Marples, “Belarus’ Susceptibility to Russian Intervention,” American Enterprise Institute (2017), https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep03284
[c] CIA, “About CIA – Mission and Vision.” CIA (2021a), https://www.cia.gov/about/mission-vision/; Presidential Approval and Reporting of Covert Actions, 50 USC § 3093 (2012); Adam Reichardt and Maciek Makulski (executive producers), The Story of Belarus , Talk Eastern Europe (2020), https://neweasterneurope.eu/2020/11/25/the-story-of-belarus/
[ci] Coordination Council, “Coordination Council,” Rada Vision (2021), https://rada.vision/en; Yauheni Preiherman and Thomas Graham, “Don’t Put Belarus in the Middle,” Foreign Affairs (2020), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/2020-10-02/dont-put-belarus-middle
[cii] Artyom Shraibman, “The House That Lukashenko Built: The Foundation, Evolution, and Future of the Belarusian Regime,” Carnegie Moscow Center (2018), https://carnegieendowment.org/files/CP328_Shraibman_Belarus_FINAL.pdf
[ciii] Artyom Shraibman, “The House That Lukashenko Built: The Foundation, Evolution, and Future of the Belarusian Regime,” Carnegie Moscow Center (2018), https://carnegieendowment.org/files/CP328_Shraibman_Belarus_FINAL.pdf; Adam Reichardt and Maciek Makulski (executive producers), The Story of Belarus , Talk Eastern Europe (2020), https://neweasterneurope.eu/2020/11/25/the-story-of-belarus/
[civ] J. Á. López Jiménez, “Bielorrusia existe: Equilibrio inestable entre una política exterior multivectorial y el tratado de unión con Rusia [Belarus Exists: Unstable Balance Between a Multivector Foreign Policy and the Union Treaty with Russia],” Revista Española de Derecho Internacional 72, no. 2 (2020): 61-88; Mark Galeotti, “How Migrants Got Weaponized: The EU Set the Stage for Belarus’s Cynical Ploy,” Foreign Affairs (2021), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2021-12-02/how-migrants-got-weaponized
[cv] Satoshi Ikeuchi, “Explaining Authoritarian Collapse and Persistence: Regime-Military-Society Relations in the Face of the Arab Spring,” Paper presentation, Western Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Hollywood, CA, 2013.
[cvi] Satoshi Ikeuchi, “Explaining Authoritarian Collapse and Persistence: Regime-Military-Society Relations in the Face of the Arab Spring,” Paper presentation, Western Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Hollywood, CA, 2013; Michael Makara, “Coup-Proofing, Military Defection, and the Arab Spring,” Democracy and Security 9, no. 4 (2013), doi: 10.1080/17419166.2013.802983
[cvii] Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, Beyond Patronage: Ruling Party Cohesion and Authoritarian Stability, Paper presentation, American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Washington, DC, 2010.
[cviii] Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, Beyond Patronage: Ruling Party Cohesion and Authoritarian Stability, Paper presentation, American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Washington, DC, 2010; Charles H. Fairbanks, “Georgia’s Rose Revolution,” Journal of Democracy 15, no. 2 (2004): 110-124, https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2004.0025
[cix] Alice Cuddy, “Myanmar Coup: What Is Happening and Why?” BBC (2021), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-55902070
[cx] Lindsay Maizland, “Myanmar’s Troubled History: Coups, Military Rule, and Ethnic Conflict,” Council on Foreign Relations (2021), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/myanmar-history-coup-military-rule-ethnic-conflict-rohingya
[cxi] Andrei Kazakevich, “Parliament: Changes Without Consequences?” Belarusian Yearbook (2017), http://nmnby.eu/yearbook/2017/en/page4.html
[cxii] Michael Makara, “Coup-Proofing, Military Defection, and the Arab Spring,” Democracy and Security 9, no. 4 (2013), doi: 10.1080/17419166.2013.802983; David R. Marples, “Europe’s Last Dictatorship: The Roots and Perspectives of Authoritarianism in ‘White Russia,’” Europe-Asia Studies 57, no. 6 (2005): 895-908, https://www.jstor.org/stable/30043929
[cxiii] Henry E. Hale, Patronal Politics: Eurasian Regime Dynamics in Comparative Perspective (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
[cxiv] Henry E. Hale, Patronal Politics: Eurasian Regime Dynamics in Comparative Perspective (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
[cxv] Ryhor Astapenia, “What Belarusians Think About Their Country’s Crisis,” Chatham House (2020), https://www.chathamhouse.org/2020/10/what-belarusians-think-about-their-countrys-crisis
[cxvi] World Justice Project, “WJP Rule of Law Index,” World Justice Project (2021), https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/country/Belarus
[cxvii] World Bank, “Expense (% of GDP),” World Bank (2019), https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/GC.XPN.TOTL.GD.ZS?contextual=region; Transparency International, “Corruption Perceptions Index,” Transparency International (2021), https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2020/index/nzl
[cxviii] OECD.Stat, “Country Programmable Aid (CPA),” OECD.Stat (2019), https://stats.oecd.org/#
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