By: Zitian Sun
(This Piece was originally published in 2019 addition – please see the below Reposting Notes for additional information)
Reposting Notes: This paper was initially submitted to the Journal of International Services (JIS), American University, in Fall 2018, when the author was a Master’s Candidate at the School of International Services, American University. It has been presented as a draft accepted during the 2019 Journal of International Service Symposium, American University, April 6, 2019. The final acceptance occurred in Fall 2019 as part of the annual issue of the JIS. In Fall 2022, the author communicated with the incumbent Editor-in-Chief of JIS, Jake Sepich, to repost the article on the new JIS website. The reposting received approval from the author with formatting alternations in contrast to the initially accepted draft.
Author: Zitian Sun is a Ph.D. student at the Department of Sociology, McGill University. His research focuses on contentious politics theory, radicalization dynamics in social movements, and state repression. His previous degrees are: M.A. Department of Politics, New York University, 2022; M.A. School of International Service, American University, 2019; and B.A. School of International Service, American University, 2018.
Word Count: 3,746 (Including Notes, References, and the Information Page)
Introductioni
The Ukraine Crisis, the Crimea Annexation, and the Middle East interventions have made Putin a superstar among global presses. As a former KGB agent who was greatly disappointed by the directive of “Moscow is silent” in 1989, Putin rose from a jobless spy to one of the most influential political figures that would determine Russia’s fate.ii While he brought hope and stability to the chaotic post-USSR Russia, he has been responsible for political uncertainty about his country’s democratic developments. The deaths of Alexander Litvinenkoiii and Boris Nemtsoviv reminded the world of old-school political repression against dissidents, casting more doubts on the future of Russia. Although Putin secured his presidency by a landslide in 2018, the growing trend of anti-Putin campaigns and the controversy of Alexei Navalny has raised the discussion of possible democratic evolution.v What would be the true meaning behind these oppositional movements?
This analytical essay focuses on a key question: “Could a sitting authority and its political opposition cooperate in a transitional democracy?” Through a brief summary of both Putin’s and Navalny’s paths to the public and political realm, although the conflict between Putin and Navalny might be inevitable, the political careers share a great number of similarities, as well as the extraordinary potential to reform Russia’s political structure for a more democratic future. By reviewing transitional democracy literature, this article suggests that successful democracy building relies on successful institutional transitions among political actors rather than changing leadership.
The overall structure of this article will be in three parts: 1) A brief political career review of Putin and Navalny; 2) A basic framework of inevitable conflict among political actors in an authoritarian structure, followed by an empirical analysis of the Putin-Navalny dynamic; 3) A cooperative-based understanding for opposition-authority interactions in a transitional democratic nation, and 4) a conclusion.
The Rise of Putin and Navalny
Putin’s life story and his path to power are no secret. As a little boy born in post-war Leningrad, Putin was “odd and disturbingly introvert.”vi After studying law at St. Petersburg State University (formerly Leningrad State University), Putin became a KGB agent in the 1980s and was stationed in East Germany.vii Various sources demonstrated that Putin felt deeply betrayed by the failure of the political system, returning to his hometown after the collapse of the USSR.viii Putin’s former professor, Anatoly Sobchak, then-mayor of St. Petersburg, became his political mentor.ix Putin soon became the vice mayor, responsible for St. Petersburg’s economic affairs.x Even though Sobchak and Putin later suffered from corruption charges,xi Putin won Boris Yeltsin’sxii trust and successfully entered the center of Russia’s political realm with a wide range of appointments, including the head of the Federal Security Service.xiii Later, as Yeltsin’s successor, Putin’s oversight of the Chechnyan conflicts, the domestic economic stabilization policies, and the increase in oil prices,xiv Putin became one of the most popular leaders in Russia. Putin’s controversial foreign policies toward Ukraine and Crimea attracted a high level of antagonism from the western nations. However, these concerns have not stopped him from maintaining an unparalleled domestic approval rate in Russia of over 80%.xv
Alexei Navalny, one of Russia’s most prominent political opposition leaders, had a different career path. Born in 1976 in Butyn, a city in the Moscow region, his childhood memory of communist Russia was unpleasant due to food shortages and a lack of necessities.xvi With big dreams of getting rich under Yeltsin’s economic reforms, Navalny became a lawyer after completing his studies at Lumumba University of People’s Friendship, but he became quickly frustrated by the post-Soviet political system of collusions between politicians and billionaires.xvii In his frustration, he joined the Yabloko party, one of Russia’s largest liberal democratic opposition parties, known as “one of the last pieces of perestroika left.”xviii However, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, Navalny’s experiences in Yabloko were never pleasant. His party remained only as a party “[casting] vote” with little political significance in Duma elections, and he increasingly disliked Yabloko’s personalization of political powers.xix Yabloko’s leaders also failed to cooperate or integrate with various political opinions, and Navalny’s political aspirations were restricted within the party. Around 2004, the rise of the “anti-systematic” opposition, which originated from social radicals and street protests, helped Navalny to identify the need to create a “systematic opposition” in Russia.xx He soon started his own populist, anti-corruption campaign on the internet.xxi By asserting that ” United Russia is the party of crooks and thieves,”xxii Navalny became increasingly popular among young Russians. Despite the fact that made-up charges against Navalny barred him from legally participating in the presidential run for 2018, his persistence in his own path won him 27.2% of the vote in the 2013 mayoral election in Moscow,xxiii granting him the great potential to challenge Putin’s throne in the future.xxiv
Based on their career paths, Putin and Navalny have shown a few similarities. First, they both found their own ways in the new Russian system with their charm and refreshing personalities. Putin entered the Russian political realm when Yeltsin was old, incapable, and controversial, bringing “new blood” to the chaotic post-USSR reconstruction as a strong leader. At the same time, Navalny found his popularity among the rising middle class and the younger generation, who had doubts about Putin’s ruling. When Navalny said, “Ironically, I can call Vladimir Putin my godfather in politics,”xxv that statement was fairly accurate. Second, both of them have remained highly popular in Russia. Putin initially assumed office in 1999 with low poll numbers,xxvi but his popularity benefitted from Russia’s economic performance and stability in his early presidential terms between 2000 and 2008.xxvii For Navalny, although he suffered from hostilities by the authorities, his YouTube, Twitter, and Facebook accounts represented a major battlefield for his 2018 presidential campaign, and they drew a significant amount of supporters and attention from both home and abroad.xxviii This failed attempt to run in the 2013 mayoral election with 27.3% of the vote demonstrated his great potential to be a popular politician.
However, the differences between the two are also identifiable. Putin has been “a good player of the system,” with the support of multiple oligarchs. His ruling and foundation come from the control of the media, high levels of political organization, and structural recognition. But Navalny, despite his lack of interactions with political establishments, has created his legitimacy and foundation outside Russia’s traditional political structure. Moreover, his internet campaigns and the strong diversity of Navalny’s popularity among younger generations mark his reputation as a “man of the people.” xxix
Inevitable Conflicts between the Opposition and the Authority
Even in modern times, post-Soviet Russia has remained heavily authoritarian and not yet fully developed as a democratic state.xxx Within all authoritarian nations, a key issue shall be, and always will be, the legitimacy of ruling and the preservation of political power at the top level. Norwegian sociologist Stein Rigen indicated, “when chips are down, the inescapable bottom line is the preservation of the regime and its power.”xxxi Putin’s lasting political influences and Russian quasi-democratic political structures have already shaped Putin-Navalny interactions as naturally conflictual, not cooperative. The Russian political establishment might tolerate minor criticism, but it would not tolerate any challenge that threatens its political legitimacy.
Specifically, as a microcosm of the conflict, Navalny was regarded as a legitimate opposition instead of a potential threat to Putin’s Rule like other political dissidents after he won 27.2% of the vote without any support from the Russian political establishment during the 2013 Moscow mayoral election. The logic of Navalny’s threat is: 1) His votes were earned entirely by public support and could not be controlled or influenced by Putin’s political mechanisms; and 2) Navalny’s ability to attract public attention from the lower levels of society likely reminded Putin of “the greatest geo-political disaster of the last century”xxxii with Gorbachev’s loss of grip of his ideal of reforming the USSR, as well as the horrific consequences of liquidating a dictatorial leadership (such as Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi and Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak during the 2011 Arab Spring). Navalny’s popular support differed from the communist party’s lite splits in the 1999 Duma elections, where political opposition leaders were limited by “centralized and bureaucratic tendencies of a single ruling party.”xxxiii Also, Navalny’s unendorsed, self-initiated campaign with a 27.2% support rate showed the Russian political establishment the risk of a radical popular movement. Although the failure of Navalny’s election failed to present an immediate threat to neither the Russian government nor Putin’s leadership, its potential for further development could be perceived as the thin end of the wedge. Without any containment or restriction, it could grow out of the system and directly challenge Putin’s leadership.
Therefore, under such logic, Navalny’s opposition in 2018 did suffer from a series of “preemptive strikes.” Under a “not free” public opinions environment, as the Freedom House concluded in 2017,xxxiv it could be interpreted that criminal charges against Navalny were a counter-attack from the political establishment. Smear campaigns served as a distraction from Navalny’s political activities, being acts of shame designed to impair his fundamental political support from the lower level of Russian politics.
However, as much as Russia remained authoritarian, elections, campaigns, and other basic democratic mechanisms still exist in Russian society today and have become a part of daily political games. Navalny’s independent public support seemed to teach an unexpected lesson for both Putin and Navalny. After the 2013 Moscow mayoral election, on the one hand, Putin seemed to realize that defeating a dangerous political opponent was important. But the potential expense of losing popular support would undermine his legitimacy in the ruling and endanger his position. On the other hand, Navalny recognized that challenging a popular leader individually with street and internet protests might create accusations of him being a radical conspirator, diminishing his political influence. That was why right after the five years conviction of Navalny’s embezzlement cases, not only did hundreds of people show up to protest his wrongful sentencing, but also the officials adjusted their position and spared his imprisonment.xxxv At the same time, after his house arrest for most of 2014,xxxvi Navalny chose to avoid direct criticism against Putin, who remained highly popular in Russia, and redirected his oppositional activities against Medvedev, Putin’s prime minister.xxxvii For Putin, although he still had major influences over Russian media and political establishments, he chose to distance himself from “the party of crooks and thieves,” the United Russia party and ran as an independent in the 2018 election.xxxviii When Putin emphasized the hopes and trust of his voters after the 2018 election,xxxix he avoided possible corruption accusations and reinforced his existing public support as a democratically elected leader. This absurd but profound compromise consolidated their political positions without any significant conflict, witnessing a “peaceful” coexistence between the opposition and authority in an authoritarian state.
For the Genuine Advance of Russia
The Putin-Navalny interactions were a small part of the post-Soviet democratization, as Russian democratic building could not be accomplished by simply resolving their conflicts. In fact, existing literature has identified various deficits among current democratic promotions: 1) Disconnection between popular votes and political results;xl 2) Resistance against external factors;xli and 3) The rise of illiberal democracy.xlii Establishing an effective political system would take not only “a generation or two to create something that [might be] both democratic and stable,”xliii but also extensive efforts to perfect governmental institutions, rule of laws, and norms of democracy. Under the key question of this essay, a possible scenario might come into the frame: Could Putin and Navalny, the authority and the opposition, work together?
First, although authoritarianism as an applicable political structure has been largely criticized, historical precedence has shown the possibility of democratic transitions facilitated by interactions between the authoritarian establishment and the opposition, such as the democratization of both modern South Korea and Taiwan. During Taiwan’s Chiang Ching-Kuo presidency,xliv when the government maintained its controls on the military and ruling party’s machine, local opposition parties and open elections could be held fairly.xlv Violent suppressions against police and military protests were strictly banned, and the press slowly started to become independent.xlvi In South Korea’s case, during the Fifth Republic’s military authoritarianism,xlvii civil societiesxlviii and political oppositions were able to engage in joint efforts of public protests and elections, forcing the authorities to democratize.xlix Although Russia did not directly copy its transitional patterns, its successes certainly offered insights. Political oppositions and authorities could strengthen a nation’s democratic institutions within a proper course of interactions.
Second, considering the recent development of Russian-related, international controversies, and domestic instabilities, there might be little room for a further political struggle between the authorities and the opposition. Political reforms usually take place when a country achieves relative political stability and a favorable international environment. Reviewing post-Soviet history, Yeltsin’s political and economic reform in the 1990s with the support of the U.S. and European states had already been difficult and chaotic. Since the constitutional crisis in 1993, Russia did not make significant democratic reforms even with a favorable international environment and left-over momentum from perestroika. Thus, the Russian environment for reform might be increasingly controversial in the future with Russia’s interventions in East European and the Middle East. Furthermore, controiveries over refugees and ethnic minorities are associated with the rise of Russian nationalism and anti-immigrant sentiments, threatening political stability.l If Putin-Navalny interactions were to be more conflictual and even destructive, the future of Russian democratic developments could not be optimistic.
Third, politically, cooperation between Putin and Navalny would benefit both of them significantly. Navalny’s campaigns against corruption would become a major effort to create future incentives for a check-and-balance system regarding Russian oligarchs and Putin himself if these campaigns were not to be radicalized. His internet influences would also attract the younger generations toward politics, inspiring them to participate in public policy discussions or even practices. Moreover, his image as a brave warrior among western media could be a part of the general Russian impression of receiving a more favorable attitude from the U.S. and other European states. For Putin, Navanly’s independent public support has shown that, as the Russian public craved more democracy, Putin’s relations with the oligarchs might slowly lose their potential benefits and eventually endanger his political capital. As Putin ran as an independent candidate for the 2018 election, his political strategies have shown traces of adjustment for a public-supported approach. Although Putin has preserved his authoritarian leadership, he would be under more public pressure to provide basic goods and services and political reforms toward democracy. Hypothetically, if such a fragile, delicate, but meaningful balance between oppositions and authorities were to be maintained, further Russian political developments might be more promising.
Lastly, as previously indicated, the conflict between Putin and Navalny would likely continue in the existing authoritarian system. These two individuals’ intentions and political agendas could be largely different and even confrontational. The total outbreak of conflict between Putin and Navalny would also be dangerous for Russian society, which would be much bloodier and much more painful, strengthening the present authoritarian system rather than democratization.
Conclusion
In conclusion, this article has extensively discussed the prospect of Russia’s prominent opposition leader, Alexei Navalny, and his interaction with Vladimir Putin’s current leadership. By providing a comparison and contrast analysis of their political profiles, Putin and Navalny showed their potential and capabilities to draw support from the Russian public within a new, quasi-democratic system. But Navalny’s relationship with the political establishment and oligarchs is vastly different from Putin’s. Further analytical opinions suggest that Putin-Navalny’s interactions remain highly fragile within the Russian political system, with a great likelihood of confrontation. Under a brief review of transitional democracy theories and cases of successful democratizations, this article suggests that alternative possibilities, with cooperation between the oppositions and authority, could facilitate the peaceful development of the democratic institution. Further analyses have demonstrated several benefits of their positive cooperation. However, because such a vision can seem overly ideal, the risk and difficulty of this cooperation are also acknowledged due to the future political uncertainty in Russia.
End Notes
[1] The author acknowledges professor David Holly at School of International Liberal Studies, Waseda University, Alex Delunna at School of International Services, American University, Jake Sepich at School of International Services, American University, and editing staff from Journal of International Service, American University.
[1] “Moscow is silent” referred to an anecdote that Putin, who was stationed in East Germany as a KGB agent, called Moscow for instructions in 1989 when a group of demonstrators showed up at the KGB office, but he received little information from his supervisor. Chris Bowlby, “Vladimir Putin’s Formative German Years,” BBC, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-32066222.
[1] Alexander Litvinenko: Profile of Murdered Russian Spy,” BBC, 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-19647226.
[1] Russia Opposition Politician Boris Nemtsov Shot Dead, BBC, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-31669061.
[1] Amie Ferris-Rotman, “The Teenagers Standing Up to Putin,” New York Times, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/12/opinion/the-teenagers-standing-up-to-putin.html
[1] Ben Judah, Fragile Empire: How Russia in and Out of Love with Vladimir Putin, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014):10
[1] David Hoffman, “Putin’s Career Rooted in Russia’s KGB,” Washington Post, 2000, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/russiagov/putin.htm
[1] “The Rise of Vladimir Putin,” Youtube, 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FlM9PvZLMwE.
[1] Olga Prodan, “Prominent Russians: Anatoly Sobchack,” RT. http://russiapedia.rt.com/prominent-russians/politics-and-society/anatoly-sobchak/.
[1] Ibid.
[1] Judah, Fragile Empire, 21.
[1] Former Russian President serving from 1991 to 1999, who facilitated the collapse of the Soviet Union.
[1] Judah, Fragile Empire, 26.
[1] Vladimir Putin’s Rise to Power, Youtube, 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nY3Uz4ELwM0.
[1] Putin’s Approval Rating, Levada-Center, 2017, https://www.levada.ru/en/ratings/.
[1] Judah, Fragile Empire, 197.
[1] Ibid, 198.
[1] Perestroika means “reform” in Russian. It was one of the slogans for the USSR’s political reforms in the 1980s during the Gorbachev administration. “The last pieces of perestroika” referred to Yabloko’s political orientation as liberal and democratic since its establishment in 1993.
[1] Ibid, 200-201.
[1] Ibid.
[1] Ibid, 217.
[1] United Russia has been one of the most influential political parties in Russia since 2003. Tom Parfitt, ” Russian Opposition Activist Alexei Navalny Fined for Suggesting United Russia Member Was Thief,” The Telegraph, 2012, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/9312508/Russian-opposition-activist-Alexei-Navalny-fined-for-suggesting-United-Russia-member-was-thief.html
[1] To clarify, Navalny was barred after his participation in the 2013 mayoral election.
[1] Neil MacFarquhar and Ivan Nechpurenko, “Aleksei Navalny, Viable Putin Rival, Is Barred from a Presidential Run,” New York Times, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/08/world/europe/russia-aleksei-navalny-putin.html.
[1] BBC Hard Talk: Alexey Navalny, BBC, 2017, http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/n3ct0c77.
[1] Putin’s Approval Rating, Levada-Center.
[1] Daniel Treisman, “Putin’s Popularity since 2010: Why Did Support for the Kremlin Plunge, Then Stabilize?” Post-Soviet Affairs, 30, no. 5 (2014): 371.
[1] Aliaksandr Herasimenka, “What’s Behind Alexei Navalny’s Digital Challenge to Vladimir Putin’s Regime? Five Things to Know,” The Washington Post, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/02/23/whats-behind-alexei-navalnys-digital-challenge-to-vladimir-putins-regime-5-things-to-know/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.b7c2b155500f.
[1] “Russian Opposition Leader Navalny Released Amid Thousands Of Detentions Nationwide,” Radio Free Europe, 2018, https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-navalny-protest-released-putin-rally-inauguration/29210933.html.
[1] Luke March, “Managing Opposition in a Hybrid Regime: Just Russia and Parastatal Opposition,” Slavic Review 68, no.3 (2009): 504; Leonid Gordon, “Russia at the Crossroads,” Government and Opposition 30, no.1 (1995): 19; Stephen White, Russia, Election, Democracy,” Government and Opposition, 35, no.3 (2000): 303.
[1] Stein Ringen, The Perfect Dictatorship: China in the 21st Century, (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2016): 4.
[1] Nick Allen, “Soviet Break-up Was Geopolitical Disaster, Says Putin,” The Telegraph, 2005, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/1488723/Soviet-break-up-was-geopolitical-disaster-says-Putin.html.
[1] Luke March, “Managing Opposition in a Hybrid Regime: Just Russia and Parastatal Opposition,” Slavic Review 68, no.3 (2009): 507, 513.
[1] “The Freedom of the Press 2017: Russia Profile,” The Freedom House, 2017, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2017/russia.
[1] David M. Herszenhorn, “Aleksei Navalny, Putin Critic, Is Spared Prison in a Fraud Case, but His Brother Is Jailed,” New York Times, 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/31/world/europe/aleksei-navalny-convicted.html.
[1] MacFarquhar and Nechpurenko, “Aleksei Navalny, Viable Putin Rival, Is Barred from a Presidential Run.”
[1] Neil MacFarquhar, “Opposition Leader Tests Public Support for Bid to Topple Putin,” New York Times, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/09/world/europe/aleksei-navalny-russia-election-putin.html.
[1] Holly Ellyatt, “Putin Abandons United Russia Party, Will Run as An Independent in 2018 Election,” CNBC, 2017, https://www.cnbc.com/2017/12/14/putin-to-run-as-an-independent-in-2018-election.html.
[1] RT, “Putin addresses Russians on the night of the 2018 elections,” YouTube, 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zQhY_LIPEzk.
[1] Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism & Democracy, (New York: Routledge, 1994): 254.
[1] The Limit of Liberal-Democracy Promotion, 394.
[1] The Rise of Illiberal Democracy, 27.
[1] Graham Allison et al., “Staggering Toward Democracy: Russia’s Future is Far from Certain,” Harvard International Review 15 no.2 (1992/93):14.
[1] Chiang Ching-kuo, son of Chiang Kai-shek. He took his father’s position in 1976 as chairman of the National Party in Taiwan. He led the democratic reforms in the 1980s.
[1] Yang Lu, “Processes and Features of Taiwan’s Political Transition: From Perspectives from Democratization and Localization (台湾政治转型的过程和特点：以“民主化”和“本土化”为视角),” Taiwan Politics, no.6 (2009): 16.
[1] Shaolai Zhou, “How Did Taiwan Democratized: Insights from Parties’ Interactions (台湾民主化是如何发生的？——基于政党策略互动的视角及其启示),” Chinese Social Sciences Net, 2014, http://www.cssn.cn/zzx/xsdj_zzx/xsdj_zsl/201402/t20140211_961357.shtml.
[1] The Fifth Republic refers to Chun Doo-hwan’s presidency from 1979 to 1988, in which he seized power through a military coup after the assassination of Park Chung-hee.
[1] Su-Hoon Lee, “Transitional Politics of Korea, 1987-1992: Activation of Civil Society,” Pacific Affairs, 66, no. 3 (1993): 353-355.
[1] Sang Joon Kim, “Characteristic Features of Korean Democratization,” Asian Perspective, 18, no. 2 (1994): 188. [1] Mary Elizabeth Malinkin, “Russia: The World’s Second-Largest Immigration Haven,” The National Interest, 2014, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/russia-the-worlds-second-largest-immigration-haven-11053.
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