By: Fabio Reith
Executive Summary
Europeans have been discussing the meaning of strategic autonomy in the security and defense sphere. Even though most governments agree on the necessity of increased European strategic autonomy, the concept remains ill-defined and controversial, not least of all due to the lingering question of the potential rivalry between the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) and the Northern Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). While the European Union (EU) throughout its history has established a successful modus operandi of continued integration without defining its finality, integration in the areas of security and defense will hit a glass ceiling if the Union’s relationship towards NATO is not addressed. As the Russian war of aggression in Ukraine continues, the chances of reaching an agreement on the division of responsibility between the EU and NATO have considerably improved. EU member states should therefore initiate a structured finality debate with NATO to develop a better understanding of the strategic autonomy concept and to alleviate concerns regarding the rivalry between both institutions. An agreement that outlines strategic guidelines along which both institutions can develop cooperatively could be a cornerstone for the development of a durable and resilient European security order.
Strategic Autonomy’s NATO Problem
Discussions on the “European Strategic Autonomy” (ESA) concept have taken center stage in the further development of the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) for years. Despite being a cornerstone in the considerations of the future of the EU — and potentially a wider European — integration process in security and defense, the concept remains ill-defined. Sometimes used interchangeably with terms such as “sovereignty”, “unilateralism”, or even “autarky”[i], the Union’s member states share no common understanding of ESA which has led to confusion, misinterpretation, and, occasionally, political abuse.[ii] However, the overwhelming majority of member states agree with the general notion that Europeans need to develop their own capabilities, which will allow them to effectively—and, if need be, independently—engage security threats and challenges.
With the U.S. as the essential security guarantor in Europe, the transatlantic relationship and its institutional manifestation in NATO has always been an important dimension of discussions on the further development of the CSDP, with ESA as one of its core concepts. This is not only due to the central role that the U.S. plays in European defense, but also the level of entanglement between the Union’s member states and the transatlantic alliance. Twenty-one of twenty-seven members of the EU’s CSDP are also members of NATO. With Sweden and Finland potentially joining NATO, this figure will likely rise to 23. While this opens up opportunities for cooperation, there remains a lingering institutional rivalry between CSDP structures and NATO, most clearly expressed by Madeline Albright’s warning against the “three D’s”—no diminution of NATO, no discrimination of NATO, and no duplication of NATO.
Today the United States is much more concerned with Europe’s reluctance to invest in its security and defense. Meanwhile, the question of to what degree European strategic autonomy equals strategic autonomy from the U.S., and by extension NATO, divides EU member states[iii] and represents a key impediment to the advancement of the ESA discussion and the development of the CSDP. Throughout the EU’s history, it has been widely successful in furthering the integration of its member states without ever declaring an intended finality, i.e., a defined goal for its integration process. With security and defense as highly sensitive areas that lie at the center of state sovereignty, however, the lack of strategic guidelines outlining the path forward is a major roadblock to the further development of the ESA concept, the Union’s CSDP, and the European security order. A joint finality discussion that creates an amicable road map forward is unavoidable, long overdue and, with the war in Ukraine ongoing, more urgently needed than ever.
Faced with hybrid threats that go beyond the mere use of military means and the rising relevance of geoeconomics in the international system, an increasing number of policy areas are considered from a security perspective, making it more difficult to differentiate between areas of responsibility of NATO and the EU. However, even a decade into the discussion of ESA, the debate on how a division of labor between them could look has made little progress. Certain member states favor a geographical division of responsibility in which NATO is tasked with maintaining security on the eastern flank bordering Russia while the EU is responsible for the southern flank. Others argue for an operational division of responsibility, in which the EU is responsible for areas such as crisis management and post-conflict stabilization operations or hybrid threats and cyber capabilities, while NATO remains the central actor in deterrence and territorial defense.[iv]
A positive development is that the EU Strategic Compass, whose development was promoted by the member states, has begun to lay a foundation for the finality discussion by clearly stating that NATO remains the central actor in deterrence and defense while presenting itself as an enabler of an improved, more efficient, and better integrated European defense sector.[v] Unfortunately, the Compass remains vague on what a division of labor would look like in practice. Nonetheless, one of its biggest shortcomings remains not setting out concrete steps on how to materialize the ambitions it formulates vis-à-vis NATO.[vi]
Starting the EU-NATO Finality Process
Moving beyond rhetoric and mere measures to promote cooperation on administrative levels, a structured process that untangles and defines the complicated relationship between both institutions should commence now. A first step could be a working draft by the EU member states in which they, assisted by the European External Action Service (EEAS) —the EU’s diplomatic arm—confidentially identify concrete tasks that the CSDP ultimately intends to fulfill, how they differ from NATO’s responsibilities, and how both institutions can create and benefit from synergies between the institutions. The Global Strategy and the Strategic Compass should be important guidelines from which the level of ambition of these tasks can be derived, but the working draft must be detailed in defining the division of labor between the CSDP and NATO. The draft should therefore look at perceivable scenarios and clearly indicate the areas of responsibility of the EU and those it would like to see managed by NATO.[vii]
A key question that deserves consideration is the role of the United Kingdom. No longer a member of the EU, the UK remains one of the biggest military powers on the continent and an important NATO ally. As a European country, it is just as much affected by Russia’s assault on the European security order as EU members, clearly visible in the close coordination of the British response to the war with EU member states. Throughout Brexit negotiations, it has been clear that the EU will have to find a way to engage with the UK on matters of security and defense, an effort that has been seriously hampered by the manifold conflicts between both parties. The Russian invasion has now created a major opportunity in which both the EU and the UK have a common desire to strategically work together in establishing a new European security order.[viii]
The working draft should therefore be discussed beyond EU member states alone. To meaningfully contribute to the establishment of a durable and effective European security order, the finality process must move beyond a mere soul-searching exercise for the EU. Though ESA is closely linked to the European Union, the concept should not and must not be closed to other European countries that are not in the EU. Therefore, the UK, along with other European NATO members such as Norway, should be regularly invited to attend and contribute to working sessions that are not exclusively focused on intra-EU issues, but address European security in a wider sense. This way, the finality process does not only provide an opportunity to assess and develop the relationship between the EU and NATO in matters of security and defense, but also that of the UK and the EU. The newly established European Political Community which first met in October 2022 in Prague could be a suitable format for such an exchange.
The working draft agreed upon by the EU member states, with contributions by other European stakeholders, should then serve as a common European foundation for a formalized Joint EU-NATO Finality Process in which all members of NATO and the EU define the areas of responsibility of both institutions in concrete scenarios. The finality process should not be misunderstood as an agreement that is set in stone. As new threats and challenges emerge, both institutions will have to develop accordingly. Rather, the process must result in a common and shared agreement on the area of responsibility of each institution in any perceivable threat scenario and, more importantly, a way to institutionalize cooperation that enables the use of synergies and sets out tangible steps to achieve these goals which go beyond more meetings between both institutions’ staffs. In the form of shared summit conclusions or even a strategic document, these results could structure and guide future EU-NATO relations. If EU and NATO member states can come to an agreement, this would not only be an important impetus for the further development of the ESA concept and potentially the Union’s CSDP, but the cornerstone of a new European security order, embedded in the transatlantic alliance, and capable of withstanding open challenges and hostilities from outside actors.
New Momentum for an Overdue Discussion
Just as the EU-NATO rivalry problem is not new, neither are calls for a structured process to address the issue.[ix] Thus far, however, it has been considered impossible to find an agreement among all stakeholders involved. Why should an agreement between an even higher number of actors of states be more fruitful if the EU27 alone were not able to agree on a common understanding of the ESA concept? First, there is no way of credibly stating that the process outlined in this paper will succeed in creating a compromise between all relevant stakeholders. Not only are there a number of divisions among them but past high-stake EU summits illustrate that negotiation dynamics can be quite unpredictable. However, an argument can be made that most stakeholders in the EU and NATO agree on the overarching strategic goal of a strong European pillar within NATO. It often seems that considerations of how other actors, particularly the U.S., would perceive ESA deliberations have hampered discussions. While differences within the EU understandably exist, they are not so fundamental as to be unresolvable in high-stake and high-pressure deliberations among all stakeholders—including the U.S. and other participants. Second, the horrific war in Ukraine has now drastically changed a number of factors that had thus far impeded fruitful discussion.
First, the war in Ukraine has spurred a new sense of urgency regarding security and defense among Europeans. Russia’s attack has rightly been perceived as a decisive blow to the post-Cold War European security order. For many years, a full-scale war was unthinkable in Europe. While the annexation of Crimea had raised concern and led to transformational processes within NATO and particularly the CSDP – for instance with the inception of cooperation and pooling frameworks like the European Defense Fund (EDF) or the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) – the Russian invasion in February 2022 caught most Europeans unprepared and prompted unprecedented reactions. German chancellor Olaf Scholz declared the attack a “Zeitenwende” — a historic turning point — which came with significant changes in the government’s positions on security, including massive investment into the country’s armed forces and a reversal on its policy regarding the export of arms into war zones. Finland and Sweden, meanwhile, decided to abandon their policy of military non-alignment by applying for NATO membership, finding themselves in a process of strategic reorientation that has raised questions, particularly about Sweden’s stance regarding EU defense policy in the future.[x]Similar processes can be observed throughout Europe, whether that be Ireland reassessing its neutrality[xi] or Denmark revoking its opt-out of the EU’s CSDP.[xii]
Second, security strategies are not only reconsidered on the national level. NATO and the EU have also responded with the development of new strategic frameworks. For NATO, this is the new strategic concept enacted in June 2022 and for the EU, the aforementioned Strategic Compass was released in March 2022. During those processes, both institutions largely worked separately on their respective strategies rather than meaningfully engaging with each other. The fact that both institutions are still in a process of strategic realignment marks a perfect moment for a finality debate on the strategic level.
Third, opportunities for building-up defense capabilities are emerging with increasing defense budgets across the continent. Just as much as the institutional rivalry with NATO, the issue of capability-building has been a central issue of ESA. Critical analysts such as Ulrike Franke claim that the:
debate largely focuses on ESA’s impact on the transatlantic relationship rather than the capabilities Europe needs to become autonomous. To develop strategic autonomy, the EU should put aside its concerns about how the United States sees ESA efforts. The EU needs to concentrate instead on the scope of these initiatives … and on the capabilities it requires to ensure that they are successful.[xiii]
This argument doubts that a strategic transatlantic finality discussion makes sense if Europeans do not have the capabilities to back up the outcome of the discussion. This will likely change in the coming years and decades. The war in Ukraine has led to a surge in defense budgets throughout Europe. According to the European Commission, EU member states have announced plans that add up to an additional defense spending of €200 billion in the coming years.[xiv] While it remains to be seen how durable these budget announcements are in the face of rising inflation and social costs, there is good reason to assume that European countries will raise their military spending in the near future and will invest significantly more in military capabilities.[xv] This not only raises the question of whether governments should invest nationally or collaboratively in NATO or EU structures, but also the question of which capabilities should be invested in. It is paramount that European governments do not spend their rising defense budgets on uncoordinated national “shopping lists.” Rather, a closely coordinated approach should identify what capabilities are required for countries to react effectively to possible threat scenarios both within NATO and the EU. If concluded in a timely manner, the strategic outcome of the finality process could provide important orientation in that regard.
Fourth, diplomatic spats between countries which until now had the potential to throw a spanner in the works of the discussion may not have been forgotten, but pale in comparison to the shock of the Russian attack. Examples include the hot-headed diplomatic spat that followed the AUKUS proclamation or the chaotic U.S. retreat from Afghanistan. The urgency of a common response to Russian aggression and the close cooperation of EU and NATO allies that followed has pushed these disputes into the background. While this does not mean that these issues have been resolved, the shift in focus helps to promote a more level-headed discussion.
This is particularly relevant when looking at the U.S. With the election of Joe Biden, the divisive attacks of the Trump administration that furthered the split of Europeans into a transatlantic and a European camp have stopped.[xvi]Biden’s presidential term, therefore, offers the Europeans a window of opportunity to advance the ESA discussion with a president that is committed to a strong transatlantic alliance. After all, the re-election of another Trumpist or Donald Trump himself in 2024 is far from unthinkable—a nightmare scenario for NATO as well as the EU.[xvii] In that scenario, generating agreement on the EU-NATO relationship now is especially vital to unite all governments behind a common position.
Finally, perceptions of power dynamics in European defense have shifted. Many European states have largely perceived ESA as a French concept, given that Emmanuel Macron is one of its most vocal proponents.[xviii] Throughout much of the ESA debate, the infamous Franco-German axis “does raise eyebrows amongst other medium-sized powers such as Italy, Spain or Poland, and leaves smaller member states in fear of being left out in the cold” as stated by Nathalie Tocci, the director of the Istituto Affari Internazionali.[xix]
Due to their resolute support of Ukraine and the vindication of their hitherto largely ignored warning of Russia’s imperialism, the Baltic states[xx] and Poland[xxi] have now strengthened their position in discussions about European defense. Emboldened by their often-admired decisive responses, these countries seem to possess a higher degree of agency, particularly in comparison to the European heavyweights of Germany and France, whose exertion of leadership pales in the public eye.[xxii] By streamlining the debate on the relationship between the EU and NATO at this stage, Poland and the Baltic states could certainly use the political capital they have gained to influence the debate. This could be bad news for France and its far-reaching understanding of the ESA concept—one that Poland and the Baltics do not share. Yet, the ESA debate would be less centered on heavyweights such as France and Germany, reducing other member states’ reservations regarding a finality debate and alleviating fears of alienating NATO. The EU presents a sense of common ownership as one of the biggest advantages of the Strategic Compass compared to the Union’s Global Strategy. It remains to be seen if this argument is valid, but if it is, having common ownership and therefore a common understanding of ESA and its implications for the EU-NATO relationship will likewise be key to building a functioning security order.
Challenges to the Process
Despite this new momentum, considerable challenges remain. With the war in Ukraine nearing its one year mark, the sense of urgency that the shock of the invasion triggered is slowly waning. The pressure on the actors involved could be heightened if the stakeholders involved were to decide to make the process distinctively public, for instance, by scheduling high-level summits for key deliberations. With the future of European security in the media spotlight, pressure on all stakeholders to come to a viable agreement would be significant. However, this step should be carefully considered, as a failure to come to an agreement would deal a heavy blow to European defense and play into the hands of revisionist powers like Russia and China.
Though timing is of the essence, some key players may need more time to cope. Germany, for instance, as a central power within the EU, and to a lesser extent NATO, is in the midst of a fundamental change in its security policy that has overthrown many long-held certainties, leaving its government scrambling for new strategies.
Additionally, key veto players that have repeatedly obstructed progress in EU-NATO relations in the past will remain major obstacles to the finality debate. This applies to Turkey, which did not hesitate to initially obstruct Sweden and Finland’s efforts to join NATO to extort concessions. Just like Turkey, Greece and Cyprus have also in the past blocked any attempt to allow sharing of confidential information between the EU and NATO.[xxiii] Without convincing these actors to make concessions, the entire process may fail before it starts. Turkey’s play on Sweden and Finland has shown what costs this could involve but might be worth paying.
Resolving the finality debate will require tremendous negotiation efforts and, most importantly, enormous political pressure to align the multitude of actors involved. The war in Ukraine has raised the stakes significantly and provided the best opportunity yet to advance a debate that will have to be settled if Europeans want to build a durable and effective security order. Building up international pressure and urgency—particularly by leading states on both sides of the Atlantic—must commence now to create conditions that are as favorable as possible for a discussion that has long been deemed just as impossible to resolve as it is necessary.
[i] Nathalie Tocci, “European Strategic Autonomy: What It Is, Why We Need It, How to Achieve It” (IAI – Istituto Affari Internazionali, 2021), https://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/9788893681780.pdf.
[ii] Dick Zandee et al., “European Strategic Autonomy in Security and Defence,” Clingendael Report (Clingendael, December 2020), https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2020-12/Report_European_Strategic_Autonomy_December_2020.pdf.
[iii] Nicole König, “Time to Go beyond the Meta-Debate on EU Strategic Autonomy in Defence,” Policy Brief (Hertie School Jacques Delor Center, April 12, 2020), https://www.delorscentre.eu/de/publikationen/detail/publication/default-f0d46889ce.
[iv] Zandee et al., “European Strategic Autonomy in Security and Defence.”
[v] Jana Puglierin, “Der Strategische Kompass – Ein Fahrplan Für Die Europäische Union Als Sicherheitspolitische Akteurin,” BAKS-Arbeitspapiere (Bundesakademie für Sicherheitspolitik, July 2022), https://www.baks.bund.de/sites/baks010/files/arbeitspapier_sicherheitspolitik_2022_7.pdf.
[vi] Nicole König, “Putin’s War and the Strategic Compass – A Quantum Leap for the EU’s Security and Defence Policy?,” Policy Brief (Hertie School Jacques Delor Center, April 29, 2022), https://hertieschool-f4e6.kxcdn.com/fileadmin/2_Research/1_About_our_research/2_Research_centres/6_Jacques_Delors_Centre/Publications/20220428_Koenig_StrategicCompass.pdf.
[vii] König.
[viii] Azeem Ibrahim, “Europe’s New Security Unity Can Repair Damaged Relationships,” Foreign Policy, March 9, 2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/03/09/europe-ukraine-security-eu-uk-unity-russia/.
[ix] Sven Biscop, “EU and NATO Strategy: A Compass, a Concept, and a Concordat,” Security Policy Brief (EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations, March 2021), https://www.egmontinstitute.be/content/uploads/2021/03/spb141-sven-concordat-final.pdf?type=pdf; Roman Fernandez et al., “Auf Dem Weg Zu Einer Gemeinsamen Europäischen Verteidigungsstrategie,” Le Grand Continent, June 10, 2022.
[x] Mats Engström, “How the Russia-Ukraine Crisis Could Change Sweden’s Security Policy – European Council on Foreign Relations,” ECFR (blog), February 2, 2022, https://ecfr.eu/article/how-the-russia-ukraine-crisis-could-change-swedens-security-policy/.
[xi] Eoin Micheál McNamara, “Evolving Irish Neutrality: Military Opportunities and Political Obstacles” (Royal United Service Institute, July 15, 2022), https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/evolving-irish-neutrality-military-opportunities-and-political-obstacles.
[xii] Iben Tybjærg Schacke-Barfoed and Lykke Friis, “Denmark’s Zeitenwende – European Council on Foreign Relations” (European Council on Foreign Relations, June 7, 2022), https://ecfr.eu/article/denmarks-zeitenwende/.
[xiii] Ulrike Franke and Tara Varma, “Independence Play: Europe’s Pursuit of Strategic Autonomy,” Security Scorecard (European Council on Foreign Relations, July 2018), 3, https://ecfr.eu/wp-content/uploads/Independence-play-Europes-pursuit-of-strategic-autonomy.pdf.
[xiv] Adam Taylor, “The Big Role That Small Countries Are Playing in Supplying Ukraine,” Washington Post, April 14, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/04/14/slovakia-estonia-small-country-supply-weapons-russia-ukraine-germany/.
[xv] Daniel Fiott, “The Fog of War: Russia’s War on Ukraine, European Defence Spending and Military Capabilities,” Intereconomics2022, no. 3 (2022): 152–56.
[xvi] König, “Time to Go beyond the Meta-Debate on EU Strategic Autonomy in Defence.”
[xvii] Thomas Wright, “What a Second Trump Term Would Mean for the World,” The Atlantic, September 30, 2020, sec. Ideas, https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/09/what-trump-second-term-would-do-foreign-policy/616536/; Michael Crowley, “Allies and Former U.S. Officials Fear Trump Could Seek NATO Exit in a Second Term,” The New York Times, September 3, 2020, sec. U.S., https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/03/us/politics/trump-nato-withdraw.html.
[xviii] Franke and Varma, “Independence Play: Europe’s Pursuit of Strategic Autonomy.”
[xix] Tocci, “European Strategic Autonomy: What It Is, Why We Need It, How to Achieve It,” 21.
[xx] Taylor, “The Big Role That Small Countries Are Playing in Supplying Ukraine.”
[xxi] The Economist, “Poland Is Being given an Opportunity to Matter in Europe,” The Economist, July 2, 2022, https://www.economist.com/europe/2022/06/30/poland-is-being-given-an-opportunity-to-matter-in-europe.
[xxii] Borja Lasheras, “Who Speaks for Europe?” (Center for European Policy Analysis, June 22, 2022), https://cepa.org/who-speaks-for-europe/.
[xxiii] König, “Putin’s War and the Strategic Compass – A Quantum Leap for the EU’s Security and Defence Policy?”; Luigi Scazzieri, “Does the Strategic Compass Herald a Stronger EU in Security and Defence?,” Insight, 2022, https://www.cer.eu/sites/default/files/insight_LS_25.3.22.pdf.
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