Operation ‘Linda Nchi’ (Defend the Country)

By Julius Ogayo

Summary 

On October 16, 2011, Alfred Mutua, Kenya’s government spokesperson, reported that the Kenyan Defence Forces (KDF) were launching an invasion into Somalia dubbed “Operation Linda Nchi” (Defend the Country) against the Somali-based terrorist group al-Shabaab. This was followed by several attacks in the east African region where the terrorist group claimed responsibility, particularly in Kenya. Was Kenya justified to attack al-Shabaab in Somalia? Applying a critical discourse analysis, I argue that Kenya acted within its interests, applying preemptive and preventive strategies to protect the country against external aggression. Kenya invoked the right to self-defense by: (1) claiming that its response was based on protecting its national economic interests; (2) announcing that a preventive attack against al-Shabaab terrorists in Somalia was necessary to restore regional peace and security; and (3) grounding their arguments on the classic concept of self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter.  

1. Introduction 

On October 16, 2011, Alfred Mutua, Kenya’s government spokesperson, reported that the Kenyan Defence Forces (KDF) were launching an invasion into Somalia dubbed “Operation Linda Nchi” (Defend the Country) against the Somali based terrorist group al-Shabaab. In his statement, the spokesperson stated that “Kenyan troops are pursuing al-Shabaab across the border … the military will track down and dismantle the al-Shabaab terrorists.” ⁱ A few days later, an anonymous Kenyan official was quoted saying, that the KDF were going all the way to Kismayu, an al-Shabaab controlled port, 155 miles from the Kenyan border to clear al-Shabaab out.ⁱⁱ This leads to the broader question: why did Kenya invade Somalia? What facts were used to justify Kenya’s military operation in Somalia? Kenya invaded al-Shabaab in Somalia to protect its economic interests and against external aggression. Applying Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), this this essay aims to identify the key discourses used to justify the intervention.  

Method: Textual Selection and Analysis 

Critical Discourse Analysis is a theoretical approach of analysis in which methods are selected according to how the object of study is theoretically and discursively constituted.ⁱⁱⁱ Politically, discourse analysis focuses on representation where one mode of representation is adopted at the expense of the other.^iv In practice, textual and social processes in discourse analysis are critically theorized by illustrating their intrinsic relationships and the implications these connections have on our thinking and actions.^v Although scholarship in the discourse field is drawn from different epistemological paradigms, they subscribe to three analytically distinct theoretical underpinnings.^vi In the first instance, discourses are used in defining subjects and determining their relationships in a system.^vii Secondly, by speaking and acting, discourses are (re)produced by authorized subjects, and legitimacy is derived from knowledge and political practices which are sensical in particular times and social settings.^viii Additionally, discourses help in the defining and enabling of events. According to Milliken, “Discourses make intelligent ways of being in and acting towards the world, and of operationalizing a particular ‘regime of truth’ while excluding other possible modes of identity and action.” In giving legitimacy, discourses regulate those who are officially allowed to speak through exclusion, limitation, and restrictions, thereby giving credence and authority to certain views and disqualifies others as inconsequential, inappropriate, and nonsensical.^ix Thirdly, in studying hegemonic discourses, attention is drawn to the understanding that discourses are traditionally contingent, thus they are constantly (re)articulating and efforts at fixing the meaning are often naturally partial.^x Therefore, academics are better equipped to investigate the working of dominant discourses in stabilizing and fixing dominant meaning and how dominant understandings are resisted by alternative discourses.^xi 

The texts, statements, and responses from the senior government officials are selected and used as the legitimate position of the government in deciding to invade al-Shabaab. Analytically, predicate analysis, subject positioning, and presupposition techniques are applied in understanding the decisions arrived at by policymakers.^xii According to Loughlin:  

(p)redicates are the descriptive characteristics, adjectives, and adverbs attached to subjects that convey the subjects’ capabilities; subject positioning determines the agency afforded different subjects and the hierarchical relationships amongst them and presupposition indicates cultural and political understandings that must be held to be ‘true’ if a discourse is to resonate as it must where legitimacy is at stake.^xiii 

A variety of texts as well as dominant discourses are thus created as a result of consistent constructive differences between subjects.^xiv In addition, core political activities are thus evidenced when there is a consistent constructive relationship between identity and policy.^xv Thus, identity and policy are detached during analysis; however, in practice the two are discursively constituted and therefore are inseparable.^xvi 

2. Taking Responsibility: Invasion of al-Shabaab in Somalia 

The theory of neo-classical realism from which foreign policy decision-making is underpinned illustrates that states, and thus policymakers, are guided by national interest given the conditions and possibilities within the framework of the international system.^xvii This theory maintains that foreign policy decision-makers are primarily concerned with the national “hard core interests” and “core concerns” referred to as the economic wealth and national security.^xviii,xix 

Lee argues that security strategies are not constructed and not a consequence of security events, but rather as a result of interpretation of and responses to events which are constructed by particular intentions, interests, and historical conditions.^xx By putting these into perspective, the concepts of “hardcore security interest” and “core economic concerns” are illustrated below, giving meaning and justification to Kenya’s actionsactions. 

1. Hard Core Security Interests 

Modern global terrorist activities and threats have shaped both local and international security policies. In the wake of global terrorism, nations have been compelled to  use force, which has attracted both support and criticism.^xxi There are four legal claims where the use of force can be made under current international security law and UN resolutions. First, under humanitarian intervention, force is applicable when states want to protect their citizens, mainly to prevent massacres and genocide. Examples include the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 794/1992 in Rwanda, Kosovo, Bosnia, Mali, and Somalia to bring UN peacekeeping missions.^xxii Secondly, force is applied under the right to self-defense, like in the case of the US against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda network in Afghanistan.^xxiii Third, force can be applied under intervention by invitation or consent from a host country, for instance in the case of French invitation to Mali, UN Resolution 2085, which aimed at full restoration of Mali’s constitutional order and territorial integrity.^xxiv Finally, force applies under UN Security Council authorization, for instance UN resolution 678/1990, which authorized the use of force against Iraq in response to its August 2^nd, 1990 invasion and subsequent occupation of Kuwait.^xxv   

Invoking the UN resolution under Article 51, “The Right to self-defense”, Kenya decided to invade the al-Shabaab terrorist group in Somalia on October 16, 2011.^xxvi In a joint communique from Kenyan and Somali government delegations, led by Kenya’s Prime Minister Raila Odinga and Somalia’s Prime Minister Mohamed Ali, respectively, in Nairobi on October 31^st 2011, the leaders stated that Kenya’s security operation inside Somalia was aimed at eliminating the threat posed by al-Shabaab to Kenya’s national security and its economic wellbeing. They further said that the operation was based on the legitimate right to self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter.^xxvii 

Under the right to self-defense, the concept of anticipatory self- defense is argued to be permissible. Three main types of anticipatory self-defense exercised constitute interceptive, pre-emptive, and preventive self-defense.^xxviii Preventive self-defense arises when an immediate threat is undisputed, and evidence exists of an imminent threat from unprovoked aggression. In the period preceding the intervention, there was credible intelligence that the al-Shabaab terrorist group would continue to attack Kenya.^xxix Evidence of attacks forced Kenya to apply preventive self-defense strategies to respond to the presumed future and immediate threats.^xxx 

  Addressing Parliament in the eve of Kenya’s invasion, the minister for Internal Security George Saitoti said, “Kenya has been and remains an island of peace and we shall not allow criminals from Somalia to destabilize our peace.”^xxxi In a quick rejoinder, the Minister for Foreign Affairs Moses Wentangula, in his ministerial address to parliament said, “Operation Linda Nchi is about a threat to our national security, about Kenya’s claim to self-defense, and about securing Kenya’s national interests.”^xxxii In their words, the ministers were categorically justifying that Kenya was making a decision to protect itself from terrorism that threatened its national security and interests. As senior government officials, their statements gave legitimacy to the Kenyan government’s actions to contain al-Shabaab.  Following on the same note at the defense headquarters, Kenya’s chief of defense forces General Julius Karangi, reaffirmed that the mission was to a greater extent about national interests and security and that it would stop when the militia group was defeated. He said, for Kenyans to feel safe, al-Shabaab would have to be severely degraded.^xxxiii From the above extract, Karangi is very categorical of the safety of Kenya and its people. He said that this would only be possible when the terror group is severely degraded. In addition, he stated that the operation has no specified end time and that Kenyan forces will be withdrawn  from Somalia when al-Shabaab is completely defeated. This emphasizes the actions that the Kenyan authorities will take to ensure that the terror group is ultimately rooted out of Somalia and that the region is free from the group. By virtue of being the head of the military, the Chief of Defense is an authorized spokesperson of the defense forces for operations and activities, and hence his statement is considered a legitimate governmental position. 

The governments duty to protect the nation and its citizens obligates them  to anticipate and counter threats using all elements of national power before the threats can cause grave damage.^xxxiv By stating and reaffirming that it will be “taking anticipatory action to defend itself,”^xxxv the government’s position was further bolstered by the Chairperson of the Defense and Foreign Relations Committee in the Parliament, Hon. Adan Keynan, when he stated that Parliament needed to step in to ensure the sovereignty of the country is protected. He further stated that the cardinal responsibility of a government is to protect its sovereignty which is hinged on enough security on internationally recognized borders. In addition, he said that the security of the people of Kenya and its visitors cannot be compromised.^xxxvi  

The UN charter recognises the right of anticipatory self-defense against an imminent attack is specified under the customary international law. It is important to note that waiting until an attack occurs before a state can permissibly claim self-defense deprives states of exercising their right to primary defense when attacks happen, stripping away the element of self-defense. Therefore, pre-emptive use of force against imminent attacks or threats is considered legal.^{xxxvii,xxxviii} Due to the complexities involved in the effective use of force against an imminent threat, states resort to targeting terrorists by using force early to strike their training camps and military installation bases in foreign territories to weaken their capabilities.^xxxix As alluded to by Kenya’s military operation commander Col. Cyrus Oguna, the ongoing operation mostly destroyed al-Shabaab’s financial, logistical, and tactical infrastructure, thus making the militia unable to carry out major operations.^xl Reiterating the ongoing operation, Reuters reported that the Kenyan Air Force, supported by naval fire, destroyed a key al-Shabaab/al-Qaeda cargo military base, a command centre in Munarani, and a training facility in Hola Wajeer/Lacta area in Badhadhe district, Lower Jubba. This infrastructure accommodated foreign fighters, most of who were trainers of al-Shabaab fighters.^xli 

In the face of this uncertainty and need to secure the country, Kenya justified the need to launch an attack against al-Shabaab in Somalia, in spite of the fact that it was official Kenyan policy not to interfere in Somalia’s internal affairs.  

2. Core Economic Concerns 

Core economic concerns involves making the country safe for economic growth, development, and for attracting both local and foreign investment.^xlii,xliii Preceding the launch of the invasion, expectations were high about Kenya becoming an oil producing country after vast deposits of oil and gas were discovered at both off-shore and inland locations. With the rise of al-Shabaab in the region, a significant military response was perceived as the obvious answer to the threat and to establishing security in the country.^xliv,xlv On September 21, 2011, the French oil giant Total Energies acquired a 40% interest in five offshore exploration blocks in the Kenya Lamu basin.^xlvi Six months after the invasion, oil was struck in northwestern Kenya, bordering South Sudan and Ethiopia.^xlvii,xlviii. In addition to the oil exploration activities at the time, Kenya was working on the most extensive infrastructure development project in the country’s history named “Lamu Port Southern Sudan Ethiopia Transport Corridor” (LAPSSET), which was worth 24.7 billion US dollars, linking Kenya to South Sudan and Ethiopia, as well as serving over 120 million people in the region.^xlix Thus, terrorist activities by the militant group concerned the Kenyan authorities, since it threatened the nation’s core economic interests. Trade and economic prospects necessitated the need “to create a safe investment climate”.^l Further justifying its action, Kenya maintained that the Somali-based al-Shabaab’s frequent kidnapping and killing of tourists in the coastal and northeastern parts of the country had become a threat to tourism, which has always been one of the key sectors in terms of foreign exchange earnings.^li In responding to the kidnaping and killing concerns, and flanked by the Defense Minister, the Minister for Internal Security Prof. George Saitoti, reading a joint statement, said that: 

the Kenyan Government has decided to take robust measures to protect and preserve the integrity of the country and the national economy and security – The government had taken specific measures to enhance security for its citizens and visitors – The steps include increased surveillance at the Coast and border points with special emphasis on tourist locations, additional boats patrolling the Indian Ocean and the adoption of a joint plan with hotels to enhance response to any threats.^lii 

3. Global Counter-Terrorism 

According to Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis, war on terror is a form of rhetorical bombardment, producing predictive and prescriptive imaginaries.^liii However, for Stampnitzky, the war on terror is a “social product forged and developed by experts and policymakers who have gradually modelled the existing phenomena of political violence into the new category of terrorism.”^liv Within this process, Malito argues that scholars have focused on the semantic and semiotic struggles generated by the word ‘terrorism’.^lv 

Global War on Terrorism (GWoT) is said to be a type of intervention in which there is an attempt to conjugate the security priorities of the intervening state; it includes disrupting and detecting militant activities perceived as a threat to the national security.^lvi According to Malito, the doctrine of the GWoT is rooted in the deductive and reductionist logic that associates the state’s failure to fight terror with international terrorism. Responding to terrorist activities in Northern Ireland in 1985, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher asserted that democracies must devise ways of starving terrorists from their livelihoods to ensure that they are stopped and destroyed as a result of their heinous acts.^lvii The fight against terrorism intensified after terror attacks in Bali in 2002, Madrid in 2004, London in 2005, and Glasgow in 2007.^lviii In their rallying call, the UK, France, Russia, Japan, Israel, India, and Australia categorically supported the need and duty to defend themselves against terrorism and called for the criteria of using force to be amended, by extension changing the international law on sovereignty of states.^lix 

Though it was not the first attack worldwide, efforts to fight global terrorism intensified immediately after the September 11^th, 2001 attacks by the Osama bin Laden terror network, al-Qaeda.^lx Declaring a GWoT in the wake of the US terrorist attacks, President George Bush, in his State of the Union address, said, “Our war on terror begins with al-Qaeda, but it does not end there, it will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.”^lxi In his quest to build a global coalition to fight terrorism, later dubbed the Bush Doctrine, President Bush further stated that it was time for nations to choose, stating “Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.”^lxii This was a clear indication that terrorism was creating a significant security threat not only to the U.S., but to the whole world and every nation was being called upon to take its position on the war on terror. 

Kenya had “good neighbour” foreign policy principles with Somalia since idependence in 1963, which included hosting Somali refugees, parliament, interim government, and never attacking Somali.^lxiii However, this changed when Kenya invoked Article 51 recognizing its right to self-defense following constant attacks by tal-Shabaab.^lxiv Kenyan authorities, acting on this premise, decided to prioritise and invest significantly in counterterrorism measures to protect its interest and security against terrorist threats. Affirming its commitment to the GWoT, Kenya has been active in supporting the West in their efforts to identify, arrest, and detain suspected terrorists^lxv as a strategic ally of the U.S. in its counterterrorism efforts. This has made it a target of terrorists operating in the region. A U.S. State Department report released on April 30, 2014 stated that Kenya’s counterterrorism co-operation with the United States and other partner nations remained strong and that Kenya was a strong ally of the United States in the fight against al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda.^lxvi 

Despite frequent attacks, Kenya has continued to work closely with the international community and the U.S. in particular to ensure that the east African region is safe. The intervention in Somalia has been a reaffirmation to the world, but particularly to the U.S., that Kenya is a ‘reliable partner’ in the global war on terror and thus can be trusted.^lxvii Internationally, Kenya has received considerable attention by promoting itself as a “regional peacemaker” worth investing in.^lxviii,lxix As a result of this, Kenya has continued to be among the largest African recipient of Western foreign aid and security-related assistance.^lxx According to the U.S., the emergence of Islamism in the region put Kenya on the frontline in the global fight against terrorism.^lxxi As a result, Washington and Nairobi are working closely together to eliminate piracy in the Indian Ocean and to stop terrorist activities in the region, which has led the U.S. State Department to increase its counterterrorism funding to Kenya from 4.5 million US dollars in 2006 to an estimated 8 million USD in 2011.^lxxii This funding has increased to 135 USD as of 2015.^lxxiii On the official Kenya Defence Forces page, Operation Linda Nchi was described as successful because KDF was able to destroy all the military and logistical operation bases in Somalia.^lxxiv Kenya has also managed to prevent further internal attacks which where serious threats to national security.^lxxv The account stated that Operation Linda Nchi was one of the most successful operations against international terrorism in recent times. It further stated that the success in Somalia was a clear testimony of an African initiative to solve a regional problem that had raised global concern.^lxxvi 

4. Conclusion 

The contemporary concept of self-defense is intricate because significant effort is required to construct the need for interventions under Article 51 of the UN Charter. The main questions, which remain quite controversial, are whether pre-emptive and preventive strikes are allowed in international law. Does the desire to protect nationals qualify as a suitable reason for invoking self-defense and whether the self-defense against global terrorism is a new concept of international law or an extension of the classical theory, and whether it is self-defence at all? 

The question of whether Kenya had a right to self-defense is not arguable. However, the incidents attributed to al-Shabaab in Kenya’s territory warranted an equally aggressive attack. Kenya therefore invoked the right to self-defense in three ways: (1) claiming that its response was to protect its national economic interests, (2) announcing that a preventive attack against al-Shabaab terrorists in Somalia was necessary to restore regional peace and security, and (3) grounding their arguments on the classic concept of self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter. Thus, the decision to invade al-Shabaab in Somalia under Article 51 was based on strong recombination of economic and security discources.  

Furthermore, preventive self-defense was indeed necessary to mitigate frequent terror attacks from al-Shabaab. It is in compliance with these principles and the “no other means” requirement in the preventive war case that a conclusion can be made. Kenya did have the right to self-defense and actually exercised it proportionally to the threat, and according to necessity and “lack of other means” principles. 

Finally, Kenya’s involvement against al-Shabaab in the region has boosted its image in the global war on terror. The success of KDF in Somalia has made Kenya the regional superpower. Kenya’s efforts to maintain security in the region by confronting al-Shabaab head-on has made the country regarded as a “strong” and “reliable” partner who can be “trusted”^lxxvii internationally in the fight against terrorism.   

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