By: David Traugott
For decades, the international community considered independent Kenya to be a “bastion of economic and political stability in a volatile region” because of its relative stability.[i] However, extreme post-election violence from December 2007 to February 2008 shattered this favorable image. Longstanding ethnic grievances fueled the conflict, as members of the oppressed Luo and Kalenjin ethnic groups took up arms against the majority Kikuyu population.[ii]Numerous international organizations and countries denounced the violence, but only the United States went as far as to declare the violence as ethnic cleansing.[iii] The political violence ended with a power-sharing agreement known as the National Accord and Reconciliation Act of 2008. However, concern remained among Kenyan citizens and international peacekeeping groups that this violent flare-up fully severed already-fraught ethnic relations, and similar violence would come again during the next election cycle.
Despite these worries, the election cycles in 2013 and 2017 came and went with relative peace. However, watchdog groups like Human Rights Watch pointed out the illegal means by which Kenyan authorities ensured a widespread negative peace, one that failed to address root causes of societal violence and inequalities. Such methods included “unlawful killings and beatings by police,” especially in former violence hotspots.[iv] However, during elections on August 9, 2022, Kenya did not need police suppression to keep the peace. Rather, the people did so themselves, withstanding ongoing political polarization and overt threats of violence to win a peaceful transition of power. This development suggests that Kenyan democracy has become strong enough to prevent electoral violence on its own.
This paper seeks to identify and explain the root causes of electoral peace in 2022 by analyzing quantitative and qualitative data obtained during field research by the author in Nairobi during the summer of 2022. The research process involved twenty-four participants, selected from the network of my research assistant, filling out a Likert scale survey questionnaire [Appendix B], and then going through a semi-structured, in-person, oral interview. The project’s participants work in one of three sectors of Kenyan society—civil society, peace committees, or education—and received different interview questions depending on their employment [Appendices C/D/E]. The participants shared their deep and wide-ranging opinions of Kenyan history, politics, and life.
The research surveys were conducted before the election, and thus participants discussed in hypothetical terms the possibility of peace in the August election. The majority of participants pointed towards four specific phenomena that proved instrumental in keeping the peace during the election cycle: the promulgation of a new Kenyan constitution, strengthened civil society, lack of overdependence on a single candidate to better one’s life, and fading importance of ethnicity. These four developments, whose impact has become more and more apparent since the 2007 violence, could explain Kenya’s peaceful 2022 election.
I. Background
To better understand the context of the 2022 elections, it is important to first understand the connections between Kenya’s longstanding socio-economic grievances and the outburst of violence in 2007. Even after the violence, relative deprivation in political and economic sectors remains prominent in Kenyan society. Furthermore, throughout the field research project, painful memories and trauma from the 2007 violence had a pervasive, tangible background presence. The 2007 violence looms large in both individual and national memory.[v] A tumultuous recent history, as well as persistent challenges that reach into the country today, all combined to create a tense atmosphere that characterized the 2022 elections.
A History of Ethnic Relative Deprivation
Kenya has a long history of ethnic conflict. After the Imperial British East Africa Company established an official colony in 1895, British settlers arrived in larger and larger numbers and land claiming accelerated to accommodate them. Settlers gravitated towards the “White Highlands” plateau land that, because of its high altitude, was arable and temperate.[vi] With good land, weather that more closely resembled that of northern Europe, and a lack of mosquitos, it was the ideal place for British colonists. To build their European-style ranches, plantations, and commercial estates, the British evicted the land’s inhabitants, all of whom had deep, intertwined spiritual and economic ties to the land formed from centuries of tradition.[vii] Displaced to faraway regions, most of the indigenous people never returned to their ancestral lands.[viii]
British deportation of indigenous Kenyans planted the seeds for exploitation, nepotism, and future land conflict. When Kenya gained independence on December 12, 1963, the British ceded political power and that land to Jomo Kenyatta, a prominent member of the Kikuyu tribe. Both the British and Kenyatta failed to address the wants and needs of the original inhabitants of the land. Marginalized groups remained disconnected from their homes, and the precedent of only the president wielding the power to bestow land based on “racially exclusive and class-based lines” became engrained in Kenyan society, according to Professor Kathleen Klaus.[ix] As such, the presidency became the ultimate prize for the leaders of prominent ethnic groups. The position offered the president an opportunity to appoint friends, families, and allies into influential federal positions that brought wealth, power, and development to their ethnic communities. Since 1963, the Kenyatta family has produced two presidents and has certainly benefitted from nepotism as the family owns more than 20% of the country’s physical land today by itself while indigenous people remained left behind. [x]
Daniel arap Moi from the Kalenjin tribe ruled Kenya from 1978 to 2002, but members of the Kikuyu tribe have historically controlled the presidency, along with Kenya’s land and economy. Kikuyu political and economic domination fostered resentment against them from other major ethnic groups, especially the Luo and Luyah, whose wait for the presidency has lasted decades.[xi] As such, in 2007, when Kikuyu incumbent Mwai Kibaki faced long-standing Luo candidate Raila Odinga, Luos finally felt like it was their turn to “eat from the seat” of the presidency.[xii]
Tensions Explode: Kenya’s 2007-2008 Election
Anger over the political and economic exclusion of certain ethnic groups provided kindling for the 2007 violence.[xiii] The Kikuyu-Luo showdown brought to the election all of the historical resentment of the Luo, who had lost their land to the British and remained the final “big three” group—besides the Kikuyu and Kalenjin— to never hold the presidency.[xiv] In 2007, Luos thought Raila could finally break the Kikuyu monopoly on political and economic power.[xv] Tensions simmered in the weeks and months leading up to the election before boiling over into extreme violence on election night. Raila held the lead for most of the returns, but a sudden TV and media blackout held off his official victory. When the TVs turned back on, Kibaki had made a “mathematically impossible” comeback and had already been sworn in during an unusual nighttime ceremony, as one participant remembered.[xvi] Violence broke out immediately.
The following conflict devasted Kenya. When the dust settled two months later, at least 1,300 had died, 700,000 fled their homes, four million lost their land, and domestic violence increased 35-fold.[xvii] As some participants remember, police and armed militant groups shut down motorways which froze movement across the country.[xviii]Prices of basic commodities skyrocketed with one interviewee recalled how the price of tomatoes tripled.[xix] The violence tore apart Kenya’s social fabric, as Kenyans viewed their neighbors of different ethnic groups as active physical threats. As one Luyah participant remembered: “There was a lot of fear. You know, you would not even take food from your Kikuyu neighbor. You feared they had poisoned that food. That was the level of hatred and anarchy that it had come to.”[xx]
Fears of Violence in 2022
After two relatively peaceful election cycles, severe economic hardship and inflammatory political rhetoric before the 2022 elections caused ordinary Kenyans to worry once again about electoral violence. Increased prices for foodstuffs and gasoline hit the youth population aged 15 to 35 especially hard as they were facing a 67% unemployment rate.[xxi]Interviewees spoke about how in previous episodes of violence, politicians recruited vulnerable young people “in the illicit brew dens, and in Kikaos,” or informal places on the side of the road where people meet to discuss politics and to harass, intimidate, or even attack political opposition.[xxii] Unprecedented economic hardship during the 2022 election cycle made youth desperate to put food on the table for their families. It seemed possible that they would be even more drawn to these violent groups, opening the door for a return to violence not seen since 2007.
To add to the worry, then-Deputy President William Ruto, Raila’s opponent in the 2022 election, is infamous for his history of inciting political violence. In 2010, the International Criminal Court (ICC) summoned Ruto for suspected “murder, deportation, persecutions and torture” crimes that took place during the 2007 violence.[xxiii] Although he was later acquitted, Kenyans still worried that he would do something similar in 2022.[xxiv]
He did, to a degree. Ruto capitalized on the plight of the ordinary Kenyan by inventing the “hustlers versus dynasty” political campaign narrative that brought an economically and socially divisive message to Kenya’s 2022 election landscape. “Hustlers versus dynasty” cast those urban poor who sell food or trinkets on the side of the road against the “dynasty,” defined by Ruto as members of a handful of Kenya’s most powerful families who became wealthy at Kenya’s expense.[xxv] The Raila and Odinga family fell into this category, as did, by extension, their supporters. The hustler versus dynasty narrative added additional socio-economic division to the country’s persistent inequalities and economic woes.
A number of the project’s participants worried that Ruto’s “hustler versus dynasty” narrative would lead to violence similar to, or worse than, that of 2007. As pointed out by a Somali Kenyan who works in mental health, the people who make up the “rich” is subjective: it “doesn’t necessarily mean ‘créme de la crème’ dynasty rich, it means that neighbor that has more than you rich.”[xxvi] The perception of another as “wealthy” depends on one’s perceived relative deprivation. As such, in the poorest and most dangerous parts of Nairobi, like Mathare slum, a member of the “dynasty” may just be someone with a bicycle or wearing a suit walking down the street. In low-income areas outside of the informal settlements a “dynasty” could be someone driving a car. In such times of economic hardship, some participants predicted that the rich would be perceived to be “everywhere” and targeted.[xxvii] The same mental health worker attested that her clients expressed an “anticipation of doom” that pervaded her neighborhood of Eastleigh, a neighborhood dominated by Somali refugees and their families. This anxiety was so potent that some of her older patients said that their feelings towards the 2022 elections mirrored those that they had prior to the outbreak of the civil war that caused them to flee Somalia in the first place.[xxviii] Other Kenyans who were born in the country predicted that 2022’s election would make 2007’s violence “just a shadow” of what was to come.[xxix]
II. Explaining Kenya’s Peaceful 2022 Elections
Longstanding economic and political grievances, unprecedented economic hardship, and a divisive election narrative created the anticipation of election violence. However, despite these warning signs, Kenya enjoyed its most peaceful election yet. I argue that four developments explain how Kenya overcame its difficult circumstances in 2022: the promulgation of a new Kenyan constitution, strengthened civil society, lack of overdependence on a single candidate to better one’s life, and fading importance of ethnicity.
The Importance of the Constitution
In response to the 2007 electoral violence, the Kenyan government instituted a wide array of political changes that attempted to address longstanding grievances. Kenya’s new constitution, developed as a response to the election violence and promulgated on August 27, 2010, was at the center of this post-conflict effort. Research participants lauded the document as it recognized rights to healthcare, food, education, and housing, and made strides toward gender equality.[xxx] As such, when participants were asked to rate their favorability of the constitution on a scale from one to ten, the average score came out to 8.0/10 [Appendix B].
The constitution recognized the human rights of the common citizen (mwananchi) and mandated the creation of independent commissions that address certain societal ills. For example, the National Land Commission (NLC) that was operationalized in February 2012 works to eradicate Kenya’s land conflicts that have plagued the country since its independence.[xxxi] They broadly work to “secure and manage public land and exercise oversight of use of land for the benefit of all Kenyans,” as declared on their website.[xxxii] So far, the NLC has successfully digitized land records in Nairobi, which, according to one interviewee, has brought “clarity on the procedures of owning land and how to address land injustice.”[xxxiii] The NLC’s work has helped to minimize land disputes, both between neighbors and those initiated by government overstep.
The election violence of 2007 spurred the creation of other institutions as well. The National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC) was formed in 2008 “to promote national identity and values, mitigate ethno-political competition and ethnically motivated violence, eliminate discrimination…and promote national reconciliation and healing.”[xxxiv] The NCIC worked to mend ethnic divides on a social level, an effort that helped to prevent violence in the 2022 election cycle. One participant discussed how the NCIC mapped out potential conflict hotspots, “which prepared the security agents in the sense that they know where the focus should be of ensuring there’s no violence,” and engaged youth with their “Election Without Violence” (uchaguzi bila noma) social media campaign.[xxxv] In addition, the Election Observers Group (ELOG) became a bulwark against political violence. Their parallel vote tabulation system increased citizens’ faith in a fair and free election.[xxxvi] In addressing two intertwined causes of violence in 2007—ethnic division and a perceived stolen election—the NCIC and ELOG contributed to a peaceful election in August 2022.
While these institutions played a role in keeping the peace, the degree to which they did so remained a point of disagreement between participants. Some doubt the implementation of constitutional measures. Indeed, in contrast to the constitution’s high average score of 8.0/10, participants rated the land reform period from 2012-2016 at just 5.0/10 [Appendix B]. Jaded participants placed most of the blame on the fact that those in charge of the constitution’s implementation are the same corrupt career politicians who served since before the election violence. With no political will to change Kenya’s political systems from which they personally benefit, these politicians can appoint friends and allies into key commission roles. As such, unqualified or corrupt politicians weaken these commissions. One participant lamented that “independent bodies are toothless…They can’t chew cassava.” Cassava is a soft vegetable that is popular in Kenya, symbolizing their inability to perform their basic mandated functions.
Others, however, expressed a greater degree of faith in the implementation of improvements mandated by the constitution that would bring tangible improvements to the lives of ordinary Kenyans. Some said that these commissions just need time. Two elections had come and gone, and, within that period of time, the NCIC and others have “start[ed] to flex its muscles,” enabling them to plan, fund, and carry out vital projects that contributed to electoral peace. Their very existence has also forced politicians to stay “on their toes,” which has limited illegal behavior.[xxxvii] Constitutionally mandated commissions have brought positive change to Kenya, but their degree of success remains up for debate.
The Rise of Kenyan Civil Society
Although some participants remained jaded about the real-world impact of Kenya’s new constitution, they praised the document for its ability to serve as a “reference point” for human rights defenders to justify their work and hold their leaders accountable.[xxxviii] In this way, the constitution, despite its shortcomings, mandated the creation of a whole host of new civil society organizations whose efforts contributed to Kenya’s electoral peace in August 2022. Fourteen out of the twenty-four people interviewed during the research period came from a newly formed Nairobian civil society organization (CSOs) or nongovernmental organization (NGO), which gave an in-depth look into their work.
The majority of these organizations work with youth living in informal settlements because youth populations fueled the violence of 2007. Poverty and “idleness,” a word used by research participants to refer Kenya’s shortage of meaningful work, makes these young people desperate for money. It also instills a sense of powerlessness, hopelessness, and leaves them searching for someone or something on which they can place the blame. This sum of attitudes primes youth populations for political manipulation, particularly during times of economic hardship such as in 2022.[xxxix]Nairobi’s slums, crowded with tens of thousands of unemployed, frustrated youth were hotbeds of election violence in 2008.[xl] Kibera, the largest slum in Africa, which houses between 250,000 and 1,000,000 people, has been “historically linked to violence associated with elections.”[xli]
One survey participant works for a youth CSO in Kibera. He recounted to me how the Mungiki, an outlawed Kikuyu gang infamous for their viciousness, came to Kibera in 2007 dressed as policemen and fought youth there. When these “policemen’s” dreadlocks flew out when their helmets got knocked off during combat, he knew that they were Mungiki because dreadlocks, the signature hair style of the Mungiki, are deemed unprofessional throughout Kenyan society. A real police officer would never have them.[xlii]
The Mungiki wreaked havoc in Kibera during the 2007 election violence. But in modern Kenya, civil society has operated in these previous hotspots of violence to prevent conflict. In Kibera itself, one youth peacebuilding organization founded five years after those events in 2013 aims to prevent similar events from happening again through their programming that targets Kibera’s most vulnerable populations. For example, one member discussed how skits and poems give young people hope, educates them about their rights, and eradicates the idleness and hopelessness so common in slum youth that made their recruitment into groups like the Mungiki possible. [xliii]
Organizations like these are prevalent throughout Nairobi. They have formed a network that brings peacebuilding messages to vulnerable areas across the city. Peace for Change works in Mathare slum where youth, pushed by economic desperation, often loot the nearby commercial hub of Eastleigh during times of turmoil. The organization trains young people to mitigate conflict and build peace, which lessens the risk that they will engage in violence. Another CSO, Naweza 254, works in a handful of informal settlements to create a “culture of reading.”[xliv] Education is vital to prevent violence in the slums. It empowers children to find their vocation and gives them the tools to improve life for themselves, their families, and neighbors. Training at-risk youth to read, think critically, and creatively solve problems undermines the economic desperation, hopelessness, and relative deprivation that featured so prominently in the 2007 violence. As such, CSO projects that center around education mitigate the potential for conflict.
Additionally, NGOs that act as political pressure groups have grown in strength. On June 12, 2022, I spoke with the founder of a women’s rights organization. Her organization, along with others, symbolically ratified the mwananchi budget on May 1, a proposed financial plan that takes the needs of the common citizens into account. Two weeks later, on May 17, they held a large protest in the Central Business District to demand its official passage. These kinds of protests have become more potent, disruptive, and threatening to elites whose power and wealth stem from Kenya’s longstanding inequalities. These NGOS have faced serious pushback. The founder testified that she and others received Twitter suspensions after posting about the mwananchi budget. There are reports of the government refusing the reregistration of new social justice organizations and imprisoning, or even disappearing, human rights defenders.[xlv] Recently, Kenya’s civil society has seen increased success in forcing the government to hear common mwananchi’s needs and desires.
Other organizations designed to provide physical and psychological help to activists have also multiplied since 2007. For example, the National Coalition of Human Rights Defenders creates more effective organizations through capacity building, enhancing digital and physical safety, paying bail if arrests are made, and providing mental health and relocation services.[xlvi] These efforts ensure that NGOs who push back against the status quo can do their work in relative safety, minimizing dangers while maximizing impact.
All in all, civil society work, from micro-level CSOs all the way to well-known NGOs, adds up to having a direct impact on the section of Kenya’s population most likely to engage in election violence. First, such work helps to eradicate the “nothing to lose” attitude that makes youth susceptible to political manipulation. Second, these CSOs redirect intense youthful energy away from violence and towards activities meant for young people, like months-long volleyball tournaments and “Mr. and Mrs. Peace” beauty pageants.[xlvii] The additional focus on education makes it more likely for slum youth to understand their rights so they respond in nonviolent ways to human rights violations. Finally, NGOs give once-disenfranchised citizens more of a voice in national affairs, which limits their political dissatisfaction.
Political Enlightenment and Modern Apathy
In addition to the constitution and the rise of civil society, numerous participants spoke of the declining dependence on the federal government to make life better for ordinary Kenyans. This turn away from dependency has happened for a couple of reasons, according to participant data.[xlviii] Since independence, the Kenyan citizenry has developed more of a political consciousness, or the individual ability to recognize political shortcomings and advocate for positive change. One interviewee, a lifelong teacher, remembers the presidency of Jomo Kenyatta. He described how political consciousness remained low during his reign. Few people questioned the decisions of the father of the country (baba wa taifa) because they had no other Kenyan leader to which they could compare him.[xlix] In short, Kenyatta “himself was law.”[l]
However, Kenyans became more critical of their leaders during the dictatorship of Daniel arap Moi. Moi felt increasing pressure as internal and external discontent of his heavy-handed rule grew, and finally allowed for a multiparty political system in December 1991. The advent of multiparty politics allowed the common people to more easily define their various political needs and desires, and then assign them to preferred political candidates from different parties. Over the next decade, Kenyans came to understand that they had the power to proactively change the political situation inside of their country.[li] Moi’s expulsion in 2002 demonstrates how the voice of the people gained enough power to disrupt the status quo more than forty years after independence.
Because of widespread disapproval of President Uhuru Kenyatta, this political “enlightenment” of Kenya’s ordinary mwananchi manifested as an extreme lack of faith in the two presidential candidates in the months leading up to the August election. Numerous participants spoke to the difficulties they faced under Uhruru Kenyatta’s presidency and their frustration at the lack of solutions. One interviewee lamented that “in these last ten years the economy has gotten worse, taxes have increased…so many people have lost jobs.”[lii] Instead of fixing these fundamental problems within that ten-year period, Kenyatta instituted a number of large projects that did not generally benefit the common person. Most recently, the Nairobi expressway opened. It cost $648 million, and requires a toll anywhere between $1.04 and $15.55, making it unusable for Nairobi’s low to lower-middle class who would benefit most from local travel.[liii]Around the same time the expressway opened, the price of ugali, Kenya’s beloved staple food, rose from 68¢ to $1.61.[liv] With huge, easily advertised projects taking such obvious priority over providing basic necessities, a number of Kenyans believe that politicians care more about their legacy than the common needs of the mwananchi.[lv]
Kenyans lost faith in the country’s executive branch because of its inability or unwillingness to act, which meant that few adhered to a certain candidate so tightly that he or she would fight for them as they did in years past. One participant who works for the Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC) described a lack of enthusiasm permeating this election cycle.[lvi] Hiring people to attend political rallies has become a political “underworld” within Kenya, and the practice was especially rampant during the last campaign season.[lvii] According to the participant, certain Kenyans bought two shirts during election season, one blue and one yellow. Blue represented Raila’s Azimio party, and yellow represented Ruto’s United Democratic Alliance (UDA). They would wait for word of a rally happening nearby, put on the shirt of the respective candidate, and then get paid between $1.00 and $7.00 to show up at the rally. Then, the person would return home and wait for word of another rally. The party did not matter to these ordinary citizens. On these rally-participant-for-hire events, the participant stated, “you’d be shocked how many people do it.” Despite this perceived widespread occurrence, the extent of the practice remains unclear.[lviii] Nonetheless, this shows how economic hardship and political disillusionment intersected to result in a lack of fervency for both Ruto and Raila.
Devolution (serikali ya ugatuzi) also played a role in minimizing the significance of the presidential race. Devolution, mandated by the 2010 constitution, broke up the federal government into forty-eight smaller governments. According to the 2010 constitution, these newly formed county governments “have a range of duties in areas such as the provision of primary health care, the implementation of agricultural policy, and the management of… transportation issues,” along with the allocation of resources.[lix] Unlike before, when presidents had all the power to bestow resources and development, this localization of duties means that Kenyans no longer have to wait for a member of their ethnic group to take the presidency and bring them tangible benefits. Instead, they can depend on locally elected members of parliament (MPs) to do that job. In fact, one participant, so disillusioned by Ruto and Raila, said that Kenyans should skip the presidential vote and instead just focus on their MP races.[lx] Devolution gave local officials the power to better their constituents’ lives, redirecting impassioned political allegiances away from the presidency and towards local, less divisive candidates.
The Fading of Ethnicity
Finally, ethnicity now plays much less of a role in Kenyan politics. Ethnicity played a significant role in the election violence of 2007, as the perception of another Kikuyu power grab was the most immediate trigger of violence. However, numerous participants spoke about how ethnicity, when compared with the situation in 2007, has faded from national view because of urbanization. People from different tribes all around Kenya have converged in Nairobi. This urbanization process played a critical role in 2022’s peaceful elections because of its profound impact on youth in informal settlements. Slums like Kibera and Mathare “have a culture of their own,” bound together not only by the common goal of improving their lives, but also by language.[lxi] Sheng, “an urban or youth language based on Swahili” that rapidly evolves, has become more popular, even replacing Swahili in the slums.[lxii] It now unites youth of different ethnicities, similar to how the principle of Ujamaa in Tanzania used language to unite “a large country of more than 100 ethnicities” into a cohesive postcolonial state.[lxiii] New slum cultures have fragmented Kenya’s traditional focus on ethnicity, which erodes one of the main causal factors of 2007’s extreme election violence.
In addition, inside and outside of Nairobi, educational reform further closes the gap between once-competing ethnic groups. Schools are often the places where Kenyans learn about ethnicity for the first time. For example, one Luo participant that I interviewed left their community for the first time to go to university. They told me that when Kenyans leave home to go to school, they “can’t ignore [ethnicity] anymore. You now know that people come from different places.”[lxiv] Children spend most of their impressionable, formative years in the classroom setting. As such, what they are taught can either be “the most tangible promoter of instability” or “an incentive for potentially aggressive parties to buy into peace.”[lxv] Indeed, education remains a key sector of focus in peacebuilding.
In Kenya, the Competence Based Curriculum (CBC), established in 2017, aims to undermine Kenya’s longstanding prejudices by allowing students to explore other cultures early in their lives.[lxvi] One primary school teacher in Baba Dogo, a low-income neighborhood hit hard by election violence in 2007, praised the curriculum for promoting cultural sensitivity. CBC students must learn the language of another Kenyan ethnicity, study the other’s culture and traditions, and even prepare meals from different communities. Such activities instill an appreciation of diversity within participating students. The curriculum design also rewards students who may not excel in traditional subject matters, as it allows them to explore other trades, like cooking or textile-making.[lxvii] The CBC’s ability to encompass more subject matters increases the chances that a student may find his or her calling in life, which further cuts down on youth idleness and hopelessness. The CBC, along with other educational reforms like the delocalization of teachers so that members of other ethnic groups can teach children, has made Kenyan youth—the population most vulnerable to political recruitment—much more accepting of other ethnicities which further cuts down on the risk of election violence.
According to survey data, ethnic relations seem healthy. When participants were asked to rate their relationships with other ethnic groups on a scale of one to ten, the average came out to 8.4/10. When asked about relationships with ethnic groups traditionally “opposed” to theirs, the number dropped to 7.3/10. Ethnic animosities remain, but this high score bodes well for violence prevention, especially considering the extreme violence that took place less than fifteen years ago.
While it may have saved lives, however, ethnicity lessening in importance saddened some project participants. One Luhya participant said that his daughter cannot speak 50% of his language.[lxviii] Another Luo confirmed this loss of language and talked about how parents no longer use tribal names.[lxix] As seen during the field research process, older Kenyans feel some kind of nostalgia for times past. While modern efforts to limit the importance of ethnicity both as a political and social identity do prevent violence, the urban death of ethnic tradition remains a tragedy for some Kenyans.
III. Conclusion
When campaign season officially began in May 2022, numerous signs pointed to violence on the horizon: Kenya’s historical grievances remained inadequately addressed, economic desperation abounded, rumors circulated of politicians once again recruiting youth to form groups that could turn violent on their command, and the “hustlers versus dynasty” election narrative threatened to turn people against one another to a degree not seen since 2007. Yet, the average of the final survey question assessing whether “there is a serious possibility of serious violence breaking out in the August election cycle,” came out to 6.4/10. This middling number, with ten indicating the highest possible level of distress, denotes weariness, but not outright alarm. Most, if not all, participants had some sort of confidence in either political reforms, the strength of Kenyan civil society, citizen “enlightenment,” or the reduction of ethnicity’s significance to prevent widespread election violence [Appendix B].
Kenyans still face a variety of serious problems that have not improved since Ruto’s election. Some participants attest that ethnic discrimination at the workplace continues, especially during hiring processes.[lxx] Land issues remain unresolved, something that one Luhya is especially concerned about, stating, “the earlier [the land issue] is solved, the better. Or else our grandchildren will kill each other one day.” Finally, wealth inequality and corruption are still embedded “in the DNA” of the country.[lxxi] Despite these issues, Kenya took a major leap forward during the 2022 election cycle. The country’s maturing, strengthening democracy succeeded in overcoming serious dangers to save lives and ensure a peaceful transition of power.
Appendix B: Survey Questionnaire
Please read the following statements carefully. After each one, fill in the line with a number in the range designated by the parenthesis, where the highest number shows complete agreement, and the lowest shows complete disagreement. You have the right to refuse to answer any question. I am happy to answer any questions or concerns you may have.
Participant #:
Year of Birth:
Place of Birth:
Ethnicity:
- Historical Developments and Modern Kenya
- The British stole my ancestor’s land (1-2). ____
- Ethnic divisions got worse under Kibaki and the “Kiambu Mafia” (1-5). ____
- The main reason for the 2007-2008 election violence was historic land grievances (1-10). ____
- Ethnic Relations
- I have good relations with:
- Members of other ethnic groups (1-10). ____
- Members of other ethnic groups traditionally “opposed” to mine (1-10). ____
- The main source of ethnic conflict is Kenya’s history of land grabbing (1-5). ____
- Ethnic relations have improved since 2008 (1-5). ____
- “The handshake” has succeeded in bringing once-hostile ethnic groups closer together (1-5). ____
- Government Reforms
- Since 2008, Kenya has made progress towards:
- Better land distribution (1-5). ____
- Better wealth equality (1-5). ____
- Better political equality (1-5). ____
- Other:
- Ethnic equality has improved since 2008 (1-5). ____
- The 2012-2016 land reform period was successful (1-10). ____
- I have a favorable view of the 2010 constitution (1-5). ____
- The National Land Commission has been effective in addressing and resolving land grievances (1-5). ____
- The forces responsible for holding back more successful land reforms are:
- A governmental system that doesn’t work (1-5). ____
- Politicians who benefit from the status quo (1-5). ____
- Other:
- What prevents progress the most is widespread government corruption (1-5). ____
- The reason why violence has not escalated to 2008 levels in 2013 and 2017 is because of:
- Successful reforms (1-5). ____
- Effective multi-ethnic coalitions (1-5). ____
- Police repression from those in power (1-5). ____
- Other:
- August’s Elections
- For me, land rights is the most important issue in Kenya’s August elections (1-5). ____
- I believe that the person who wins in August will play a role in determining if I get to:
- Keep my title deed (1-5). ____
- Lose my title deed (1-5). ____
- Obtain a title deed (1-5). ____
- During this election cycle, politicians have promised land in order to win votes (1-2). ____
- I believe that dividing the election between “hustlers vs. dynasty” rather than between ethnic groups has lowered the possibility of violence (1-5). ____
- I feel safe to vote in the upcoming election (1-5). ____
- Politicians are the main source of election violence in Kenya (1-5). ____
- The Kikuyu have ways of keeping political control even if they don’t have a candidate running for president (1-5). ____
- There is a serious possibility of serious violence breaking out in August election cycle (1-10). ____
Appendix C: NGO/CBO Worker Interview Question Sheet
Participant Number:
- Tell me a little bit about your work. What kinds of societal problems do you address, and how do you try and solve them? What obstacles do you face?
- What do you remember about Kenya’s 2007 election?
- What do you think were the main reasons for its intensity?
- Do you agree that the violence increased the urgency to create new, positive changes in Kenyan society?
- Have reforms passed since 2010 (like the constitution and the National Land Commission) made your job easier or harder?
- Do you think that it has brought about any kind of positive change, especially concerning social, political, and wealth inequality? Why or why not?
- In your view, have political, economic, and social inequalities in Kenya improved or worsened since the passage of those reforms?
- Let’s talk about how the “hustlers versus dynasty” narrative has changed Kenyan politics. Is the change positive or negative? What kinds of people are voting for one candidate or the other in August 2022, and why?
- How do you think the winner of the August 2022 election will impact your work and society at large?
- What do you think the chances are that this election season sees violence similar to 2008’s? Do you have recommendations that can be done either at a local or political level that can lower the risk for the future?
Appendix D: Peace Committee Member Interview Question Sheet
Participant Number:
- Tell me a little bit about your work. What kinds of societal problems do you address, and how do you try and solve them? What obstacles do you face?
- What do you remember about Kenya’s 2007 election?
- What do you think were the main reasons for its intensity?
- Do you agree that the violence increased the urgency to create new, positive changes in Kenyan society?
- Have reforms passed since 2010 (like the constitution and the National Land Commission) made your job easier or harder?
- Do you think that it has brought about any kind of positive change, especially concerning social, political, and wealth inequality? Why or why not?
- In your view, have political, economic, and social inequalities in Kenya improved or worsened since the passage of those reforms?
- Let’s talk about how the “hustlers versus dynasty” narrative has changed Kenyan politics. Is the change positive or negative? What kinds of people are voting for one candidate or the other in August 2022, and why?
- How do you think the winner of the August 2022 election will impact your work and society at large?
- What do you think the chances are that this election season sees violence similar to 2008’s? Do you have recommendations that can be done either at a local or political level that can lower the risk for the future?
Appendix E: Teacher Interview Question Sheet
Participant Number:
- How do you and/or your family remember the presidencies of Jomo Kenyatta, Daniel arap Moi, and Mwai Kibaki? What changes did they bring to Kenyan society that have an impact on today?
- Have you seen any overall changes in student behavior and relationships since the 2007 election? If so, what?
- Do you think ethnic relationships as a whole have improved or worsened since 2007? Do you see this relationship reflected in your students?
- How has CBC changed students’ perceptions of ethnicity?
- Does it contribute to the acceptance and celebration of differences today?
- Do you think that it will make a more equitable and safer Kenya for all Kenyans in the future?
- Has there been another change in behavior and relationships in this current election season?
- What do you think about William Ruto and Raila Odinga and the alliances that support them? What kinds of people are voting for one candidate or the other in August 2022, and why?
- What can Kenyans do to resolve societal issues and points of conflict? Do you think that some of the techniques do you use in a classroom setting to resolve conflict between students can benefit Kenyan society as a whole? If so, which?
Endnotes
[i] Human Rights Watch, Ballots to Bullets: Organized Political Violence and Kenya’s Crisis of Governance. March 16, 2008. https://www.hrw.org/report/2008/03/16/ballots-bullets/organized-political-violence-and-kenyas crisis-governance.
[ii] Jeffrey Gettleman, “Ethnic Violence in Rift Valley is Tearing Kenya Apart,” NY Times (2008).
[iii] David Lewis, “Arrows rain in Kenyan battles despite peace talks,” Reuters (2008).
[iv] Human Rights Watch, “Kenya: Post-Election Killings, Abuse: Investigate Police Use of Excessive Force; Uphold Right to Peaceful Protest,” 2017. https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/08/27/kenya-post-election-killings-abuse.
[v] Personal communication with project participants, May 21 to June 26, 2022.
[vi] Human Rights Watch, Ballots to Bullets, 2008.
[vii] Catherine Boone, “Land and Distributive Politics in Kenya,” African Studies Review 55, no. 1 (2012): 79.
[viii] Helen Nyambura-Mwaura, “Q + A – Why is land in Kenya a perennial flash point?” Reuters
[ix] Kathleen Klaus, Political Violence in Kenya: Land, Elections, and Claim-Making (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press), 2020: 76.
[x] Confidential Interview, in discussion with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, June 11, 2022.
[xi] Confidential Interview, in discussion with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, May 31, 2022.
[xiii] Hamdi Ibrahim Tartarini, “Marginalization and Democracy: Kenya’s 2007 Post Election Violence,” Syracuse University (2015): 8.
[xv] Reuters Staff, “FACTBOX-Facts about Kenyan Tribes (2008). https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-kenya-election-tribalism/factbox-facts-about-kenyan-tribes-idUKL0163565020080104.
[xvi] Confidential Interview, in discussion with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, May 31, 2022.
[xvii] Kirsten Johnson et al., “A national population-based assessment of 2007 – 2008 election
related violence in Kenya, in Conflict and Health 8, no. 2 (2014).
[xviii] Mary Kimani, “East Africa feels blows of Kenyan crisis,” Africa Renewal (2008).
[xix] Confidential Interview, in discussion with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, June 7, 2022.
[xx] Confidential Interview, in discussion with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, June 20, 2022.
[xxi] Federation of Kenyan Employers.
[xxii] Gezahegn Kebede Gebrehana, “Electoral Justice Traits of Youth-Led Election Violence in
Nairobi’s Informal Settlements” (Walden University, 2021): 56-72. https://scholarworks.waldenu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=11606&context=dissertations.
[xxiii] Reuters Staff, “Kenyan ministers, ex-police chief named as key ICC suspects,” Reuters (2010). https://www.reuters.com/article/warcrimes-kenya/kenyan-ministers-ex-police-chief-named-as-icc-suspects-idUSWEA768620101215.
[xxiv] “Kenya’s William Ruto’s Case dismissed by ICC,” BBC. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-35965760.
[xxv] Confidential Interview, in discussion with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, May 29, 2022.
[xxvi] Confidential Interview, in discussion with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, June 11, 2022.
[xxvii] Confidential Interview, in discussion with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, May 29, 2022.
[xxviii] Confidential Interview, in discussion with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, June 11, 2022.
[xxix] Confidential Interview, in discussion with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, May 29, 2022.
[xxx] Christina Murray, “Kenya’s Constitution.” Jahrbuch des offentlichen Rechts (2013): 13.
[xxxi] National Land Commission, “Our History,” https://landcommission.go.ke/our-history/.
[xxxii] National Land Commission, “Mandate & Functions.” 2017. https://www.landcommission.go.ke/article/mandatefunctions.
[xxxiii] Confidential Interview, in discussion with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, May 28, 2022.
[xxxiv] National Cohesion and Integration Commission Kenya, “NCIC at a Glance.” https://cohesion.or.ke/index.php/about-us/ncic-at-a-glance.
[xxxv] Confidential Interview, in discussion with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, June 1, 2022.
[xxxvi] Parallel vote tabulation (PVT) uses trained election observers to report election irregularities and count votes after the end of election day. Now deployed throughout the world, PVTs “confirm official results and increase public confidence in well-run elections” and “thus, reduce potentials for political conflict.” “What is a Pvt?” National Democratic Institute. https://www.ndi.org/what-pvt.
[xxxvii] Confidential Interview, in discussion with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, May 31, 2022.
[xxxviii] Confidential Interview, in discussion with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, May 22, 2022.
[xxxix] Gebrehana, “Electoral Justice Traits of Youth-Led Election Violence,” 56.
[xl] Paul Letiwa, “Wounds of chaos still festering in city slums,” Daily Nation (2012). https://reliefweb.int/report/kenya/wounds-chaos-still-festering-city-slums.
[xli] Amélie Desgroppes and Sophie Taupin, “Kibera: The Biggest Slum in Africa?” The East African Review (2011): 14.https://journals.openedition.org/eastafrica/521?lang=en.
[xlii] Reuters Staff, “FACTBOX: Key facts about Kenya’s Mungiki gang,” Reuters (2009). https://www.reuters.com/article/us-kenya-gang-mungiki-sb/factbox-key-facts-about-kenyas-mungiki-gang-idUSTRE52537620090306.
[xliii] Confidential Interview, in discussion with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, May 29, 2022.
[xliv] Confidential Interview, in discussion with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, May 22, 2022.
[xlv] Confidential Interview, in discussion with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, June 12, 2022.
[xlvi] Confidential Interview, in discussion with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, June 15, 2022.
[xlvii] Confidential Interview, in discussion with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, May 28, 2022.
[xlviii] Confidential Interview, in discussion with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, June 8, 2022.
[xlix] Confidential Interview, in discussion with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, June 4, 2022.
[l] Confidential Interview, in discussion with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, June 20, 2022.
[li] National Youth Council. “Multiparty Democracy in Kenya.” https://www.nationalyouthcouncil.go.ke/multipartydemocracy-of-kenya/.
[lii] Confidential Interview, in discussion with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, May 29, 2022.
[liii] “Relief for motorists as Kenya opens Nairobi expressway, Africa News (2022). https://www.africanews.com/2022/05/16/relief-for-motorists-as-kenya-opens-nairobiexpressway//.
[liv] Barnabas Bii, “Pain as cost of ugali on the rise,” Nation (2022), https://nation.africa/kenya/news/pain-as- cost-of-ugali-on-the-rise-3849822.
[lv] Confidential Interview, in discussion with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, June 8, 2022.
[lvi] Luke Anami, “Kenya election: Lowest turnout in 15 years as youth stay away,” Zawya (2022).
[lvii] Sidney Chazima and Mercy Simiyu, “Inside the underworld of political crowds for hire,”
Nation Africa (2022).https://nation.africa/kenya/news/inside-shadowy-world-political-crowds-for-hire-3754652.
[lviii] Confidential Interview, in discussion with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, June 13, 2022.
[lix] Eric Kramon and Daniel N. Posner, “Kenya’s New Constitution,” Journal of Democracy (2011): 12.
[lx] Confidential Interview, in discussion with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, June 8, 2022.
[lxi] Confidential Interview, in discussion with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, May 31, 2022.
[lxii] Rose Marie Beck, “Sheng: an urban variety of Swahili in Kenya,” in Youth Language
Practices in Africa and Beyond (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2015): 51.
[lxiii] Jaclynn Ashly, “Tanzania: Remembering ujamaa, the good, the bad, and the buried,” African
Arguments (2020). https://africanarguments.org/2020/12/tanzania-remembering-ujamaa-the-good-the-bad-and-the-buried/.
[lxiv] Confidential Interview, in discussion with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, June 7, 2022.
[lxv] Fatmata Samsura, “Peace Education for Reconstruction and Peacebuilding in Postwar African Societies,” in African Conflict and Peacebuilding 3, no. 2 (2013): 25.
[lxvi] David Njeng’ere and Lili Ji, “The why, what and how of competency-based curriculum
reforms: the Kenyan Experience,” UNESCO (2017): 9.
[lxvii] Confidential Interview, in discussion with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, June 21, 2022.
[lxviii] Confidential Interview, in discussion with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, June 20, 2022.
[lxix] Confidential Interview, in discussion with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, May 31, 2022.
[lxx] Confidential Interview, in discussion with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, June 13, 2022.
[lxxi] Confidential Interview, in discussion with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, June 20, 2022.
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