By Austin Pomianowski
The Russian state, through the leadership and policy of its authoritarian despot Vladimir Putin, has become ideologically influential in Eastern Europe. It gained this influence through the Russian states’ focus on traditional values, rejection of liberalism coming from the European Union and the United States, and political patronage networks that have been established for the mutual benefit of authoritarian or conservative-leaning states. While states such as Poland and Ukraine are skeptical of the motives of the Russian state, the skeptical nature of these states have more to do with their respective history with Russia than issues with the ideology that Putin has institutionalized domestically. Throughout the entirety of Polish, Hungarian, and Ukrainian history, each state has been politically and militarily controlled by the Russian state for varying time periods; Poland and Ukraine during both the Tsarist and Soviet period of Russian history and Hungary during the Soviet era. This research will explore the ideological and political impacts that the Russian state has had on both standard political parties and far-right movements within the countries of Poland, Ukraine, and Hungary.
The Russian state has had a tremendous influence on the far-right of Eastern Europe, whether directly through cooperation and public admiration for the Russian state and Vladimir Putin, or indirectly through fear of the Russian state combined with shared ideological stances and views toward the West. This influence does not extend only to the traditional political establishment of Hungary, Ukraine, and Poland; political participation in the traditional party sense has been historically and contemporarily low for Eastern European countries[i]. The Russian state and Vladimir Putin’s presence both ideologically and politically has had a tremendous impact on far-right street politics, movements, and individual thought leaders in Ukraine, Poland, and Hungary.
This paper will have three distinct analytical section to outline Russia’s influence on far-right regimes and movements in Hungary, Ukraine, and Poland: Religious Tradition and Historic Conflict, Russia: The Traditional Model, and Influence: Identity and the Far-Right. To explore the religious influence of Russia on Eastern Europe, the Roman Catholic and Russian Orthodox churches (ROC), their history in the region, and their values will be discussed given each religion’s influence on the social fabric of far-right groups and governments in Eastern Europe. This history and religion section will then describe outside occupation of these regions as this history plays an important role for identity in Eastern European far-right movements. After this, Russia’s role as an ideological and regional hegemon and its resulting effects on Polish, Hungarian, and Ukrainian far-right political society will be examined. This section will include discussions on Putin’s appeal to traditional values and policy, as well as Russian and Eastern European perception and legislation against LGBTQ rights. The final analytical section of this research will examine the fundamentals of Eastern European far-right politics that will include discussions on identity and homogeneity, identity politics, political participation in Eastern Europe, and will close with the differences in influence of the Russian state influence for each respective country.
Ultimately, this paper will illustrate that Russia, as an ideological hegemon, directly and indirectly influences the far-right of Eastern Europe by creating a discursive model for traditional Eastern European values, broadcasting an effective model of conservative policy enaction, and influence on far-right nationalism through its identity as a historically aggressive neighbor.
Religious Tradition and Historic Conflict
Eastern Orthodoxy is the prominent religion in Ukraine and Russian while Roman Catholicism is the prominent religion in Hungary and Poland, and traditional values have been a long-held institution in Eastern Europe for centuries. The ROC finds its beginning in the 10th century in the Kievan-Rus, a loose Slavic federation and the predecessor to the Imperial Russian state.[ii] The ROC would undergo varying periods of influence through different periods of Tsarist leadership.[iii] While the influence of the ROC would fluctuate leading up to the faith’s revival after the fall of the Soviet Union, its adherence to traditional values would become institutionalized into the fabric of Russian and Eastern European society. [iv][v] While Ukraine and Russia share Eastern Orthodoxy as the majority religion due to shared imperial history, Hungary and Poland share Roman Catholicism as their majority religions.[vi] Roman Catholicism was introduced into Poland in the year of 966 AD, 22 years before the introduction of Eastern Orthodoxy in the Kievan-Rus.[vii] Roman Catholicism would become the majority religion in Poland by the 13th century.[viii] The official baptism of the Polish nation is considered the birthplace of the nation due to the strong adherence to the Catholic faith that has informed the ruling class of Poland which can be seen in the modern-day Law and Justice party in Poland.[ix] Roman Catholicism in Hungary dates back to the to the 900s through efforts of Byzantian monks and the cooperation with the area’s royalty, with full Christianization of Hungary being cemented in the 1100s.[x] Roman Catholicism is the majority religion in Hungary whose estimates of adherence to the faith fall between 56%-62% of citizens.[xi]
On top of having a common religion in Christianity, Poland, Ukraine, and Hungary all possess a shared history of outside rule and occupation through various regimes. However, Russian control is the commonality of control for all three of these states. While rule from empires, such as the Ottoman or Austro-Hungarian Empire, are important for understanding the issue of identity and anti-democratic sentiments, these are particularly important for understanding Poland, Ukraine, and Hungary. This paper will primarily focus on the Russian occupation of these countries. The Ukrainian territory, once a part of the Kievan-Rus, was controlled by the imperial Russian state until the 1917 revolution which saw the Ukrainian state briefly independent until the Russo-Ukrainian war of 1921.[xii] After Ukrainian defeat at the hands of the Red Army, the Ukrainian state would then be absorbed into the Soviet Union as a Union Republic until its collapse in 1991.[xiii] Poland’s long history of occupation by Russian began in 1772 with the three major partitions of Poland lasting until its initial modern independence in 1918.[xiv] Following World War II and Nazi occupation, Poland became a de-facto People’s Republic until 1989 through Soviet Occupation.[xv] Hungary was occupied by the Soviet Union as a People’s Republic from 1949 until the fall of the Soviet Union.
Russia: The Traditional Model
Putin drew from traditionally conservative Russian values that would cement “traditional Russian values” into Russian policy and mark the beginning of Russia as an ideological hegemon. While past right-wing regimes have used these tactics prior to Russia’s conservative pivot in 2013, Russia’s regional hegemony and its successful domestic policy would promote traditional conservative values and provide a discursive blueprint for far-right movements in the modern age.
As aforementioned, the fall of the Soviet Union was proceeded a revivalist movement for the ROC as the Church during the Soviet Union was perceived as an institutional farce to present the image of religious freedom within the country to citizens within Russia.[xvi] The political uncertainty following the fall of the Soviet Union presented the new leader of the Russian state with a legitimacy crisis. While Putin’s early political career could depend on his image as a hyper-masculine Russian James Bond-esque figure[xvii], Putin sought to muster a base of Russian support yearning for the resurgence of traditional Russian values- a action plan that became most notable in his 2013 State of the Union address. During this address, the Russian leader spoke at length about the dangerous of the liberalism of the West as a “destructive ideology” that sought to break apart traditional families and erode the values of the Russian state. Putin fervently cast himself as the sole defender of the Russian nation and Russia as the home of traditional European values.[xviii] A key aspect of this speech that would resonate with the European far-right was when the Russian leader described the European nations of the West as abandoning their true traditional moral values.[xix]
This speech would cast allegiance to the Russian state and allegiance to the Russian Orthodoxy religion and traditions as intrinsically intertwined. The Russian leader would then spend the following decade institutionalizing this Russian moral and political identity through the use of public policy and decrees to cast traditionalism as Russian state policy, couple traditional messaging with a fear of Western liberal ideology, and consolidate the ROC as a political and cultural moral agenda-setter.[xx] A prime example of public decrees institutionalizing traditional values within Russian society is the “The Fundamentals Of Public Policy To Preserve And Strengthen Traditional Russian Spiritual And Moral Values.”[xxi] This decree, upon enaction, would promote “strengthening and protection of [the] traditional spiritual and moral values [of the] cultural and historical heritage of the people of Russia” through the implementation of public policy.[xxii] This decree, along with anti-LGBTQ legislation and Putin’s efforts to solidify the relevance and power of the ROC within Russian society, sought to institutionalize traditional conservatism. While Putin is quoted in 1999 as being hesitant of forcefully setting a state ideology, he used conservative messaging to create a “Russian spiritual renewal” and instituted fear of the West to re-institutionalize Russian traditional values as the state ideology. [xxiii] By combining the Russian political and religious authority, Putin efficaciously renewed the Tsarist tradition of symbiotic power-legitimization[xxiv], thus erasing the separation of church and state. This maneuver by Vladimir Putin was dangerously effective as the ROC has historically held the position of being anti-Western.[xxv] The ROC’s particularly anti-Western stance is exemplified by statements made by the head of the ROC during a public appearance at the UN in 2008. Patriarch Kirill, in front of the United Nations General Assembly, would lambast Western liberal values as promoting homosexual and feminist values as well as abortion.[xxvi] The Russian state would further legitimize the connection between the West and the erosion of traditional values by attacking LGBTQ rights within the Russian state while influencing other conservative Eastern European powers to follow in the Russian state’s course. The Russian state has consistently characterized LGBTQ rights as an incursion of liberalism from the West and has framed members of the LGBTQ community as pedophiles since the introduction of the Russian legislation prohibiting “non-traditional relationships” which Putin claimed was to “protect” minors.[xxvii] After its passing, multiple international organizations and Eastern and Central European countries began to pass anti-LGBTQ legislation that mirrored the Russian law.[xxviii] Members of the LGBTQ community being labelled as pedophiles as a rhetorical devise against the neo-liberal world is a tactic that has been adopted by regimes in Eastern Europe, particularly Hungary and Poland. In 2012, Hungary enacted a child-abuse law that would target the LGBTQ community with far-right leader Viktor Orbán stating that Hungary is a tolerant place for LGBTQ individuals, but that there was a “red-line, leave our children alone.”[xxix] Polish lawmakers debated adopting a “Stop Pedophilia” law that was described as protecting children; however, opposition to the legislation described this law as targeting members of the LGBTQ community and sex educators.[xxx] Polish lawmakers who had been proponents of the anti-LGBTQ legislation stated that they had wanted to protect Polish children from “outside agitators” who wanted to destroy traditional values.[xxxi] The Ukrainian Parliament also debated over a homosexual propaganda law in 2012 which would have banned any depiction that would promote homosexuality.[xxxii]
While homosexuality and its rhetorical connection to the liberalism of the West will be further discussed later in research, the presence of these commonalities is important when understanding Russia as creating a discourse coalition- meaning a collection of states that share a unified set of narratives over a shared time period.[xxxiii] As previously discussed, the ROC in Russia and the Roman Catholic Church act as “cultural morality” agenda-setters for religious Eastern European civil society.[xxxiv] Both the ROC and the Roman Catholic Church have taken anti-LGBTQ stances since the fall of the Soviet Union with Putin, who had embraced a “culturally traditionalist stance”[xxxv] since the 1990s, fully embracing cultural traditionalism as a political agenda following his return to the presidency in 2012. The Russian state’s achievement in institutionalizing traditional values within its own society while positioning itself as the most powerful European actor against the liberal hegemonic world order[xxxvi] relates to the Russian states’ definition of moral sovereignty. The Russian state’s normative framework for sovereignty relates to a state’s ability to hold power over the ideological identity of itself free from interference from “society or international actors”[xxxvii]. Therefore, Putin seems to believe that the spread of any perception of any group or idea that does not fall within the scope of traditional Russian society is an existential threat to Russia’s sovereignty.[xxxviii] It is imperative that the concept of Russia as an ideological hegemon and leader of the conservative discourse coalition in Eastern Europe should be seen as working symbiotically. Russia’s hard and soft power as a state make it the greatest challenger to the West while also providing legitimacy, through the previously mentioned utilization of ROC moral agenda-setting and policy implementation from the state to the discourse surrounding traditional values.[xxxix] In turn, the production of a traditional identity, codified through messaging and policy, further cements Russia as a conservative discourse leader. This emboldens far-right governments and movements to adopt similar messaging and strategies on issues seen as abhorrent to a “traditional” European identity. This moral identity is thus intertwined with a conservative political identity that creates ideological and political networks with the Russian state. Conservative and far-right political figures, parties, and movements have all adopted similar messaging on key cultural and identity issues that mirrors the conservative Russian state regardless of whether these individual actors or entities support the Russian state itself. It is important to note that these beliefs are not monolithic due to historical oppression by the Russian state; however, the key parallels between these actors are a shared Euroscepticism and support of a traditional European identity.
Influence: Identity and the Far Right
An identity centered around traditional European values and culture, and the perceived loss of such identity, sits at the core of Eastern European far-right movements. Historically, Eastern European countries have consolidated their states through homogenous identity, rather than through liberal revolution and often did not form into liberal democracies like their Western European counterparts.[xl] The formation of these states would exist as “ethno-cultural” entities through the collapse of multi-state empires such as the Habsburg or Russian empires. Western European countries such as France and Spain fought their respective monarchies to develop states within their already established borders where a unified ethno-cultural identity had already been forged, whereas these identities in Eastern European states were ruled by “outsider” empires whose cultural practices and identities had been forced up these occupied states. During Russian imperial rule over Ukraine, the Ukrainian language and cultural practices were banned in favor of supporting Russian language and cultural practice.[xli] During rule of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Polish language had been heavily regulated by the Hungarian autonomous monarchy which contributed to language and ethnic conflicts leading up to the Polish nationalism movement in the 1ate 18th and 19th century.[xlii] The Russian Empire also sought to express control over the Polish language as a means of political control.[xliii] This conquered history would inform post-empire civil society and would result in strong cultural movements characterized by homogeneity. Hungary, Poland, and Ukraine all share these movements in the 19th century; thus, the “homogenous identity” would come to hold significant power within the minds of each of these countries’ respective far-right movements. This homogenic myth within Eastern European far-right groups operates under an exclusive and inclusive framework[xliv]– a paradigm that is non-exclusive to far-right groups within Eastern Europe. The exclusionary nature of far-right in groups acts as a buffer between what is seen by these groups as the acceptable character of their respective societies while any group seen as the “other” is deemed an existential threat that threatens the moral sovereignty of their nation.[xlv] For Ukrainian and Polish far-right groups, such as the National Radical Camp in Poland or the Svoboda Party in Ukraine, Russians, and other individuals outside of their exclusionary view of an acceptable society member, are viewed as a threat[xlvi]; the Hungarian far-right lacks this view of Russia as an existential threat but see immigrants and outsiders in similar ways.[xlvii] Polish and Hungarian far-right groups share the view of Russia that Western values are an existential threat to the moral sovereignty of their nations while Ukrainian far-right groups have a more complicated view of the West. These Ukrainian far-right groups share the anti-LGBTQ and other ideological sentiments of other Eastern European far-right movements; however, many of these groups will support pro-Western political candidates and regimes due to historic and contemporary oppression from Russia. [xlviii]
Religion would play a critical role in the identity formation of these nations, having a lasting effect in the formation of far-right movements. The cultural relevance of Eastern Orthodoxy and Roman Catholicism is so deeply embedded in Eastern European society that a strong majority of citizens within these respective countries consider those who do not identify with a country’s majority religion as not “true” citizens.[xlix] In Poland, religious fundamentalism is particularly important to these groups. This aspect of Eastern European far-right movements is intertwined with anti-Semitism as Jewish religion and cultural traditions have traditional been seen as outsiders and not a part of the “true” culture of Poland, Hungary, or Ukraine.[l] This prevalence of traditional values, has also led to these groups and politicians to designate LGBTQ rights as ideological imperialism from the West.[li] The framing of anti-LGBTQ policy and rhetoric as an attempt to “protect children and the traditional family” is a common tactic amongst far-right parties and movements across Eastern Europe; far-right street movements, the Polish Law and Justice party, the Hungarian Fidesz party, and the Kremlin have all used this rhetorical tactic against LGBTQ communities.[lii]
Apart from language policy and religion, historical oppression of Poland from the Russian Empire has had a distinctive role in Polish identity. While this phenomenon is not monolithic, the role of Russia in Poland’s history is used as a metanarrative to cast blame for Poland’s relative weakness as a state and is a motivating factor for far-right Polish mobilization.[liii] The current Prime Minister of Poland and leader of the Law and Justice party has been openly Russo-phobic and acted as an international voice against the Russian state.[liv] This anti-Russian and traditionalist far-right sentiment is most visible during the annual Polish Independence parade due to the historical and symbolic nature of the event.[lv] This Polish Independence march has increasingly held a greater presence of the far-right with increasing numbers of far-right group members and Law and Justice Party supporters joining together to oppose liberal counter-protestors.[lvi] This independence celebration is not exclusively an event for the far-right; however, these groups’ presence at the event has been increasingly visible during the march.[lvii] While Polish far-right parties and movements vary, as some groups are focused on socio-economic policy while other groups focus more deeply on the symbolic nature of a traditional Polish identity, a through line of traditional Polish cultural views intercedes the majority of these groups.[lviii] Far-right groups in Poland conceive an independent Poland as both physically independent and ideologically independent free from the influence of western values; therefore, these individual parties and street movements’ focus on religious fundamentalism often leads these groups to absorb each other if one disbands while also having mutual membership.[lix] This results in political and social networks being created, thus cementing far-right cooperation within Polish politics.[lx] The now defunct League of Polish Families Party that ran on a virulently anti-LGBTQ, anti-immigration, and anti-Semitic platform lost prominence during the mid-2000s and was then absorbed into the Law and Justice party of Poland.[lxi] The Law and Justice party in Poland is designated as a conservative party; however, the regime has been criticized by opposition party leaders and activists[lxii] as being lenient and accepting of these movements. The leader of the National Radical Camp, Robert Bąkiewicz, has received monetary support from the Law and Justice party of Poland[lxiii] while a court ruled that the National Radical Camp can be legally designated as a fascist organization in 2021. Ukrainian far-right groups share anti-Russian sentiment with Polish far-right groups. The Ukrainian far-right paramilitary group, the Azov Battalion, garnered national attention leading up to the February 2022 invasion by training Ukrainian citizens to use rifles and combat techniques.[lxiv] The Svoboda party, a political party that acquired a small level of electoral support in 2015, designates itself as an ultra-nationalist group who utilize public demonstration in support of Ukrainian identity and independence in opposition to Russian state.[lxv] The Ukrainian far-right group Right Sector acted as the most violent arm of anti-Russian mobilization during the Euromaidan Revolution- this group, while a mixture of opposition with varying ideologies to the Yanukovych regime in Ukraine, committed the highest percentage of violence.[lxvi] The anti-Russian sentiment present within the Ukrainian far-right and Polish far-right has led to networks of cooperation between these groups, as Polish far-right groups have trained Ukrainian far-right groups like the Azov Battalion in combat training and often find asylum within each other when necessary. These far-right groups in Ukraine explicitly advocate for a “traditionalist” image of Ukraine by routinely committing violence and spreading violent rhetoric against immigrants, the LGBTQ community, and specifically the Roma community.[lxvii] These Ukrainian far-right groups do not share the out-right acceptance from the state that groups within Poland or Hungary have despite the shared anti-Russian government sentiment and lax policing of far-right groups.[lxviii] Another difference is that the Ukrainian government does not adopt the moral sovereignty argument targeting the West that Polish and Hungarian far-right groups do. The Hungarian far-right, represented by Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz party and the Jobbik party, share key components and key differences with Polish and Ukrainian far-right groups. Viktor Orbán utilizes similar messaging to the Polish Law and Justice party by regarding Western liberalism as an existential threat to the moral sovereignty of Hungary’s traditional European values.[lxix] This shared discourse on Western liberalism as a threat to the Eastern European identity has led both the Polish and Hungarian governments to become key actors within Eastern Europe’s Eurosceptic movement- both of these countries offer safe-haven to international far-right individuals seeking asylum from the “values and persecution of the West”[lxx]. The Azov Battalion and the Svoboda party in Ukraine share these Eurosceptic beliefs with the Polish and Hungarian government; yet Euroscepticism has not been adopted as an official point of view by the ruling government of Ukraine due to its support from the EU and the United States in conflicts with Russia.[lxxi] The varying degrees of Euroscepticism present within far-right movements in Hungary, Poland, and Ukraine exemplifies the key politically motivated similarities each of these countries’ respective far-right movements. Political participation in a traditional voting and party sense has historically been low for the Eastern European region due to the aforementioned differences in state-building in the West and East of Europe.[lxxii] This lack of political participation is due in part to the political and economic realities created by neo-liberal economics in Hungary, Poland, and Ukraine. Each of these countries have failed to fully develop into liberal democracies like Western Europe due to differences of outside rule and successful democratic revolutions; therefore, many of these far-right groups, apart from the perception of feminist and LGBTQ movements being a threat to traditional European values, see liberal economics as representing the elitism of the West.[lxxiii] This has led these countries, and the far-right movements within them, to reject the neo-liberal world older and seek alternatives within each other and Russia. This distrust of the neo-liberal political structure has also led to far-right groups in Eastern Europe to gravitate to public displays in the form of protest and marches. This visibility is a viable political tool for consolidating social acceptance for their extremist values.
Conclusion
Whether indirectly through historical influence on Eastern European identity or directly through Eastern European political patronage networks of support, the Russian state has enabled far-right groups in Eastern Europe to become more visible, adopt similar messaging and policy, and has overall aided and embedded these groups to become interconnected. The far-right network of influence in Eastern Europe has allowed for groups to form political networks that disseminate information and strategy to one another. While Poland and Hungary have had more significant swings towards far-right conservatism within government leadership, Russia has had significant effects on far-right movements and regimes in Ukraine, Poland, and Hungary.
Ultimately, the Russian state has permanently altered the Eastern European far-right landscape. The Ukrainian-Russian war has caused once sympathetic actors to distance themselves from the Russian state and will undoubtedly allow these groups to be enabled by the image of Russia as an existential threat.
[i] Michael Minkenberg. “The rise of the radical right in Eastern Europe: Between mainstreaming and radicalization.” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs 18, no. 1 (2017): 27-35
[ii] George Vernadsky. Kievan Russia. Vol. 2. Yale University Press, 1973.
[iii] N/A Brittanica, “Russian Orthodox Church,” Encyclopædia Britannica (Encyclopædia Britannica, inc., 0AD), https://www.britannica.com/topic/Russian-Orthodox-Church.
[iv] Mikhail D. Suslov. “” Holy Rus”: The Geopolitical Imagination in the Contemporary Russian Orthodox Church.” Russian Politics & Law 52, no. 3 (2014): 67-86.
[vi] Travis Mitchell, “Religious Belief and National Belonging in Central and Eastern Europe,” Pew Research Center’s Religion & Public Life Project (Pew Research Center, April 26, 2022), https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2017/05/10/religious-belief-and-national-belonging-in-central-and-eastern-europe/.
[vii] N/A Polishnews.com, “The Christianization of Poland 1050th Anniversary of the Baptism of the Polish Nation,” Polishnews.com, June 14, 2016, https://www.polishnews.com/the-christianization-of-poland-1050th-anniversary-of-the-baptism-of-the-polish-nation.
[x] N/A Encyclopedia.com, “.” New Catholic Encyclopedia. . Encyclopedia.com. 29 Nov. 2022 .,” Encyclopedia.com (Encyclopedia.com, December 15, 2022), https://www.encyclopedia.com/religion/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/hungary-catholic-church.
[xi] Travis Mitchell, “Religious Belief and National Belonging in Central and Eastern Europe,”
[xii] N/A BBC, “Ukraine Profile – Timeline,” BBC News (BBC, March 5, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-18010123.
[xiv] N/A BBC, “Poland Profile – Timeline,” BBC News (BBC, December 2, 2022), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17754512.
[xvi] Mark Bassin and Catriona Kelly, eds. “Soviet and post-Soviet identities.” (2012)
[xvii] Andrew Foxall. “Photographing Vladimir Putin: Masculinity, nationalism and visuality in Russian political culture.” Geopolitics 18, no. 1 (2013): 132-156
[xviii] C.Wilkinson. (2014). Putting “traditional values” into practice: The rise and contestation of anti-homopropaganda laws in Russia. Journal of Human Rights, 13(3), 363-379
[xix] Alicja Curanović. “Guardians of Traditional Values: Russia and the Russian Orthodox Church in the Quest for Status.” (2015).
[xx] Marcel H. Van Herpen, “The Political Role of the Russian Orthodox Church,” The National Interest (The Center for the National Interest, November 19, 2019), https://nationalinterest.org/feature/political-role-russian-orthodox-church-97647.
[xxi] MEMRI, N/A. “Russia Publishes Draft Decree on ‘Public Policy to Preserve and Strengthen Traditional Spiritual and Moral Values’ to Counter ‘Destructive Ideology’ – I.e. Progressive Liberalism.” MEMRI. Middle East Media Research Institute, February 24, 2022. https://www.memri.org/reports/russia-publishes-draft-decree-public-policy-preserve-and-strengthen-traditional-spiritual
[xxiii] Fiona Hill and Clifford G. Gaddy. Mr. Putin: operative in the Kremlin. Brookings Institution Press, 2015
[xxiv] BBC, N/A. “Role of the Russian Church – Imperial Russia – Government and People – National
[xxv] Glenn Diesen. “Russia as an international conservative power: the rise of the right-wing populists and their affinity towards Russia.” Journal of Contemporary European Studies 28, no. 2 (2020): 182-196.
[xxvi] Marcel H. Van Herpen, “The Political Role of the Russian Orthodox Church,”
[xxvii] Francesca Ugolino. “In Russia was passed the law prohibiting propaganda of ‘non-traditional relationships’ in the presence of minors, at the federal level. Protection of minors or discrimination based on sexual orientation?.” Civitas Europa 2 (2013): 331-332.
[xxviii] C. Wilkinson. (2014). Putting “traditional values” into practice: The rise and contestation of anti-homopropaganda laws in Russia. Journal of Human Rights, 13(3), 363-379.
[xxix] Justin Spike, “Hungarian LGBT Activist among Time’s 100 Most Influential,” KSAT (KSAT San Antonio, October 1, 2021), https://www.ksat.com/entertainment/2021/10/01/hungarian-lgbt-activist-among-times-100-most-influential/.
[xxx] Donald Padgett, “Poland Considers Law Labeling Sex Educators, LGBTQ Folks as Pedophiles,” ADVOCATE (Advocate.com, April 16, 2020), https://www.advocate.com/news/2020/4/16/poland-considers-law-labeling-sex-educators-lgbtq-folks-pedophiles.
[xxxii] David Stern, “Ukraine Takes Aim against ‘Gay Propaganda’,” BBC News (BBC, October 11, 2012), https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-19881905.
[xxxiii] Sergei Prozorov. “Russian conservatism in the Putin presidency: The dispersion of a hegemonic discourse.” Journal of Political Ideologies 10, no. 2 (2005): 121-143.
[xxxiv] C. Wilkinson. (2014). Putting “traditional values” into practice: The rise and contestation of anti-homopropaganda laws in Russia. Journal of Human Rights, 13(3), 363-379
[xxxvi] Elena Stepanova. “‘The Spiritual and Moral Foundation of Civilization in Every Nation for Thousands of Years’: The Traditional Values Discourse in Russia.” Politics, Religion & Ideology 16, no. 2-3 (2015): 119-136.
[xxxvii] Andrey Makarychev. “Russia, Ukraine and the Eastern Partnership: From Common Neighborhood to Spheres of Influence?.” Insight Turkey 16, no. 3 (2014).
[xxxix] Elena Stepanova. “‘The Spiritual and Moral Foundation of Civilization in Every Nation for Thousands of Years’: The Traditional Values Discourse in Russia.”
[xl] Michael Minkenberg. “The rise of the radical right in Eastern Europe: Between mainstreaming and radicalization.” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs 18, no. 1 (2017): 27-35.
[xli] Taras Kuzio. “Nationalism, identity and civil society in Ukraine: Understanding the Orange Revolution.” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 43, no. 3 (2010): 285-296
[xlii] László Marácz. “Multilingualism in the Transleithanian part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire (1867-1918): Policy and practice.” Jezikoslovlje 13, no. 2 (2012): 269-298.
[xliii] Elena V. Voevoda, Anatoliy Yu Belogurov, Lidiya P. Kostikiva, Nadezhda M. Romanenko, and Margarita V. Silantyeva. “Language policy in the Russian Empire: legal and constitutional aspect.” Language policy in the Russian Empire: legal and constitutional aspect (2017): 121-129.
[xliv] Margit Feischmidt and Kristóf Szombati. “Understanding the rise of the far right from a local perspective: Structural and cultural conditions of ethno-traditionalist inclusion and racial exclusion in rural Hungary.” Identities 24, no. 3 (2017): 313-331.
[xlv] Andrey Makarychev. “Russia, Ukraine and the Eastern Partnership: From Common Neighborhood to Spheres of Influence?”. Insight Turkey 16, no. 3 (2014).
[xlvi] Mark Bassin. “” Real Europe” Civilizationism and the Far Right in Eastern Europe.” (2022): 15-22.
[xlvii] Lenka Buštíková. “The radical right in Eastern Europe.” (2018).
[xlviii] F. Stephen Larrabee. “Ukraine and the West.” Survival 48, no. 1 (2006): 93-110.
[xlix] Travis Mitchell, “Religious Belief and National Belonging in Central and Eastern Europe,” Pew Research Center’s Religion & Public Life Project (Pew Research Center, April 26, 2022), https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2017/05/10/religious-belief-and-national-belonging-in-central-and-eastern-europe/.
[l] Lenka Buštíková. “The radical right in Eastern Europe.” (2018).
[li] Glenn Diesen. “Russia as an international conservative power: the rise of the right-wing populists and their affinity towards Russia.” Journal of Contemporary European Studies 28, no. 2 (2020): 182-196.
[lii] Emil Edenborg. “Anti-Gender Politics as Discourse Coalitions: Russia’s Domestic and International Promotion of “Traditional Values”.” Problems of Post-Communism (2021): 1-10.
[liii] Tomasz Zarycki. “Uses of Russia: the role of Russia in the modern Polish national identity.” East European politics and societies 18, no. 4 (2004): 595-627.
[liv] Michael Duffin, “Poland’s Evolving Violent Far-Right Landscape,” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, September 20, 2022, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/polands-evolving-violent-far-right-landscape/.
[lv] Mieczysław BB Biskupski. Independence Day: Myth, symbol, and the creation of modern Poland. Oxford university press, 2012.
[lvi] Marek Strzelecki Strzelecki and Agnieszka Pikulicka-Wilczewska. “Far-Right Independence Day March Draws Thousands in Poland.” Reuters. Thomson Reuters, November 11, 2022. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/far-right-independence-day-march-draws-thousands-warsaw-2022-11-11/.
[lviii] Rafał Pankowski. Right-wing extremism in Poland.
[lix] Mark Bassin. “” Real Europe” Civilizationism and the Far Right in Eastern Europe.” (2022): 15-22.
[lxi] Michael Duffin, “Poland’s Evolving Violent Far-Right Landscape,” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, September 20, 2022, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/polands-evolving-violent-far-right-landscape/.
[lxiii] Piotr Macej Kaczyński. “Poland’s Extreme Far-Right Has a Problem with Its Leader,” http://www.euractiv.com (EURACTIV, October 19, 2021), https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/short_news/polands-extreme-far-right-has-a-problem-with-its-leader/.
[lxiv] Michael Duffin. “Poland’s Evolving Violent Far-Right Landscape,” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, September 20, 2022, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/polands-evolving-violent-far-right-landscape/.
[lxv] Yuriy Shveda and Joung Ho Park. “Ukraine’s revolution of dignity: The dynamics of Euromaidan.” Journal of Eurasian Studies 7, no. 1 (2016): 85-91
[lxvi] Volodymyr Ishchenko. “Far right participation in the Ukrainian Maidan protests: an attempt of systematic estimation.” European Politics and Society 17, no. 4 (2016): 453-472.
[lxvii] April Gordon. “A New Eurasian Far Right Rising,” Freedom House, 2020, https://freedomhouse.org/report/special-report/2020/new-eurasian-far-right-rising.
[lxix] Michael Minkenberg. “The rise of the radical right in Eastern Europe: Between mainstreaming and radicalization.” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs 18, no. 1 (2017): 27-35.
[lxx] Carol Schaeffer. “How Hungary became a haven for the alt-right.” The Atlantic 28 (2017).
[lxxi] Yuriy Yakymenko and Viktor Zamiatin. “Ukraine: The Progress of (Euro) Populism in Postmodern Age.” Euroscepticism and the Future of Europe: Views from the Capitals (2021): 167-170.
[lxxii] Michael Minkenberg. “The rise of the radical right in Eastern Europe: Between mainstreaming and radicalization.” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs 18, no. 1 (2017): 27-35.
Leave a Reply