Meta in Turkey: Quantifying Political Risks with PRINCE Analysis

By: Josiah Gottfried, Wyatt Frank, and Anjali Madaram

Introduction

Between 2010 and 2020, no country experienced a greater decline in democracy than Turkey, according to the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance.^[i] The rapid transformation of Turkey’s system of government is creating uncertainty that poses political risks to businesses operating in Turkey. For these businesses, the problem of forecasting Turkish policies has risen to the fore, because every good business decision relies upon an accurate conception of the future.

While clear forecasts are more important than ever in Turkey, political risk analysts frequently hedge their forecasts with ambiguity. For example, after Turkey’s February earthquake, Stratfor, a geopolitical intelligence company, released the following analysis: “Turkey’s recent massive earthquakes will impact the country’s election campaign, potentially making it even more difficult for the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) to maintain control over the legislature and presidency in upcoming elections.”^[ii] Stating that the earthquake makes an AKP victory “potentially… even more difficult” offers little clarity; anything from the total collapse of AKP polling numbers to no decline at all could be interpreted as a successful forecast. Vague forecasts allow forecasters to explain mistakes away, but they provide little value to decision makers, who need solid information to ground their decisions on.

One method to force forecasters to avoid vague language is to require quantitative forecasts.^[iii] Over time, probabilistic forecasting enables evaluation of forecasters’ track records. For example, if an expert forecasts that 100 different events each have a 90% chance of occurring, and only 50 of the events (50%) occur, he is overconfident. This provides a critical mechanism for honesty and clarity in forecasts.

In political risk analysis, however, arriving at a number poses difficulties, since political decisions are highly subjective. Coplin and O’Leary suggest breaking down political problems by analyzing each of the actors who will affect the decision and rating them by their position on the issue, their power, and the salience of the issue to them. Combining these ratings, they suggest a simple calculation for estimating the probability of the decision. Then, impacted businesses or others can use this knowledge to affect the probability of the decisions. Altogether, they call this method PRINCE analysis.^[iv]

We will illustrate the potential utility of PRINCE analysis for Turkey by presenting a case study of Meta, a company that has already suffered considerably from Turkey’s slide toward authoritarianism. The technology giant is the largest social media company in Turkey—Instagram alone is used by three-fourths of eligible Turks^[v]—so the company must weigh the benefits of a significant market against the moral and reputational costs of cooperating with authorities to censor free speech. If Turkish censorship continues to become more stifling, Meta may need to adjust its presence in Turkey. Our case study will illustrate how Meta can elicit a clear and quantitative picture of the risk of new social media restrictions in Turkey and provide critical information for Meta’s decisionmakers.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, we define political risk, a term that has contested and often vague definitions. Then, we introduce the PRINCE analysis system. Next, we present important case study background about Turkey, the social media industry in Turkey, and Meta. From there, we implement the PRINCE analysis, and we discuss how to dynamically adjust the analysis following Turkey’s May elections. Finally, we conclude with a discussion of what our study has accomplished, the study’s limitations, and avenues for further research.

Definition of Political Risk

Before we analyze Meta’s political risk profile, we will settle on a definition of political risk. Howell defines political risk as “the probability (a forecast, not a prediction) that some political factor like an ethnic dispute, a popular response to government repression, or a government decision on control of the private enterprise, will result in a loss of some kind to a foreign enterprise operating in the country.”^[vi] Others emphasize that political risk stems from political decisions and actions^[vii] and that it can affect a company without causing a direct financial loss.^[viii] For our purposes, we define political risk as “the probability of political decisions, actions, and events in a host country affecting the performance of a foreign enterprise operating in the country.” Our definition implies that government actors are major determinants of political risk since they are responsible for most of the political decisions and actions in a country.

Introduction to PRINCE analysis

Given our actor-focused definition of political risk, PRINCE analysis is particularly appropriate. It is an actor-based method for understanding the probability of policies being implemented and for influencing the passage of such policies.^[ix] In our case study, we will use PRINCE analysis to forecast the probability of new social media restrictions in Turkey by determining the political calculus of actors involved in the potential restrictions.

The acronym “PRINCE” stands for probing, information gathering,^[x] calculation, and execution, which are the four steps of PRINCE analysis.

• Probing comprises a broad survey of the policy of interest, including how the policy would affect the company, and identification of who may influence the issue.
• Information gathering involves learning about each actor’s influence over the issue, according to the three components of influence: issue position, power, and salience.
• Calculation means assigning numbers to each actor for each influence component and calculating the total support for the policy. The greater the support, the higher the probability of passing the policy.
• Execution describes how the company could influence an important actor’s position, increase friendly actors’ power, or change the issue’s salience for key players.

If all steps are followed, PRINCE analysis provides actionable forecasting insights. Additionally, by allowing for transparent calculations, it is adjustable if actors change, which will be especially useful in our case because Turkey will undertake national elections on May 14.

Case study background

During Turkey’s 2013 Gezi Park protests, social media enabled protestors to share information and circumvent government restrictions.^[xi] Since then, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) have viewed social media with suspicion.^[xii] In recent years, Turkey has increasingly restricted social media companies, causing major headaches for Meta. Recent history helps to explain this phenomenon, so the following profiles will introduce Turkey, the local social media industry, and Meta.

Turkey: Sliding toward authoritarianism

Constitutionally, the government of Turkey has been a republic since 1923.^[xiii] Erdogan and the AKP rose to power in the 2002 parliamentary elections, and Erdogan served as prime minister from 2003 to 2014. Although his rule was initially marked by liberalization, the later years showed signs of increasing authoritarianism, culminating in a brutal response to the 2013 Gezi Park protests.^[xiv] In 2014, Erdogan ascended to the largely symbolic post of president. A failed coup attempt in 2016 enabled the AKP to purge many of its political opponents in the government and military and push through a constitutional referendum to concentrate power in the presidency—removing nearly all checks to President Erdogan’s rule.^[xv]

According to the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index, Turkey is currently a “hybrid regime,” one level above “authoritarian.” The country ranked first among countries where democratic rule decreased between 2010 and 2020.^[xvi] President Erdogan maintains his power by manipulating government institutions, the media, and elections. He often targets foreign social media companies in order to control information consumed by the Turkish population.

However, in 2023, the situation could change dramatically, as President Erdogan will stand in May elections.^[xvii] Although these elections are unlikely to be fair because the AKP controls most institutions, analysts are relatively optimistic that the opposition can win given voters’ growing frustrations with unemployment and inflation.^[xviii] Six of the main opposition parties are contesting this election united behind a single candidate, increasing the chances of ousting Erdogan.^[xix] After the elections, the political landscape could be dramatically different in the event of an upset win by the opposition, and hence we will provide guidance about how to update our PRINCE analysis after the elections.

Social media in Turkey: Censorship rising

Turkey’s government increasingly restricts social media in the country, especially since “Turkish citizens are turning to social media channels in place of traditional media.”^[xx] The government has previously shut down social media during politically tense situations. For example, during the 2016 attempted military coup, Turkey blocked access to Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp, and YouTube.^[xxi]

A 2020 social media law forced social media companies to localize data, monitor misinformation as defined by the government, and delegate regulation compliance to a local office staffed by Turkish citizens. The government can impose harsh fines and up to 90% bandwidth cuts for noncompliance.^[xxii]

The 2022 Disinformation Law further threatened speech on social media by criminalizing the spread of vaguely defined “misinformation.”^[xxiii] Turkey is already “one of the world’s top requesters for content removal from Twitter and Facebook.”^[xxiv] Thus, Meta must prepare to make decisions about the extent to which it can comply with increasing Turkish censorship.

Meta: A mission-driven company

Despite some declines recently, Meta holds a majority of the social media market share in Turkey.^[xxv] However, its values frequently conflict with the Erdogan regime’s values. Per Meta’s company website, its mission is, “giving people the power to build community and bring the world closer together.”^[xxvi] Meta’s principles are to give people a voice, build connection and community, serve everyone, keep people safe and protect privacy, and promote economic opportunity.^[xxvii] The company has declared that, even amid restrictive laws, it remains committed to maintaining free expression in Turkey.^[xxviii]However, if Meta insists on protecting free expression, it may be subject to fines or even be blocked outright, as it has in authoritarian countries like China, Russia, and Iran.^[xxix]

Analysis of Current Risk: PRINCE analysis

Probing

Completing a PRINCE analysis requires a clear definition of the policy under analysis.^[xxx] We are interested in any new policies restricting Meta, so we need to determine which policies would qualify as restrictions. Several potential policies that should worry Meta include:

• increasing censorship,
• persecution for social media posts,
• seizure of user data to enable prosecution of political opponents, and
• outright blocking of Meta platforms

Any combination of these policies would substantially disrupt Meta’s operations in Turkey. Therefore, we will analyze the probability that anyof these policies will be promulgated in 2023.

To do this, we identified important actors that will influence such policies. We surveyed Freedom House’s Freedom on the Net 2022 report for Turkey,^[xxxi] and identified nine actors who have significant power over social media regulation. In the next section, we explore the influence of each of these actors.

Information Gathering

President Erdogan and the Justice and Development Party (AKP)

Erdogan and the AKP are the dominant force in Turkish politics. After the failed coup attempt in 2016, the government purged the bureaucracy and the judiciary, and installed party loyalists so the AKP could wield influence throughout the government. Erdogan takes a restrictive view of social media, calling it “one of the main sources of threats to today’s democracy.”^[xxxii] After opposition victories in 2019 proved that the AKP can be beaten, Erdogan’s party has even more incentives to regulate online speech to increase its unfair advantages.^[xxxiii] Meta has little ability to influence Erdogan and the AKP, but it must remain watchful and oppose any moves that threaten the company.

The Information and Communication Technologies Authority (BTK)

The Information and Communication Technologies Authority (BTK) regulates the telecommunications sector. Operating with little oversight or transparency, it controls the certification of internet service providers, which allows it to force compliance with its directives. It is also responsible for blocking websites and removing content.^[xxxiv]

The BTK has proven to be heavy-handed and quick to censor online information. It is a world leader in Facebook content removal requests. In the second half of 2021, the BTK was responsible for 1,351 successful requests based on Turkey’s social media regulations law.^[xxxv] The agency has the power to impose fines and bandwidth cuts should Meta fail to comply with its regulations.^[xxxvi] It also has extensive access to online user data. Due to its expansive role as an online regulator, the BTK is the most powerful element of the bureaucracy to which Meta must comply.

Parliament

Turkey’s parliament has been under the control of the AKP and its allies since 2002. Currently, the AKP is just short of a majority, but it controls parliament with the support of two nationalist parties, the Nationalist Movement Party and the Great Unity Party. Although the 2017 constitutional amendments reduced the parliament’s power, it continues to support Erdogan’s restrictions on social media, including by passing restrictive laws in 2020 and 2022. After Meta failed to immediately comply with a requirement in the 2020 social media regulations law to appoint a local representative to monitor compliance with Turkish regulations, it was fined $5.3 million.^[xxxvii] The law also increased fines for failure to comply with censorship. The parliament’s 2022 Disinformation Law gives a vague definition of disinformation, facilitating censorship of practically any speech that the AKP disapproves of. Those convicted of spreading disinformation can be imprisoned for up to three years. These laws were passed with minimal public discussion.^[xxxviii]

The Courts

Turkey’s courts are composed of the constitutional, civil, criminal, administrative, and jurisdictional dispute courts. Although the constitution guarantees judicial independence, this has eroded significantly since the 2016 coup attempt, according to the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights.^[xxxix] Overall, in cases involving social media restrictions, the courts frequently support the government. However, they have also ruled against the government occasionally, such as when a court ruled in March 2020 that insulting Erdogan did not constitute the crime of insulting the president, since his registration with the AKP caused him to lose impartiality.^[xl]

Opposition parties

Opposition parties include the Republican Peoples’ Party (CHP), Good Party (IYI), and Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP). The CHP and IYI agreed to join with four smaller parties to form the Nation Alliance for the 2023 elections.^[xli] Opposition ideologies range from secular democrat to nationalist and Islamist, but they are united by their opposition to Erdogan’s strongman tactics and authoritarian turn. Despite an unfair playing field, the opposition has continued to contest and win elections. For example, in 2019, CHP candidate Ekrem Imamoglu narrowly won the Istanbul mayoral election. If the opposition were to regain power at the national level, they have indicated that they would repeal many of the AKP’s censorship policies.^[xlii]

Mobile Service Providers

Turk Telekom, Turkcell, and British multinational company Vodafone are Turkey’s leading mobile service providers. However, Meta’s WhatsApp is the most popular messaging app, used by 82% of the Turkish population.^[xliii] Last year, Turk Telekom, Turkcell, and Vodafone signed an agreement to promote local messaging apps, such as Turkcell’s BiP and Turk Telekom’s Yaay. President Erdogan supports local messaging apps in order to keep users’ data within Turkey.^[xliv] These companies would financially benefit from government restrictions on WhatsApp.

European Court of Human Rights (ECHR)

As a signatory of the European Convention on Human Rights, Turkey is officially under the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). The ECHR has notably intervened to protect online freedom, including by overturning the blocking of the news website sendika.org. When the BTK blocked Wikipedia in 2017, the Turkish Constitutional Court failed to hear Wikipedia’s appeal for two years and only ruled on the case after the ECHR asked for the ban’s justification. Wikipedia had petitioned for the ECHR to hear the case, and the ECHR expedited it.^[xlv] For normal cases, the ECHR takes an average of five or six years to produce a ruling.^[xlvi] Turkey has not always complied with ECHR rulings, but for Meta, the ECHR may be an avenue of defense in the case of major government action such as blocking Facebook entirely.

European Union (EU)

The EU has some soft power within Turkey, ^[xlvii] but it lacks formal leverage. As long as the AKP prioritizes remaining in power over democracy and EU membership, the EU can offer little incentive to change. Furthermore, EU leaders want to avoid further frustrating relations with Turkey due to the key role Turkey plays in controlling migrant flows and its potential to mediate the Russia-Ukraine War. Meta’s best option with the EU is to raise awareness of Turkish censorship to EU lawmakers.

Calculation

Based on the information gathered, we assign to each actor an issue position between -3 and 3, power between 1 and 3, and salience between 1 and 3. Issue position refers to the actor’s general attitude toward implementing new restrictive policies, such as censorship, persecution, privacy, and blocking, within the next year. A “3” indicates a firm belief that is unlikely to change. Power refers to the actor’s ability to influence decisions about restrictions relative to the ability of other actors. Salience refers to the issue’s importance to the actor relative to other issues.^[xlviii]The formula for calculating an actor’s total support for increased restrictions is:

Total Support = Issue Position  X  Power  X  Salience

Table 1. PRINCE Analysis

Actors	Issue Position -3 – +3	Power 1 – 3	Salience 1 – 3	Total Support
President Erdogan and the AKP	3	3	3	27
BTK	3	3	3	27
Courts	1	3	2	6
Parliament	3	3	2	18
Opposition parties	-3	1	3	-9
Mobile Service Providers	3	1	2	6
European Court of Human Rights	-3	2	1	-6
European Union	-3	1	1	-3

To estimate the probability of new restrictions this year, we perform the following calculation:

This comes out to an 82% chance of new restrictions on Meta this year. These may take the form of increased censorship, growing persecution of users for social media posts, seizure of user data, or blocking Meta platforms entirely.

Execution

Given the 82% probability of new restrictions, Meta should prepare for an adversarial operating environment in the months ahead. Our analysis shows that it has few allies; only the opposition, the European Court of Human Rights, and the EU are firmly against restrictions. The Turkish courts will be a key swing variable, so Meta should invest in legal experts who can help the company navigate the Turkish legal system.

Keeping the PRINCE analysis dynamic: Post-election scenarios

The election could dramatically change Meta’s operating environment in Turkey, depending on whether Erdogan and the AKP remain in power. In this section, we will briefly discuss the implications of continued Erdogan rule and how a power transition could impact the preceding PRINCE analysis.

If Erdogan remains in power

While Erdogan might win the election in a free vote—where the playing field is unfair, but all votes are counted—he could also remain in power by other means, such as blatant electoral fraud. ^[xlix] He might even engineer a self-coup. Although the Turkish military was once renowned for independence from political officials, Erdogan has filled its leadership with AKP loyalists since 2016.^[l] However, brash moves to overturn the election result would risk Turkey’s remaining ties with the West. Regardless of the scenario, most of the actors would remain the same as before the election and current trends would likely continue. Erdogan and the AKP would increasingly consolidate power in the presidency, while the opposition and outside organizations would continue to lose influence.^[li] Even if the opposition were to win a majority in parliament, the 2017 constitutional reforms would mean that parliament may be sidelined.^[lii]

For Meta, continued Erdogan rule would entail further restrictions on its operations. The 2022 Disinformation Law could be used to stifle free speech on the platform, and the Turkish government would likely continue to abuse its power to obtain user data for political purposes. Meta should expect less protection from the Turkish courts as they continue to fall under AKP influence, and the role of the European Court of Human Rights and the European Union would increasingly diminish. In this scenario, Meta should continue to invest in its allies and in mastering the Turkish justice system, but it should also prepare for worst-case policies like a total ban on its platforms.

If Erdogan is removed

After 21 years of Erdogan’s rule, an opposition victory in the presidential election would be a shocking upset. If the military does not intervene to prevent the opposition from taking power, Meta should expect an overhaul of the actors in the PRINCE analysis. Turkey’s opposition has vowed to return Turkey to a parliamentary system and to support the independence of the judiciary, which would increase checks and balances within the Turkish government.^[liii] However, the opposition would face challenges in overturning years of AKP influence in the civil service, since the opposition would have only a small pool of experienced bureaucrats to draw from.^[liv] Thus, Meta should expect that some AKP policies will continue for the short- to medium-term, and that inexperienced opposition leaders will make early mistakes. If this scenario comes to pass, Meta cannot passively expect a positive operating environment, and the company will need to invest heavily in working with its new regulators.

Concluding Insights

Our PRINCE analysis returned an 82% risk of new restrictions this year. This should warn Meta that it is probably unable to maintain current standards for free expression on its Turkish platforms without incurring fines and other penalties from the government. However, the analysis also showed that the judiciary is the last semi-independent Turkish government entity that can act to protect Meta from the government’s most egregious restrictions. Thus, Meta should prioritize an understanding of how to navigate the Turkish courts.

After the elections, the position, power, and influence of the actors in the PRINCE analysis will change. Meta must prepare for either outcome, and it should update the PRINCE analysis after the outcome is known. Although it may seem obvious that an Erdogan victory would lead to further restrictions, and his defeat would lead to the opposite, it will be critical to quantify the risk to enhance decision making.

Limitations

Our PRINCE analysis suffers from several limitations. One problem that is common to all political analysis is subjectivity. While we tried to reduce this with a numerical prediction that can eventually be evaluated for accuracy, ratings of actors’ power, position, and salience are not objectively verifiable. Even the choice of actors to analyze was somewhat subjective. Potentially, collecting ratings from a large group of experts and averaging them would result in more reliable ratings.

Another problem that we encountered was the rapidly changing situation in Turkey. When we began this paper, elections were scheduled for June. However, in March, Erdogan officially announced the elections were being moved up to May. Other major factors that occurred during the writing of this paper included an $18.6 million fine on Meta for alleged monopolistic behavior^[lv] and the February earthquake, which triggered new waves of censorship. This underscores the importance of constantly revisiting the PRINCE analysis.

Future Research

We hope that this paper will lead to further research on methods for quantifying political risk. The methods and much of the material of this paper could easily be used to provide similar analyses for other companies in Turkey. Our results could provide a baseline against which to compare the new results. Expanding the number of companies analyzed could help to nuance understanding of Turkish political decision-making.

Other analyses could examine Meta’s political risks in other countries that have suffered from democratic backsliding, such as Hungary and Tunisia. Another interesting pair of cases would be Russia and Belarus, since Facebook is banned in Russia but not in Belarus, despite alignment between the countries’ strongmen rulers. Comparing across countries could enable new perspectives on how Meta can mitigate risks in increasingly authoritarian countries.

Finally, future researchers could examine how other systems for quantifying risk compare with PRINCE analysis on the question of Meta’s risk profile in Turkey. For example, a modified version of Alon and Herbert’s model can produce probabilistic results.^[lvi] The accuracy of predictions from these different models can then be assessed over time, allowing identification of the most successful forecasting method.

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[i] International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. The Global State of Democracy 2021: Building Resilience in the Pandemic Era, (Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2021), https://doi.org/10.31752/idea.2021.91.

[ii] Stratfor. “Gauging the Political Fallout From Turkey’s Massive Earthquakes,” Stratfor, February 8, 2023. https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/gauging-political-fallout-turkeys-massive-earthquakes.

[iii] Good Judgment Inc. “How Distinct Is a “Distinct Possibility”?” Good Judgment. Accessed April 3, 2023. https://goodjudgment.com/vague-verbiage-forecasting/; Peter J. Scoblic and Philip E. Tetlock. “A Better Crystal Ball,” Foreign Affairs, October 13, 2020. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-10-13/better-crystal-ball.

[iv] William D. Coplin and Michael K. O’Leary. “Knowing When to Use the PRINCE System,” Political Analysis Through the PRINCE System, (Croton-on-Hudson, NY: Policy Studies Associates, 1983), pp. 1-13.

[v] Simon Kemp. “Digital 2022: Turkey,” DataReportal, February 15, 2022. https://datareportal.com/reports/digital-2022-turkey.

[vi] Llewellyn Howell. The Handbook of Country and Political Risk Analysis, 5th ed. (East Syracuse, NY: Political Risk Services, 2013), quoted in Steven Johnston. “Introduction to Political Risk Analysis” (class lecture, Introduction to Political Risk Analysis, American University, Washington, DC, 12 August 2022).

[vii] John O’Connell. Blackwell Encyclopedic Dictionary of International Management, (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers, Ltd., 2005), 283-285, quoted in Steven Johnston. “Introduction to Political Risk Analysis” (class lecture, Introduction to Political Risk Analysis, American University, Washington, DC, 12 August 2022); Heinrich Matthee. “Political Risk Analysis,” Encyclopedia Britannica, March 21, 2017. https://www.britannica.com/topic/political-risk-analysis.

[viii] Merve Tuncay. “Do Political Risks Matter in the Financial Markets?: Evidence from Turkey,” Eurasian Business Review 8, no. 2 (06, 2018), 209-227. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40821-017-0077-5; Heinrich Matthee. “Political Risk Analysis,” Encyclopedia Britannica, March 21, 2017. https://www.britannica.com/topic/political-risk-analysis; EY Geostrategic Business Group. “Presentation to AU PRA Course” (presentation, Introduction to Political Risk Analysis, American University, Washington, DC, Summer 2022)

[ix] William D. Coplin and Michael K. O’Leary. “Knowing When to Use the PRINCE System,” Political Analysis Through the PRINCE System, Policy Studies Associates, 1983, pp. 1-13.

[x] The original acronym has interaction instead of information gathering, but due to the infeasibility of directly interacting with the actors in this study, we have modified it.

[xi] Sophie Hutchinson. “Social Media Plays Major Role in Turkey Protests.” BBC News, June 4, 2013. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-22772352.

[xii] Özge Zihnioğlu. “The Legacy of the Gezi Protests in Turkey – after Protest: Pathways beyond Mass Mobilization,” Carnegie Europe, October 24, 2019. http://carnegieeurope.eu/2019/10/24/legacy-of-gezi-protests-in-turkey-pub-80142; Nate Schenkkan. The Struggle for Turkey’s Internet, Freedom House, February 2014.‌ http://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2020-02/The_Struggle_for_Turkeys_Internet_Report.pdf.

[xiii]  John C. Dewdney and Malcolm Edward Yapp. “History of Turkey,” Encyclopedia Britannica, April 17, 2023. https://www.britannica.com/place/Turkey/History.

[xiv] “Turkey accused of gross human rights violations in Gezi Park protests,” Amnesty International, October 2, 2013. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/2013/10/turkey-accused-gross-human-rights-violations-gezi-park-protests/.

[xv] Angela Dewan. “Turkey referendum: What happened and what comes next,” CNN, April 18, 2017. https://www.cnn.com/2017/04/17/europe/turkey-referendum-explainer/index.html.

[xvi] “Turkey Ranks 103rd among 167 Countries in EIU’s Democracy Index 2021,” Stockholm Center for Freedom, February 10, 2022. https://stockholmcf.org/turkey-ranks-103rd-among-167-countries-in-eius-democracy-index-2021/; “The world’s most, and least, democratic countries in 2022.” The Economist, February 1, 2023. https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2023/02/01/the-worlds-most-and-least-democratic-countries-in-2022.

[xvii] James Ryan. “The Path Ahead in Turkey’s Upcoming Electoral Campaign.” War on the Rocks, November 10, 2022. https://warontherocks.com/2022/11/the-path-ahead-in-turkeys-upcoming-electoral-campaign/.

[xviii] Ibid.

[xix] James M. Lindsay. “Five Elections to Watch in 2023.” Council on Foreign Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, 13 Dec. 2022. https://www.cfr.org/blog/five-elections-watch-2023-0.

[xx] “Turkey Social Media.” Toppan Digital Language, January 31, 2018. https://toppandigital.com/translation-services/social-media/turkey-social-media/.

[xxi] Julia Carrie Wong. “Social Media May Have Been Blocked during Turkey Coup Attempt,” The Guardian, Guardian News and Media, July 15, 2016. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/15/turkey-blocking-social-facebook-twitter-youtube.

[xxii] Asli Aydintasbas. “Turkey’s New Media Law Is Bad News – but Don’t Report It,” Brookings, October 19, 2022. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2022/10/18/turkeys-new-media-law-is-bad-news-but-dont-report-it/.

[xxiii] Ibid.

[xxiv] Ayla Jean Yackley. “Turkey’s Social Media Law: A Cautionary Tale,” Politico, March 29, 2021. https://www.politico.eu/article/turkeys-social-media-law-a-cautionary-tale/.

[xxv] Zeynep Derks. “Social Media in Turkey – Statistics and Facts,” Statista, August 1, 2022. https://www.statista.com/topics/9412/social-media-in-turkey/#topicOverview.

[xxvi] “Learn About Who We Are,” Meta, accessed April 19, 2023. https://about.meta.com/company-info/

[xxvii] Ibid.

[xxviii] “An Update on Facebook in Turkey,” Meta, January 18, 2021. https://about.fb.com/news/2021/01/an-update-on-facebook-in-turkey/.

[xxix] Arline Groenewald. “These Countries Have Outlawed Social Media,” CyberGhost Privacy Hub, February 17, 2023. https://www.cyberghostvpn.com/en_US/privacyhub/countries-ban-social-media/.

[xxx] William D. Coplin and Michael K. O’Leary. “Steps in Completing the PRINCE System to Provide a Political Forecast,” Political Analysis Through the PRINCE System, Policy Studies Associates, 1983, pp. 15-26.

[xxxi] Gurkan Ozturan. “Turkey,” Freedom on the Net 2022, Freedom House, 2022, https://freedomhouse.org/country/turkey/freedom-net/2022.

[xxxii] “Disinformation has become a global security issue: Erdoğan,” Daily Sabah, December 12, 2021. https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/diplomacy/disinformation-has-become-a-global-security-issue-erdogan.

[xxxiii] Gurkan Ozturan. “Turkey,” Freedom on the Net 2022, Freedom House, 2022, https://freedomhouse.org/country/turkey/freedom-net/2022.

[xxxiv] Ibid.

[xxxv] “Content Restrictions Based on Local Law,” Meta Transparency Center, December 2021. https://transparency.fb.com/data/content-restrictions/country/TR/.

[xxxvi] Gurkan Ozturan. “Turkey,” Freedom on the Net 2022, Freedom House, 2022, https://freedomhouse.org/country/turkey/freedom-net/2022.

[xxxvii] Zeyneb Bilginsoy. “Facebook bows to Turkish demand to name local representative,” AP News, January 18, 2021. https://apnews.com/article/turkey-media-social-media-6f2b1567e0e7f02e983a98f9dc795265.

[xxxviii] Gurkan Ozturan. “Turkey’s Disinformation Law Will Strike Further Blow to Media Freedom,” Balkan Insight, May 31, 2022. https://balkaninsight.com/2022/05/31/turkeys-disinformation-law-will-strike-further-blow-to-media-freedom/.

[xxxix] Dunja Mijatovic. “Summary,” Report Following Her Visit to Turkey from 1 to 5 July 2019, February 19, 2020, https://rm.coe.int/report-on-the-visit-to-turkey-by-dunja-mijatovic-council-of-europe-com/168099823e.

[xl] Gurkan Ozturan. “Turkey,” Freedom on the Net 2022, Freedom House, 2022, https://freedomhouse.org/country/turkey/freedom-net/2022.

[xli] Berk Esen. “The Opposition Alliance in Turkey: A Viable Alternative to Erdoğan?” Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, September 1, 2022. https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/the-opposition-alliance-in-turkey-a-viable-alternative-to-erdogan.

[xlii] “You will tweet freely if I am elected: CHP candidate İnce,” Hurriyet Daily News, May 22, 2018. https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/you-will-tweet-freely-if-i-am-elected-chp-candidate-ince-132220.

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[xliv] “Turkish phone operators join forces to facilitate use of local messaging apps,” Daily Sabah, January 15, 2021. https://www.dailysabah.com/business/tech/turkish-phone-operators-join-forces-to-facilitate-use-of-local-messaging-apps.

[xlv] Stephen Harrison. “Wikipedia Has Been Unblocked in Turkey, Finally,” Slate, January 29, 2020. https://slate.com/technology/2020/01/wikipedia-ban-turkey-venezuela-china.html.

[xlvi] Robert Spano. “Speech by Robert Spano: President of the European Court of Human Rights” (speech, Solemn Hearing on the Occasion of the Opening of the Judicial Year, September 10, 2021). https://echr.coe.int/Documents/Speech_20210910_Spano_JY_ENG.pdf.

[xlvii] Max Hoffman. “A Snapshot of Turkish Public Opinion Toward the European Union,” Center for American Progress, September 27, 2018. https://www.americanprogress.org/article/snapshot-turkish-public-opinion-toward-european-union/.

[xlviii] William D. Coplin and Michael K. O’Leary. “Steps in Completing the PRINCE System to Provide a Political Forecast,” Political Analysis Through the PRINCE System, Policy Studies Associates, 1983, pp. 15-26.

[xlix] Berk Esen. “Post-2023 Election Scenarios in Turkey,” Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, September 22, 2022. https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/post-2023-election-scenarios-in-turkey.

[l] Ozgur Ozkan. “Why Was Turkey’s Military MIA After the Earthquake?” Foreign Policy, Graham Digital Holding Company, February 24, 2023. https://foreignpolicy-com.eu1.proxy.openathens.net/2023/02/24/turkey-earthquake-erdogan-military-tsk-diaster-response-reform-coup/.

[li] Murtaza Hussain. “Turkey’s Next Elections Could Be the Country’s Last Real Democratic Vote,” The Intercept, January 22, 2023. https://theintercept.com/2023/01/22/turkey-election-erdogan/.

[lii] Berk Esen. “Post-2023 Election Scenarios in Turkey.” Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, September 22, 2022. https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/post-2023-election-scenarios-in-turkey.

[liii] Susan Fraser. “Turkey’s opposition vows more democracy if it wins election.” AP News, January 30, 2023. https://apnews.com/article/politics-turkey-government-recep-tayyip-erdogan-49b2a7d7afa1e476d2eab40f4dbca8e4.

[liv] Berk Esen. “Post-2023 Election Scenarios in Turkey.” Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, September 22, 2022. https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/post-2023-election-scenarios-in-turkey; Bobby Ghosh. “The World’s Most Important Election in 2023 Will Be in Turkey,” The Washington Post, January 9, 2023. https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/energy/the-worlds-most-important-election-in-2023-will-be-in-turkey/2023/01/09/ac2cf916-8fe3-11ed-90f8-53661ac5d9b9_story.html.

[lv] Aysu Bicer. “Turkish watchdog fines Meta Platforms $18.6M for breaking competition law,” Anadolu Agency, October 26, 2022. https://www.aa.com.tr/en/science-technology/turkish-watchdog-fines-meta-platforms-186m-for-breaking-competition-law/2721228.

[lvi] Ilan Alon and Theodore T. Herbert. “A Stranger in a Strange Land: Micro Political Risk and the Multinational Firm.” Business Horizons 52, no. 2 (2009): 127–137.