Modernizing US Alliance Structure and Asian Security Architecture for the Indo-Pacific

By Narupat Rattanakit

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The United States (‘US’) Alliance structure, also known as the San Francisco System, or more commonly known as the “hub and spokes,” is reimagining its alliance structure to meet current and future challenges of the Indo-Pacific era. As the US reworks its alliance to create deterrence against China through minilateral frameworks and cooperations, existing Asian security multilateral, regional organizations and forums are currently underutilized, ultimately leaving these workshop equalizers sidelined. The objective of this paper is to suggest avenues to modernize the US Alliance structure and Asian security architectures for the Indo-Pacific. While this policy acknowledges the importance of deterrence against China, it places a secondary emphasis on this objective. Instead, the primary aim of the US Alliance structure established during the Asia-Pacific era is to make these institutions sustainable and appropriately utilized to address the challenges posed by geopolitical competition and rising insecurity in the region.

The success of this strategy relies heavily on several factors, which include: 1) the US’ significant commitment, consistency, and presence, especially in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)-led mechanisms; 2) overstretching Washington’s resources in the long-term; 3) preference for minilateralism; and 4) the US becoming a “commercial police state.” Risks associated with this approach could escalate the conflict between the two countries from “strategic rivalry” to “strategic enmity” if not managed cautiously in tandem with its relations with Beijing. Consequently, the development of AUKUS, particularly the acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines by Australia, could lead to confrontation and an arms race in the region. The strongest argument for pursuing this strategy is that if managed, “the hubs and spokes alliance system enforces Asia’s regional institutions.”[i]

CONTEXT/BACKGROUND

The Indo-Pacific has emerged as a crucial region in the 21st century, with geopolitical competition and strategic rivalries shaping its security dynamics. Against this backdrop, the US has been working to modernize its alliance structure and security architecture in the Indo-Pacific. The US-led system of bilateral security alliances, also known as the San Francisco System or the “hub-and-spokes” security system, has been a central pillar of the Asia-Pacific security order.[ii] The US objectives in engaging with Asia are to preserve open sea lines of communication (SLOCs), promote multilateral cooperation, and uphold regional order.[iii]

The US has enduring defense treaties with regional nations, anchoring its alliance structure.[iv] However, China’s assertiveness poses significant challenges, causing profound disconnects within the US alliance system in the region.[v] In addition to bilateral treaties, the US has also been working to strengthen alliance-based security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. For instance, India and ASEAN have developed their own “Visions of Order” to maintain ASEAN’s centrality in the region’s security architecture and have emphasized concepts of inclusion and respect for a rules-based order.[vi]

Free and Open in the Indo-Pacific

In February 2022, President Biden announced the Indo-Pacific strategy of the US, which aims to anchor the country more firmly in the region and strengthen it in the process.[vii] The strategy focuses on sustained and creative engagement with allies and partners, strengthening defense capabilities, and promoting interoperability. Under this administration, National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan is forging a “latticework” of alliances and partnerships – a more flexible and ad hoc approach to international architecture.[viii] The US Marine Corps has also developed Force Design 2030, which considers current threats in the Indo-Pacific while expanding joint operability with key allies such as Japan.[ix] Additionally, the recent formation of the QUAD (comprising the US, Japan, India, and Australia) and AUKUS (comprising Australia, the UK, and the US) has added another dimension to the Indo-Pacific construct.[x] Alliances play a critical role in governing global military power. US-aligned nations collectively invest approximately $1 trillion in defense, constituting about 62% of the world’s military spending.[xi] However, the purpose of the US alliance structure in the Asia-Pacific has become more questionable, and its future hinges on its ability to adapt to the changing dynamics of the Indo-Pacific era.[xii]

Regional Institutions Underutilized Due to Great Power Competition

While the alliance remains central for US influence in the Indo-Pacific, the country has not fully leveraged existing regional institutions and forums to their potential. The US preference for bilateralism has, in turn, impeded the development of multilateralism in Asia.[xiii] The intensifying US-China rivalry and the prior administration’s lack of a multilateralism approach have worsened the situation, resulting in a confidence deficit, especially among Southeast Asia nations. ASEAN championed relative peace, stability, and relevance under its principles of centrality with ASEAN-led mechanisms such as ASEAN Plus-One, ASEAN Plus Three (APT), East Asia Summit (EAS), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) has caused the central grouping to be fragmented, undermining its progress to lead and remain relevant. Additionally, current intermestic relations in Southeast Asia have made ASEAN less cohesive. Internal issues related to Myanmar and the South China Sea, coupled with external disruptive events like Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Taiwan, have led Southeast Asian nations to adopt diverse hedging preferences. Cambodia and Myanmar are notable nations that have deviated from hedging strategies, impacting the principles of ASEAN centrality.[xiv]

Growing Salience of Minilaterals

Lastly, the significance of minilaterals presents an additional challenge for existing institutions and forums. Nevertheless, these minilaterals are specifically crafted to address gaps in the Indo-Pacific security architecture.”[xv] It complements and strengthens “the US-led alliances by pooling resources, increasing burden-sharing and facilitating the alliances’ adaptation to new security challenges,” which makes it productive. “Minilaterals are increasingly important in addressing specific non-traditional security issues not dealt with by bilateral alliances. Additionally, their functional and informal characteristics make minilaterals likely mechanisms for the involvement” of extra-regional players in the Indo-Pacific security architecture.[xvi]

APPROACHES

Amidst evolving geopolitical dynamics, two paramount objectives stand out in shaping a robust strategy to modernize the US Alliance Structure and Asian Security Architecture for the Indo-Pacific:

• The top-priority objective is to strengthen existing Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) allies such as Japan, Philippines, South Korea, and Australia. Additionally, expand partnerships like India, Indonesia, Thailand, and Vietnam by deepening defense cooperation, enhancing information sharing, and increasing joint military exercises addressing conventional and nonconventional threats. Strengthening existing MDT creates a more diverse, flexible, and resilient security architecture while also reinforcing the rules-based order. In terms of partnerships, it involves enhancing interoperability in technology and intelligence sharing, as well as modernizing military capabilities to maintain a technological edge among alliances and partners.
• The second most crucial objective is to build trust through multilateralism and be the stakeholder to promote confidence building in the region by supporting existing regional organizations (i.e., ASEAN and ASEAN-led mechanisms), frameworks (i.e., QUAD and AUKUS), and forums (i.e., EAS). These are critical institutional equilibriums in the Asia-Pacific region that should be utilized in order to appropriately meet the challenges of the Indo-Pacific era. If the US is to secure its presence in Asia-Indo-Pacific, “the hub and spokes alliance system” should also bolster Asia’s existing regional institutions.[xvii]

IMPLEMENTATION

The US State Department (DoS) and Defense Department (DoD) will be the key actors in strengthening existing bilateral alliances with MDT allies and expanding partnerships on defense cooperation, enhanced information sharing, increasing joint military exercises addressing conventional (e.g., maritime security) and transnational security issues (e.g., HADR, cyber, piracy, and climate change). Key stakeholders, especially those dealing with nonconventional threats from other Executive branches such as USAID and the Intelligence Community (IC), will be crucial to work with DoS and DoD to improve the quantity and quality of multilateral military exercises and engagements in the Indo-Pacific. Ultimately, this will help the US expand its access and influence to apply all instruments of national power. As the US increases the amount of freedom of navigation operations with treaty partners and conducts more frequent large-scale force employment exercises, joint forces will gain greater interoperability and confidence in their abilities to deter PRC military and non-military aggression. This will prove America’s commitment to its allies and partners, as it willeasily translate to greater integration during future crises. As a result, routine training and exercise relationships will become “sticky” and not easily undone through changes resulting from coups or elections.[xviii]

Japan as a Force Multiplier

The US should also strengthen existing (US-JP-AUS, US-JP-IN, and US-JP-ROK) cooperations and cultivate new (US-JP-PH and US-JP-VN) trilateral coalitions. Japan’s engagement, facilitated through its bilateral defense relationships in the region, across all minilateral cooperations, contributes not only to credible deterrence but also fosters an inclusive alliance structure (Figure 1).

Figure 1

This approach ensures coherence and synchronization with crucial allies and partners. Japan has bolstered regional alignment by reinforcing or creating security agreements with Asian and European partners like Australia, India, the UK, France, and the EU. This approach prioritizes non-traditional security challenges, especially in maritime security, while emphasizing joint military drills to enhance interoperability.[xix] As a result, Japan’s role is crucial and an asset to such multilateral activity, which advances the mirroring of joint statements, greater consensus on tangible areas of focus, particularly related to maritime security, and facilitates tabletop exercises.

The US and Multilateral Architectures in the Indo-Pacific

Given the current state of ASEAN, domestic political challenges have hindered member states ability to fully engage in the organization’s activities and objectives. This causes a lack of leadership in all ASEAN-led mechanisms. To mitigate this, the US must hear and follow, rather than lead, ASEAN and ASEAN-led mechanisms to rebuild confidence.[xx] Over time, this allows the US to fill its legitimacy gap in the region. It also allows Southeast Asian states to “enmesh” great powers to “ensure they comply with the rules and norms.”[xxi] Other key stakeholders like the US, Japan, and Australia actively shape regionalism in Asia alongside ASEAN, redefining the architecture to align with their goals.[xxii] Therefore, the US should restrain itself from leading. Instead, encourage a space for ASEAN to create incremental plurilateral venues, particularly on the South China Sea, which is a core area of contention within ASEAN.[xxiii]

Equally important is for the US to pay attention to ASEAN’s existing minilaterals to avoid overlapping new initiatives. Being present and acting as the mediator of minilateral approaches in ASEAN can fundamentally be emulated in other ASEAN-led mechanisms. The US’ support is also essential in sustaining the relevance of inclusive groups like the EAS, the Indo-Pacific’s premier forum for strategic dialogue.[xxiv] There is much room for more institutionalized multilateralism, and an opportunity to balance on-the-ground activity with dialogue to reach an equilibrium, such as adding more frequency to the ministerial-level meetings (2+2 and 4+4 formats) and ambassadorial level.[xxv] This realization leads each of the major powers to understand that active multilateral cooperation better serves their interests than competitive maneuvering.[xxvi] With Southeast Asia becoming more focal in the long-term, it will also help ASEAN become central in major powers’ Indo-Pacific strategies, which ASEAN has always feared being deemed less relevant.[xxvii]

Minileteral Groupings in the Indo-Pacific

As for the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), the US must also add two of its mutual defense treaty allies, South Korea and the Philippines, particularly on maritime security issues, while also expanding the role of the National Maritime Intelligence-Integration Office (NMIO). Given the US bilateral alliance and expansion of trilateral strategic dialogues, the QUAD has the potential to serve as the primary regional maritime security framework. It can strengthen norms like “freedom of navigation” and foster increased cooperation, potentially leading to reduced naval spending and activity levels among its members.[xxviii] This can be reinforced by AUKUS when it comes to technological workaround and a flexible defense arrangement that responds to China’s maritime aggression.[xxix] Partners within AUKUS can also help advance subsequent developments such as in artificial intelligence, robotics, and quantum computing.[xxx] The region, with its complex latticework, resolves security issues and fosters collective action. It helps the region use its framework effectively, navigating major power relations and reducing disruptive competition.[xxxi] Additionally, the complexity and density of these many groupings readily create channels to reduce anxieties associated with exclusion.”[xxxii] In other words, it can mute great power competition while overseeing other existing groupings.

CONCLUSION

Opponents against revamping the US Alliance Structure and Asian Security for the Indo-Pacific propose that it creates more tensions in the region, disrupting the delicate balance of power that is ultimately expanding the US’ sphere of influence. In addition to this, civilians in allies and partners would protest that it only projects US power, neglects their country’s real problems, and could lead to severe consequences for the host country. Another complaint is that the cost of modernizing is prohibitively high, given the US is currently facing other pressing domestic challenges such as surging inflation and slowing economic activity. Another consequence is the increased pressure on countries to balance their relationships between China and the US. This pressure arises from the lack of progress in stabilizing relations and addressing global emerging threats, despite a consensus to enhance global economic security. Conclusively, domestic politics in the US, specifically Congress and the American public, also play a significant role. China being a bipartisan issue makes it difficult for Washington to engage in existing forums (i.e., EAS) with Beijing, which lacks the drive to come to the negotiation table, even indirectly.

The expense associated with this approach burdens the US’ demands for significant commitment, its ability to maintain a consistent stance, and its presence, especially within ASEAN-driven frameworks. President Biden’s “America is back” and stressed that “diplomacy is back at the center” of his administration’s foreign policy, requires significant effort and urgent headway to equalize geo-political and economic tensions with China.[xxxiii] In the long-term, the US itself will be overburdened. Despite Japan’s “honest-broker” role and presence in all existing and emerging trilateral cooperation, it requires both the US and China to perpetually keep each other informed where domestic politics could disrupt such diligence.[xxxiv]

Another associated cost is that a revised latticework weakens multilateral cooperation if it becomes overly reliant. Given the positive approach of minilateralism in the US alliance system, it also creates “efficiency concerns as the number of meetings proliferates, demanding time, resources and …coordination across initiatives.”[xxxv] Additionally, it’s challenging to foresee Southeast Asian minilateral arrangements contributing effectively to overall regional deterrence efforts. Governments are concerned that these new arrangements might undermine institutions centered around ASEAN, creating fear and hesitancy among them.[xxxvi] Furthermore, minilateralism could undermine multilateralism if, for instance, these minilateral initiatives become platforms for major power rivalry.[xxxvii] Amidst the strained economic ties and selective decoupling from China, the US faces the challenges of being a “commercial police state on an unprecedented scale in the long-term.”[xxxviii] Lastly, “China sees Asia’s architecture as a zero-sum nature referring to the US alliance system as ‘Cold War anachronisms’ that are exclusionist, that protect the few at the expense of the many, and that no longer fit the region’s needs.”[xxxix]

The risk involved is having the US encircle China through numerous trilateral networks, which could escalate the bilateral relationship calculus from “strategic rivalry” to “strategic enmity.” The AUKUS strategic military pact, unlike the QUAD, could lead to confrontation, especially related to Taiwan, and the acquisition of nuclear-powered attack submarines by the Australian Navy.[xl] Nuclear-powered submarines are necessary only for attack purposes and not “for peaceful purposes” which could potentially fuel an arms race in the region.[xli] Mismanagement of democratic Indo-Pacific alignments could cause geopolitical tensions with China.[xlii] The cost of these alignments could strain the US economy or divert resources from domestic priorities. Oriana Skylar Mastro, a China scholar at Stanford, warned that without joint planning and execution, the aggregation of capabilities will not enhance deterrence against China.[xliii] Furthermore, minilateralism could make international organizations less effective and promote contention.[xliv] Partnerships could create emerging rivals, especially India, which holds “nonalignment and strategic autonomy as core principles of its foreign and security policies” and employs a hedging strategy with China and Russia.[xlv]

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[i] Victor Cha, Powerplay: The Origins of the American Alliance System in Asia (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016), 218.

[ii] Elena Atanassova-Cornelis, “Reshaping the San Francisco System Through Alignment Cooperation: Japan’s Security Partnerships,” in Rethinking the San Francisco System in Indo-Pacific Security: Enduring Legacies, Structural Contradictions and Geopolitical Rivalry, edited by Yoneyuki Sugita and Victor Teo (Palgrave Macmillan US, 2022), 241.

[iii] Jocelyn D. Roberts and Scott A. Wicker, “U.S. Bilateral Alliances System: Going in the San Francisco Strong at Seventy,” in Rethinking the San Francisco System in Indo-Pacific Security: Enduring Legacies, Structural Contradictions and Geopolitical Rivalry, edited by Yoneyuki Sugita and Victor Teo (Palgrave Macmillan, 2022), 211.

[iv] Benjamin D. Youngquist, “Examining America’s Treaty and Alliance Structure in the Indo-Pacific,” Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs (2021), https://media.defense.gov/2021/Jun/03/2002733836/-1/-1/0/YOUNGQUIST.PDF/YOUNGQUIST.PDF.

[v] Adam P. Liff, “China and the US Alliance System,” The China Quarterly 233 (2018): 137–65, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/china-quarterly/article/china-and-the-us-alliance-system/1FF369905B4A8110DC8693A3C8A7857B.

[vi] James J. Przystup, “Visions of Order in the Indo-Pacific: Strengthening Alliance-Based Security Cooperation,” Hudson Institute, accessed April 20, 2023, https://www.hudson.org/national-security-defense/visions-of-order-in-the-indo-pacific-strengthening-alliance-based-security-cooperation.

[vii] “Fact Sheet: Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States,” The White House, accessed April 20, 2023, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/02/11/fact-sheet-indo-pacific-strategy-of-the-united-states/.

[viii] Susannah Patton, “Biden’s ‘Lattice’ Asia Policy Not Meshing,” United States Studies Centre, accessed April 20, 2023, https://www.ussc.edu.au/analysis/bidens-lattice-asia-policy-not-meshing.

[ix] Alec Bohlman, “USMC Force Design 2030: US Marines and the Indo-Pacific,” The Diplomat, accessed April 19, 2023, https://thediplomat.com/2021/07/usmc-force-design-2030-us-marines-and-the-indo-pacific/.

[x] Rashi Randev, “Reshaping the Indo-Pacific Construct through Strategic Geopolitical Convergences: AUKUS as a Harbinger of a Multipolar Hegemony in the Region,” Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, accessed April 21, 2023, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/2904531/reshaping-the-indo-pacific-construct-through-strategic-geopolitical-convergence/.

[xi] “The Importance of Alliances for US Security,” The Heritage Foundation, accessed April 20, 2023, https://www.heritage.org/military-strength-topical-essays/2017-essays/the-importance-alliances-us-security.

[xii] William T. Tow and Amitav Acharya, “Obstinate or Obsolete? The US Alliance Structure in the Asia-Pacific,” working paper, no. 2007/4, ANU College of Asia & the Pacific, August 2007, https://ir.bellschool.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/uploads/2016-08/ir_working_paper_2007-4.pdf.

[xiii] Amitav Acharya, “The New Transregional Security Politics of the Asia-Pacific,” in Security Politics in the Asia-Pacific: A Regional-Global Nexus?, ed. William T. Tow (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 305.

[xiv] Hunter Marston, “Abandoning Hedging: Reconsidering Southeast Asian Alignment Choices,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 45, no. 1 (2023), https://bookshop.iseas.edu.sg/publication/7851#contents.

[xv] Brad Glosserman, Filling the Gaps in the Indo-Pacific Security Architecture, The Japan Times, accessed April 20, 2023, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2022/10/26/commentary/world-commentary/indo-pacific-security-2/.

[xvi] Elena Atanassova-Cornelis, “The Future of the US-Japan Alliance in the Asia-Pacific: From Honeymoon to Realism?” Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 39, no. 3 (2020): 113-142, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03932729.2020.1712132.

[xvii] Victor Cha, Powerplay: The Origins of the American Alliance System in Asia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018), 218.

[xviii] Scott W. Harold, Derek Grossman, Brian Harding, Jeffrey W. Hornung, Gregory Poling, Jeffrey Smith, and Meagan L. Smith, “The Future of a Densely Networked Indo-Pacific Defense Community,” in The Thickening Web of Asian Security Cooperation: Deepening Defense Ties Among US Allies and Partners in the Indo-Pacific, ed. Scott W. Harold et al. (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2019), 351.

[xix] Elena Atanassova-Cornelis, “Reshaping the San Francisco System Through Alignment Cooperation: Japan’s Security Partnerships,” in Rethinking the San Francisco System in Indo-Pacific Security: Enduring Legacies, Structural Contradictions and Geopolitical Rivalry, ed. Yoneyuki Sugita and Victor Teo (Palgrave Macmillan US, 2022), 241-242.

[xx] Amitav Acharya, ASEAN and Regional Order: Revisiting Security Community in Southeast Asia (London: Routledge, 2009), 133-134.

[xxi] Victor Cha, Powerplay: The Origins of the American Alliance System in Asia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018), 218.

[xxii] See Seng Tan, Multilateral Asian Security Architecture: Non-ASEAN Stakeholders (Singapore: ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, 2019), 165.

[xxiii] Joanne Lin and Laura Lee, “Minilateral Cooperation in ASEAN May Help it Overcome Challenges in Multilateralism,” ISEAS Perspective, no. 16 (March 8, 2023), https://www.iseas.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/ISEAS_Perspective_2023_16.pdf.

[xxiv] Susannah Patton, “Biden’s ‘Lattice’ Asia Policy Not Meshing,” United States Studies Centre, https://www.ussc.edu.au/analysis/bidens-lattice-asia-policy-not-meshing.

[xxv] Frederick Kliem, “Engaging the Region: The Role of the Significant Others” in Great Power Competition and Order Building in the Indo-Pacific: Towards a New Indo-Pacific Equilibrium, (Routledge, 2022), 179-80.

[xxvi] Michael Wesley, “Asia-Pacific Institutions,” in Security Politics in the Asia-Pacific: A Regional-Global Nexus?, ed. William T. Tow (Cambridge University Press, 2009), 65.

[xxvii] Hoang Thi Ha, “Understanding the Institutional Challenge of Indo-Pacific Minilaterals to ASEAN,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 44, no. 1 (2022): 22, https://www.jstor.org/stable/27130806.

[xxviii] Sam Bateman, “Maritime Security: Regional Concerns and Global Implications,” in Security Politics in the Asia-Pacific: A Regional-Global Nexus?, ed. William T. Tow (Cambridge University Press, 2009), 264-5.

[xxix] Patrick M. Cronin, “The 3 Pillars of Asia’s New Security Architecture,” Hudson Institute, accessed April 21, 2023, https://www.hudson.org/foreign-policy/the-3-pillars-of-asia-s-new-security-architecture.

[xxx] Editorial Board, “AUKUS Sub Deal is One Pillar of Regional Security,” The Japan Times, accessed April 19, 2023, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2023/03/17/editorials/aukus-summit/.

[xxxi] Victor Cha, Powerplay: The Origins of the American Alliance System in Asia, (Princeton University Press, 2018), 216.

[xxxii] Ibid., 218.

[xxxiii] “Remarks by President Biden on America’s Place in the World,” The White House, February 4, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/02/04/remarks-by-president-biden-on-americas-place-in-the-world/.

[xxxiv] Shihoko Goto, “Japan’s Emerging Role as the World’s Consensus Builder,” Wilson Center, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/japans-emerging-role-worlds-consensus-builder.

[xxxv] Brad Glosserman, “Filling the Gaps in the Indo-Pacific Security Architecture,” The Japan Times, accessed April 20, 2023, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2022/10/26/commentary/world-commentary/indo-pacific-security-2/.

[xxxvi] Ibid.

[xxxvii] Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, “Explaining the Rise of Minilaterals in the Indo-Pacific,” Observer Research Foundation, no. 490 (2021): 1-6, https://www.orfonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/ORF_IssueBrief_490_Minilaterals-IndoPacific.pdf.

[xxxviii] Adam Posen, “America’s Zero-Sum Economics Doesn’t Add Up,” Foreign Policy, March 24, 2023, accessed April 19, 2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/03/24/economy-trade-united-states-china-industry-manufacturing-supply-chains-biden/.

[xxxix] Victor Cha, Powerplay: The Origins of the American Alliance System in Asia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018), 212.

[xl] Ian Storey and William Choong, “The AUKUS Announcement And Southeast Asia: An Assessment Of Regional Responses And Concerns – Analysis,” Eurasia Review, accessed April 22, 2023, https://www.eurasiareview.com/08042023-the-aukus-announcement-and-southeast-asia-an-assessment-of-regional-responses-and-concerns-analysis/. 

[xli] Ted Snider, “What the AUKUS Aub Ruckus Means for Regional Security,” Responsible Statecraft, accessed April 20, 2023, https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2023/03/17/what-the-aukus-sub-ruckus-means-for-regional-security/. 

[xlii] Elena Atanassova-Cornelis, “Alignment Cooperation and Regional Security Architecture in the Indo-Pacific,” International Politics 58, no. 5 (2021): 672-689, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03932729.2020.1712132.

[xliii] Brad Glosserman, “Filling the Gaps in the Indo-Pacific Security Architecture,” The Japan Times, accessed April 20, 2023, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2022/10/26/commentary/world-commentary/indo-pacific-security-2/.

[xliv] Husain Haqqani and Narayanappa Janardhan, “The Minilateral Era,” Hudson Institute, accessed April 19, 2023, https://www.hudson.org/foreign-policy/minilateral-era.

[xlv] Michael Schuman, “What Limits Any U.S. Alliance With India Over China,” The Atlantic, accessed April 23, 2023, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2023/03/india-relations-us-china-modi/673237/.