By Luke Maloney
“We don’t take lessons on democracy from the Kremlin,” stated President Maia Sandu of Moldova.[i] This statement would be unimaginable from a Moldovan president just five years ago, yet the country is changing. Instead of pandering to the Russians and tolerating high levels of Russian interference in internal affairs, Sandu and her Pro-West Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) have had enough. She made the aforementioned statement after Russia criticized Moldova for blocking 31 websites, including 21 owned by the Russian government, and suspending the licenses of 6 pro-Russian TV stations; this move perfectly evinces the remarkable shift in Moldovan politics.[ii] Europe and the United States must take advantage of this fortunate turn of events to gain a geographically important ally while working to remove malign Russian influence in Eastern Europe permanently. Moldova sits at a critical juncture in the supply chain between Ukraine and the rest of Europe and, until recently, was one of the last strongholds of Russian influence on the continent. Furthermore, the Russian-backed breakaway state of Transnistria represents the final unresolved military occupation from the Soviet era, and it is crucial to support Moldova in asserting its territorial integrity.
First and foremost, President Sandu has led Moldova a long way since she was elected as its first female president in 2021. Before, socialist pro-Russia politicians, many of them holdovers from the country’s old days as a Soviet Republic, abused their power to wiretap journalists, opposition leaders, and civic activists.[iii] Nowadays, the socialist Democratic Party of Moldova has felt the need to rebrand itself to the European Social Democratic Party, and its former leader, Vladimir Plahotiuc, is on the run after his alleged role in a $1 billion banking theft from 2012 to 2014.[iv] His counterpart, Ilan Șor, was convicted in absentia for his role in the “Theft of the Century” and his Șor Party was banned in June 2023, causing the European Court of Human Rights to review the legality of the ban.[v] That said, he and his Russian backers do not intend to renounce their claims on Moldova without a fight, recently announcing the creation of the so-called “Victory Bloc” in Moscow as an attempt to unite Russian supporters in Moldova ahead of the presidential election on October 20.[vi] President Sandu acts as a critical bulwark against Russian influence and her reorientation of Moldovan politics benefits the broader Western world. The West must laud her efforts and help Moldova secure elections free from undue foreign influence. With the upcoming presidential election and referendum on EU membership being held the same day, it is vital that the West acts fast to help her achieve the mutually beneficial goal of greater integration into the European sphere or risk an opposition victory that undoes the progress Moldova has made over the previous four years.[vii]
A significant step towards regional integration without granting full EU membership would be to allow Moldova into the Three Seas Initiative (3SI), a regional project aimed at reorienting transport, energy, and digital infrastructure connections.[viii] The initiative, which includes 13 countries from Estonia to Greece, attempts to link the Adriatic, Baltic, and Black Seas, strengthens European supply lines, decreases reliance on east-west infrastructure from Russia, and develops new commercial links between the nations. Moldova first asked to join the group in 2021, shortly after Sandu assumed office, and in 2023, it obtained partner-participant status.[ix] While this is a good first step, it is not enough. The 3SI member countries must allow non-EU members to join the initiative and grant Moldova full membership status. It sits at a crucial crossroads between Ukraine and the rest of Europe and will be an essential transportation highway once the war ends and reconstruction begins. Moldova has already made concrete efforts to facilitate its integration by transitioning to the European railroad gauge, standardizing the size of the tracks and thus increasing the efficiency of transportation by train, and it is time that Europe realizes the country’s strategic importance.[x] The 3SI member states should be proactive as the benefits are multifaceted. The economic growth Moldova would experience would help dissipate internal Moldovan suspicions of the EU, and the infrastructure would create a network capable of supporting Ukraine. This change would clearly signal that the EU is awaiting its membership and establish essential supply lines while replacing those in utter disrepair. The United States should also deliver on its 2020 promise to commit $1 billion to the 3SI.[xi] This sum would greatly alleviate the internal competition for funding and allow member states to pass more funds to Moldova.
In addition to the economic aspect, it is essential to back Moldova militarily in its ongoing feud with Russia over Transnistria. In February, after requiring Transnistrian firms to pay taxes to the Moldovan government, the unrecognized region convened a congress requesting Russia’s assistance in dealing with what it labels “undue pressure” from the Moldovan state.[xii] The next day, NATO reaffirmed its support for Moldova if Russia tried to annex Transnistria. In response, Russia accused the alliance of wanting to turn Moldova into a “second Ukraine” and warned of “possible consequences.”[xiii] This is a very real threat to the sovereignty of Moldova, and the international community cannot take it lightly, given the invasion of Ukraine. It is foolish to believe that if Russia succeeds in Ukraine, it will stop at the Moldovan border or even the Dniester River (the breakaway state’s claimed demarcation between Moldova and Transnistria). Given Russia’s military presence in Transnistria, it is vital Moldova has the tools to defend itself and, when the opportunity arises, expel the occupation force from its soil through diplomatic means. If the Moldovan people approve EU membership this October, President Sandu should consider calling for a subsequent referendum to gauge the popularity of amending the constitution to allow NATO membership. Given the ambitious nature of pushing for a constitutional amendment, Moldova should continue to work closely with the NATO Liaison Office in Chișinău as well as Ukrainian officials to refine its military doctrine and coordinate training to improve its readiness in the case of Russian aggression. NATO members should look to facilitate this process, expanding on last year’s Defense and Related Security Capacity Building Package while taking Russian threats over Transnistria seriously to avoid a wider conflict.[xiv]
President Sandu’s leadership marks a significant turning point for Moldova, signaling a decisive shift towards the West. The country’s pursuit of greater integration into European institutions and efforts to crack down on Russian influence and hold corrupt officials accountable presents a unique opportunity for the EU and the United States to create a permanent ally in Eastern Europe. By standing with Moldova, the West can not only bolster regional stability but also advance democracy and sovereignty while removing Russian influence from yet another former Soviet Republic. The West must continue making concerted efforts to ensure Moldova’s incorporation into the European system, finally finishing the job that started in 1991, breaking Russia’s hold over Eastern Europe for good.
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Cotoros, Alina. “ISW, Despre Blocul Victoria al pro-Rusului Șor: VA Permite Kremlinului Să Se Concentreze ASUPRA Unui Efort Politic.” Adevărul, April 22, 2024. https://adevarul.ro/stiri-externe/republica-moldova/isw-despre-blocul-victoria-al-pro-rusului-sor-va-2356447.html.
“Declarațiile de Presă Ale Viceprim-Ministrului, Ministrului Afacerilor Externe Și Integrării Europene, Nicu Popescu, Și Ale Omologului Său Român, Bogdan Aurescu, La Finalul Consultărilor Bilaterale.” Ministerul Afacerilor Externe Al Republicii moldova, September 7, 2021. https://mfa.gov.md/ro/content/declaratiile-de-presa-ale-viceprim-ministrului-ministrului-afacerilor-externe-si-0.
Dinu, Maria. “Maia Sandu, După Reacția Rusiei La Blocarea Mai Multor Site-Uri Și Posturi TV: Nu Luăm Lecţii de Democraţie de La Kremlin.” Adevărul, November 2, 2023. https://adevarul.ro/stiri-externe/republica-moldova/maia-sandu-dupa-reactia-rusiei-la-blocarea-2313017.html.
“Moldova: Freedom in the World 2020 Country Report.” Freedom House, 2021. https://freedomhouse.org/country/moldova/freedom-world/2020.
Necsutu, Madalin. “Moldovan Oligarch Plahotniuc Faces Trial in ‘grand Theft’ Case.” Balkan Insight, May 30, 2023. https://balkaninsight.com/2023/05/30/moldovan-oligarch-plahotniuc-faces-trial-in-grand-theft-case/.
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“Second Man Jailed in Moldova’s ‘fraud of the Century’.” Reuters, January 29, 2024. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/second-man-jailed-moldovas-fraud-century-2024-01-29/.
Solovyov, Vladimir. “Moldova’s Sandu Stakes Reelection on EU Integration – Carnegie …” Carnegie Endowment, February 26, 2024. https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/91800.
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[i] Maria Dinu, “Maia Sandu, După Reacția Rusiei La Blocarea Mai Multor Site-Uri Și Posturi TV: Nu Luăm Lecţii de Democraţie de La Kremlin,” Adevărul, November 2, 2023, https://adevarul.ro/stiri-externe/republica-moldova/maia-sandu-dupa-reactia-rusiei-la-blocarea-2313017.html.
[ii] Ibid.
[iii] “Moldova: Freedom in the World 2020 Country Report,” Freedom House, 2021, https://freedomhouse.org/country/moldova/freedom-world/2020.
[iv] Madalin Necsutu, “Moldovan Oligarch Plahotniuc Faces Trial in ‘grand Theft’ Case,” Balkan Insight, May 30, 2023, https://balkaninsight.com/2023/05/30/moldovan-oligarch-plahotniuc-faces-trial-in-grand-theft-case/.
[v] “Second Man Jailed in Moldova’s ‘fraud of the Century’ ,” Reuters, January 29, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/second-man-jailed-moldovas-fraud-century-2024-01-29/, Saman Rizwan, “As Moldova Approaches Presidential Elections, Legal Battles Intensify at the International Stage,” Forbes, March 18, 2024, https://www.forbes.com/sites/zengernews/2024/03/14/as-moldova-approaches-presidential-elections-legal-battles-intensify-at-the-international-stage/?sh=77c7ea76749f.
[vi] Alina Cotoros, “ISW, Despre Blocul Victoria al pro-Rusului Șor: VA Permite Kremlinului Să Se Concentreze ASUPRA Unui Efort Politic,” Adevărul, April 22, 2024, https://adevarul.ro/stiri-externe/republica-moldova/isw-despre-blocul-victoria-al-pro-rusului-sor-va-2356447.html.
[vii] Vladimir Solovyov, “Moldova’s Sandu Stakes Reelection on EU Integration – Carnegie …,” Carnegie Endowment, February 26, 2024, https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/91800.
[viii] “Three Seas Summit Vilnius 2024,” Three Seas Summit Vilnius 2024, accessed March 3, 2024, https://3seas.eu/.
[ix] “Declarațiile de Presă Ale Viceprim-Ministrului, Ministrului Afacerilor Externe Și Integrării Europene, Nicu Popescu, Și Ale Omologului Său Român, Bogdan Aurescu, La Finalul Consultărilor Bilaterale,” Ministerul Afacerilor Externe Al Republicii moldova, September 7, 2021, https://mfa.gov.md/ro/content/declaratiile-de-presa-ale-viceprim-ministrului-ministrului-afacerilor-externe-si-0.
[x] Mihai Sebe, “Anticipating the 2023 Three Seas Initiative Bucharest Summit,” ed. Ana-Maria Andreea Anghelescu and Iulian Oneașcă, WP-46-Anticipating-the-2023-3SI-Bucharest-Summit, April 2023, http://ier.gov.ro/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/WP-46-Anticipating-the-2023-3SI-Bucharest-Summit.pdf.., 45.
[xi] David Wemer, “US Commits $1 Billion Dollars to Develop Central European Infrastructure,” Atlantic Council, October 17, 2022, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/news/press-releases/us-commits-1-billion-dollars-to-develop-central-european-infrastructure/.
[xii] “Pro-EU Moldova Dismisses Breakaway Region’s Request for Russian …,” Reuters, accessed March 4, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/moldovan-breakaway-region-asks-russia-protect-its-economy-pressure-2024-02-28/.
[xiii] Ioana Coman, “Moscova Acuză Republica Moldova Că Trece de La Neutralitate La O Poziţie Antirusă: „E Un Nou Atac La Adresa Noastră”,” Digi24, March 3, 2023, https://www.digi24.ro/amphtml/stiri/externe/moscova-acuza-republica-moldova-ca-trece-de-la-neutralitate-la-o-pozitie-antirusa-e-un-nou-atac-la-adresa-noastra-2270715.
[xiv] “Relations with the Republic of Moldova,” NATO, May 26, 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49727.htm.
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