Pushed Into Precarity

Costa Rican Anti-Asylum Migration Decrees’ Impact on Nicaraguan Migrants & Development

Image Source: Pixabay; https://tinyurl.com/3r9sxrnw

By Amanda Clark

Once praised for its humanitarian approach to migration, Costa Rica now risks that reputation as decrees turn Nicaraguan asylum seekers into a vulnerable labor force, exposing the growing gap between the country’s ideals and its practices.

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Migration between Nicaragua and Costa Rica has a long and complex history, shaped by geographic proximity, shared cultural and linguistic ties, and economic interdependence. As neighboring nations in Central America, the flow of Nicaraguan migrants into Costa Rica dates back to the 19th century, initially driven by a demand for seasonal labor in the agricultural sector. Over time, this migration evolved and became an integral part of Costa Rica’s labor force— particularly in sectors reliant on low-wage workers.[i]

This paper explores how recent shifts in Costa Rican migration policy, particularly the 2022 anti-asylum decrees, have reshaped the legal and labor conditions of Nicaraguan migrants. While traditional frameworks such as the push-pull functionalist theory and migration hierarchies help explain the volume and direction of migration, they fall short in explaining why migrants remain precarious once they arrive. In this context, precarity involves insecure legal statuses, vulnerability to xenophobia, and lower levels of human development (lower incomes, education levels, and access to healthcare) compared to native citizens. To understand the increasing exclusion and exploitation of Nicaraguan migrants, we must move beyond descriptive models and engage with historical-structural and dual labor market theories, which foreground how systemic inequalities and state interests shape migrants’ access to rights, protections, and long-term integration.

This analysis unfolds in four parts. First, I trace the historical evolution of Nicaraguan migration and Costa Rica’s formerly rights-centered approach, particularly under the 2010 General Migration Law. Second, I examine how Nicaragua’s political and economic crisis, alongside Costa Rica’s relatively stable labor market, drive the recent surge in migration. I do so through applying the push-pull theory and migration hierarchies to situate these flows within broader regional dynamics. Third, I demonstrate how Costa Rica’s recent legal shifts transform its asylum system into a mechanism of labor extraction. Drawing on historical-structural and dual labor market theories, I show how migrant labor is deliberately kept precarious to maximize its utility to the state and employers. Finally, I assess the implications of this shift for Costa Rica’s broader development goals, arguing that policies that marginalize migrants ultimately undermine inclusive, long-term national development. By analyzing Costa Rica’s migration regime through this layered theoretical lens, I aim to reveal the structural forces behind the country’s evolving approach to migration—a model that increasingly frames migrants not as rights-bearing individuals, but as a flexible labor force whose precarity is central to their economic value.

Background: Historical Trends and Integration Policy

The flow of Nicaraguan migrants to Costa Rica dates back to the 19th century, when the route was formed by seasonal labor migration. After almost two centuries of this relatively stable flow, migration increased in the 1990s as a result of growing demand in Costa Rica in the construction, agricultural, and domestic services sectors. Over time, this migration evolved to be an integral part of Costa Rica’s labor force, particularly in sectors reliant on low-wage workers such as agriculture, construction, and domestic labor.[ii] Originally, many of these migrants entered the country irregularly and faced labor rights inequalities in comparison to their Costa Rican counterparts. In response, the Costa Rican government enacted a new migration law in 2010, Ley General de Migración y Extranjería Nº 8764 (the “General Migration Law” in English), which intended to facilitate the regularization of unauthorized workers and better integrate them into the Costa Rican society and workforce.[iii]

         The institution of the General Migration Law marked a shift of the Costa Rican government’s migration policy from enforcement to integration.[iv] For example, Article 31, Paragraph 10 has explicitly integrative language, stating that “every foreign person authorized to legally remain in the country has the right to fully integrate into Costa Rican society.”[v] This law had two major outcomes that are particularly relevant to Nicaraguan migration today. First, it formalized pathways to migrate for work, providing greater security and rights to migrant workers. Second, it set up Costa Rica’s comparatively developed humanitarian protection system, which has historically allowed migrants seeking refugee or asylum status to access work and temporary legal status during their asylum adjudication.[vi]

The law includes 268 articles that outline the rights of both foreign-born individuals and Costa Ricans.[vii] One of the most notable pieces of this law is Article 31, which states that foreign-born populations hold the same “individual and social rights and guarantees” granted to Costa Ricans by the constitution.[viii] Article 31 outlines the rights of foreign-born people to seek asylum, access social security, and beyond. It also states that “no foreigner who has applied for asylum or who has been granted such status may be expelled, deported, or rejected to another country,” thereby providing special protections for individuals who may face persecution in their country of origin.[ix]

A series of other articles in the law outline the process of regularization, allowing certain unauthorized migrants to gain legal paperwork for their immigration status.[x] For instance, in direct response to the problem of unauthorized foreign workers, the law allows workers in this category to legalize their status via expedited employment-based temporary residence permits. The law also set up the National Immigration Council, a body composed of representatives of various state and civil society entities that oversee the approval of migration policies and guidelines.[xi]

The regularization mechanisms were generally considered unsuccessful at first, as there was no clear increase in the number of applications or acceptance rates for temporary and permanent residence in the first three years.[xii] However, the law matured as national policies and plans that could better implement the law’s mandates were developed. As time passed, Costa Rica gradually became known as a “sanctuary” for migrants and refugees, particularly for those who make up the migration flow from Nicaragua.[xiii]

Political Crisis and An Increasing Flow: Functionalist Push-Pull Models

In 2018, Nicaraguan university students and civil society activists began protesting Nicaragua’s new Social Security Act, calling for President Daniel Ortega to step down. The protests, which involved an estimated 24-63 deaths due to the use of excessive force by the police and pro-government groups, focused on a pension overhaul plan that increased contributions for workers and employers but lowered all-around benefits.[xiv] Ortega’s government responded to this activism with violent crackdowns, spurring widespread human rights abuses in the months and years to come.[xv] Political repression, persecution of opponents, and human rights violations continue to this day.[xvi]

In response to these conflating crises, increasing numbers of Nicaraguans have fled the country. As displayed in Figure 1, the number of Nicaraguans migrating towards Costa Rica have trended upwards since 1990, with notable recent increases in 2015 and 2020.[xvii] This trend can be analyzed through simple functionalist push-pull models, where political and economic crises have acted as “push” factors, driving high levels of emigration.[xviii] Simultaneously, the labor opportunities and economic prosperity in neighboring Costa Rica along with peaceful political conditions act as “pull” factors, driving a mass influx of Nicaraguan migrants toward Costa Rica as a destination. In 2024, according to the International Organization on Migration (IOM), more than half a million Nicaraguans (under humanitarian and non-humanitarian statuses) arrived in Costa Rica.[xix] These numbers are slightly higher than the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs’ data and can be explained by the IOM data’s focus on including circular and irregular migration in reports cited.

Note: (UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, 2024)[xx]

While the push-pull theory provides a basic descriptive model through which to view the increasing flow of recent years at a macro-scale, migration scholars have criticized it as an oversimplified explanation of migration.[xxi] These pitfalls are evident in the Nicaragua to Costa Rica case study, as the push-pull model fails to fully account for the long history of migration from Nicaragua to Costa Rica and does little to identify “why Costa Rica” as compared to other nations.

Another analytical tool that helps illuminate the dynamics of Nicaraguan migration to Costa Rica is the migration hierarchies theory. According to Skeldon, a global hierarchy in which countries occupy different roles based on their economic development shape migration patterns.[xxii] In this framework, Costa Rica can be understood as an “expanding core” country, one that experiences both high immigration and emigration rates, while Nicaragua functions as a “labor frontier country.”[xxiii] This helps explain why Costa Rica itself continues to attract large numbers of Nicaraguan migrants, despite the fact that Costa Ricans tend to migrate to other countries like the United States.

Nicaraguans make up the majority of migrants in Costa Rica (Figure 2). In 2021, 384,894 individuals (66.1% of the 582,483 people who migrated through formal channels) were of Nicaraguan origin.[xxiv] They also represent the largest group of migrants under protected status in Costa Rica— accounting for 73%.[xxv] As of 2024, Nicaraguans comprised approximately 7% of Costa Rica’s total population.[xxvi]

These numbers illustrate what Miller & Castles refer to as a “migration system” between Nicaragua and Costa Rica, a pattern of sustained migration flows that has historical roots but has expanded considerably in recent years.[xxvii] This migration system, coupled with cultural ties and accumulated social knowledge (including familiarity with Costa Rican institutions, language, and employment networks), reduces the barriers to mobility for Nicaraguans and reinforces Costa Rica’s position within a regional migration hierarchy.

The approaches of push-pull functionalist and migration hierarchies theories, while useful in explaining the volume and direction of migration flows, fail to account for the deeper systemic forces that shape migrants’ legal status, labor conditions, and integration, or exclusion, upon arrival. As the next sections demonstrate, even as Costa Rica continues to absorb large numbers of Nicaraguan migrants, its legal and labor frameworks, especially following the implementation of Decrees 43809-MGP and 43810-MGP, have increasingly constrained migrants’ rights, access to protection, and prospects for long-term development. To fully grasp these dynamics, we must turn to historical-structural and dual labor market theories, which foreground power relations, economic dependency, and institutionalized labor segmentation.

Baking Xenophobia Into Law: Recent Decrees through Historical-Structural Theory

Despite the large number of Nicaraguans living in Costa Rica and the legal protections afforded to them under Costa Rica’s 2010 General Migration Law, Nicaraguan migrants today face significant social exclusion, discrimination, and racial stigma. As Jesús Mora describes, “hostility has historically been latent in Costa Rican-Nicaraguan interpersonal relations.”[xxviii] This stigmatization has intensified in recent years as Nicaraguan migration to the nation has surged in response to Nicaragua’s dual political and economic crisis.[xxix]

In 2018, Costa Rica witnessed its first anti-immigrant rally in modern history, with native-born Costa Ricans jeering at Nicaraguan migrants and chanting anti-immigrant sentiments.[xxx] During the Covid-19 pandemic, tensions heightened further. Though Costa Rica was able to somewhat contain the first outbreak of the pandemic, its neighbor to the north was not.[xxxi] When the second wave hit and Covid cases spiked in Costa Rica, many natives blamed Nicaraguan migrants.[xxxii]

Racial and class stigmatization underlie anti-Nicaraguan xenophobia. As Cindy Regidor, a Nicaraguan migrant herself, reflects, “we were, for some, the poor, brown-skinned, simple, inferior, but also sometimes perceived as criminal threats.”[xxxiii] Costa Ricans often pride themselves on being the “whitest” Central American nation, a national identity constructed through the rejection of the general Latin American mestizaje (racially mixed) identity.[xxxiv] As Telles and Flores explain, “in Costa Rica, elites and the popular classes proclaimed themselves all part of the same ‘great national white family,’ even though there was racial mixture among them.”[xxxv] This “whiteness” is associated with peaceful, egalitarian values in the dominant cultural narrative within Costa Rica, which aims to set apart Costa Rica as different and even better than their Central American neighbors.[xxxvi] These dominant narratives thus translate to racist, xenophobic depictions of other Central Americans as “brown-skinned… criminal threats” as Regidor (quoted above) explains.[xxxvii]

Mounting pressure on Costa Rica’s asylum system compounds these tensions. As of 2025, 75.4% of migrants under protected status in the country are asylum seekers, and nearly 10% are classified as refugees.[xxxviii] Since 2018, Costa Rica has hosted over 300,000 asylum seekers.[xxxix] From 2018 to 2023, an average of 58,700 people sought refugee status annually—21 times the yearly average of the previous six years.[xl] This growing burden on the asylum system has fueled restrictive policy responses.

In 2022, xenophobic reactions crystallized into law. President Rodrigo Chaves Robles announced two administrative measures ostensibly aimed at easing the administrative burden but with clear exclusionary impacts: Decrees 43809-MGP and 43810-MGP. This legal pivot marks a stark departure from the rights-centered integration framework established by the 2010 General Migration Law (2010) and positions migrants as temporary laborers whose precarity can be leveraged for economic gain. Decree 43810-MGP dramatically redefined asylum eligibility and reduced refugee rights by forcing applicants to file claims within 30 days of arrival, prohibiting access to free open work permits, and disqualifying them if they travel abroad while awaiting a decision. Past claimants are also barred from renewing one-year work permits, and those found working without authorization face deportation.[xli]

This long list of administrative changes has a significant impact on migrants’ access to asylum. For example, due to the high volume of claims, it is almost impossible for people to get an asylum appointment within their first 30 days in the country. As Lucho, a Nicaraguan migrant, explains, “you have only 30 days to make a claim, and the time runs quickly. Days go by, and you keep on dialing the numbers. You dial 150 times per day, from three different phones, and the call never gets through. Some people told me that they had been dialing for a week with no luck. It is impossible to access a webpage.”[xlii] The inability of refugee claimants to receive an open work permit free of charge also undermines the basic labor rights and integration focus previously outlined by the General Migration Law.

Decree 43809-MGP created a Temporary Special Category for Nicaraguans, Cubans, and Venezuelans with unresolved refugee claims submitted between 2010 and 2022. These individuals were invited to abandon their asylum applications in exchange for a two-year renewable work permit. While framed as administrative streamlining, this effectively pushed migrants into a temporary labor status, stripping them of long-term protections and formal refugee recognition.

Though these decrees do not formally repeal the rights outlined in the General Migration Law, they drastically narrow access to asylum. In 2023, 225,000 Nicaraguans sought asylum in Costa Rica, but fewer than 10% of their claims were accepted.[xliii] As Basok and Candiz note, asylum seekers now face “an ‘eternal’ wait, lacking access to jobs and social protections, and pressured to abandon their claims.”[xliv] These policies amount to “internal bordering”—administrative tactics that systematically marginalize migrants while avoiding outright legal bans.[xlv]

The turn toward restrictive policies can be examined through historical-structural and dual labor market theories. Historical-structural theory views migration as a mechanism of labor control, arguing that capitalist economies rely on managing and exploiting mobile labor forces. As Miller and Castles write, “the control of labor by states and corporations [is] vital to the survival of the capitalist system.”[xlvi] Dual labor market theory complements this by describing how migrant labor is channeled into low-wage, precarious jobs, roles typically avoided by native-born workers.[xlvii] Employers often benefit from migrants’ irregular or temporary statuses, which weaken their bargaining power and make them more “docile” in the face of exploitation.[xlviii] In the Costa Rican context, these employers predominately include international and local agriculture corporations, Costa Rican construction businesses, and even private homeowners with housekeeping and care needs.[xlix]

Though traditionally used to explain why migration occurs, these theories also illuminate how xenophobia becomes operationalized in policy. As Miller and Castles note, restrictive policies rarely stop migration as long as labor demand persists. Instead, they increase irregular migration and deepen migrant vulnerability.[l] This is precisely what Decrees 43809-MGP and 43810-MGP have done. They have narrowed the legal path to protection while preserving demand for Nicaraguan labor, especially in sectors like construction, domestic work, and agriculture.

Faced with shrinking options, migrants are pushed toward two precarious outcomes: (a) applying for temporary labor status, which ties them to employer sponsorship, or (b) entering the informal labor market. For those who pursue work permits, employer dependency means that leaving an abusive or exploitative job could result in deportation. However, Costa Rica’s work permit process is “lengthy and complicated,” often taking over eight months to complete.[li] As a result, many Nicaraguans are effectively barred from legal employment, making informal work “the only option… in the short term.”[lii]

Taken together, historical-structural and dual labor market theories offer a more nuanced understanding of Costa Rica’s recent migration policy shifts. These theories reveal how Nicaraguan migrants are systematically funneled into precarious legal and labor positions—not just as a byproduct of administrative strain, but as a function of deeper structural forces. These frameworks challenge the simplicity of the functionalist push-pull model, which posits that migration flows respond predictably to economic and political incentives. According to that model, the erosion of legal protections for Nicaraguan migrants, such as restricted access to asylum, should reduce migration to Costa Rica and divert the flow towards other nations. However, the opposite has occurred, and migration continues to rise.

Historical-structural theory helps explain this disconnect.[liii] This theory emphasizes that migration is not merely a matter of individual decision-making or economic opportunity, but a consequence of global capitalist systems that rely on a steady supply of cheap, disposable labor. Push-pull models also fail to explain why migrants, once they arrive, are disproportionately concentrated in specific roles under restrictive legal conditions. From a historical-structural perspective, Costa Rica’s 2022 decrees (43809-MGP and 43810-MGP) function not only as administrative measures, but as mechanisms that institutionalize precarity, thereby increasing the capacity of the state and employers to extract value from migrant labor.

Dual labor market theory adds further depth by showing how migrants are channeled into the secondary labor market largely because native-born workers avoid these roles. Restrictive asylum policies, in this light, do not deter migration; instead, they redirect it. By closing off formal pathways to protection, the state pushes migrants into irregular or temporary statuses that make them more vulnerable and exploitable. As DeHaas et al. note, “while immigration restrictions often fail to curb migration as long as labor demand persists, they lead to an increase in irregular migration and the increased vulnerability of migrants in labor markets.”[liv] This is precisely the pattern unfolding in Costa Rica. The legal route to asylum is narrowing, but demand for low-wage labor in sectors like agriculture, domestic service, and construction remains high. The result is a growing reliance on informal labor and employer-dependent work permits, both of which reinforce migrant precarity.

Development Impacts of Nicaraguan Immigration & the Legal Shift

Nicaraguan migrants have historically played an important role in the development of the Costa Rican economy. The nation reaps the benefit of Nicaraguan migrants’ involvement in labor-intensive sectors like agriculture, construction, and domestic work, a trend that continues today. In rural areas today, the majority of Nicaraguan men (56%) work in agriculture (largely informally), while the largest industry for rural Nicaraguan women is accommodation (24%). As opportunities in other sectors outside of rural agriculture have grown, migration to urban areas increased. Today, 30% of Nicaraguan men in urban Costa Rica work in the construction industry. Throughout both rural and urban Costa Rica, Nicaraguan women largely work in paid domestics jobs (34%).[lv] This data reflects what dual labor market theory predicts: migrants are funneled into sectors where native workers are absent, and their exclusion from protections ensures a compliant labor pool.

National-level data further support this. For example, compared to the Costa Rican population, the Nicaraguan-born population has a higher proportion of individuals employed in agriculture, construction, households, accommodation, commerce, and the informal sector (Figure 4). Notably, manufacturing and agriculture (sectors in which many Nicaraguans are employed) are two of Costa Rica’s largest sectors, making up a combined 15.1% of the nation’s GDP from 2020-2022[lvi].

         Despite Nicaraguans’ contributions to the Costa Rican economy, they experience significant labor inequalities (Figure 4). Their wage earnings are lower, averaging 36% less than nationals overall and 10% less for low-skilled workers. Higher proportions of Nicaraguans also live in poverty or extreme poverty in Costa Rica. Furthermore, a higher proportion of Nicaraguans have received less than secondary education, trapping them within lower-paying, “low-skilled” sectors.[lvii]

         Nicaraguan labor does not just help support the Costa Rican economy by filling vacant low-skill jobs, it also supports an aging economy. As of 2021, people aged 60 and older represented 9% of the total population of Costa Rica. By 2050, this proportion is expected to more than double, with older adults accounting for about 20% of the population.[lviii] As a result, the dependency ratio (people 65 and older relative to the working-age population) is expected to double between 2022 and 2050, adding pressure to the nation’s social security system. The higher proportion of working-age Nicaraguans and their populations’ high labor market participation rate could help sustain the nation’s economy and meet the rising need for caregivers in the midst of this demographic transition.[lix]

         Furthermore, Nicaraguans’ contribution to Costa Rica’s economy and social security system far outweighs their cost to the system. Estimates suggest that foreign-born workers directly contribute between 6.5 and 12% of the nation’s GDP.[lx] From 2017 to 2021, the economic contribution that the foreign-born population in Costa Rica made through social security contributions (health, pensions and other social contributions) and tax revenue (through income and consumption taxes) reached around 1.1% of GDP. This exceeds the cost to the state of providing the foreign-born population with health services, education services, social transfers, housing benefits, and pensions, which totaled about 0.6% of GDP in the same time period.[lxi] As demonstrated in Figure 5, the impact of the foreign-born population on fiscal revenue and expenditure is net positive, with Nicaraguans contributing a greater net positive impact on fiscal revenue than all other members of the foreign-born population combined.

Note: (IMF, 2023)

Altogether, this data shows a significant impact of the migration flow from Nicaragua to Costa Rica on Costa Rican economic development. However, the human development of Nicaraguans in Costa Rica and the development levels of the Nicaraguan economy do not mirror these trends. Outward personal remittances from Costa Rica are quite low, averaging at about 0.6% of GDP from 2017-2021, with 78% of that sent to Nicaragua. Although 69% of Nicaraguans in Costa Rica declared sending remittances during this time period, “their low salaries have limited the overall amount of capital outflows under this category,”[lxii] Scholars like Guiliano & Arranz argue that remittances spur growth in countries of origin through financing investment. [lxiii] However, the remittances that have been sent to Nicaragua do not appear to have made a huge difference in the broader Nicaraguan economy, as Nicaragua remains one of the poorest countries in the Americas.[lxiv] Limited developmental impact of remittances in Nicaragua thus challenge such optimistic narratives about migration as a simple, one-to-one tool for development. From a migration hierarchies perspective, Nicaragua remains trapped as a labor frontier, a source of expendable labor for more stable economies, while systemic underdevelopment persists at home.

Furthermore, Nicaraguans in Costa Rica face challenges to human development, even as they support the development of the Costa Rican economy. While migrating to Costa Rica provides many Nicaraguans more opportunities for human development than they may have had in Nicaragua, Nicaraguan migrants to Costa Rica still lag behind the Costa Rican-born population on key indicators. Nicaraguans disproportionately experience income inequality, with a higher proportion of Nicaraguans subject to poverty in comparison to Costa Rican counterparts. Nicaraguans in Costa Rica also face barriers in accessing health care, especially those who are undocumented. According to Voorend et al., “migratory status is determinant for access to health insurance, public health care services and medicine” in Costa Rica.[lxv] For example, Nicaraguan-born individuals are almost 28% less likely to be insured compared to their Costa Rican-born counterparts.[lxvi] Scholars have also shown racism against Nicaraguans as a key barrier to healthcare access.[lxvii] Lastly, there is a large gap between Nicaraguans and native-born Costa Ricans in educational status, as Nicaraguans 18-35 years of age are less likely than their Costa Rican counterparts to have attained full secondary education.[lxviii]

While Nicaraguan migrants contribute significantly to Costa Rica’s economic growth, their precarious legal status and low wages limit their potential for long-term human development. The concentration of Nicaraguans in low-skilled jobs with limited access to education, healthcare, and social services reinforces their marginalization, even as they help sustain key parts of the Costa Rican economy. These dynamics reflect not only an exploitative labor structure, but also broader patterns of inequality rooted in both Costa Rican and Nicaraguan socio-political systems. As historical-structural theory suggests, the intersection of migration, labor exploitation, and restrictive policy frameworks produces uneven development outcomes.[lxix] In this case, Costa Rica reaps economic benefits, while migrant communities remain excluded from meaningful social and economic integration.

The long-term implications of these restrictive migration policies are troubling for Costa Rica’s broader development goals. By pushing a large segment of Nicaraguan migrants into precarious, low-wage employment, the country risks perpetuating a cycle of economic dependence and inequality. Although these migrants play a vital role in sustaining key industries, their exclusion from social protections and pathways to upward mobility limits not only their individual development but also the country’s overall human capital potential. This marginalization undermines efforts to foster inclusive growth, especially as Costa Rica faces challenges such as an aging population. By maintaining a system that keeps migrants in temporary, vulnerable positions, the state forfeits the long-term gains that could be achieved through fuller integration—such as increased innovation, productivity, and social cohesion. Over time, this approach may exacerbate inequality and create a structurally disenfranchised labor force, ultimately slowing national development and weakening the social fabric.

Conclusions

When compared to other countries in the region, Costa Rica stands out for its relatively robust humanitarian legal framework on migration.[lxx] Yet, as this paper has shown, the gap between law and practice is widening. The rise in xenophobia, combined with restrictive policy shifts such as Decrees 43809-MGP and 43810-MGP, reveals a state increasingly unable, or unwilling, to uphold the inclusive values it professes. These recent measures, which reframe Nicaraguan migrants as temporary laborers rather than individuals deserving of long-term protection, undermine the very humanitarian commitments that once distinguished Costa Rica on the international stage.

Though the decrees have, in theory, decreased “pull” factors by reducing migrants’ rights in Costa Rica, these policies have not reduced migration flows. Instead, they have redirected migrants into increasingly precarious roles within the labor market. Viewed through the lenses of historical-structural and dual labor market theories, these decrees can be understood not as neutral administrative adjustments, but as strategic tools designed to enhance the exploitability of migrant labor. By restricting access to asylum and legal protections, Costa Rica’s policies effectively bolster the interests of the capitalist class at the expense of migrant rights and well-being.

In doing so, Costa Rica risks eroding both its humanitarian legacy and its long-term development potential. The country now faces a fundamental contradiction: its positions itself as a sanctuary for those fleeing crisis, yet structures its most recent policies in ways that marginalize, exploit, and exclude the very populations it claims to protect. As the line between protection and exploitation becomes increasingly blurred, the challenge for Costa Rica is to confront the structural forces, like xenophobia and class stigmatization, driving this divergence. Without a reorientation toward genuine social inclusion and equitable labor rights, Costa Rica’s model may come to reflect not humanitarian exceptionalism, but the very global inequalities it once sought to transcend.

End Notes

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[i] Jesús Mora, María. 2021. “Costa Rica Has Welcoming Policies for Migrants, but Nicaraguans Face Subtle Barriers.” Migration Policy Institute, November 5, 2021. https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/costa-rica-nicaragua-migrants-subtle-barriers.

[ii] Ibid.

[iii] Sojo-Lara, Gabriela. 2015. “Business as Usual? Regularizing Foreign Labor in Costa Rica.” Migration Policy Institute. https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/business-usual-regularizing-foreign-labor-costa-rica.

[iv] Ibid.

[v] Costa Rica. 2010. Ley General de Migración y Extranjería No. 8764 [General Migration and Immigration Law]. La Gaceta, San José. http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?Valor1=1&nValor2=66139.

[vi] Jesús Mora, María. “Costa Rica Has Welcoming Policies”

[vii] Costa Rica. Ley General de Migración y Extranjería.; International Labour Organization (ILO). n.d. Ley núm. 8764 General de Migración y Extranjería. NATLEX. https://natlex.ilo.org/dyn/natlex2/r/natlex/fe/details?p3_isn=82524.

[viii] Ibid.

[ix] Ibid.

[x] Ibid.

[xi] Sojo-Lara, Gabriela. “Business as Usual?”

[xii] Ibid.

[xiii] Ibid.; Integral Human Development. n.d. Costa Rica Country Profile. Migrants & Refugees Section. Accessed April 3, 2025. https://migrants-refugees.va/country-profile/costa-rica/.

[xiv] Human Rights Watch. 2018. “Nicaragua: Protests Leave Deadly Toll.” April 27, 2018. https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/04/27/nicaragua-protests-leave-deadly-toll.; Diao, Alexis. 2018. “Nicaragua’s President Withdraws Social Security Reforms That Sparked Violent Unrest.” NPR, April 22, 2018. https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/04/22/604762080/violent-unrest-continues-in-nicaragua-over-social-security-reforms.

UN News. 2024. “New UN Report Details Nicaragua’s Ongoing Human Rights Crisis.” UN News, September 2024. https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/09/1153891.

[xvi] Ibid.; ACAPS. n.d.b. Nicaragua. Accessed February 18, 2025. https://www.acaps.org/en/countries/nicaragua.

[xvii] United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA), Population Division. 2024. International Migrant Stock 2024. New York: United Nations.

[xviii] Passaris, C. (1989). Immigration and the evolution of economic theory. International migration (Geneva, Switzerland), 27(4), 525-542.; Castles, Stephen and Miller, Mark J. 2019. The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World. London: Bloomsbury Publishing.

[xix] International Organization for Migration (IOM). 2024. “Costa Rica – Monitoreo del Flujo Circular Migratorio de Personas Nicaragüenses – Septiembre 2024.”; International Organization for Migration (IOM). 2025. “Costa Rica – Monitoreo del Flujo Circular Migratorio de Personas Nicaragüenses – Diciembre 2024.” Displacement Tracking Matrix. https://dtm.iom.int/reports/costa-rica-monitoreo-flujo-circular-migratorio-personas-nicaraguenses-diciembre-2024.; Displacement Tracking Matrix. https://dtm.iom.int/reports/costa-rica-monitoreo-flujo-circular-migratorio-personas-nicaraguenses-septiembre-2024.; Nicaragua Investiga. 2024. “Más de Medio Millón de Nicaragüenses Llegaron a Costa Rica en 2024.” * Nicaragua Investiga*, December 31, 2024. https://nicaraguainvestiga.com/nacion/158160-mas-de-medio-millon-de-nicaraguenses-llegaron-a-costa-rica-en-2024.

[xx] United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. 2024. International Migrant Stock 2024.

[xxi] Castles & Miller. The age of migration.

[xxii] Skeldon, R. (1997). Rural-to-urban migration and its implications for poverty alleviation. Asia Pacific Population Journal, 12, 3-16.

[xxiii] Catles & Miller. The age of migration.

[xxiv] International Organization for Migration (IOM). 2023. ”Contexto Migratorio en Costa Rica y Últimas Tendencias.” Accessed February 19, 2025. https://costarica.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl1016/files/documents/2023-05/resumen_mig_cr_02_2023.pdf.

[xxv] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). 2025. “Costa Rica.” UNHCR | Global Focus. https://reporting.unhcr.org/operational/operations/costa-rica.

[xxvi] Lentini, Valeria, and Bruno Carayon. 2024. “Shining a Spotlight on Nicaraguans’ Poverty and Wellbeing in Costa Rica.” UNHCR Blog. https://www.unhcr.org/blogs/shining-a-spotlight-on-nicaraguans-poverty-and-wellbeing-n-costa-rica.

[xxvii] UNESA, Population Division. International Migrant Stock 2024.

[xxviii] Jesús Mora. “Costa Rica Has Welcoming Policies.”

[xxix] IOM. “Contexto Migratorio en Costa Rica.”;  Nicaragua Investiga. “Más de Medio Millón.”; Ripley, Charles G. 2023. “Crisis Prompts Record Emigration from Nicaragua, Surpassing Cold War Era.” Migration Policy Institute, April 19, 2023. https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/record-emigration-nicaragua-crisis.

[xxx] Jesús Mora. “Costa Rica Has Welcoming Policies.”

[xxxi] Ibid.

[xxxii] Ibid.

[xxxiii] Regidor, Cindy. 2024. “Costa Rica and ‘The Others.’” ReVista: Harvard Review of Latin America. https://revista.drclas.harvard.edu/costa-rica-and-the-others/.

[xxxiv] Telles, Edward, and René Flores. 2013. “Not Just Color: Whiteness, Nation, and Status in Latin America.” Hispanic American Historical Review 93 (3): 411–49.

[xxxv] Ibid. 424.

[xxxvi] Leeds, Asia. 2010. Representations of Race, Entanglements of Power: Whiteness, Garveyism, and Redemptive Geographies in Costa Rica, 1921–1950. PhD diss., University of California, Berkeley.; Campo-Engelstein, Lisa, and Karen Meagher. 2011. “Costa Rica’s ‘White Legend’: How Racial Narratives Undermine Its Health Care System.” Developing World Bioethics 11 (2): 99–107.

[xxxvii] Regidor“Costa Rica and ‘The Others.’”

[xxxviii] Ibid.

[xxxix] UNHCR. “Costa Rica.”

[xl] Ibid.

[xli] Basok, Tanya, and Gabriela Candiz. 2025. “Performing, Contesting, and Resisting Internal Bordering of Refugee Rights in Costa Rica.” Journal of Refugee Studies feae091.

[xlii] Ibid.

[xliii] ACAPS. n.d Country Analysis: Costa Rica. ACAPS. Accessed February 18, 2025. https://www.acaps.org/en/countries/costa-rica.

[xliv] Basok & Candiz. 2025. “Performing, Contesting, and Resisting.”

[xlv] Jones, Reece, and Corey Johnson. 2014. Placing the Border in Everyday Life. Farnham: Ashgate.; Bonizzoni, Paola. “The border (s) within: Formal and informal processes of status production, negotiation and contestation in a migratory context.” Migration, borders and citizenship: Between policy and public spheres (2019): 217-235.

[xlvi] Castles & Miller. The Age of Migration. 48.

[xlvii] Ibid.;

Piore, M. J. (1979). Birds of passage.

[xlviii] Castles & Miller. The Age of Migration. 53-54.

[xlix] International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2023. “Characteristics and Economic Impact of Migrants and Refugees in Costa Rica.” IMF E-Library, December 2023. https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/002/2023/443/article-A003-en.xml.

[l] Castles & Miller. The Age of Migration. 51.

[li] Vega, María. 2023. “Complete Guide to Navigating Work Permits for Hiring in Costa Rica.” Rippling Blog. https://www.rippling.com/blog/work-permits-in-costa-rica.

[lii] IMF. “Characteristics and Economic Impact.”

[liii] Castles & Miller. The Age of Migration.

[liv] Castles & Miller. The Age of Migration. 51.

[lv] IMF. “Characteristics and Economic Impact.”

[lvi] IMF. “Characteristics and Economic Impact”

[lvii] Ibid.

[lviii] Segura, Sofía Elena. 2021. “The Aging Population in Costa Rica and the Importance of Lifelong Learning.” AARP International. https://www.aarpinternational.org/the-journal/current-edition/journal-articles-blog/2021/12/atj2021-segura.

[lix] Ibid.

[lx] Ibid.; Gatica-López, Gustavo. 2017. “Costa Rica as a Source of Emigrants: A Reading from a Political Economy Approach.” Economía y Sociedad 22 (51): 1–22.; Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 2018. How Immigrants Contribute to Costa Rica’s Economy. Paris: OECD Publishing. https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2018/07/how-immigrants-contribute-to-costa-rica-s-economy_g1g92f58/9789264303850-en.pdf.; Oviedo, Luis. 2022. “Contributions of Recent Migration to Sustainable Development: The Case of Costa Rica.” In On the Contributions of Migration to Sustainable Development: Studies in Selected Countries, edited by Jorge Martínez Pizarro and María Verónica Cano Christiny, Project Documents (LC/TS.2021/195). Santiago, Chile: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).

[lxi] IMF. “Characteristics and Economic Impact”

[lxii] Ibid.

[lxiii] Giuliano, Paola, and Marta Ruiz-Arranz. 2009. “Remittances, Financial Development, and Growth.” Journal of Development Economics 90 (1): 144–52.

[lxiv] ACAPS. Nicaragua.

[lxv] Voorend, Koen, Ariadna Sánchez Bedo, and Roxana Sura-Fonseca. 2021. “Migrants and Access to Health Care in Costa Rica.” International Institute of Social Studies Research Brief. https://www.iss.nl/en/media/2021-10-final-research-brief-migrants-access-healthcare-costa-rica. 1.

[lxvi] Ibid

[lxvii] Campo-Engelstein, Lisa, and Karen Meagher. 2011. “Costa Rica’s ‘White Legend’: How Racial Narratives Undermine Its Health Care System.” Developing World Bioethics 11 (2): 99–107.

[lxviii] IMF. “Characteristics and Economic Impact.”

[lxix] Castles & Miller. The Age of Migration.

[lxx] Jesús Mora. “Costa Rica Has Welcoming Policies.”

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