Travel distance visual comparison between the Northern Sea Route and the Suez.
(Image Source: Grid Arendal; https://tinyurl.com/5fuxv55y)
By Lucas Wood-Gluck
As climate change continues to melt Arctic ice, the Kremlin hopes to exploit newly-revealed natural resources and develop an alternative Arctic shipping route to enrich itself at the expense of its rivals.
As Russia’s economy continues to falter amid sanctions, a lack of economic diversification, and costly offensives in southeastern Ukraine, few positive signs emerge regarding the country’s future. To offset this damage, the Kremlin is banking on an unorthodox long-term solution: climate change. With the resulting melting of Arctic ice, new deposits of fossil fuels would likely be discovered for extraction, and a fast, new shipping route under majority Russian control in the Arctic would be made available year-round.[i] In the eyes of the Kremlin, the effects of climate change will awaken the resting power of the Arctic and result in a resurgent Russia that empirically adapts to 21st-century challenges without once again “caving in” to the West.
Even after acknowledging the adverse effects that climate change will have on Russia, the Kremlin optimistically cites “easier access to the Arctic for commercial exploration due to melting polar ice.”[ii] This melting of Arctic ice, while environmentally destructive, presents new economic and political opportunities for Russia including unilateral access to untapped oil, natural gas and rare earth metal (REM) deposits.[iii] The increased access coincides with the Kremlin’s calculations that global demand for oil and natural gas will remain stable enough in the coming decades to continue prioritizing them over more renewable forms of energy.[iv] Likewise, energy-importing countries that continue to struggle paying for the costs of expensive oil, natural gas, or the modernization of their energy infrastructure may be incentivized to purchase newfound Arctic fuel from Russia at low prices rather than invest in renewable energy. Furthermore, Russia aims to become “one of the top five REM producers with up to twelve percent of the global market share by 2030.” This comes at a time when REM extraction and processing are overwhelmingly controlled by China, and while Russia has the fifth largest REM reserves, it currently accounts for about one percent of global production.[v] As a result, despite being a signatory of the Paris Climate Accords, Russia has made no significant effort to curb its carbon emissions.[vi]
In addition to more accessible oil, natural gas, and REM deposits, the Kremlin is especially hopeful about a fast, new shipping route opening along the arctic. Known as the Northern Sea Route (NSR), this shipping lane extends from the coastline of the European North Sea to the East China Sea.[vii] While the NSR has historically been extraordinarily expensive and dangerous to cross outside of the summertime due to freezing conditions and unpredictable weather, rising temperatures may soon allow for year-round traversal.[viii] Shipping times between Europe and East Asia are approximately thirty to forty percent faster through the NSR than through the Suez Canal, and melting ice will moreover reduce the costs associated with the risks of shipping in Arctic conditions.[ix] In fact, in October 2025, a Chinese container ship sailing from Zhoushan just south of Shanghai to the United Kingdom completed a pioneering journey through the NSR in just twenty days compared to the usual forty or fifty days through the Suez Canal or around the Cape of Good Hope.[x] This successful voyage highlights both the newfound commercial and military possibilities of a new shipping route but also the detrimental environmental impacts of climate change. With over fifty-three percent of the NSR under Russian jurisdiction, the Kremlin stands to profit tremendously while gaining immense political leverage with a new, fast shipping lane.[xi] One estimate cites that shipping and resource extraction along the NSR may generate approximately $160 billion USD in revenue for Russia over the next decade at a cost of about $40 billion USD in investments.[xii] As a result, the Kremlin has reportedly been modernizing ports along the NSR including in Murmansk, Arkhangelsk, Dikson, Tiksi, and Pevek to prepare itself and the world for the mainstream viability of the NSR.[xiii] While reduced shipping times will mean reduced costs for manufacturers and consumers, the development and use of the NSR places this new leverage predominantly in Moscow’s hands.
Unfortunately, the scientific consensus is that climate change has very likely become irreversible.[xiv] Regardless of what should have been done or should still be done from an environmental perspective, policymakers and private decision-makers must address the new reality that U.S. adversaries are likely intending to profit from rather than combat the climate crisis. The Arctic is no longer just a wasteland for political prisoners nor a vacation getaway to see the northern lights, but an increasingly contested geopolitical hotspot unprecedentedly drawing in far-flung states, intergovernmental organizations, and multinational conglomerates. From several U.S. attempts to diplomatically acquire Greenland to China declaring itself a “Near-Arctic State,” the Far North is experiencing an extraordinary strategic ascendance.[xv] Under present conditions, however, the Arctic is fueling a resource race and game of geopolitical leverage that Russia will likely dominate predominantly due to its natural endowments and callous long-term vision. Therefore, as temperatures continue to climb and natural disasters rise in frequency and intensity, the United States and its allies must do whatever is possible to abate the effects of climate change. If, God forbid, not even that is possible, then the United States and its allies must at least shift their interpretation of the climate crisis to that of a fundamentally unfair geopolitical force that seeks to undermine their positions while emboldening the opposition.
Works Cited
Brownlee, Genevieve. “Cold Calculations: Economic Prospects for Arctic Shipping Routes.” Middlebury Institute of International Studies, June 2024. https://www.middlebury.edu/institute/sites/default/files/2024-07/cold-calculations-arctic-shipping-routes_miis_ited-working-paper_june2024.pdf?fv=vMZXNi3A.
Bryanski, Gleb, and Anastasia Lyrchikova. “What Are Russia’s Rare Earth Metals Ambitions?” Reuters, February 26, 2025. https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/what-are-russias-rare-earth-metals-ambitions-2025-02-26/.
Chen, Xiuhao, and Joe Cash. “Chinese Freighter Halves EU Delivery Time on Maiden Arctic Voyage to UK.” Edited by Emelia Sithole-Matarise. Reuters, October 14, 2025. https://www.reuters.com/sustainability/climate-energy/chinese-freighter-halves-eu-delivery-time-maiden-arctic-voyage-uk-2025-10-14/.
Climate Action Tracker. “Russian Federation.” Climateactiontracker.org, November 9, 2022. https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/russian-federation/.
Deutsche Welle. “Arctic Melt: The Race for Resources.” dw.com, April 21, 2020. https://www.dw.com/en/arctic-melt-the-race-for-resources/video-48168376.
Devyatkin, Pavel. “Russia’s Arctic Strategy: Energy Extraction (Part III).” The Arctic Institute – Center for Circumpolar Security Studies, February 20, 2018. https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/russias-arctic-strategy-energy-extraction-part-three/.
Edvardsen, Astri. “Russia to Increase the Northern Fleet’s Combat Readiness and Strengthen Arctic Shipbuilding and Port Capacity.” Edited by Birgitte Annie Hansen. High North News, August 22, 2024. https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/russia-increase-northern-fleets-combat-readiness-and-strengthen-arctic-shipbuilding-and-port.
Humpert, Malte. “Russia to Earn $160bn in Taxes from Northern Sea Route by 2035, Arctic Region Accounts for 7.5 Percent of GDP.” High North News, May 19, 2025. https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/russia-earn-160bn-taxes-northern-sea-route-2035-arctic-region-accounts-75-percent-gdp.
———. “The Future of the Northern Sea Route – a ‘Golden Waterway’ or a Niche Trade Route.” The Arctic Institute, September 15, 2011. https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/future-northern-sea-route-golden-waterway-niche/.
Korchunov, Nikolay. “The Russian Federation.” Arctic Council, n.d. https://arctic-council.org/about/states/russian-federation/.
“The Effects of Climate Change,” National Aeronautics and Space Administration, October 23, 2024, https://science.nasa.gov/climate-change/effects/.
Puranen, Matti, and Sanna Kopra. “China’s Arctic Strategy – a Comprehensive Approach in Times of Great Power Rivalry.” Scandinavian Journal of Military Studies 6, no. 1 (January 1, 2023): 239–53. https://doi.org/10.31374/sjms.196.
Soldatkin, Vladimir. “Russia Sees Stable Oil Exports and Booming Gas Business by 2050.” Reuters, April 14, 2025. https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/russia-sees-stable-oil-exports-booming-gas-business-by-2050-2025-04-14/.
The Economist. “Polar Bearings.” The Economist, July 12, 2014. https://www.economist.com/china/2014/07/12/polar-bearings?fsrc=scn%2Ftw%2Fte%2Fpe%2Fpolarbearings.
The Moscow Times. “Russia’s Updated Climate Doctrine Drops Mention of Fossil Fuels.” The Moscow Times, October 27, 2023. https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023/10/27/russias-updated-climate-doctrine-drops-mention-of-fossil-fuels-a82915.
U.S. Energy Information Administration. “Arctic Oil and Natural Gas Resources.” Eia.gov, January 20, 2012. https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=4650.
[i] Pavel Devyatkin, “Russia’s Arctic Strategy: Energy Extraction (Part III),” The Arctic Institute – Center for Circumpolar Security Studies, February 20, 2018, https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/russias-arctic-strategy-energy-extraction-part-three/.
[ii] The Moscow Times, “Russia’s Updated Climate Doctrine Drops Mention of Fossil Fuels,” The Moscow Times, October 27, 2023, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023/10/27/russias-updated-climate-doctrine-drops-mention-of-fossil-fuels-a82915.
[iii] U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Arctic Oil and Natural Gas Resources,” Eia.gov, January 20, 2012, https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=4650.
[iv] Vladimir Soldatkin, “Russia Sees Stable Oil Exports and Booming Gas Business by 2050,” Reuters, April 14, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/russia-sees-stable-oil-exports-booming-gas-business-by-2050-2025-04-14/.
[v] Gleb Bryanski and Anastasia Lyrchikova, “What Are Russia’s Rare Earth Metals Ambitions?,” Reuters, February 26, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/what-are-russias-rare-earth-metals-ambitions-2025-02-26/.
[vi] Climate Action Tracker, “Russian Federation,” Climateactiontracker.org, November 9, 2022, https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/russian-federation/.
[vii] The Economist, “Polar Bearings,” The Economist, July 12, 2014, https://www.economist.com/china/2014/07/12/polar-bearings?fsrc=scn%2Ftw%2Fte%2Fpe%2Fpolarbearings.
[viii] Malte Humpert, “The Future of the Northern Sea Route – a ‘Golden Waterway’ or a Niche Trade Route,” The Arctic Institute, September 15, 2011, https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/future-northern-sea-route-golden-waterway-niche/.
[ix] Genevieve Brownlee, “Cold Calculations: Economic Prospects for Arctic Shipping Routes” (Middlebury Institute of International Studies, June 2024), https://www.middlebury.edu/institute/sites/default/files/2024-07/cold-calculations-arctic-shipping-routes_miis_ited-working-paper_june2024.pdf?fv=vMZXNi3A.
[x] Joe Cash and Xiuhao Chen, “Chinese Freighter Halves EU Delivery Time on Maiden Arctic Voyage to UK,” ed. Emelia Sithole-Matarise, Reuters, October 14, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/sustainability/climate-energy/chinese-freighter-halves-eu-delivery-time-maiden-arctic-voyage-uk-2025-10-14/.
[xi] “The Effects of Climate Change,” National Aeronautics and Space Administration, October 23, 2024, https://science.nasa.gov/climate-change/effects/.
[xii] Malte Humpert, “Russia to Earn $160bn in Taxes from Northern Sea Route by 2035, Arctic Region Accounts for 7.5 Percent of GDP,” High North News, May 19, 2025, https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/russia-earn-160bn-taxes-northern-sea-route-2035-arctic-region-accounts-75-percent-gdp.
[xiii] Astri Edvardsen, “Russia to Increase the Northern Fleet’s Combat Readiness and Strengthen Arctic Shipbuilding and Port Capacity,” ed. Birgitte Annie Hansen, High North News, August 22, 2024, https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/russia-increase-northern-fleets-combat-readiness-and-strengthen-arctic-shipbuilding-and-port.
[xiv] NASA, “The Effects of Climate Change,” science.nasa.gov (NASA, October 23, 2024), https://science.nasa.gov/climate-change/effects/.
[xv] Matti Puranen and Sanna Kopra, “China’s Arctic Strategy – a Comprehensive Approach in Times of Great Power Rivalry,” Scandinavian Journal of Military Studies 6, no. 1 (January 1, 2023): 239–53, https://doi.org/10.31374/sjms.196.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR(S)
Lucas Wood-Gluck
Lucas is a second-year master’s student in the U.S. Foreign Policy and National Security program at SIS and a 2025-2026 Boren Fellowship awardee (Latvia, Russian). He is from Miami, Florida, received his bachelor’s degree in international studies from the University of Florida, and speaks English, Spanish, Russian, and Brazilian Portuguese.
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