By Wiley Carter Reid
Introduction
Following the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1991, numerous former constituent states moved towards land reform, shifting away from Soviet policies of state-owned collectivized agriculture towards privately-owned farms. Among these constituent states to initiate de-collectivization measures were the three Caucasus nations of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. Despite the relative parity shared between these states during the Soviet era, the outcomes of privatizing previously state-owned collective farms differed significantly in the post-Soviet era. Analyzing this incongruence in the impact of privatization in the former Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic (Georgian SSR), Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic (Armenian SSR), and Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic (Azerbaijan SSR) may yield a broader understanding regarding land reform in the post-Soviet space and its possible causal linkage to the emergence of internal societal tension, discontent, and grievance.
This paper will proceed as follows: First, establishing historical context for the Georgian, Armenian, and Azerbaijani experiences of land tenure, agricultural practice, and governance across the distinct pre-Soviet and Soviet eras. Then, transitioning into a sustained discussion regarding the post-USSR era, elaborations on the path to de-collectivization will follow with greater specificity given to the respective approaches towards land reform. Understanding these conditions, investigating the relationship between privatization and internal societal friction can take place. Consideration is given to the contemporary significance of agriculture in the three respective economies to further investigate why societal friction may or may not be pronounced in the states in question. Additionally, I offer supplemental remarks regarding the need for more data that directly addresses the issue of land reform perceptions in the region, along with an acknowledgement of the challenges of such a complex comparative study. This paper will close with conclusions regarding land reform campaign strength and weakness in the Caucasus and the relationship to societal grievances.
Historical Context for Caucus Region Agriculture and Social Order
Pre-Soviet Era
During the pre-Soviet era, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan each rested in the southwestern corner of the Russian Empire. The Caucasus region was a moderately productive zone in the agricultural sector within the broader economy of the Russian Empire.[i] In what would become modern Georgia,ii Armenia,iii and Azerbaijan,iv agricultural land was privately owned in a semi-feudal system comprised of a landed noble class and a laboring peasant class that was legally tied to the land.
Figure 1. Russian Empire – Value Added Per Worker in Agriculture in 1897 (Rubles) This map illustrates the agricultural productivity of the Caucasus Region relative to the Russian Empire as a whole.
Soviet Era
Armeniaviand Azerbaijanvii were annexed by the USSR in 1920, followed by the annexation of Georgia in 1921.viii For the next 70 years, these states would function as constituent units of the USSR. Under the Soviet system, sweeping changes were made in the social and economic structures of Caucasus life. Among these changes was the assumption of control of private property by the State. Farmland, therefore, no longer remained in the ownership of the landed elite, nor, however, did ownership get directly transferred to the peasant farmers themselves. Instead, farmland became a state-run industry in which brigades of farming families worked in collectivized agricultural complexes and supplied the fruits of their labor directly to the internal command economy rather than trading their goods for prices set by markets.ix Though drastically different from the socioeconomic order of agricultural communities prior to the advent of the USSR, several generations of Georgians, Armenians, and Azerbaijanis would be born into this collectivized agricultural system which had bred its own unique social order by the time of the USSR’s dissolution.x This, among many other changes in post-Soviet transformation after 1991, would prove to be an important feature of established norms to address in the reforms to come.
Central Premise
In analyzing implications of land reform campaigns to de-collectivize agriculture from state-owned complexes to privately owned farms in the Caucasus region following the dissolution of the USSR, there is an observable relationship between the transitional pathways to reform employed and outcomes in the emergence of societal dissonance in the years following the reform period. Before engaging with this study further, it is first appropriate to establish a workable typology of land reform approaches in order to frame the analysis to follow. This typology is articulated below:
Type 1 reform is defined by a lower level of privatization, where the State continues to maintain administration over a majority share of agricultural land. The State has a high degree of involvement in agriculture and land use.
Type 2 reform is defined by a moderate level of privatization, where the State continues to maintain administration over a large portion, though not majority share, of agricultural land. The State has a moderate/hybridized degree of involvement in agriculture and land use.
Type 3 reform is defined by higher level of privatization, where the State maintains minimal administration over a small minority share of agricultural land. The State has a low degree of involvement in agriculture and land use.
In this study, I apply this land reform typology to the three aforementioned Caucasus states: Georgia represents Type 1 reform of low-level privatization; Armenia represents Type 2 reform of moderate privatization; Azerbaijan represents Type 3 reform of high privatization. More specifically, the analysis will demonstrate that citizen grievances developed more acutely in association with Type 2 reform, whereas Type 1 and Type 3 reforms exhibit comparatively less societal dissatisfaction.
Continuity Among Units of Analysis
The shared historical context of USSR membership illustrates a common thread of national experience among the three post-Soviet Caucasus states of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. Each of these states – though unique in ethnoreligious identities, linguistic terms, and cultural heritages – engaged in the Soviet system and thereby share a unified governance linkage.xi With this is mind, these three states are well positioned for a cross-comparative analysis of the legacy of agricultural collectivization and state-ownership in their respective post-Soviet phases of development.
Additionally, present day Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan share factors that make them particularly well suited for cross-state comparison. Firstly, these three states are relatively compact in geographic terms with mutually contiguous borders.xii Secondly, they are each located in the centralized Caucus region and unified by a common history of Soviet experience in modernity. Taken together, these factors make the three states particularly well suited for a cross-state comparative case study.
Figure 2. South Caucasus Map
This map illustrates Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the Contested Region of Nagorno-Karabakh. xiii.
We see further continuity still when calibrating this analysis to evaluate the agricultural specificities of these states and the population of Georgians, Armenians, and Azerbaijanis engaged in this economic sector – populations for whom land reform in the post-Soviet era would have been felt most acutely.xiv The following tables illustrate several key general equivalencies between these three former USSR constituents, utilizing 2013 World Bank Data. The World Bank data has been selected to compliment data from a 2013 Gallup Poll of former Soviet states which will later add texture to this analysis.
Given the general parity in this data between the states in question, a portrait in broad strokes can be painted of three post-Soviet states with similar geographic constraints and agronomic emphasis, unified by a common historical legacy of collectivized agriculture in the USSR. These commonalities position Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan to be sufficiently analogous for cross-comparison. Critically, it should be noted that the metrics measuring the percentages of population that would engage directly with the outcomes of land reform, i.e., rural populations employed in the agricultural sector, are highly comparable.
| Agricultural Land (% of Total Land Area) | |
| Georgia | 35.8 |
| Armenia | 59.1 |
| Azerbaijan | 57.7 |
Table 1. Agricultural Land as Share of Total National Land Area
| Rural Population (% of Total Population) | |
| Georgia | 43.3 |
| Armenia | 36.8 |
| Azerbaijan | 45.9 |
Table 2. Rural Population as Share of Total National Population
| Employment in Agriculture (% of Total Employment) | |
| Georgia | 47.3 |
| Armenia | 36.3 |
| Azerbaijan | 37.1 |
Table 3. Employment in Agriculture as Share of Total National Workforce
Thus, if all land reform campaigns in the post-Soviet era were to be executed using similar policy approaches, it could be expected that reported discontent or content among citizenry in the decades to follow might also present as generally equivalent. Such uniformity in land reform campaigns did not manifest across the Caucasus in the aftermath of the USSR breakup, however, leading to widely divergent policy approaches to the question of post-Soviet change.xviii This may explain equally divergent opinion polling describing quality of life after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the emergence of highly pronounced grievance in some states while not in others.
Reform Type and Divergent Outcomes of Post-Soviet Grievance
Notable differences emerged in the trajectory of post-Soviet land reform and development among Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, despite the baseline parity in physical and human geography among these three states. Recognizing this allows us to isolate the land reform policies themselves as the causal trigger for divergent outcomes in degrees of expressed grievance in the post-Soviet era.
| Benefit | Harm | Neither | Don’t Know/Refused | |
| Georgia | 37% | 33% | 9% | 21% |
| Armenia | 12% | 66% | 10% | 12% |
| Azerbaijan | 44% | 31% | 8% | 18% |
Table 4. Sentiment Regarding Breakup of the Soviet Union
This survey captures a broader sense of discontent with post-Soviet trajectories which is disproportionately high in Armenia when compared with Georgia and Azerbaijan. This polling data, paired with the data collected in response to the following survey question, begins to illuminate a possible causal linkage between reform type and grievance.[1]
| Likelihood to Prefer Total State Ownership Over Total Private Ownership | |
| Georgia | 1.19 times more likely |
| Armenia | 2.84 times more likely |
| Azerbaijan | 1.24 times more likely |
Table 5. World Values Survey Response Data: Preferences Regarding State Ownership
The responses to this survey question indicate that, once again, Armenia stands apart as markedly unique in its positioning among these three states. As seen above, Armenians are twice as likely to express favorability for total state ownership than total private ownership, whereas Georgians and Azerbaijanis appear to be largely neutral on the subject. Combining this data, we see that post-Soviet grievance, as measured by the belief that breakup of the Soviet Union did more harm than good, is twice as likely to be present in Armenia as in either Georgia or Azerbaijan. This tracks in direct proportion to Armenians being twice as likely to prefer total state ownership of the economy when compared with their counterparts in Georgia or Azerbaijan.
Figure 3. Survey Response: Georgia
Figure 4. Survey Response: Armenia
Figure 5. Survey Response: Azerbaijan
Analysis of Specific Reform Types
In this section, I examine the details of land reform campaigns, delineated by Type 1, 2, and 3 as a gradient of degree of reform. I first outline the fundamental characteristics of each reform campaign, with country specific details to follow to ground this typology in specific case studies.
Reflecting Type 1 reform, Georgia shows the lowest level of privatization, where the State continues to maintain administration over a majority share of agricultural land at 60% of arable land. The State has a high degree of involvement in agriculture and land use via centralized farm restructuring administrative apparatuses and a consolidated land titling and registration system. Private sector involvement has remained comparatively low.xxiv
Type 2 reform, as seen in Armenia, exhibits a level of privatization neither fully private nor fully State-owned, where the State continues to maintain administration over a large portion, estimated to be between 15-30%. Yet, private sector involvement and decentralized systems for land titling and registration creates a system characterized by internal contradiction: The State has a moderate and hybridized degree of involvement in agriculture and land use, reportedly opaque and difficult to navigate for farmers as it is neither familiar in structure to the Soviet model, nor entirely open for free market competition.xxv
Exhibiting Type 3 reform, Azerbaijan demonstrates the highest level of privatization, where the State maintains minimal administration over a small minority share of agricultural land at 5%. The State has a low degree of involvement in agriculture and land use. Though centralized farm restructuring administrative apparatuses exist, as well as a centralized Land Titling and Registration system, the State does not fix prices or prohibit private purchasing/selling/leasing. This, therefore, allows for private sector involvement in the land market.xxvi
| Metrics of Evaluating Land Reform | Type 1 (Georgia) | Type 2 (Armenia) | Type 3 (Azerbaijan) |
| Privatization Timeframe | 3rd to initiate reform | 1st to initiate reform | 2nd to initiate reform |
| State-Owned Land Reserves | Large; 60% arable land | Medium; 15-30% arable land | Small; 5% arable land |
| Farm Restructuring Administrative Apparatuses | Centralized institution, heavy State involvement | Local, decentralized; complex administrative system | Centralized State commission |
| Land Transaction: Purchase and Sale | Highly regulated by State (permitting, fixed prices, minimum plot size) | State fixes prices for land (considerably higher than market prices) | Open market with minimal regulation; no fixed prices |
| Land Transaction: Leasing | Mixed leasing of State/private land | Leasing of land almost entirely through State | High degree of private leasing |
| Mortgage | Stagnation/Failed to Establish Viability | Stagnation/Failed to Establish Viability | Stagnation/Failed to Establish Viability |
| Land Titling and Registration | Centralized institution, moderate efficiency | Decentralized institutions, severe inefficiency (3 separate agencies) | Centralized institution, high efficiency |
| Private Sector Involvement in Land Market | Minimal; use of private surveyors | Large presence of real estate companies (managing purchase/sale of agricultural land, leasing, and property valuation) | Moderate; some use of private real estate agents/private surveyors |
Table 6. Summary of Land Reform Typologies in the Caucus States
Summarizing these three approaches to post-Soviet land reform, it is clear that Georgia and Azerbaijan were most decisive in their approach to crafting a post-Soviet trajectory regarding the issue of state-owned collective agriculture. Georgia retained its alignment to the vestiges of the Soviet approach, whereas Azerbaijan was decisively committed to a largely-privatized model. By contrast, Armenia’s land reform campaign did not reflect a decisive or coherent philosophy of land tenure, exhibiting internal contradictions.xxvii It has been the least efficient and most difficult to navigate of the three types. This analysis demonstrates that it was this lukewarm approach to the issue of state-owned collectivization that has contributed to the development of grievance with the post-Soviet status of the nation. In essence, Armenian farmers have lost the stability and familiarity of the Soviet mode of organization without gaining the sovereignty or independence of privatization. Instead, the portrait of post-Soviet Armenian rural life is one painted with the colors of dependency on the private sector giants and the state, operating in a haphazard system that at times pulls itself in opposing directions without distributing Soviet modes of support or free market levels of prosperity.xviii
Alternative Considerations – Diversification of Economy and Acknowledgment of Historical Specificities
It is valuable to consider the shifting relevance of agriculture within the respective economies of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan in order to add texture to the understanding of why the linkage of privatization and post-Soviet grievance may be more pronounced in some states than in others. As the data below demonstrates, the agricultural sector accounts for a notably higher share of GDP for Armenia than the other two states in comparison. In other words, agricultural issues such as land tenure are especially likely to occupy a greater degree of importance in the context of the national economy of Armenia than Georgia or Azerbaijan. This factor may partially account for the elevated degree of grievance surrounding issues of post-Soviet reform and privatization.
| Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing, Value Added (% of GDP) | |
| Georgia | 8.6 |
| Armenia | 18.4 |
| Azerbaijan | 5.4 |
Table 7. Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing, Value Added as Share of National GDP – 2013
It is also worth noting that in the aftermath of the fall of the Soviet Union the share of agriculture in the total GDP was markedly higher in each of the three states. Armenia, however, has been the least successful in diversifying its economy away from agriculture in the transition to the post-Soviet era. The chart below illustrates these percentages during the immediate aftermath of the USSR, generally reflective of shares in the late stage of the Soviet economy.
| Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing, Value Added (% of GDP) | |
| Georgia | 52.3 |
| Armenia | 30.0 |
| Azerbaijan | 26.1 |
Table 8. Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing, Value Added as Share of National GDP – 1992
Thus, in the decade following the dissolution of the USSR, Georgia was able to downshift reliance on the agricultural sector with a difference of 43.7%, Azerbaijan with a difference of 20.7%, while Armenia remained the most dependent on the sector having only shaved off a difference of 11.6%.
The diversification of economic portfolios in Georgia and Azerbaijan may have helped to reduce the contextual weight of land reform in contemporary Georgian and Azerbaijani consciousness, as farming has diminished significantly in relevance to the broader national economies. This stands in contrast to the modest reduction in farming as a percentage of GDP seen in Armenia, thereby maintaining the relative importance of agriculture in the context of the national economy at large. Consequently, the state of affairs in Armenia may keep issues of land reform and the associated discontent top-of-mind. This is to be expected, as the experiences of agricultural workers occupy more space in the contemporary Armenian economic landscape – and the national consciousness that stands to perceive it – than observed in the Georgian or Azerbaijani contexts.
It is also fair to acknowledge the inherent difficulty in comparative analysis between multiple states, even when these states share so much commonality. Furthermore, data that directly speaks to the complexities of post-Soviet land reform in this region is currently not available. In lieu of data that speaks directly to this topic, analysis has been faithfully executed by cross-examining related data compiled to approximate a composite image of land reform in this setting and the implications for grievance. To further build on the compiled data explored in this paper, surveys specifically targeting perceptions of grievance related to land reform could be conducted with communities formerly engaged in state-owned collectivized agriculture in each of the three states. It is likewise necessary to note that there are alternative factors not discussed in this paper that might also account for post-Soviet discontent and its relationship to land tenure, agriculture, and the paths of reforms after 1991. These factors include but are not limited to historical specificities, cultural differences, and internal political circumstances. Though these states have enough continuity among themselves to open up a comparative analysis case study, it should be recognized that each unit in this analysis is deeply complex and governed by forces not able to be directly accounted for in this research.
Conclusion
This paper has sought to explore the relationship between de-collectivization and land reform in the Caucasus region and the development of internal societal tension, discontent, and grievance in the post-Soviet era. Looking at Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, three uniquely distinct approaches to reform campaigns emerged. Type 1 reform is defined by a lower level of privatization, where the State continues to maintain administration over a majority share of agricultural land. The State has a high degree of involvement in agriculture and land use. Type 2 reform is defined by a moderate level of privatization, where the State continues to maintain administration over a large portion, though not majority share, of agricultural land. The State has a moderate/hybridized degree of involvement in agriculture and land use. Type 3 reform is defined by higher level of privatization, where the State maintains minimal administration over a small minority share of agricultural land. The State has a low degree of involvement in agriculture and land use.
These three states are well suited for comparative analysis as they each inhabit the same region with contiguous borders, have comparable land mass with similar shares of agricultural land allocated within total area, hold analogous percentages of rural population as a share of whole population, maintain general equivalence in percentages of population employed by agriculture, and critically all share common experience in the USSR of 70 years of state-owned collectivized agriculture.
Interestingly, a recurring disproportionate relationship between post-Soviet reform and grievance emerged in Armenia when compared to Georgia and Azerbaijan, an essentially 2-to-1 ratio in measured grievance and wish to return to total state-ownership. This phenomenon may be traced to the fact that Armenia’s Type 2 reform reflected neither the low level of change from the USSR models, as in Georgia, nor in the high level of change from the USSR models, as in Azerbaijan.
This was determined by evaluating the specific approaches to land reform in each of the three states along the lines of privatization timeframe, state-owned land reserves, farm restructuring administrative apparatuses, land transaction: purchase and sale, land transaction: leasing, mortgage, land titling and registration, and private sector involvement in land market. Engaging with factors such as privatization timeframe, state-owned land reserves, farm restructuring administrative apparatuses, and land transactions allows for unique portraits of each state/reform type to take form. Type 1 and Type 3 can be described as decisive in nature, whereas Type 2 can be described as mixed or indecisive. This undefined approach to the issue of state-owned collectivization may be a contributing factor to the development of grievance directed at the post-Soviet status of the nation. In essence, Armenian farmers from 1991 onward have lost the stability and familiarity of the Soviet mode of organization, yet not gained the sovereignty or independence associated with full commitment to privatization. Instead, the image of post-Soviet rural Armenian life is one of dependency on private sector giants and the state, operating in a contradictory system that at times pulls itself in opposing directions without distributing either the Soviet modes of support or the opportunity to climb towards prosperity as is suggested by advocates of privatization and free market.
Therefore, the main takeaway from this comparative analysis is that states have been served well while engaging in post-Soviet reform to either retain familiar modes of agricultural organization as modeled in the USSR or to shift deliberately to a land reform campaign of de-collectivization and privatization. Pursuing an ambivalent or ambiguous campaign seen in Type 2 reform has resulted in pronounced post-Soviet grievance. It has therefore been important to avoid ambiguity in these shifts so as to be a master of one rather than a master of none in forging a new path in the post-Soviet world.
Appendix A: Figures
Map Visualizations of the Caucasus Region
Figure 1. Russian Empire – Value Added Per Worker in Agriculture in 1897 (Rubles)
Figure 2. South Caucasus Map
Figure 3. Survey Response: Georgia
This graph illustrates Georgian responses to the following survey question: “How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you agree completely that private ownership of business and industry should be increased; 10 means you agree completely that government ownership of business and industry should be increased and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between.” This data was compiled by Polling the Nations/World Values Surveys in 2019.
Figure 4. Survey Response: Armenia
This graph illustrates Armenian responses to the following survey question: “How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you agree completely that private ownership of business and industry should be increased; 10 means you agree completely that government ownership of business and industry should be increased and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between.”
This graph illustrates Armenian responses to the following survey question: “How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you agree completely that private ownership of business and industry should be increased; 10 means you agree completely that government ownership of business and industry should be increased and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between.”
Figure 5. Survey Response: Azerbaijan
This graph illustrates Azerbaijani responses to the following survey question: “How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you agree completely that private ownership of business and industry should be increased; 10 means you agree completely that government ownership of business and industry should be increased and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between.” This data was compiled by Polling the Nations/World Values Surveys in 2019.
[1] Acknowledging that this survey by was conducted in 2019, complete parity with the 2013 data that constitutes the bulk of this analysis could not be established; however no notable changes to land reform among Georgia, Armenia, or Azerbaijan are reported to have occurred within this 6-year span.
Endnotes
[i] Andrei Markevich. “A Regional Perspective on the Economic Development of the late Russian Empire.” New Economic School, Moscow, Russia, May 14, 2019.
ii D. Marshall Lang et al. “Georgia.” Encyclopedia Britannica, September 29, 2021.
iii R. Grigor Suny et al. “Armenia.” Encyclopedia Britannica, February 2, 2022.
iv E. Dmitrievich Silaev et al. “Azerbaijan.” Encyclopedia Britannica, February 20, 2021.
v Andrei Markevich. “A Regional Perspective on the Economic Development of the late Russian Empire.” New Economic School, Moscow, Russia, May 14, 2019.
vi Robert Owen Krikorian. “Armenia – The Cold War, The Definitive Encyclopedia and Document Collection.” Edited by Spencer C. Tucker, ABC-CLIO Publishing, Santa Barbara, California, 2020.
vii Robert Owen Krikorian. “Azerbaijan – The Cold War, The Definitive Encyclopedia and Document Collection.” Edited by Spencer C. Tucker, ABC-CLIO Publishing, Santa Barbara, California, 2020.
viii Robert Owen Krikorian. “Georgia – The Cold War, The Definitive Encyclopedia and Document Collection.” Edited by Spencer C. Tucker, ABC-CLIO Publishing, Santa Barbara, California, 2020.
ix “Collectivization.” Encyclopedia Britannica, May 20, 2020.
x Scott Rozelle and Johan F.M. Swinnen. “Why Did the Communist Party Reform in China, But Not in the Soviet Union? The Political Economy of Agricultural Transition.” Columbia University, New York City, New York, January 10, 2007.
xi Philip Remler. “Russia’s Stony Path in the South Caucasus.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C., October 20, 2020.
xii “General Profile: Azerbaijan” United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, January 5, 2022; “General Profile: Georgia” United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, January 5, 2022; “General Profile: Armenia” United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, January 5, 2022.
xiii Mapsproject. South Caucasus Map, 2011
xiv Renee Glovarelli and David Bledsoe. “Chapter 3. CIS Countries: Transcaucasus States (Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan) – Land Reform in Eastern Europe: Western CIS, Transcaucuses, Balkans, and EU Accession Countries.” Rural Development Institute, Seattle, Washington, October, 2001.
xv “World Development Indicators.” The World Bank, Washington, D.C., 2013.
xvi Ibid.
xvii Ibid.
xviii Renee Glovarelli and David Bledsoe. “Chapter 3. CIS Countries: Transcaucasus States (Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan) – Land Reform in Eastern Europe: Western CIS, Transcaucuses, Balkans, and EU Accession Countries.” Rural Development Institute, Seattle, Washington, October, 2001.
xix Neli Esipova and Julie Ray. “Former Soviet Countries See More Harm From Break Up: Residents More Than Twice As Likely to Say Collapse Hurt Their Country,” Gallup News, December 19, 2013.
xx “I’d like You to Tell Me Your Views on Various Issues. How Would You Place Your Views on This Scale? 1 Means You Agree Completely That Private Ownership of Business and Industry Should Be Increased; 10 Means You Agree Completely That Government Ownership of Business and Industry Should Be Increased and If Your Views Fall Somewhere in Between, You Can Choose Any Number in Between.” World Values Surveys, 2019.
xxi Ibid.
xxii Ibid.
xxiii Ibid.
xxiv Renee Glovarelli and David Bledsoe. “Chapter 3. CIS Countries: Transcaucasus States (Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan) – Land Reform in Eastern Europe: Western CIS, Transcaucuses, Balkans, and EU Accession Countries.” Rural Development Institute, Seattle, Washington, October, 2001.
xxv Ibid.
xxvi Ibid.
xxvii Anahid M. Ugurlayan, “Armenia: Privatization and Foreign Direct Investment in a Climate of Political and Economic Instability.” Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review Volume 23, Los Angeles, California, May 1, 2001.
xviii Christian H. Beddies, et al. “Chapter 1. Armenia after a Decade of Reform – Growth and Poverty Reduction in Armenia: Achievements and Challenges.” International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C., 2005.
xxix “World Development Indicators.” The World Bank, Washington, D.C., 2013.
xxx “World Development Indicators.” The World Bank, Washington, D.C., 1992; Marianna Arzangulyan “The Role of Agriculture in the Transition Economy of Armenia.” Master’s Thesis, University of Georgia, Athens, Georgia, 2005.
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