By Lia Russell
Introduction
Refugee camps are meant to be temporary facilities that provide immediate protection and assistance to people forced to flee their home countries. When refugees’ countries of origin remain too volatile for safe return, however, camps designed to be dismantled become permanent.[i] As of 2020, 15.7 million refugees were in protracted refugee situations, when 25,000 or more refugees of the same nationality are in exile for at least five consecutive years in another country. Although camps have expanded their services to accommodate this long-term displacement among 76% of refugees worldwide, life under these circumstances is excruciating.[ii] Refugees are confined to crowded settlements of semi-permanent structures and sustained by unreliable aid, with limited access to educational and economic opportunities. When discriminated against by host communities, where they lack the protections of citizenship, refugees are vulnerable to violence and coercion. Refugees squander years in this seemingly interminable limbo referred to as ‘refugee warehousing:’ prolonged restricted mobility, enforced idleness and dependency in violation of their basic rights.[iii]
The pervasiveness of these conditions begs the question: who bears what responsibility among the actors involved? Host nations are obligated by international law to allow asylum seekers to access their territory and request refugee status; they are also prohibited from forcibly returning refugees to places where their life or freedom is threatened on account of their race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or social group.[iv] While host countries are not compelled to locally integrate refugees, they must respect refugees’ rights to employment, travel documentation, freedom of movement and residence among others.[v] The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) must defer to host government policies as it helps distribute aid to refugees, while still advocating for refugees’ rights and seeking durable solutions to their displacement.[vi] Other states are expected but not mandated to provide support through financial assistance and resettlement. The UNHCR depends almost entirely on donations from governments, the European Union, and the private sector and is chronically underfunded.[vii] This underfunding results in the provision of substandard services that fail to meet refugees’ basic needs and add strain to host communities.[viii] Resettlement is also neglected by third countries. In 2020, 95% of resettlement needs were unmet,[ix] meaning that the vast majority of refugees identified by the UNHCR as needing resettlement because of particular vulnerabilities or inadequate protection in their countries of asylum were not granted this opportunity to leave.[x] Advocacy groups hold all parties accountable by documenting their transgressions and calling for reform. When host nations flout international law and third states still withhold support, however, conditions in refugee camps deteriorate and the prospect of their dissolution fades in the absence of viable alternatives.
This paper examines how these international actors have exacerbated and contributed to protracted refugee encampment by analyzing Kakuma and Dadaab, two Kenyan refugee camps established in the 1990s. I begin by tying the origins of the camps to Kenya’s perception of refugees as security threats, which informed its strict border encampment policy. Secondly, I locate the cause of Kakuma and Dadaab’s longevity in the failure of the UNHCR’s three solutions to displacement, which depend more heavily on the sacrifices and conditions of individual countries than on international cooperation. Thirdly, I evaluate the critical discourse surrounding Kakuma and Dadaab, whose poor conditions have provoked harsh criticisms of Kenya that overshadow its domestic challenges as a host nation and inhibit international burden-sharing for refugees by shielding donor countries from blame. Finally, I analyze whether two recently developed frameworks, the Global Compact on Refugees and the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework, have thus far succeeded in their aim of enhancing responsibility-sharing. I conclude that these frameworks have fallen short by enabling donor countries to shirk resettlement and pressuring host nations to absorb more refugees. This discouraging early outcome does not preclude the possibility of slow but steady change which a renewed, persistent emphasis on international solidarity and accountability may bring.
Behind Kakuma and Dadaab: Why Kenya Enforced Border Encampment
Kenya hosts two of the largest refugee camps in the world: Kakuma was established in 1992 and hosts 149,125 refugees, while the Dadaab refugee complex established in 1991 shelters 226,744 refugees.[xi] These camps have evolved into sprawling, city-like settlements sustained by humanitarian aid. How and why did they originate at Kenya’s desolate outskirts? The story of Kakuma and Dadaab’s inception sheds light on a grim reality: though established to sustain refugees, both camps were designed to control unwanted and distrusted populations. When neighboring civil wars forced thousands to flee into Kenya, Kenya enforced encampment at its borders not only to meet a dire need for humanitarian assistance, but also to defend its own interests at the expense of its refugees’ safety.
Setting up Kakuma and Dadaab was Kenya’s immediate reaction to a sudden crisis. Before the 1990s, Kenya hosted only 15,000 refugees who were allowed to self-settle throughout the country. They were not perceived as security threats and the Kenyan government was able to manage them without foreign assistance.[xii] The fall of Somalia’s central government in 1991 pushed hundreds of thousands of Somalis into Kenya just as an equal number of Sudanese youths arrived evading capture by the SPLA (Sudan People’s Liberation Army) rebel group.[xiii] This massive influx of refugees overwhelmed Kenya’s system. The government responded by turning to the UNHCR for help in implementing encampment: placing refugees in a specific location and restricting their movement.[xiv]
Encampment was pursued for various reasons, but primarily driven by security concerns. Concentrating refugees attracted and facilitated the delivery of necessary foreign aid,[xv] as attending to such a high volume of refugees was more efficient with their confinement to the same space.[xvi] By keeping refugees apart from its society, Kenya also protected itself from the ‘shock-impact’ of absorbing such a large population.[xvii] Yet members of Parliament insisted on this policy not for its humanitarian or logistical merits, but because they perceived refugees as security threats to be contained and kept at a distance. Their linkage of refugees to crime lacked compelling evidence.[xviii]
In choosing to locate Kakuma and Dadaab at its borders, the Kenyan government prioritized this perception of refugees as sources of insecurity over the well-being of refugees themselves. Kakuma is just 95 kilometers from Kenya’s border with South Sudan while Dadaab is only 150 kilometers from the border with Somalia.[xix] This proximity to their war-torn countries of origin fails to insulate refugees from ongoing conflict and insecurity. Both camps have been infiltrated by violent rebel groups under Kenyan security forces’ watch: the SPLA and Al-Shabaab, Somalia’s anti-government faction, have recruited new fighters from among the camps’ youth through deception, intimidation, and force.[xx]
Kenya’s positioning of the camps at its borders was also a means of influencing the outcomes of Somalia and Sudan’s civil wars.[xxi] Camp officials allowed the SPLA to infiltrate Kakuma and recruit new members but retaliated against Al-Shabaab’s incursions and encouraged refugees to return to Somalia and oppose them. While Kenya had vested economic interests in the SPLA’s victory, it viewed Al-Shabaab as a direct threat to its national security.[xxii] This manipulative strategy exemplifies the extent to which Kenya’s self-interest dictated Kakuma and Dadaab’s location and design to the detriment of its refugees.
However practically sound, Kenya’s border encampment policy is undeniably linked to its stigmatization of refugees as threats who are being conflated with the perpetrators of the conflicts they fled.[xxiii] The structure of Kakuma and Dadaab reflects the tension between a host nation’s overwhelming obligations and its militant self-preservation, which results in policies that perpetuate violence against refugees even as recipients of humanitarian relief.
When Durable Solutions Fail: Why Kakuma and Dadaab Still Exist
Kakuma and Dadaab originated in response to dire humanitarian crises as a means of distributing aid efficiently while guarding Kenya’s national security interests. Though initially regarded as temporary, both camps have remained in existence for over twenty years. The UNHCR promotes three long-term solutions to protracted displacement: local integration, voluntary repatriation, and resettlement.[xxiv] What has led to the longevity of these camps and prevented more durable solutions from supplanting them? Though Kenya’s refusal to locally integrate refugees laid the foundation for Kakuma and Dadaab’s stagnation, the infeasibility of refugee repatriation and the selectivity of refugee resettlement have contributed as well. The failure of these approaches exposes their fundamentally unilateral nature, which renders them antithetical to international cooperation and thus more challenging to implement.
All three of the UNHCR’s durable solutions rely separately on either third countries, host countries, or countries of origin that may be unwilling or unfit to implement them. Resettlement depends on the willingness of third states to admit refugees with permanent residence status; local integration depends on the willingness of host governments to incorporate refugees into their countries by providing them with social, economic, and civil rights, and eventually granting them citizenship through naturalization. Voluntary repatriation is the free, willing, and safe return of refugees to their country of origin, whose conditions dictate the viability of this option.[xxv] Rather than constituting inter-dependent efforts premised on international cooperation, these three distinct solutions are taken on by single countries at will.
Kenya has resisted local integration by enforcing encampment and refusing to naturalize refugees primarily due to its perception of them as security threats, which has been compounded by several terror attacks to which refugees were inconclusively tied.[xxvi] Though Kenya nominally grants refugees the right to employment, they are excluded from the formal labor market in practice. As non-citizens, refugees must apply for work permits in Nairobi, which they cannot reach without movement passes that are rarely granted.[xxvii] Marginalized and confined, refugees are barred from any semblance of integration.
The Kenyan government and the UNHCR have pursued voluntary repatriation with little success due to the ongoing instability that renders this option unfeasible for refugees from most countries, particularly South Sudan and Somalia where the majority of Kakuma and Dadaab’s inhabitants are from. Although 90,000 refugees returned to South Sudan between 2006 and 2011, a 2013 uptick in violence led to an additional influx of over 44,000 asylum seekers.[xxviii] Beginning in 2014, Somali repatriation has followed a similarly halting trajectory.[xxix] Overall, repatriation to all countries of origin has been too unsafe to substantially reduce Kakuma and Dadaab’s populations and warrant their dissolution.
The selectivity of refugee resettlement by third countries renders this option even less accessible: on average, only 1% of refugees are extended this opportunity.[xxx] Refugees must meet very specific vulnerability criteria before being referred to third countries, whose exhaustive bureaucratic screenings take years to complete. Just like Kenya’s aversion to local integration, the low resettlement ceilings and selectivity of third countries is based on their stigmatization of refugees as security threats who must be thoroughly vetted.[xxxi]
The longevity of Kakuma and Dadaab stems from the failure of any one of the UNHCR’s three durable solutions, which are framed as separate and depend on the voluntary sacrifices and conditions of individual states. Instead of fostering international cooperation by prescribing how these solutions might be reached concurrently and collaboratively, or by proposing different, inherently integrated approaches, the UNHCR promotes alternatives to encampment that are burdensome and unappealing to states who are unwilling or ill-equipped to pursue them.
International Indictment: Critical Scrutiny of Kenya as Host
Kenya is known for its resistance to local integration,[xxxii] and has been urged by the UNHCR and advocacy groups to better implement integration as a long-term solution for the refugees it hosts.[xxxiii] Kenya’s management of Kakuma and Dadaab, its unlawful deportation of asylum seekers, and the illegitimacy of its Somali repatriation program have also been denounced as human rights violations.[xxxiv] Though well-founded, these criticisms tend to minimize the legitimate domestic challenges that have informed Kenya’s policies and the role played by donor countries in many of the issues at stake. Centering critical scrutiny on host nations has detracted from international accountability and burden-sharing for refugees, the global ideal which the UNHCR’s founding established.
Beyond objecting to the strict encampment policy which unlawfully restricts refugees’ mobility, the UNHCR and advocacy groups have criticized Kenya for exacerbating overcrowding in Kakuma and Dadaab by refusing to sufficiently expand them.[xxxv] Affluent UN member states whose underfunding or lack of support have left the camps under-resourced, causing refugees to suffer from malnutrition and poor sanitation, have not experienced the same degree of targeted criticism. When pressured to provide more land, Kenya has argued that refugees destroy local environments and that impoverished host communities are overlooked by the UN and NGOs.[xxxvi] Alongside generic funding appeals,[xxxvii] blame of Kenya for overcrowding minimizes the legitimacy of its reluctance as a physically strained host nation that has faced famine, drought, and post-election violence,[xxxviii] while obscuring the centrality of underfunding to the camps’ deplorable states.
Kenya has also been criticized for forcible deportations, which were motivated by security concerns that the US amplified to further its own counter-terrorism agenda.[xxxix] When Kenya closed its border with Somalia in 2007 to prevent the infiltration of militants associated with Al-Qaeda, the UNHCR and human rights groups condemned its rejection of Somali asylum seekers in violation of international law.[xl] Kenya’s decision emanated not only from its history with Al-Qaeda, which carried out three bombings in Kenya between 1998 and 2002, but also from its partnership with the US in US-led operations against Somali terrorist groups. Although the US encouraged and exploited Kenya’s resistance to Somali terrorists by situating it within a US-backed global war on terror,[xli] international outcries against Kenya dismissed the validity of its anti-terrorism stance without acknowledging the extent of US involvement.[xlii]
In 2016, advocacy groups primarily condemned Kenya and the UNHCR for a Somali repatriation program that violated international standards for safe and voluntary return, although donors knowingly funded its implementation. A Human Rights Watch report accused Kenya of intimidating Somali refugees into repatriation and the UNHCR of providing them with misleading information.[xliii] It did not censure donor countries for contributing to Kenya’s desperate initiative by failing to fully fund its humanitarian appeals and assist through resettlement.[xliv] Although an Amnesty International report acknowledged these factors and addressed the complicity of donors in funding the program to keep African refugees and migrants out of Europe, this context is only elaborated upon at the end. Both reports conclude with precise recommendations for Kenyan policy change but only vaguely urge the international community to ‘meaningfully’ share responsibility.[xlv]
Indicting Kenya as a host country with little regard for its internal struggles, and without thoroughly examining the responsibility borne by donors, reflects a skewed international discourse that acknowledges the necessity of burden-sharing for refugees but only holds host nations accountable. This discourse has helped generate and reinforce a dynamic in which host nations bound by law bear all moral and physical responsibility for refugees which they are incapable of supporting alone, and which unobligated donors cannot be blamed for neglecting.
The GCR and CRRF in Kenya: Shirking Resettlement for Local Integration
At the 2016 UN Summit for Refugees and Migrants, all 193 UN member states recommitted themselves to sharing responsibility for refugees and better supporting host nations through the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) and the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF). The CRRF is included in the GCR and guides host communities in sustainably supporting refugees through integration. The GCR focuses on international responsibility-sharing, namely through a Global Refugee Forum held every 4 years to evaluate and galvanize progress on both fronts.[xlvi] As exemplified by their impact on Kenya, these frameworks have put financial pressure on host states to increase local integration without mobilizing wealthy countries to expand resettlement, an equally explicit core objective of the GCR. Despite the benefits of integration, prioritizing this approach has enabled donor nations – generally states in the Global North – to continue shirking responsibility-sharing and effectively coerce overburdened, lower income countries to continue absorbing the majority of refugees worldwide.
The Eurocentric impetus of the GCR and CRRF underlies these frameworks’ tacit facilitation of a dynamic in which wealthy countries make donations to keep refugees and migrants in lower income states. Both frameworks emerged following the peak of the EU migrant crisis in 2015, after the EU promised Turkey 6 billion USD in exchange for its help preventing additional arrivals.[xlvii] The 2016 Summit replicated this transaction: wealthy countries pledged money while poor host nations like Kenya pledged to further integrate refugees. In doing so, the Summit set a precedent normalizing ‘I-pay-you-host’ schemes[xlviii] which undermine the GCR’s goal of responsibility-sharing through resettlement.
The inconsistency of Kenya’s CRRF implementation exposes the financial power imbalance that has amplified the CRRF and GCR’s demands on poor host nations by directing funds away from aid-based camps like Kakuma and Dadaab towards more self-sustaining integrated settlements instead. Since formally adopting the CRRF in 2017, Kenya has hardly improved Kakuma and Dadaab in part due to funding losses caused by this redirection.[xlix] The CRRF has informed its management of Kalobeyei, a newer settlement that attracts donations by better integrating refugees and including them in local development plans.[l] In Kalobeyei, locals and refugees share access to education, health, and WASH services; two new programs allow refugees to purchase and grow food, increasing their well-being and self-reliance.[li] Although refugees and locals have benefited from this CRRF-guided approach, it reflects a disturbing power differential that allows donor countries to dictate significant host nation policies without revising their own.
Since 2016, the GCR has failed to increase resettlement even through the first Global Refugee Forum, which was attended by over 200 states in 2019. Of 1,400 pledges made, only 8% pertained to increased resettlement, compared to 34% related to host nation policy changes and 48% related to financial, material, or technical support.[lii] That year, the UNHCR only received 66% of its needed funding, and only 2,213 (or .5%) of 438,901 refugees in Kenya were resettled.[liii] Only .31% of 20.4 million refugees under the UNHCR’s mandate worldwide were resettled in 2019.[liv] As these figures suggest, the GCR’s responsibility-sharing rhetoric has not yet compelled the international community to increase resettlement and shrink the UNHCR’s budgetary gaps.
The GCR and CRRF continue to place the heavy-lifting burden of refugee hosting on poor nations by compelling them to offer increased integration in exchange for critical (yet insufficient) donations.[lv] Although these frameworks promisingly emphasize that resolving protracted refugee situations cannot rest on the shoulders of host nations alone, it remains to be seen whether third states will be held equally accountable to their promises to expand resettlement instead of being exempted through financial leverage.
Conclusion
International responsibility-sharing for refugees remains an aspiration, and mid to low-income countries are still hosting 85% of 26.6 million refugees worldwide.[lvi] Kenya’s experience as a host nation sheds light on a profound imbalance and lack of cooperation among all actors directly and indirectly responsible for refugees. Kenya’s record as a host country is far from clean, as evidenced by its stigmatization and treatment of refugees. Still, the policies and violations for which Kenya has been criticized reflect legitimate strain which the international community has observed yet constantly failed to alleviate. When Kenya was urged to set its domestic and national security interests aside, donor countries were spared from commensurate criticism for practices, including low resettlement and underfunding, which stem from the same concerns and perpetuate the same abuses. Emphasizing Kenya’s obligations and failures without equally interrogating the limited, voluntary engagement of other countries has enabled them to lean too heavily on Kenya as a country of asylum proximal to civil war, prolonging the encampment of Kakuma and Dadaab’s refugees.
Urging nations to pursue more integrative, sustainable approaches to hosting has expanded refugees’ access to the essential services and opportunities within their rights in Kenya and elsewhere,[lvii] but eradicating protracted encampment demands more than what host nations can provide through these changes. Without stipulations that legally compel all members of the international community to contribute, eliciting global solidarity will require other mechanisms of expectation-setting and accountability. By foregrounding responsibility-sharing, the GCR marked an important shift in global discourse which may eventually be reflected in practice. As of 2019, the UNHCR and its partners have launched a three-year strategy to expand the number of resettlement countries, increase resettlement spaces, and expand complementary pathways, other avenues such as education or sponsorship programs by which refugees may be admitted to a country. The strategy aims to resettle 1 million refugees and provide 2 million more with complementary pathway opportunities by 2028.[lviii] The precise articulation of these targets in partnership with donor countries who will assess their progress at the 2023 Global Refugee Forum suggests that a long-term process of incremental change may already be underway.
Endnotes
[i] Mangus Manhart, “Capability and Legal Empowerment for Escaping the ‘Refugee Warehouse’- an Assessment of the Global Compact on Refugees and the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework in Kenya” (master’s thesis, McGill University, 2019).
[ii] “Global Trends in Forced Displacement,” UNHCR, 2020, https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/statistics/unhcrstats/60b638e37/global-trends-forced-displacement-2020.html.
[iii] Merrill Smith, “Warehousing refugees: A denial of rights, a waste of humanity” (World Refugee Survey, Washington: US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, 2004). https://sswm.info/sites/default/files/reference_attachments/SMITH%202004%20Warehousing%20Refugees.pdf.
[iv] Gerry Simpson and Gerald Simpson, “From Horror to Hopelessness: Kenya’s Forgotten Somali Refugee Crisis” (Human Rights Watch report, United States, 2009), https://www.google.com/books/edition/From_Horror_to_Hopelessness/KDIpyb5RvccC?hl=en&gbpv=0.
[v] Smith, “Warehousing refugees: A denial of rights, a waste of humanity.”
[vi] “Mandate of the High Commissioner for Refugees and his Office Executive Summary” (UNHCR report, accessed November 20, 2021), https://www.unhcr.org/5a1b53607.pdf.
[vii] “Frequently Asked Questions: About UNHCR’s work,” UNHCR, accessed April 24, 2022, https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/frequently-asked-questions.html.
[viii] “Consequences of Underfunding in 2020” (UNHCR report, 2020), https://www.unhcr.org/underfunding-2020/wp-content/uploads/sites/107/2020/09/Underfunding-2020-Full-Report.pdf.
[ix] “10 Facts About Refugees 2020” (UNHCR infographic, 2020), https://www.unhcr.org/cy/wp-content/uploads/sites/41/2021/01/10-facts-about-refugees-1-Aug-2020_ENG.pdf.
[x] “What is Resettlement?” (UNHCR report, 2020), https://www.unhcr.org/5fe06e8b4.
[xi] “Kenya Statistics Package: Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Kenya” (UNHCR statistical summary report, 2021), https://www.unhcr.org/ke/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2021/09/Kenya-Statistics-Package-31-August-2021.pdf; “Dadaab Refugee Complex,” UNHCR, 2020, https://www.unhcr.org/ke/dadaab-refugee-complex.
[xii] Avery Burns, “Feeling the Pinch: Kenya, Al-Shabaab, and East Africa’s Refugee Crisis,” Refuge 27, no. 1 (2010): 5-15, accessed September 13, 2021, DOI: 10.25071/1920-7336.34356.
[xiii] “Inside the world’s five largest refugee camps,” UNHCR, 2021, https://www.unrefugees.org/news/inside-the-world-s-five-largest-refugee-camps.
[xiv] Andrew Maina, “Securitization of Kenya’s Asylum Space: Origins and Legal Analysis of the Encampment Policy,” in Refugees and Forced Migration in the Horn and Eastern Africa: Trends, Challenges and Opportunities, ed. Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt, Leah Kimathi, and Michael Omondi Owiso (Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2019), 81-91, DOI: https://doi-org.proxyau.wrlc.org/10.1007/978-3-030-03721-5.
[xv] Kara Ross Camarena, “Location Matters: The Politics of Refugee Camp Placement,” (2019): 1-39, https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/kara_ross_camarena/files/krc_camplocation.pdf.
[xvi] Burns, “Kenya, Al-Shabaab, and East Africa’s Refugee Crisis.”
[xvii] Elias O. Opongo, “Refugee Undesirability and Economic Potentials: Questioning Encampment Policy in Forced Migration,” in Refugees and Forced Migration in the Horn and Eastern Africa: Trends, Challenges and Opportunities, ed. Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt, Leah Kimathi, and Michael Omondi Owiso (Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2019), 115-130, DOI: https://doi-org.proxyau.wrlc.org/10.1007/978-3-030-03721-5.
[xviii] Maina, “Securitization of Kenya’s Asylum Space: Origins and Legal Analysis of the Encampment Policy.”
[xix] Dulo Nyaoro, “From Co-option, Coercion to Refoulement: Why the Repatriation of Refugees from Kenyan Refugee Camps Is Neither Voluntary Nor Dignified,” in Refugees and Forced Migration in the Horn and Eastern Africa: Trends, Challenges and Opportunities, ed. Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt, Leah Kimathi, and Michael Omondi Owiso (Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2019), 221-239, DOI: https://doi-org.proxyau.wrlc.org/10.1007/978-3-030-03721-5.
[xx] Burns, “Kenya, Al-Shabaab, and East Africa’s Refugee Crisis.”
[xxi] Camarena, “The Politics of Refugee Camp Placement.”
[xxii] Burns, “Kenya, Al-Shabaab, and East Africa’s Refugee Crisis.”
[xxiii] Opongo, “Questioning Encampment Policy in Forced Migration.”
[xxiv] “Durable Solutions,” UNHCR, accessed October 16, 2021, https://www.unhcr.org/ke/durable-solutions.
[xxv] “Durable Solutions,” UNHCR.
[xxvi] Nyaoro, “Why the Repatriation of Refugees from Kenyan Refugee Camps Is Neither Voluntary Nor Dignified.”
[xxvii] Manhart, “Assessment of the Global Compact on Refugees and the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework in Kenya.”
[xxviii] Nyaoro, “Why the Repatriation of Refugees from Kenyan Refugee Camps Is Neither Voluntary Nor Dignified.”
[xxix] “Kenya Statistics Package” (UNHCR statistical summary report, 2021).
[xxx] Sophia Balakian, “Navigating Patchwork Governance: Somalis in Kenya, National Security, and Refugee Resettlement,” African Studies Review 63, no. 1 (2020): 43-64, DOI: 10.1017/asr.2019.53.
[xxxi] Rose Jaji, “Social Technology and Refugee Encampment in Kenya,” Journal of Refugee Studies 25, no. 2 (2011): 221-238. DOI: 10.1093/jrs/fer046.
[xxxii] Nyaoro, “Why the Repatriation of Refugees from Kenyan Refugee Camps Is Neither Voluntary Nor Dignified.”
[xxxiii] “Kenya Comprehensive Refugee Program” (UNHCR report, 2015), https://www.unhcr.org/ke/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2016/08/KCRP-2015.pdf; “Kenya: Global Compact on Refugees must be quickly anchored in national policy,” Amnesty International, December 24, 2018, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/12/kenya-global-compact-on-refugees-must-be-quickly-anchored-in-national-policy/.
[xxxiv] “Nowhere Else to Go: Forced Returns of Somali Refugees from Dadaab Refugee Camp, Kenya” (Amnesty International report, 2016), https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr32/5118/2016/en/; Simpson and Simpson, “Kenya’s Forgotten Somali Refugee Crisis.”
[xxxv] Burns, “Kenya, Al-Shabaab, and East Africa’s Refugee Crisis.”
[xxxvi] Simpson and Simpson, “Kenya’s Forgotten Somali Refugee Crisis.”
[xxxvii] “The Global Appeal and Supplementary Appeals,” UNHCR, 2022, https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/the-global-appeal-and-supplementary-appeals.html.
[xxxviii] Burns, “Kenya, Al-Shabaab, and East Africa’s Refugee Crisis.”
[xxxix] Rose Jaji, “Somali Asylum Seekers and Refoulement at the Kenya-Somali Border,” Journal of Borderlands Studies 28, no. 3 (2013): 355-368. DOI: 10.1080/08865655.2013.862758.
[xl] Simpson and Simpson, “Kenya’s Forgotten Somali Refugee Crisis.”
[xli] Jaji, “Somali Asylum Seekers and Refoulement at the Kenya-Somali Border.”
[xlii] “Kenya: Denied Refuge: The effect of the closure of the Kenya/Somalia border on thousands of Somali asylum-seekers and refugees” (Amnesty International report, 2007), https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr32/002/2007/en/; “Kenya-Somalia: Border remains closed to asylum seekers,” Reliefweb, April 3, 2007, https://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/kenya-somalia-border-remains-closed-asylum-seekers; Simpson and Simpson, “Kenya’s Forgotten Somali Refugee Crisis.”
[xliii] “Kenya: Involuntary Refugee Returns to Somalia” (Human Rights Watch report, 2016), https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/09/15/kenya-involuntary-refugee-returns-somalia#.
[xliv] Cristiano D’Orsi, “‘We Cannot Manage This Plight Alone Anymore’: Analyzing the Kenyan Threats to Forcibly Repatriate All Somali Refugees from Dadaab Camp,” in Refugees and Forced Migration in the Horn and Eastern Africa: Trends, Challenges and Opportunities, ed. Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt, Leah Kimathi, and Michael Omondi Owiso (Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2019), 221-239, DOI: https://doi-org.proxyau.wrlc.org/10.1007/978-3-030-03721-5.
[xlv] “Nowhere Else to Go” (Amnesty International report, 2016).
[xlvi] “The New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions” (UNHCR report, 2018), https://www.unhcr.org/584689257.pdf.
[xlvii] Kyilah Terry, “The EU-Turkey Deal, Five Years On: A Frayed and Controversial but Enduring Blueprint,” Migration Information Source, Migration Policy Institute, 2021, https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/eu-turkey-deal-five-years-on.
[xlviii] Fatima Khan and Cecile Sackeyfio, “Situating the Global Compact on Refugees in Africa: Will it Make a Difference to the Refugees ‘Languishing in Camps’?,” Journal of African Law 65, no. 1 (2021): 35-57, DOI: 10.1017/S0021855321000012.
[xlix] Sorcha O’Callaghan, Farah Manji, Kerrie Holloway, and Christina Lowe “The Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework: Progress in Kenya” (Humanitarian Policy Group working paper, ODI, 2019), https://cdn.odi.org/media/documents/12940.pdf.
[l] Eva Dick and Markus Rudolf, “From Global Refugee Norms to Local Realities: Implementing the Global Compact on Refugees in Kenya” (German Development Institute briefing paper, 2019), DOI: 10.23661/bp192019.
[li] Manhart, “Assessment of the Global Compact on Refugees and the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework in Kenya.”
[lii] “Outcomes of the Global Refugee Forum 2019,” UNHCR, 2019, https://www.unhcr.org/events/conferences/5ecd458c4/outcomes-global-refugee-forum-2019.html.
[liii] “Global Funding Overview 2019” (UNHCR brochure, 2019), https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/publications/brochures/5eddeb394/global-funding-overview-2019.html; “Kenya Statistics Package: Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Kenya” (UNHCR statistical summary report, 2021).
[liv] “Global Report 2019” (UNHCR report, 2019), https://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/gr2019/pdf.
[lv] Khan and Sackeyfio, “Situating the Global Compact on Refugees in Africa.”
[lvi] “Outcomes of the Global Refugee Forum 2019,” UNHCR.
[lvii] Khan and Sackeyfio, “Situating the Global Compact on Refugees in Africa.”
[lviii] “Three-Year Strategy on Resettlement and Complementary Pathways,” UNHCR, 2019, https://www.unhcr.org/protection/resettlement/5d15db254/three-year-strategy-resettlement-complementary-pathways.html.
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