By Samantha A. Sloane
One day, a woman threw a bone out of her house. Two dogs started fighting for it. A wise old man called Robele Megerra saw them. "Stop those dogs!" he called out. "If you don't, the boys will start fighting too." Nobody listened to Robele Megerra. A few minutes later, a boy came up the path. The big dog was fighting with his little dog. He ran up and began to beat the big dog with a stick. At the same time, another boy was coming home from school. He saw the boy with the stick. He was hitting his big dog. "What are you doing?" he shouted. "Stop hitting my dog!" Soon the two boys were fighting. [Although Robele Megerra kept suggesting someone stop the fight, the boys’ mothers joined the fight, followed by their husbands, and then their two clans.] The fighting was very bad. At last the battle ended. [Eight men from each clan were dead]. Everyone was very sad. "What are we going to do now?" they said. "How are we going to end this war?" They went to see the elders. The elders discussed the matter for a long time. At last they said, "You must pay for every dead man with the life of another." "But if we do that," everyone said, "we'll kill another sixteen men." "Then you must pay a hundred cows for each dead man," the elders said. "But if we do that," the people said, "we will lose one thousand six hundred cows. Then we will have nothing." A crazy old man was passing the elders' meeting. "What's the matter? What are you talking about?" he asked them. They told him all about it, and he listened carefully. At last he said, "If you kill sixteen more men, everyone will be very sad. And if you give away all your cows, you will all be very poor. I know the answer to your problem." "Tell us, tell us!" everyone said. "Each clan must take its silver necklace," the old man said, "and throw it into the river. Throw away your hatred with the necklaces, and forgive each other." So the people took the necklaces of their clans and threw them into the river. They forgave each other, and they never fought again.[i]
– The Dog Fight, an Oromo Folktale from Bale, Ethiopia
Introduction
On the night of November 3–4, 2020, members of the ruling party of Ethiopia’s northern Tigray region, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), attacked an Ethiopian military compound in Tigray.[ii] A few hours later on the morning of November 4, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed ordered a military offensive into Tigray.[iii] This early-November 2020 clash sparked the underlying ethno-political tensions in Ethiopian society, igniting a major conflict between the TPLF on one side and the federal government, Eritrean military, and Amhara regional special police and affiliated Fano militias on the other.[iv] Since the beginning of November 2020, this conflict has left over 7.5 million people in the Afar, Amhara, and Tigray regions facing severe acute food insecurity,[v] 2.1 million people displaced, and 63,110 refugees fleeing to Sudan.[vi] Additionally, at least 820 women and children have been raped by Ethiopian, Eritrean, and Amhara forces, lending credence to world leaders’ allegations of ethnic cleansing.[vii]
The conflict in Tigray is quickly evolving into the genocide[1] of the Tigrayan people and needs to be resolved rapidly to stop the violence, provide humanitarian assistance to those in need, and ensure the protection of human rights in Ethiopia. This paper seeks to add to the literature on resolving the Tigray conflict by arguing that principles of conflict transformation can help resolve the conflict by transforming ethno-political identity in Ethiopia. The first section of this paper will analyze how current ethno-political identities in Ethiopia evolved into two camps of thought on Ethiopian nationalism and governance, creating the conditions for this conflict to ignite. It will also examine how these ethno-political identities and associated camps of thought have influenced the development of the Tigray conflict. The second section will critique prior attempts to resolve the conflict and recommend strategies to improve and transform these attempts by incorporating ethno-political identity into transitional justice mechanisms. Last, the final section will discuss the generalizability and limits of this paper’s conclusions.
Ethno-Nationalism vs. Pan-Ethiopianism: Creating the Conditions for Conflict
At the root of the Tigray conflict are ethno-political disagreements as to Ethiopia’s cultural and political identity.[viii] Divergent ethno-political identities in Ethiopia have created divergent visions of Ethiopian governance and identity—ethno-nationalism and pan-Ethiopianism—providing the underlying conditions for the conflict to erupt.[ix] Thus, understanding how ethno-nationalism and pan-Ethiopianism evolved from ethno-political identities is critical to resolving this conflict. This section will first explain general features of ethno-political identity and how ethno-political identities can manifest in conflict. This section will also describe how different ethno-political identities created the conditions for this conflict through the development of ethno-nationalism and pan-Ethiopianism.
Ethno-Political Identity and Its Manifestation in Conflict
Although there is not universal agreement as to the meaning of the term “ethno-political identity,” the term in the context of conflict refers to the “identity that forms the basis for intractability [of a conflict] and the psychological factors . . . that become consequences of the conflict.”[x] In other words, ethno-political identity is an “adaptive and malleable”[xi] social construct that individuals and leaders manipulate to “encourage members of ethnic groups to feel a heightened cultural identification necessary to pursue political objectives.”[xii] Through cognitive, information, and communication biases, these identities become entwined with the politics of the conflict itself, resulting in the conflict’s intractable character.[xiii] This section explains how ethno-political identities develop and both shape and are shaped by a conflict.
Identity and Biases
Identity is an adaptive mechanism for maximizing survival that helps satisfy a collective need for “dignity, recognition, and control.”[xiv] This mechanism operates by creating a group identity, which results in the automatic creation of an “in-group” and an “out-group,” the group to which one belongs and the group or groups to which an individual does not belong.[xv] During an in-group–out-group conflict—in other words, an intergroup conflict—the political issues filter through the lens of identity, producing biases that further distort and exacerbate the conflict.[xvi] A few key types of biases that influence conflict include cognitive, information, and communication biases.[xvii]
There are three cognitive biases that arise most often in research on conflicts: the in-group favorability bias, the mirror image effect, and self-serving attribution biases.[xviii] The in-group favorability bias is the tendency to interpret in-group behaviors favorably while disfavoring the same behaviors in the out-group. The in-group favorability bias in part can lead to the mirror image effect, which is where biased images and perceptions of the opponent result in the perception that the opponent has evil intentions and is amoral and inferior.[xix] Self-serving attribution biases occur where a group explains its own positive behavior as a result of positive internal characteristics while explaining positive behavior by the out-group as a result of external factors.[xx]
These cognitive biases lead groups to engage in information biases that result in the misperception and distortion of information, such as biased assimilation and the hostile media effect. Biased assimilation occurs when each side of a conflict assimilates information in a manner consistent with preference for the in-group, meaning each side interprets information as confirming its position regarding the other side. The hostile media effect, similarly, occurs where each party to a conflict biasedly assimilates information even when a third party neutrally presents that information.
Communication between groups in a conflict can also be susceptible to procedural biases and substantive misunderstandings. Parties to a conflict tend to “communicate from incommensurate cultural systems,” meaning that the historical, political, and personal narratives that comprise their shared experience make it difficult to share common meanings. Additionally, each party frames information differentially to “influence perceptions and reactions,” [xxi] another communication bias that can result in miscommunication. Finally, conflicting groups tend to speak using different communication codes, forms of producing and interpreting language rooted in cultural conventions that are often inaccessible or unavailable to the other side. These communication codes can result in miscommunication and misunderstanding because the codes reflect cultural psychology and sociology that often varies between the conflicting groups.[xxii] Through these interrelated biases, ethno-political identities become interwoven in the politics of the conflict, causing miscommunication and misunderstanding between the parties to the conflict. The failure of one party to a conflict to communicate with and understand another party from the second party’s perspective can often contribute to the conflict’s intractability.
Ethno-Political Conflicts and Intractability
Because ethno-political conflicts[2] encompass competition over identities, these conflicts are often particularly resistant to resolution.[xxiii] Thus, conflict resolution must address the following five aspects of intractable conflicts to ensure a transformative resolution process.[xxiv] First, resolution of an intractable conflict must consider the ways in which each side uses ethnicity and politics to influence the balance of power in conflicts.[xxv] Second, intractable conflicts tend to focus less on “tangible resources” and center more on “human needs and identity.”[xxvi] Consequently, parties to intractable conflicts often perceive the other side as posing an existential threat and thus understand the conflict in zero-sum terms.[xxvii] Third, misinformation and stereotypes results in “polarized attitudes” and the perception that the parties’ differences and needs are irreconcilable.[xxviii] Fourth, because intractable conflicts are often central to public life, emotions are strong, accessible, and deeply-rooted.[xxix] Finally, intractable conflicts involve significant violence and trauma, which often make these conflicts protracted as well.[xxx] Addressing these factors is critical to transforming the competing identities and narratives and resolving an intractable conflict.[xxxi]
The Role of Ethno-Political Identity in Developing Ethno-Nationalism and Pan-Ethiopianism in Ethiopia
The Current Cultural and Ethnic Makeup of Ethiopia
To fully understand the development of ethno-political identities in Ethiopia, understanding the makeup of Ethiopia’s population is critical. Reflecting its historical makeup, Ethiopia today has an ethnically, linguistically, and religiously diverse population.[xxxii] The largest ethnic group, the Oromo, speak Oromo and live primarily in the Oromia region, which encompasses Ethiopia’s capital, Addis Ababa. The second largest ethnic group, the Amhara, speak Amharic and live in the Amhara region in the northeast. The Tigray, who speak Tigrigna, are the third largest ethnic group and live in the north on the border with Eritrea.[xxxiii]
There is also a diversity of religions that Ethiopians practice.[xxxiv] The majority of the Oromo either follow Islam or belong to the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church, although some do practice the traditional Oromo religion, Waaqqefeta.[xxxv] The Amhara and Tigrayans widely belong to the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church.[xxxvi]
From Pan-Ethiopianism to Ethno-Nationalism
Like most ethno-political conflicts, the current conflict in Ethiopia has little to do with tangible resources and centers more around warring narratives and identities.[xxxvii] In Ethiopia’s case, there are two primary narratives regarding identities and the future of Ethiopia: ethno-nationalism and pan-Ethiopianism.[xxxviii] Ethno-nationalists perceive Ethiopia not as a single nation, but “made up of a dozen nationalities with their own languages, ways of dressing, history, social organization and territorial integrity”[xxxix]: a nation of nations. Pan-Ethiopianists, on the other hand, understand Ethiopia to be a single nation-state comprised of the Ethiopian people.[xl]
These divergent views on Ethiopia’s system of governance trace far back in Ethiopia’s history but found modern expression in the 1960s during Emperor Haile Selassie’s authoritarian rule.[xli] Selassie came to power in 1916 when he took over as regent and heir apparent to Emperor Menelik II’s daughter, Zauditu.[xlii] After Zauditu’s death on April 1, 1930, Selassie declared himself emperor and continued what pan-Ethiopianists consider the previous nation-building work of Menelik, whom Ethiopians largely credit as “an architect of the modern Ethiopian state”[xliii] and pan-Ethiopianism.[xliv]
However, as Selassie’s authoritarian rule developed “oppressive socio-economic and cultural structures,” [xlv] university students began to oppose Selassie’s rule, demand rights and freedom, and question the idea of Ethiopia as a nation-state.[xlvi] With this backdrop of social unrest, Haile Selassi I University student Walleligne Mekonnen wrote “On the Question of Nationalities in Ethiopia,” an influential essay that became the foundational text of ethno-nationalism in Ethiopia.[xlvii] Asserting that Ethiopia was not a single nation but rather a nation of nations, Mekonnen criticized what he dubbed as Selassie’s “fake [Ethiopian] nationalism.”[xlviii] Selassie imposed this “fake nationalism”, which was based on the linguistic and cultural superiority of the Amhara and Amhara-Tigrayan, on the other peoples of Ethiopia, resulting in their economic and cultural subjugation.[xlix] Only through violence and revolutionary armed struggle, Mekonnen argued, could the oppressed dismantle Selassie’s empire and replace it with a “genuine Nationalist Socialist State.”[l]
Despite the intellectual elites’ radical ideas of revolution, it was mutinous junior officers and senior noncommissioned officers in Selassie’s military who rebelled against Selassie in January of 1974 and then deposed him in September of that year.[li] Mengitsu Haile Mariam chaired this group of mutineers, who called themselves the Coordinating Committee of the Armed Forces, Police, and Territorial Army (the “Derg”).[lii] The Derg established the Provisional Military Administrative Council (“PMAC”), which governed Ethiopia “with an iron fist” [liii] until the EPRDF—a coalition of the TPLF, the Amhara National Democratic Movement (“ANDM”), the Oromo Peoples Democratic Organization (“OPDO”), and the Southern Ethiopia Peoples Democratic Front (“SEPDF”)—liberated itself by defeating the Derg and came to power in 1991.[liv]
With the TPLF at its helm, the EPRDF introduced an ethno-nationalist constitution in 1995.[lv] Promulgated in 1995, the new constitution created the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, seemingly striking a balance between the TPLF’s deep-rooted Marxist-Leninist ideology with the post-Cold War “triumphalism” [lvi] of liberal democracy.[lvii] The new ethnic federalist Ethiopia embodied the ideals of ethno-nationalism: nine ethnic states based on the ethnic identities of those states’ residents with the right to self-determination, including secession.[lviii] Tigrayan Meles Zenawi led the EPRDF in governing Ethiopia, ensuring the education system would inculcate students with an ethno-nationalist narrative of Ethiopian history, identity, and governance.[lix]
The Revival of Pan-Ethiopianism
Despite—and perhaps because of—the EPRDF’s successful insertion of ethno-nationalism into Ethiopia’s governance and historical narrative, ethnic differences deepened and intensified.[lx] In addition, the EPRDF suppressed opposition and violated human rights.[lxi] As social unrest in Ethiopia increased, the EPRDF claimed to win 100% of the 2015 election, demonstrating the EPRDF’s struggle to maintain power and marking the beginning of EPRDF’s end.[lxii] After the EPRDF announced its plan in 2016 to expand the capital city, Addis Ababa, into the Oromo ethnic group’s land, protests erupted to protect Oromo farmers from losing their lands, livelihoods, and economic and cultural rights.[lxiii] The EPRDF responded harshly in attempt to quash the opposition, killing and imprisoning hundreds of protesters.[lxiv]
However, the EPRDF’s violent response invigorated rather than stopped protests across Ethiopia.[lxv] Although the TPLF began losing their political clout when a pan-Ethiopian party nearly clinched power in the 2005 elections, the TPLF’s rate of decline significantly increased in April of 2018 when Abiy Ahmed, an ethnic Oromo and member of the OPDO, was appointed as the EPRDF’s leader and Ethiopia’s Prime Minister.[lxvi] Ahmed’s popularity with pan-Ethiopianists skyrocketed after he introduced several democratic reforms and won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2019 for brokering a peace deal with Eritrea.[lxvii] However, Ahmed became unpopular at the end of 2019 with the ethno-nationalist TPLF when he formed the Prosperity Party out of the EPRDF with the ANDM, OPDO, and SEPDF.[lxviii] Thus, the Tigray conflict emerged from this backdrop of warring ethno-nationalist and pan-Ethiopianist narratives, with the Tigrayans’ ethno-political identity as ethno-nationalist and the Oromo and Amhara people as pan-Ethiopianist.[lxix]
Ethno-Political Identity’s Influence on the Evolution of the Tigray Conflict
The cognitive, information, and communication biases that typify intractable ethno-political conflicts have been present in the Tigray conflict and influenced its evolution.[lxx] Both pan-Ethiopianists and ethno-nationalists have intentionally tapped into these biases through social media campaigns to attempt to control the narratives of this conflict.[lxxi] The government has even shut down communications—including phone lines and internet services—in the Tigray region to prevent the spread of information and narratives.[lxxii] Because the narratives of pan-Ethiopianists and ethno-nationalists continue to clash, the conflict has largely failed to evolve and remains a battle over Ethiopia’s identity: “[i]s it an empire[,] a loose, multinational federation[,] or a centrally controlled state?”[lxxiii]
Resolving the Tigray Conflict: Prior Attempts and Moving Forward
There has been a dearth of attempts to resolve the Tigray conflict, with prior attempts consisting primarily of condemnations, calls for ceasefires by world leaders, and the Government’s declaration of a unilateral ceasefire.[lxxiv] Although the March 24, 2022 ceasefire has paused the fighting,[lxxv] moving forward, conflict transformation may be the best method of healing the conflict in Ethiopia and eliminating the warring ethno-political identities and narratives.
One major issue with prior attempts to resolve the Tigray conflict is that there has not been any real effort to resolve the conflict.[lxxvi] Although U.S. President Biden called for a ceasefire and end to human rights abuses in Ethiopia in May of 2021,[lxxvii] the international community has been slow in its response, which has admittedly been inadequate.[lxxviii] Human rights abuses have been rampant since the start of the conflict; however, world leaders only began condemning these abuses in April of 2021.[lxxix] The United Nations (U.N.) Human Rights Council only placed Tigray on its agenda in mid-July of 2021. Although the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights has established a commission of inquiry into the Tigray conflict, there is insufficient financial, technical, and political capital to accomplish fact finding, let alone to begin peace talks.[lxxx]
To facilitate the emergence of a resolution process, international bodies and governments, at a minimum, should take concrete action beyond mere condemnations of the violence.[lxxxi] A further step would be to support credible U.N. investigations of the conflict, impose individual sanctions on violators of international human rights and humanitarian law, and institute an arms embargo. The U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights should take steps to ensure its joint investigation with the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission is credible, accurate, and neutral.[lxxxii]
Despite the seeming intractability of the Tigray conflict, there is a good entry point for the international community to help facilitate dialogue between the government and Tigrayans: revisiting the July 4, 2021 statement of “the Government of Tigray” in light of the current ceasefire.[lxxxiii] In this statement, the TPLF outlines seven conditions for a negotiated ceasefire, including the withdrawal of government and Eritrean forces from the Tigray region, accountability for crimes against humanity and gender-based violence, access to humanitarian aid and basic services like telecommunications and electricity, and observation by an independent international entity over the implementation of the preconditions.[lxxxiv] Although the parties to the conflict have agreed to adhere to the cessation of hostilities, federally-imposed administrative and security barriers still prevent the delivery of adequate humanitarian resources.[lxxxv] Thus, while Ethiopia’s government is unlikely to agree to all of the TPLF’s conditions for the negotiated ceasefire, revisiting the conditions in light of the current ceasefire may provide additional points for negotiation, such as permitting the entry of unhindered humanitarian aid.[lxxxvi] However, future international involvement in the conflict resolution process must address what is at the heart of the conflict: ethno-political identity, the basis for the battling narratives and visions for Ethiopia.
Because the Tigray conflict is a clash over the identity of Ethiopia, conflict transformation may be the best-suited path for constructively building Ethiopia’s identity.[lxxxvii] Conflict transformation is both a lens and a strategy for approaching conflict; the key goal of conflict transformation is “to build constructive change out of the energy created by conflict [by] focusing this energy on the underlying relationships and social structures” causing and perpetuating conflict.[lxxxviii] Conflict transformation thus “understands social conflict as evolving from, and producing changes in, the personal, relational, structural, and cultural dimensions of human experience [and] seeks to promote constructive processes within each of these dimensions.”[lxxxix]
A conflict transformation approach is particularly useful in minimizing cognitive, information, and communication biases because of its methodological focus on flexibly framing issues and options while engaging identity and narratives.[xc] The Burundi peace process used the guiding principles of conflict transformation to great effect.[xci] Although the conflict environment in Burundi was not identical to the civil war in Ethiopia, the procedural lessons of the peace process have universal application. Implementing the following recommendations will likely support a successful dialogue for Ethiopia by transforming ethno-nationalist and pan-Ethiopianist narratives and visions for the future.
First, international actors should encourage the government and TPLF to continue building confidence with one another.[xcii] Helping these parties develop a bilateral ceasefire agreement—beyond the current humanitarian ceasefire—premised on confidence-building measures will help develop confidence both through successfully negotiating a ceasefire and adherence to its terms. However, failing to successfully negotiate or adhere to the ceasefire’s terms could pose a threat to future interactions by reinforcing in-group and communication biases. Thus, if the government or TPLF is not yet ready to engage in ceasefire talks, the international community should convince and help each party to undertake unilateral acts of good faith. Such acts can include the TPLF’s release of political prisoners and the government’s restoration of all services to the Tigray region, including permitting unhindered humanitarian access to the region.
Second, international parties should be neutral and ensure they are perceived as such.[xciii] Dialogue facilitators should very clearly describe their role to avoid any confusion and ensure that the government and TPLF make all decisions, both substantive and procedural.[xciv] This is critical because conflict transformation is not possible without the conflicting parties’ full buy in, engagement, and autonomy in making choices.[xcv] Thus, while the parties must perceive the facilitators as neutral, they must also be able to trust these facilitators to remain within the bounds of their role.
Third, because of the importance of understanding the conflict from personal, relational, structural, and cultural perspectives, international parties should ensure that all stakeholders have representation in the process.[xcvi] This is particularly important for women for two reasons. First, women need a voice in the process due to the degree to which parties used sexual violence as a tool of perpetrating and perpetuating ethno-nationalist or pan-Ethiopianist narratives and objectives. Additionally, women in Ethiopia are disadvantaged in literacy, health, livelihoods, and human rights because of the absence of social support networks and the low social status Ethiopian society affords women.[xcvii]
Fourth, facilitators should train dialogue participants in the principles of conflict transformation to maximize parties’ understandings of the process. This helps ensure that all parties are procedurally on equal footing and maintains the integrity of conflict transformation.[xcviii] The Burundi Leadership Training Program can help model how to train dialogue participants due to its success in Burundi.[xcix] These recommendations are non-exhaustive but can serve as good starting points for facilitating a conflict transformation process in Ethiopia while addressing ethno-political identities and the future identity of Ethiopia and its peoples.
Conclusion
Although the Tigray conflict may seem unresolvable, principles of conflict transformation that can help mitigate the three major sources of biases in conflict settings may still aid in halting the violence, enabling humanitarian aid to reach those in need, and ensuring the protection of human rights in Ethiopia. This would be possible by addressing ethno-political identity as a cause of conflict and transforming identity as an alternative to conflict. However, this paper’s etic approach and pretext limit both the accuracy of its conclusions and applicability to other conflicts. Supporting emic and more rigorous etic research is necessary to ensure accuracy and applicability.
In “The Dog Fight” folktale, the old man’s suggestion to reframe the resolution of the conflict between the clans by abandoning the clans’ necklaces—their metaphorical identities—resulted in peace, forgiveness, and open possibilities for new identity to develop.[c] To foster peace, forgiveness, and open possibilities for the development of a new Ethiopian identity, the international community should, like the old man, suggest the parties to the conflict reframe its resolution. The best way for the international community to do so is by (1) encouraging the government and the TPLF to engage in confidence-building measures, (2) ensuring that international facilitators remain neutral and are perceived as such, (3) guaranteeing representation for all stakeholders in the conflict transformation process, and (4) training dialogue participants in the principles of conflict transformation. Taking these steps would be a helpful way for international parties to encourage Ethiopians to abandon their ethno-political identities, thereby creating space for Ethiopians to develop a new identity for Ethiopia.
Appendix: Images
[1] This paper uses the term “genocide” as defined in the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. This document defines genocide as “any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or metal harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcible transferring children of the group to another group.”).
[2] “Ethno-political conflicts” in this paper refer to conflicts that are “informed and intensified” by ethnic issues. Donald G. Ellis, “Ethno-Political Conflict,” in The International Encyclopedia of Interpersonal Communication, ed. Charles R. Berger and Michael E. Roloff (John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 2016), 5.
Endnotes
[i] Elizabeth Laird, “The Dog Fight,” Ethiopian English Readers, The Christensen Foundation, last accessed June 26, 2021, https://www.ethiopianenglishreaders.com/20-stories/oromia/44-the-dog-fight.
[ii] Declan Walsh and Abdi Latif Dahir, “Why Is Ethiopia at War with Itself?,” New York Times, published November 5, 2020; last modified March 16, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/05/world/africa/ethiopia-tigray-conflict-explained.html.
[iii] Ibid.; Safia Farole, “Ethiopia’s Tigray Conflict Reflects Unresolved Ethnic Tensions,” Washington Post, November 24, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/11/24/ethiopias-tigray-conflict-reflects-unresolved-ethnic-tensions/; Scott Neuman, “9 Things to Know About the Unfolding Crisis in Ethiopia’s Tigray Region,” National Public Radio, March 5, 2021, https://www.npr.org/2021/03/05/973624991/9-things-to-know-about-the-unfolding-crisis-in-ethiopias-tigray-region.
[iv] “NGOs Call for UN Human Rights Council Resolution on Tigray,” Human Rights Watch, June 11, 2021, https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/06/11/ngos-call-un-human-rights-council-resolution-tigray; Scott Neuman, “9 Things to Know About the Unfolding Crisis in Ethiopia’s Tigray Region,” National Public Radio, March 5, 2021, https://www.npr.org/2021/03/05/973624991/9-things-to-know-about-the-unfolding-crisis-in-ethiopias-tigray-region.
[v] United States Agency for International Development, “Fact Sheet # 5: Ethiopia – Northern Ethiopia Crisis,” USAID, February 25, 2022, https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2022-02-25_USG_Northern_Ethiopia_Crisis_Fact_Sheet_5.pdf. However, the United Nations has estimated that approximately 9.4 million people in these regions require humanitarian food assistance. United Nations, “Tigray: Eritrean Refugees ‘Scared and Struggling to Eat’ Amid Aid Obstacles,” UN News, January 21, 2022, https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/01/1110252#:~:text=More%20than%2025%2C000%20refugees%20live,to%20the%20neighbouring%20Amara%20region.&text=We%20are%20deeply%20alarmed%20by,Eritrean%20refugees%20in%20Tigray%2C%20Ethiopia; Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Northern Ethiopia – Humanitarian Update,” UN OCHA, last updated March 25, 2022, https://reports.unocha.org/en/country/Ethiopia.
[vi] Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Northern Ethiopia – Humanitarian Update,” UN OCHA, last updated March 25, 2022, https://reports.unocha.org/en/country/Ethiopia.
[vii] Hilary Matfess, “Sexual Violence and the War in Tigray,” Lawfare, June 16, 2021, https://www.lawfareblog.com/sexual-violence-and-war-tigray; see, e.g., “Top US Diplomat Decries ‘Ethnic Cleansing’ in Ethiopia’s Tigray,” Al Jazeera, March 10, 2021, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/3/10/us-top-diplomat-decries-ethnic-cleansing-in-ethiopias-tigray (noting U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken condemned acts of ethnic cleansing in Tigray); “Ethiopian Leaders Said They Would ‘Wipe Out’ Tigrayans: EU Envoy,” Al Jazeera, June 18, 2021, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/6/18/ethiopian-leaders-said-they-would-wipe-out-tigrayans-eu-envoy (asserting Finland’s foreign minister, Pekka Haavisto, reported that Ethiopian leadership said they were “going to wipe out the Tigrayans for 100 years”).
[viii] Shimelis Mulugeta Kene and Solen Feyissa, “The Pitfalls of the Ethiopian Elites’ War of Narratives: Part I,” Centre for Human Rights and Legal Pluralism, McGill Law, November 19, 2020, https://www.mcgill.ca/humanrights/article/inclusive-citizenship-and-deliberative-democracy/pitfalls-ethiopian-elites-war-narratives-part-i [hereinafter “Part I”] (describing the role of ethno-political identities in the evolution of clashing ethno-nationalist and pan-Ethiopian perspectives on Ethiopia as a nation-State).
[ix] Ibid.; see also Shimelis Mulugeta Kene and Solen Feyissa, “The Pitfalls of the Ethiopian Elites’ War of Narratives: Part II,” Centre for Human Rights and Legal Pluralism, McGill Law, January 22, 2021, https://www.mcgill.ca/humanrights/article/inclusive-citizenship-and-deliberative-democracy/pitfalls-ethiopian-elites-war-narratives-part-ii [hereinafter “Part II”] (explaining how different ethno-political identities created the tensions underlying the Tigray conflict).
[x] Donald G. Ellis, “Ethno-Political Conflict,” in The International Encyclopedia of Interpersonal Communication, ed. Charles R. Berger and Michael E. Roloff (John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 2016), 4.
[xi] Ibid.
[xii] Ibid.
[xiii] Ibid., 5-8 (noting intractable conflicts are particularly resistant to resolution).
[xiv] Ibid., 4.
[xv] Ibid.
[xvi] Ibid., 6.
[xvii] Ibid., 6-8.
[xviii] Ibid., 6-7.
[xix] Ibid., 6.
[xx] Ibid., 6-7.
[xxi] Ibid., 7.
[xxii] Ibid., 8.
[xxiii] Ibid., 3, 5, 6.
[xxiv] Ibid., 5-6.
[xxv] Ibid., 5; see also Nadim N. Rouhana and Daniel Bar-Tal, “Psychological Dynamics of Intractable Ethnonational Conflicts: The Israeli-Palestinian Case,” American Psychologist 53, no. 7 (1998): 761-62 (noting that these conflicts “penetrate the social fabric of [each party to the conflict] and force themselves on individuals and institutions.”).
[xxvi] Ellis, “Ethno-Political Conflict,” 5.
[xxvii] Ibid.; Rouhana and Bar-Tal, “Psychological Dynamics of Intractable Ethnonational Conflicts,” 761-62.
[xxviii] Ellis, “Ethno-Political Conflict,” 5-6; Rouhana and Bar-Tal, “Psychological Dynamics of Intractable Ethnonational Conflicts,” 762.
[xxix] Ellis, “Ethno-Political Conflict,” 6; Rouhana and Bar-Tal, “Psychological Dynamics of Intractable Ethnonational Conflicts,” 762.
[xxx] Ibid.
[xxxi] See, e.g., Howard Wolpe et al., “Rebuilding Peace and State Capacity in War-Torn Burundi,” The Round Table 93, no. 375 (2004): 457-67 (describing good practices for conflict transformation processes to resolve intractable conflicts).
[xxxii] Central Intelligence Agency, “Ethiopia,” The World Factbook, Central Intelligence Agency, last visited June 21, 2021, https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/ethiopia/.
[xxxiii] Ibid.; Figure 3. Ethno-Federalist States in Ethiopia.
[xxxiv] Central Intelligence Agency, “Ethiopia,” The World Factbook, Central Intelligence Agency, last visited June 21, 2021, https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/ethiopia/; see also Figures 1-4.
[xxxv] Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, “Oromo: People,” Encyclopaedia Britannica, Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., last modified March 2, 2018, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Oromo; “Ethiopia and the Oromo People: Is It Possible to Determine Whether an Ethiopian Is an Ethnic Oromo by the Individual’s Last Name? What Religion or Religions Are Practiced by Ethnic Oromos in Ethiopia,” Refworld, United States Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services, April 28, 1998, https://www.refworld.org/docid/3df0a18e4.html.
[xxxvi] “Amhara,” Countries and Their Cultures, last visited July 31, 2021, https://www.everyculture.com/wc/Costa-Rica-to-Georgia/Amhara.html; Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, “Tigray: People,” Encyclopaedia Britannica, Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., last modified January 19, 2015, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Tigray-central-Eritrean-people.
[xxxvii] Kene and Feyissa, “Part I”; Kene and Feyissa, “Part II.”
[xxxviii] Ibid.
[xxxix] Kene and Feyissa, “Part I”; Walleligne Mekonnen, “On the Question of Nationalities in Ethiopia,” Marxists Internet Archive, November 17, 1969, https://www.marxists.org/history/erol/ethiopia/nationalities.pdf.
[xl] Kene and Feyissa, “Part I”; Kene and Feyissa, “Part II.”
[xli] Kene and Feyissa, “Part I.”
[xlii] Donald Edward Crummey, “Ethiopia,” Encyclopaedia Britannica, Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., last modified March 10, 2021, https://www.britannica.com/place/Ethiopia.
[xliii] Kene and Feyissa, “Part I”; Crummey, “Ethiopia.” Pan-Ethiopianists also celebrate Menelik’s defeat of Italy in the Battle of Adwa is “as a key moment in Black anticolonial consciousness. Kene and Feyissa, “Part II.”
[xliv] Ibid.
[xlv] Kene and Ferissa, “Part I.”
[xlvi] Kene and Ferissa, “Part I.”
[xlvii] Mekonnen, “On the Question of Nationalities in Ethiopia”; Kene and Feyissa, “Part I.”
[xlviii] Ibid.
[xlix] Mekonnen, “On the Question of Nationalities in Ethiopia.”
[l] Ibid.
[li] Kene and Feyissa, “Part I”; Crummey, “Ethiopia.”
[lii] Crummey, “Ethiopia.”
[liii] Kene and Feyissa, “Part I.”
[liv] Kene and Feyissa, “Part I.”
[lv] Ibid.
[lvi] Ibid.; Crummey, “Ethiopia.”
[lvii] Ibid.; Crummey, “Ethiopia.”
[lviii] Kene and Feyissa, “Part I.”
[lix] Kene and Feyissa, “Part I”; Crummey, “Ethiopia.”
[lx] Kene and Feyissa, “Part I.”
[lxi] Kene and Feyissa, “Part II”; Crummey, “Ethiopia.””
[lxii] Ibid.
[lxiii] Ibid.
[lxiv] Kene and Feryissa, “Part II.”
[lxv] Ibid.
[lxvi] Kene and Feyissa, “Part I;” Kene and Feyissa, “Part II”; Crummey, “Ethiopia.”
[lxvii] Kene and Feyissa, “Part II.”
[lxviii] Ibid.
[lxix] Kene and Feyissa, “Part I;” Kene and Feyissa, “Part II”; Crummey, “Ethiopia.”
[lxx] See, e.g., Kene and Feyissa, “Part II” (describing the role social media has played in perpetuating biases during the Tigray conflict).
[lxxi] See Alexi Drew and Claire Wilmot, “In Ethiopia’s Digital Battle over the Tigray Region, Facts Are Casualties: Claims About Disinformation May Be Undermining Online Activism,” Washington Post, February 5, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/02/05/ethiopias-digital-battle-over-tigray-region-facts-are-casualties/ (analyzing pan-Ethiopianist and ethno-nationalist Twitter campaigns).
[lxxii] Laetitia Bader and Amy Braunschweiger, “The Latest on the Crisis in Ethiopia’s Tigray Region,” Human Rights Watch, July 30, 2021, https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/07/30/latest-crisis-ethiopias-tigray-region#.
[lxxiii] Robert D. Kaplan, “Ethiopia’s Problems Aren’t Postcolonial,” Foreign Policy, July 9, 2021, https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/07/09/ethiopias-problems-arent-postcolonial/.
[lxxiv] See, e.g., Associated Press, “Ethiopia Declares an Immediate, Unilateral Cease-Fire in Tigray,” National Public Radio, June 28, 2021, https://www.npr.org/2021/06/28/1011053371/ethiopia-declares-an-immediate-unilateral-cease-fire-in-tigray.
[lxxv] Abdi Latif Dahir and Simon Marks, “Ethiopia Declares ‘Humanitarian Truce’ in War-Ravaged Tigray Region,” New York Times, March 24, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/24/world/africa/ethiopia-tigray-conflict-truce.html.
[lxxvi] See, e.g., “Timeline of Ethiopia’s Tigray Conflict,” Barron’s, Agence France Presse News, July 13, 2021, https://www.barrons.com/news/timeline-of-ethiopia-s-tigray-conflict-01626164107 (noting most efforts by world powers and international organizations have been to attempt to deliver humanitarian aid).
[lxxvii] “Ethiopia’s Tigray Conflict: Biden Demands Ceasefire and End to Abuses,” BBC, May 27, 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-57266110.
[lxxviii] Bader and Braunschweiger, “The Latest on the Crisis in Ethiopia’s Tigray Region.”
[lxxix] “Ethiopia’s Tigray Conflict: World Powers Condemn ‘Human Rights Abuses,’” BBC, April 2, 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-56613940.
[lxxx] See Bader and Braunschweiger, “The Latest on the Crisis in Ethiopia’s Tigray Region” (explaining the African Union needs to provide the commission of inquiry with more assistance).
[lxxxi] Ibid.
[lxxxii] See ibid. (describing the joint investigation); “About EHRC,” Ethiopian Human Rights Commission, last visited July 31, 2021, https://ehrc.org/about-ehrc/ (explaining the EHRC was established by Ethiopia’s government, though it is supposedly independent of the government).
[lxxxiii] “Ethiopia’s Tigray Crisis: Accept Our Rule or No Ceasefire, Rebels Say,” BBC, July 4, 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-57714799 (citing Getachew K. Reda, Twitter post, July 4, 2021, 5:43a.m., https://twitter.com/reda_getachew/status/1411621680280113156); “Building on Ethiopia’s Fragile Truce,” International Crisis Group, April 15, 2022, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/ethiopia/building-ethiopias-fragile-truce.
[lxxxiv] Ibid.
[lxxxv] Ibid.
[lxxxvi] See Daphne Psaledakis, “U.S. Aid Chief to Travel to Ethiopia in Diplomatic Push on Tigray,” Reuters, July 30, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/us-aid-chief-travel-ethiopia-diplomatic-push-tigray-2021-07-29/ (expressing U.S. hopes that sending USAID Administrator Samantha Power on a diplomatic mission to Ethiopia will help start negotiations and secure humanitarian access to Tigray).
[lxxxvii] See John Paul Lederach, “Conflict Transformation,” Beyond Intractability, University of Colorado, October 2003, http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/transformation (describing the method and process of conflict transformation).
[lxxxviii] Ibid.
[lxxxix] Ibid.
[xc] Ibid.
[xci] Howard Wolpe, “Making Peace After Genocide: Anatomy of the Burundi Process,” Peaceworks no. 70 (2011).
[xcii] Ibid., 64.
[xciii] Ibid.
[xciv] Ibid., 63-65.
[xcv] John Paul Lederach, “Conflict Transformation.”
[xcvi] Ibid.
[xcvii] “Ethiopia: Leave No Women Behind,” U.N. Women, last visited July 31, 2021, https://www.unwomen.org/mdgf/B/Ethiopia_B.html#.
[xcviii] John Paul Lederach, “Conflict Transformation.”
[xcix] Howard Wolpe et al., “Rebuilding Peace and State Capacity in War-Torn Burundi,” The Round Table 93, No. 374 (2004), 457-67.
[c] Elizabeth Laird, “The Dog Fight.”
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