How Cycles of Retaliation and a Perilous Information Space Drive the Northern Ethiopian Conflict and Jeopardize Future Reconciliation
By Benjamin Stevenson
Man-made famine, massacres, and chilling episodes of sexual violence; these have defined Northern Ethiopia across decades of protracted ethnic conflict. A new war was launched on November 4, 2020 under the ironic leadership of Nobel Peace Prize winner Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, catching international attention as evidence of widespread atrocities came to light. These atrocities – amounting to an unacknowledged genocide – are dismissed by most Ethiopians as fabrications from terrorist groups and biased Western media. In the case of Ethiopia, the truth is weaponized as a means of concentrating power. The truth is heavily guarded, altered, and fabricated through the employment of a powerful mix of tools including misinformation, propaganda, and suppression. These have been given new life with the assistance of a powerful new actor: social media. Distortion through misinformation, hate speech, bias, and propaganda has driven the conflict, complicating short-term efforts for securing peace and the impending transitional justice that will be necessary in a conflict of this scale and brutality.
At the heart of this conflict lies the spirit of retaliation, with poor and disadvantaged communities bearing the worst effects. Daniel Bekele, the head of the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission, described it as “a cycle of revenge attacks on poor communities.”[i] Everyday Ethiopians in the Tigray, Afar, and Amhara states of Northern Ethiopia have been targeted as pawns in games of retribution, revenge, and political violence. The complex history of inter-ethnic political relations has caused multiple actors to dominate the military and security sector at different times in history. Many of these actors see no incentive for peace. In fact, they have much to lose from peace, and have developed a culture of cyclical retaliation rather than working towards holistic resolution.
Recent news of a mutual cessation of hostilities on March 25, 2022 offers an opportunity for reconciliation, but this is only the first step in addressing the deep psychosocial rifts between the warring parties.[ii] An earlier declaration of a humanitarian ceasefire proved to short-lived, bringing into question whether this recent development can be sustained.[iii] Continued division is fueled by diametrically opposed perceptions of truth within sharply divided ethnic groups. Propaganda, bias, hate speech, misinformation, and media blackouts are ubiquitous, and key drivers of violence. They inhibit psycho-social reconciliation processes by precluding the formation of a collective truth, an idealized state where involved parties reach consensus on the events of the conflict and which actors are responsible.
While some suggest constitutional reforms creating a consensus government as a catalyst to reconciliation, power sharing systems already exist in the current constitution. However, the majoritarian executive and the codification of ethnic divisions create an untenable foundation for peace in a country with a history of ethnic conflict. While reforms in these areas could be beneficial in the long run, such reforms could exacerbate tensions in the immediate term by further destabilizing the country. The only hope to maintain cessation of hostilities and to jumpstart reconciliation processes is to incentivize peace. All parties must stand to benefit from peace as opposed to retaliation.
Military Conflict and Security Sector Instability
Complex historical interactions between different ethnic groups reveal patterns, and analysis of the circumstances that have perpetuated conflict can help explain the disastrously obscured and polarized information space in Ethiopia. This examination of Ethiopia’s past is necessary in order to imagine the potential peace-building mechanisms needed to sustain the ceasefire, stop the cycles of retaliation, and incentivize reconciliation.
Active conflict in Ethiopia began on November 4, 2020, with fighting centered in the Tigray region and spreading into the neighboring Afar and Amhara regions.[iv] The conflict centers around the tenuous relationship between diverse Ethiopian ethnic groups and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). The TPLF was formed a year after Haile Selassie, the last emperor of Ethiopia, was deposed and murdered in 1974 by hardline Marxist army officers, who then established the Derg communist regime and imposed strict authoritarian rule.[v] A quashed Tigrayan armed revolt in 1943 lingered in their memory and inspired a rebel group of a dozen young men to create the TPLF. Disenfranchised in the centralized Ethiopian state, they called for Marxist-Leninist liberation and ideations of a strong national identity for Ethiopia.[vi] During the late 1970s, they saw tremendous growth, with CIA numbers estimating 2,000 fighters as of 1978 and 4,000 in 1980.[vii]
The TPLF included talented propagandists, who downplayed their Marxist views to appeal to their conservative Christian base and emphasized the threat posed by the centralized regime in Addis Ababa to local traditions and regional autonomy. The TPLF was successful in destroying rival groups in Tigray, and with critical military training from the like-minded Eritrean People’s Liberation Front across the border, they resisted the Soviet-supported regime. This came at an immense price, however, with an estimated 1-2 million people dying from man-made famine in 1984.[viii]
The TPLF grew to be the largest opposition armed rebel group in Ethiopia and garnered the most influence in the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), a coalition of opposition parties.[ix] When the TPLF seized control of Addis Ababa in 1991, Tigrayans dominated the army and intelligence services and consolidated control, securing jobs preferentially for Tigrayans in all sectors.
During this period, the TPLF constructed ethnicity-based federal states in a 1994 constitution, developed infrastructure, oversaw rapid economic growth, and addressed famine conditions. However, the allocation of benefits was disproportional, with the majority of resources funneled into Tigray and its regional capital Mekelle, despite Tigrayans only accounting for 6% of all Ethiopians.[x] Tensions continued to grow as non-Tigrayans were subjected to human rights violations and widespread repression. Rising discontentment between the Amhara and Omoro ethnic groups – the two largest in the country – threatened the constitution in the 2010s. These two communities were eventually able to skillfully outmaneuver the TPLF and appointed Abiy Ahmed as prime minister in 2018.[xi] Abiy became the leader of the newly-formed Prosperity Party, which was created in the aftermath of the TPLF decline to essentially replace the EPRDF.[xii] The TPLF refused to join the party.[xiii]
Meanwhile, Abiy freed political prisoners, returned exiled dissidents, privatized industries, increased media freedom, and established a peace deal with Eritrea that won him a Nobel Peace Prize.[xiv] The latter action triggered resentment from the TPLF, whose relations with Eritrea had dissolved in the 30 years since their alliance. Tigrayans pushed back against Abiy by holding local elections despite a national delay implemented in light of the COVID-19 pandemic.[xv]
Over the course of its decades of rule, the TPLF had reinforced its economic supremacy, siphoned resources, and created deep resentment between other ethnic groups. They were either unaware of or comfortable with the structural violence that targeted non-Tigrayans.[xvi] However, as they stood to lose greatly from the redistribution of powers with the formation of the Prosperity Party, they had greater incentive to prepare for violence than to actively pursue peace.
Following a realpolitik security understanding – in which the driving logic of deterrence causes rational actors to defend themselves by maximizing power – TPLF units raided national military bases in Tigray in early November 2020, killing many officers and seizing equipment.[xvii] By repurposing materials that posed a threat into equipment for defense, they sought to alter the net capabilities of both groups. This sparked an immediate retaliatory offensive by Abiy on November 4. Tigray has been subject to media blackouts, with visitors prohibited from bringing hard drives, flash drives, photo and video devices into the region.[xviii]
Because of this blocked access to information, credible reports of the magnitude of violence were slow to emerge. However, the nature and expanse of massacres soon became clear, with atrocities committed against Tigrayan civilians by the Eritrean Defense Forces, Ethiopian National forces, and Amhara Paramilitary groups like the “Fano”.[xix] Reports of the tragedies are astounding in the extent of the hellish actions that took place. A total of 151 massacres were reported between November 2020 to March 2021, the first few months of conflict:.[xx] Estimates of total deaths range in the tens of thousands, though there is no official death toll.[xxi] Some notable massacre events include Mai Kadra, where around 600 Tigrayans were killed by axe-wielding Amhara “Fano” militants; Adigrat, where Eritrean soldiers fired at a seminal historic monastery; and Mahibere Dego, where video evidence exists of Ethiopian forces killing unarmed civilians.[xxii] These videos were geolocated using satellite imagery of the location.[xxiii]
Potentially the largest of these massacres was at Axum, where more than 800 were killed.[xxiv] Young men and boys were targeted as Ethiopian and Eritrean forces aimed to eradicate potential TPLF militants. They also arbitrarily detained civilians, looted hospitals and local stores, and – in a striking display of violence – killed people that were collecting the bodies for burial.[xxv]
Additionally, reports of sexual violence began to emerge and increased dramatically in early 2021. Here is a first-hand account describing the depth and trauma of sexual violence, which many survivors interpreted as acts of ethnic cleansing and genocide:
Mehrawit, 27, was separated from her sister and locked in a room with only a thin, dirty mattress. For two weeks, she said, the Eritrean soldiers gang-raped her repeatedly, fracturing her spine and pelvis and leaving her crumpled on the floor. One day, she counted 15 soldiers who took turns sexually assaulting her over eight hours, her cries of agony punctuated by their laughter.[xxvi]
The Ethiopian government, in consort with the Eritrean government and Amhara and Afar special forces, took control of supply routes and blocked humanitarian access to Tigray, preventing food, money, telecommunications, medicine, and international humanitarian aid sent by foreign governments and INGOs from entering the region.[xxvii]
By employing tactics used in 1984 to induce a crippling wartime famine, retaliatory measures have again led to man-made famine conditions in this conflict, leaving 5.2 million Tigrayans with critical food insecurity.[xxviii] Many considered this a deliberate attempt to weaken and kill Tigrayans – who resorted to eating leaves and roots to survive – in advance of renewed attacks on Tigray.[xxix] Efforts including burning crops and destroying seed stores are long term methods that are caused women and children to perish from the famine in cities like Kola Tembien, Ofla, and Indera.[xxx] Deaths from famine have been reported in at least 20 Tigrayan districts by September 2021.[xxxi]
Despite Abiy’s repeated claims that he will allow international aid into Tigray, aid was systematically prevented from entering the region.[xxxii] The Ethiopian government has stated that humanitarian aid would be siphoned by TPLF rebel militants and government, as they did during the 1984 famine.[xxxiii] Signs of improvement appeared in June 2021 as the Ethiopian government declared a ceasefire and troops were pulled from Mekelle, purportedly on humanitarian grounds.[xxxiv] However, although the prime minister’s spokeswomen, Billene Seyoum, claimed the government had cut “the number of checkpoints from seven to two and creat[ed] air bridges for humanitarian flights,” the government in practice had restricted access to the region even further, banning such mundane items as dental floss, can openers, multivitamins, and personal medicines on the few flights that do enter Tigray.[xxxv]
The following month, Abiy won a commanding majority in an election that conspicuously excluded the Tigray region, where no voting was held.[xxxvi] The ceasefire was broken soon thereafter in September when the TPLF entered the Amhara and Afar regions, aiming to secure supply routes to Sudan and Djibouti which were blocked by Amhara and Afar groups, respectively.[xxxvii] Though early prospects were strong with the TPLF advancing within 190 km from Addis Ababa, these gains were short-lived.[xxxviii] Abiy soon went to the front lines to lead military operations, addressing soldiers in military uniform and assuming the propaganda style of autocratic leaders, claiming “[w]e will continue [liberating] the remaining areas… nothing will stop us. The enemy will be destroyed.”[xxxix] In addition, he declared a state of emergency, calling on citizens to take up arms against the TPLF.[xl]
With the assistance of drones from Turkey, China, and Iran, the Ethiopian government acquired a huge reconnaissance and striking advantage, well-suited to the mountainous Tigray region.[xli] This allowed the Ethiopian government to retake control of several strategic towns.
The TPLF has been credibly accused of retaliatory acts during their offensive in Amhara and Afar, including closing off supply routes.[xlii] There is also strong evidence of atrocities committed by the TPLF, including similarly abhorrent acts of sexual violence and execution of civilians in towns throughout Amhara, though they deny these charges.[xliii] These mirror attacks from the EDF, ENDF, and Amhara paramilitary forces that took place in Tigray. Arguably, the most credible report, produced by the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission in conjunction with the Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights, released findings implicating all parties in human rights violations and abuses potentially amounting to atrocity designations.[xliv]
As different armed groups rise in and out of power, they adopt the violent tactics of their oppressors in a horrific cycle of retaliation. If any type of security sector reform is to be implemented, it needs to take into context the extremely specific considerations of this society.[xlv] Security sector reform, especially when driven by Western states, tends to redistribute power and reinforce the central state as the sole power capable of legitimate and justified use of force.[xlvi] In this situation, doing so would further exacerbate the crisis. Instead, the priority should be placed on demobilization and long-term reintegration.[xlvii]
The recent cessation of hostilities marks an opportunity to dramatically alter the trajectory of the conflict, building from the momentum of this long-sought ceasefire to transition out of protracted conflict. To accomplish this, all parties must view peace as a net neutral outcome, if not a net positive, compared to the expected return if they continue to fight. However, the widespread nature of the atrocities that have occurred will greatly complicate the transitional justice space, as many will call for accountability. For those involved in the conflict, the potential for accountability can incentivize them to perpetuate violence, as they could stand to lose from peace if convicted.
Social Media: A Breeding Ground for Misinformation and Hate Speech
The security dynamics in the Northern Ethiopian conflict are further disrupted by a disastrous information space in Ethiopia, which inhibit the formation of a collective truth. To achieve reconciliation, the following elements are needed: “mutual recognition and acceptance, invested interests and goals in developing peaceful relations, mutual trust, positive attitudes, and sensitivity and consideration of other party’s needs and interests.”[xlviii] Societies develop “sociopsychological repertoire” of perceived root causes of conflict, understandings of the trajectory of the conflict, emotions and goals of conflict, and desired solutions.[xlix] If these collective understandings are perceived as mutually incompatible across plural societies, conflict will continue. This can lead to intractable conflicts lasting over 25 years, where goals are “perceived as being existential, violent, unsolvable, and of a zero-sum nature, greatly preoccupying society’s members with parties involved investing much in their continuation.”[l] The starkly divided groups in Ethiopia are an example of such a conflict.
With the rise of self-publishing on social media, misinformation has been given a powerful new avenue for proliferation. Facebook, the predominant form of social media used by Ethiopians, has been accused of “fanning ethnic violence,” just as it has in Myanmar.[li] The consequences have been devastating. In one September 27, 2021 Facebook post from an Ethiopian media outlet, members of an ethnic minority group were blamed for recent murders and kidnappings.[lii] The following day, after hundreds of likes and shares of the post, the village cited was ransacked and burnt to the ground, its inhabitants murdered. The post remained publicly visible, despite being repeatedly reported to Facebook content mediators. Incendiary hate speech like this often goes unnoticed, unreported, and unchecked as Facebook lacks the capacity and necessary language skills to prevent hate speech.[liii]
Despite Ethiopia having the second highest population in Africa with 105 million citizens, less than 15% of Ethiopians have access to internet, and for those that do, it is often expensive and unreliable.[liv] This severely limits access to information for people living in Ethiopia, especially in more rural areas. Despite low levels of access, Ethiopia has frequently employed media and telecommunications shutdowns in times of crisis (see Appendix 1).
Internet access has been blocked since the beginning of the conflict on November 4, 2020 in most of Tigray.[lv] This has shifted the dynamics of conversation around the conflict by obfuscating the true depth of suffering. Although the government maintains control of internet and communication infrastructure throughout Ethiopia, they have attempted to blame the TPLF and the Tigray regional government for the telecommunications blackout. For information that does escape, it is usually gathered from the accounts of refugees who were able to enter Sudan.[lvi] This also greatly affects the timing of dialogues, as information is released long after the events and massacres took place. Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch were finally able to release detailed reports of atrocities that occurred at Axum months after they had taken place.[lvii] Access to telephones is also extremely limited.
Though there are only 21.14 million internet users in Ethiopia as of January 2020, there is still robust use of Facebook, with many individuals boasting over a million followers.[lviii] However, it is difficult to untangle diaspora followers from followers within Ethiopia. It is also expected that rural users could receive news from the lens of only a few accounts, and some accounts may use bots or fake information to boost popularity.[lix]
In one study, around 42% of posts were found to contain bias and propaganda.[lx] While hate speech is not seen in a majority of these posts themselves, the unregulated comments sections are rife with hate speech and incitements to violence. The initial biased post then becomes coopted by everyday users, who have become radicalized by one-sided reporting, fear-mongering, and sensationalized ethnic divisions. Private messaging applications, such as WhatsApp and Telegram, also are venues for the spread of propaganda and misinformation.[lxi] These are even more opaque to observers, allowing for uncontrolled spread.
This tenuous and disparate information space hinders the development of ethnoempathy, defined as “the ability of a person or a group to experience what the other ethnic person or group feels and thinks.” [lxii] This in turn precludes authentic liberation through the process of humanization of the other.[lxiii]
Social media and television generally dominate the media space compared to scant circulation of printed press.[lxiv] Popular pages like Zehabesha, Dire Tube, and Ethiopian DJ, which have between 1.5 and 3 million followers, attract viewers with a hybrid of entertainment and news.[lxv] Television networks such as the Oromia Media Network (OMN) and ESAT, with 1.2 million and 1.5 million followers respectively, also perform similarly. Previously, the state had a monopoly on telecommunications.[lxvi] While this has supposedly been abolished, there is still government control of a majority of media platforms, and the government still controls a third of all broadcast media.[lxvii]
These media platforms garner significantly higher traffic than traditional print media.[lxviii] The highest performing newspapers, for example, print about 15,000 copies per issue. The government owns an even larger proportion of print media, with 20 privately-owned newspapers in circulation as compared to 23 owned by federal and regional governments. Traditional media sources also have been known to print false or misleading information due to low editorial standards.[lxix] In one story featuring the launching of Ethiopia’s first satellite into space, doctored photos of a Chinese aircraft were posted on major news sources like borkena.com and attributed to the Ethiopia Broadcasting Corporation (EBC).[lxx] Similar stories like these have lessened trust in Ethiopian media.
Despite the waning importance of traditional printed press, journalists face austere conditions of suppression and arbitrary arrest, with at least six journalists arrested within the first week of conflict.[lxxi] Dawit Kebede Aray, a Tigrayan reporter in Mekelle working for Tigray TV, was shot and killed by unidentified attackers, likely by the security forces who had previously detained him.[lxxii] Ethiopia was listed as one of the world’s top jailers of journalists, despite recognition in Abiy Ahmed’s 2019 Nobel Prize citation praising him for “discontinuing media censorship.”[lxxiii]
The net effect of this amalgamation of restrictive media and a limited information space is a distinct lack of agreement as to what the truth is. Each party has a fundamentally distinct understanding of events and, given the lack of access to telecommunications, important information including proof of atrocities may never be discovered. This poses serious ramifications for generations of Ethiopians to come as they attempt to understand and recover from the conflict. The stratification of understanding divided along ethnic lines extends beyond Ethiopia’s borders as well, with the Ethiopian diaspora, particularly in the United States, playing an extremely important role in the information space.
Diaspora Engagement
The Ethiopian diaspora has had an outsized influence on social media. Misinformation is often spread through these communities, which are arguably more ethnically segregated than their peers in Ethiopia.[lxxiv] Ethiopia-focused pages with contact and locations listed in the U.S., like Kello Media, Geda Media Network, and Kush Media Network have over 575,000 combined followers.[lxxv]
Ethnic division has increased even among diaspora Ethiopians as a result of the conflict. For example, there is a large number of Tigrayans currently living in Denver, Colorado (see Appendix 2 for more diaspora statistics).[lxxvi] The community was as small as half a dozen people in the 1970s, but over time, it has grown to a total Ethiopian population of around 30,000.[lxxvii] Even in areas like Denver, ethnic divisions between Ethiopians from the Amhara and Tigray regions are striking, with ethnic groups attending separate churches and community centers. The Ethiopian population in Washington, D.C. is the largest in the country, with estimates ranging from 38,000 to as many as 250,000.[lxxviii] Ethiopian communities in D.C. are split among ethnic divides as well.
Ethiopians with ties to the Tigray region claim the U.S. should be doing more to label the crisis a genocide and force Prime Minister Abiy’s hand to ensure an appropriate quantity of supplies and food reach Tigrayan civilians.[lxxix] Many Tigrayans in the U.S. could not contact their community members for at least five months, with one respondent saying that nine of her family members had died in the conflict.[lxxx] Thousands of Tigrayans travelled to Washington, DC from Denver and elsewhere in the U.S. in early November 2021 to protest and commemorate a year since fighting began.[lxxxi]
On the other hand, Ethiopians who do not have ties to Tigray – a majority of the diaspora in Washington, DC – remember more sharply the human rights abuses they experienced under TPLF rule for three decades.[lxxxii] They conceptualize the TPLF as a terrorist organization and are vehemently opposed to the U.S. response, which they believe has been favoring the TPLF since the beginning of the conflict (see Appendix 3). Along these points, it is fair to say that U.S. and Western media have highlighted the violence against Tigrayan people in their reporting, although the sentiment towards the TPLF in particular has been generally neutral or disapproving.
With the perception that “the US administration is supporting lies, fake news and terrorism,” Ethiopians are experiencing a great sense of betrayal. [lxxxiii] The extent of their distaste for the U.S. response has been so great that non-Tigrayan Ethiopians are mobilizing to vote Republican for the first time in decades. In their view, President Joe Biden’s conception of the conflict is “based on distorted information” and is “ill-advised.” [lxxxiv] The U.S. response is seen as placing undue pressure on the Ethiopian and Eritrean governments. Protesters gathered outside of the U.S. State Department with a letter, chanting “TPLF is a terrorist organization,” and “America stop supporting terrorist organizations.”[lxxxv] Separately, there have also been protests against what some Amhara activists claim is a genocide of ethnic Amhara in the Oromo and Benishangul Gumuz states.[lxxxvi]
Non-Tigrayans believe Ethiopian government officials, who claim that tales of violence in Tigray, including massacres, hunger, and horrific instances of sexual violence, are exaggerated.[lxxxvii] They maintain a positive perception of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, who handily secured another term in July 2021 when the Prosperity Party won 410 out of 436 contested federal parliamentary seats.[lxxxviii] The vote was held after two major postponements, purportedly in light of the COVID-19 pandemic and logistical concerns. Notably, this election did not include any input from Tigrayans. The ruling party ran unopposed in several dozen constituencies, including opposition parties in Oromia who boycotted the election. Voter turnout among the 37 million registered voters was extremely high, at 90%.[lxxxix] Abiy Ahmed called the election as the nation’s first attempt at a free and fair vote, although opposition parties cited harassment and intimidation, and the United States called the election “significantly flawed” given the detention of opposition figures.[xc]
The results of this election show how the government has successfully employed techniques of information suppression and propaganda to convince its non-Tigrayan population of the merits of the war in Tigray. By labeling western media as imposing on their sovereignty, spreading fake news, and exaggerating the extent of suffering in Tigray, they tap into the ethnic division and historical resentment for the TPLF – which is admittedly valid given the human rights abuses committed when the TPLF held power – and have mobilized this into political currency based on scapegoating and moralist positions that emphasize retaliation against the TPLF.
Potential Long-term Solutions
One solution often employed to address ethnic conflict is constitutional reform. The current constitution was established in 1994, three years after the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) overtook Addis Ababa and established a transitional government.[xci] This constitution designates a powerful prime minister and a president who serves as head of state. It also establishes a bicameral legislature with direct elections for the lower chamber, the House of Peoples’ Representatives, and state selection (or direct election if a state exercises that option) to the upper chamber: the House of the Federation. The prime minister is designated by the ruling party in the lower chamber. This party also selects a candidate for president, who is subject to a confirmation vote by both houses. All of these officials serve five-year terms, with the exception of the president who serves a six-year term. The constitution also created regional states called kililoch (singular kilil), which are divided by ethnicity. Each kilil has a state council that elects a president.
In his seminal work on democracy, Arend Lijphart concludes that consensus democracies are a stronger democratic structure than majoritarian democracies, with the former yielding more effective policy-making.[xcii] In the case of Ethiopia, the constitutional framework includes elements of both consensus and majoritarian government.[xciii] One element of consensus government includes the multi-ethnic coalition parties who have been in power since the constitution was established, with the EPRDF morphing into the Prosperity Party in 2018 (excluding the TPLF). The constitution also establishes universal suffrage for Ethiopians over 18 years of age and includes two key provisions for representation of minority groups: each group must be represented by at least one member in the House of the Federation, and underrepresented minorities are guaranteed about one-fifth of the seats in the House of People’s Representatives. This seems to be an ideal model for consensus government, which are recommended specifically for plural societies. However, representation is not proportional, another key idea in Lijphart’s consensus government.[xciv] In addition, the disproportionate amount of power given to the prime minister, with little effective oversight, and the selection of the prime minister by the majority party in the lower chamber cause the government to lean towards majoritarian government in practice.
In terms of laying the foundation for a consensus government, the current constitution is comparatively strong, including bicameral legislature and an established federal system. Constitutional tweaks to avoid enshrining ethnic divides in the constitution could potentially encourage a stronger consensus government. Additionally, the main majoritarian element of the constitution is the selection of the executive and the lack of term limits. When first selected, Abiy hinted he would institute a two-term limit for the prime minister, but this is seeming less likely as time goes on.[xcv] In general, it does not appear the nature of the constitution is generating or driving the conflict, and it does not appear constitutional changes would be a plausible solution to the deep ethnic divides. In fact, constitutional reforms implemented at a time of rapidly evolving power dynamics could likely destabilize the region even further.
To take a note from Ethiopians themselves, this recommendation from the joint report by the EHRC and OHCHR is an insightful and promising framework for reconciliation:
The State should initiate a victim-centred and gender-sensitive reparations scheme that includes restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction – including the right to the truth, and guarantees of non-repetition. The international community should support initiatives to strengthen justice and accountability for serious violations and crimes. [xcvi]
This conflict is at an incredibly important crossroads, as the current cessation of hostilities has held for almost a month, arbitrarily detained journalists been released, and the government of Ethiopia has finally relaxed its humanitarian blockade to a degree, permitting entry of a small amount of humanitarian aid into Tigray.[xcvii] Yet this truce is still incredibly fragile; future reconciliation will be depend on keeping promises, reaching a consensus truth, and working to remedy the decades of ethnic tension that form the foundation of the intractable conflict.[xcviii] Though the attribution of blame for the beginning of the conflict is disputed, all parties have vested interests, which they perceive as a battle over real goods such as sovereignty, territory, and self-determination.[xcix] The long-term solution will need to incorporate this reality and shift incentives so that all parties gain—or have minimal loss—from peace. Widespread interpersonal healing is complicated and necessitates additional resources.[c] This may include such controversial methods as amnesty, as a conditional amnesty could be predicated on disarmament, admission of full truth, or other context-specific methods. However, amnesty can cause increased animosity and resentment from victims who see perpetrators walk free without any real accountability.[ci] The peace-building mechanism would have to emerge locally, as Ethiopians are the only ones attuned to the situation at hand and the only people intimately familiar with their current slate of options regarding incentives. In any peace-building mechanism, persistent economic inequalities will also need to be addressed to create actual change.[cii]
Ethiopians of all ethnicities deserve open access to truth: a truth in real-time without distortion or bias. The blockades, military retaliation, and a distorted/stymied information space employed during the conflict will greatly increase the difficulties and length of time needed to build a post-conflict reconciliation. Without the reintegration of security forces, the establishment of a collective truth, and anticipated gains from peace for all parties, the conflict has the potential to return episodically in the future.
Appendices
Appendix 1
Previous internet blackouts include a months-long shutdown of West Oromia as the government battled the Oromo Liberation front. The Ethiopian government has also implemented nation-wide shutdowns, including an example following the murder of the famous Oromo singer/activist Hachalu Hundesa.[i]
In this incident, Hachalu expressed criticism of the Oromo government and police forces in an interview with Oromia Media Network (OMN), while also supporting Abiy Ahmed’s administration.[ii] He was murdered shortly after on June 29, 2020, which set off a wave of riots, televised racist sentiment against Amharas by Oromo youth, and 166 deaths in Oromia alone. Media in Tigray, including TPLF-supported Tigrina TV and DW (Demtsi Woyane), also distorted Hachalu’s narrative, claiming he had criticized the government and opposed moving from federalism to consolidating power at the national level. The government response was haphazard, with PM Abiy assigning blame to TPLF forces stoking ethnic conflict and Takele Uma, Mayor of Addis Ababa, assigning blame to one of Oromo’s factions, the Oromo Liberation Front/Army (OLF/A).[iii] Following this event, the government implemented a three-week long national internet blackout. Tigrina TV and DW then interpreted these events as evidence for the Government’s harsh response to opposition and criticism.
[i] Salem Solomon, “Journalists Struggle Through Information Blackout in Ethiopia,” VOA, December 4, 2020, https://www.voanews.com/a/press-freedom_journalists-struggle-through-information-blackout-ethiopia/6199045.html; European Institute of Peace, “Fake News Misinformation and Hate Speech in Ethiopia,” 4.
[ii] European Institute of Peace, “Fake News Misinformation and Hate Speech in Ethiopia,” 16.
[iii] Ibid, 4; 16.
Appendix 2
Geographically, diaspora communities are also segregated within the United States.[i] Ethiopians came principally in three waves. First, in 1974, many students, business leaders, and government officials could not return to Ethiopia during the political overthrow of the emperor. The second wave came during the 1980s, as new political and economic changes unfolded. Finally, there was intense growth in Ethiopian immigrants in the US between 2008-2012, increasing from 8,000 to 195,000, a population increase of 2,400 percent. Based on a 2017 report from the U.S. Census Bureau, Ethiopians are widely dispersed throughout the United States, with many living in Midwestern states such as Ohio, Indiana, Michigan, Illinois and Missouri, and a large share of Ethiopians live in California. The share of foreign-born Ethiopians is also extremely high at 72.3%, which means that most Ethiopians have personal memories of their homeland. Of those foreign born, around half are naturalized U.S. citizens. The median age of Ethiopians is about 30 years, with 45.7% of the population between the ages of 20 and 44 (higher than the national average of around 33%). In terms of education and employment, Ethiopians in the U.S. have bachelor’s degrees or higher at a rate of 27%, just under the U.S. national average of 28.5%. They also have a 75.9% labor force participation, which is substantially higher than the 64.7% national rate. However, compared to national averages, Ethiopians have lower median earnings ($34,018 for men and $30,253 for women compared to U.S. rates of $48,629 for men and $39,155 for women), higher poverty rates (19.7% compared to U.S. rate of 14.9%), and lower rates of home ownership (35.2% compared to U.S. rate of 65.6%). These figures are paramount to understanding the psychology of diaspora Ethiopians living in the United States, as they play an incredibly large role in the formulation and consumption of media related to the conflict.
[i] US Census Bureau, “New Report Offers Close-Up Look at Five Groups.”
Appendix 3
In a round of visa and economic sanctions against persons carrying out human rights abuses, established by an executive order on September 17, 2021, President Biden listed numerous parties: the Government of Ethiopia, the Government of Eritrea or its ruling People’s Front for Democracy and Justice, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, and the Amhara regional government, or the Amhara regional or irregular forces.[i] However, when designations were released on November 12, 2021, they only targeted four Eritrean entities (Eritrean Defense Force, the People’s Front for Democracy and Justice, Hidri Trust, Red Sea Trading Corporation) and two Eritrean officials (Abraha Kassa Nemariam and Hagos Ghebrehiwet W Kidan).[ii] This denotes a stepping back from overt criticism of the Government of Ethiopia and appeared to be an attempt to avoid taking sides in the conflict, especially as atrocities committed by TPLF are increasingly reported in the Amhara region. The U.S. State Department had announced an earlier round of broad visa sanctions in May 2021 on members of warring parties that are “responsible for, or complicit in, undermining resolution of the crisis in Tigray.” [iii]
Another major action was the announcement that Ethiopia would have its African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) benefits cut if it did not address the “gross violations of internationally recognized human rights.”[iv] On January 1, 2022, the United States Trade Representative announced that these benefits were indeed cut.[v] This will dramatically harm Ethiopia’s garment industry – the largest beneficiary industry in the country.[vi] AGOA trade benefits enabled $722 million worth of garments to be exported to the U.S. duty-free between 2000 (the year Ethiopia was designated a beneficiary) and 2020, with three quarters of that figure coming from exports from 2017-2020. Ethiopian government spokesperson Legesse Tulu said that the suspension would cost Ethiopia 1 million jobs.[vii] The The suspension of trade benefits from AGOA will cause far more tangible harm to the Ethiopian economy and many Ethiopians than sanctions.
[i] Joseph R. Biden, “Executive Order on Imposing Sanctions on Certain Persons With Respect to the Humanitarian and Human Rights Crisis in Ethiopia,” The White House, September 17, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/09/17/executive-order-on-imposing-sanctions-on-certain-persons-with-respect-to-the-humanitarian-and-human-rights-crisis-in-ethiopia/.
[ii] “Treasury Sanctions Four Entities and Two Individuals in Connection with the Crisis in Ethiopia,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, November 12, 2021, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0478.
[iii] Anthony J. Blinken, “United States’ Actions To Press for the Resolution of the Crisis in the Tigray Region of Ethiopia,” United States Department of State (blog), May 23, 2021, https://www.state.gov/united-states-actions-to-press-for-the-resolution-of-the-crisis-in-the-tigray-region-of-ethiopia/.
[iv] V.O.A. News, “Why US Is Suspending Ethiopia, Mali, Guinea From Free-Trade Deal,” VOA, November 6, 2021, https://www.voanews.com/a/why-the-us-suspended-ethiopia-mali-guinea-from-free-trade-deal/6302446.html.
[v] United States Trade Representative, “U.S. Terminates AGOA Trade Preference Program for Ethiopia, Mali and Guinea,” United States Trade Representative, January 1, 2022, http://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2022/january/us-terminates-agoa-trade-preference-program-ethiopia-mali-and-guinea.
[vi] Trade Law Centre (tralac), U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), “AGOA and Ethiopia,” African Growth and Opportunity Act, 2021, https://agoa.info/images/documents/15558/ethiopiacountrybrochureagoafinal.pdf.
[vii] V.O.A. News, “Why US Is Suspending Ethiopia, Mali, Guinea From Free-Trade Deal.”
Endnotes
[i] Stephen Grey, “As Government Offensive Pushes Forward, Scars of War Dot Ethiopia’s Amhara Region,” Reuters, December 11, 2021, sec. Africa, https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/government-offensive-pushes-forward-scars-war-dot-ethiopias-amhara-region-2021-12-10/.
[ii] Agence France-Presse in Addis Ababa, “Ethiopia: Tigray Rebels Agree ‘Cessation of Hostilities’ after Government Truce,” The Guardian, March 25, 2022, sec. World news, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/25/ethiopia-tigray-rebels-agree-cessation-of-hostilities-after-government-truce.
[iii] Addis Getachew, “Ethiopia Ends Cease-Fire as Tigray Rebels Continue Incursions,” Anadolu Agency, August 10, 2021, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/ethiopia-ends-cease-fire-as-tigray-rebels-continue-incursions/2330251.
[iv] Associated Press, “‘I Just Cry’: Dying Of Hunger In Ethiopia’s Blockaded Tigray Region,” NPR, September 20, 2021, sec. World, https://www.npr.org/2021/09/20/1038858345/i-just-cry-dying-of-hunger-in-ethiopias-blockaded-tigray-region.
[v] “Ethiopia – Constitutional Framework | Britannica,” accessed December 16, 2021, https://www.britannica.com/place/Ethiopia/Constitutional-framework; Jason Burke, “Rise and Fall of Ethiopia’s TPLF – from Rebels to Rulers and Back,” The Guardian, November 25, 2020, sec. World news, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/nov/25/rise-and-fall-of-ethiopias-tplf-tigray-peoples-liberation-front.
[vi] Burke, “Rise and Fall of Ethiopia’s TPLF – from Rebels to Rulers and Back.”
[vii] Ibid.
[viii] Associated Press, “‘I Just Cry’”; David Del Conte, “7 Facts You Need to Know about the Famine in Tigray,” Refugees International, August 13, 2021, https://www.refugeesinternational.org/reports/7-facts-you-need-to-know-about-the-famine-in-tigray.
[ix] Burke, “Rise and Fall of Ethiopia’s TPLF – from Rebels to Rulers and Back.”
[x] Scott Neuman, “9 Things To Know About The Unfolding Crisis In Ethiopia’s Tigray Region,” NPR, March 5, 2021, sec. Africa, https://www.npr.org/2021/03/05/973624991/9-things-to-know-about-the-unfolding-crisis-in-ethiopias-tigray-region.
[xi] Burke, “Rise and Fall of Ethiopia’s TPLF – from Rebels to Rulers and Back.”
[xii] Associated Press, “Ethiopia’s Ruling Party Wins National Election In Landslide,” NPR, July 10, 2021, sec. Africa, https://www.npr.org/2021/07/10/1015019374/ethiopias-ruling-party-wins-national-election-in-landslide.
[xiii] Burke, “Rise and Fall of Ethiopia’s TPLF – from Rebels to Rulers and Back.”
[xiv] Ibid.
[xv] Associated Press, “Ethiopia’s Ruling Party Wins National Election In Landslide.”
[xvi] Daniel J Christie, Richard V Wagner, and Deborah Du Nann Winter, “Introduction to Peace Psychology,” in Peace, Conflict, and Violence: Peace Psychology for the 21st Century (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, n.d.), 17.
[xvii] Christie, Wagner, and Du Nann Winter, 4; Burke, “Rise and Fall of Ethiopia’s TPLF – from Rebels to Rulers and Back.”
[xviii] Associated Press, “‘I Just Cry.’”
[xix] Amnesty International, “Ethiopia: The Massacre in Axum” (Amnesty International, February 26, 2021), 5, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/document/?indexNumber=afr25%2f3730%2f2021&language=en.
[xx] Sofie Annys et al., Tigray: Atlas of the Humanitarian Situation, 2021, 23.
[xxi] Lee Hale and Eyder Peralta, “Social Media Misinformation Stokes a Worsening Civil War in Ethiopia,” NPR, October 15, 2021, sec. Africa, https://www.npr.org/2021/10/15/1046106922/social-media-misinformation-stokes-a-worsening-civil-war-in-ethiopia.
[xxii] Annys et al., Tigray, 62; Julia Steers, “‘He’s Planning to Exterminate Us All’: Ethiopians Speak of Ethnic Massacres,” December 24, 2020, https://www.vice.com/en/article/qjpzqw/hes-planning-to-exterminate-us-all-ethiopians-speak-of-ethnic-massacres; Barbara Arvanitidis et al., “Tigray Massacre: How an Ethiopian Festival Turned into a Killing Spree,” CNN, March 22, 2021, https://edition.cnn.com/2021/02/26/africa/ethiopia-tigray-dengelat-massacre-intl/index.html; Bethlehem Feleke et al., “Analysis of Massacre Video Raises Questions for Ethiopian Army,” CNN, April 2, 2021, https://www.cnn.com/2021/04/01/africa/tigray-mahibere-dego-massacre-video-cmd-intl/index.html.
[xxiii] Feleke et al., “Analysis of Massacre Video Raises Questions for Ethiopian Army.”
[xxiv] Annys et al., Tigray, 69–71.
[xxv] Amnesty International, “Ethiopia: The Massacre in Axum,” 14; 22; 4.
[xxvi] Lucy Kassa and Shashank Bengali, “A Rape Survivor’s Story Emerges from a Remote African War,” Los Angeles Times, February 11, 2021, https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2021-02-11/troops-accused-of-mass-rape-in-ethiopias-tigray-conflict.
[xxvii] Davide Tommasin, “Man Made Famine in Tigray – yet Another Catastrophic History in the Making? – Focus On Africa -,” Focus On Africa (blog), October 12, 2021, https://www.focusonafrica.info/en/man-made-famine-in-tigray-yet-another-catastrophic-history-in-the-making/.
[xxviii] Del Conte, “7 Facts You Need to Know about the Famine in Tigray.”
[xxix] Joshua Keating, “The Information Age Retreats From the Battlefield,” Slate, March 9, 2021, https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2021/03/ethiopia-tigray-violence-media-blackout.html; Tommasin, “Man Made Famine in Tigray – yet Another Catastrophic History in the Making?”
[xxx] Anna Cara, “‘Leave No Tigrayan’: In Ethiopia, an Ethnicity Is Erased,” AP NEWS, April 26, 2021, https://apnews.com/article/ethiopia-tigray-minority-ethnic-cleansing-sudan-world-news-842741eebf9bf0984946619c0fc15023; Tommasin, “Man Made Famine in Tigray – yet Another Catastrophic History in the Making?”
[xxxi] Associated Press, “‘I Just Cry.’”
[xxxii] Tommasin, “Man Made Famine in Tigray – yet Another Catastrophic History in the Making?”
[xxxiii] Keating, “The Information Age Retreats From the Battlefield”; Tommasin, “Man Made Famine in Tigray – yet Another Catastrophic History in the Making?”
[xxxiv] Associated Press, “‘I Just Cry.’”
[xxxv] Ibid.
[xxxvi] Associated Press, “Ethiopia’s Ruling Party Wins National Election In Landslide.”
[xxxvii] Associated Press, “‘I Just Cry.’”
[xxxviii] Grey, “As Government Offensive Pushes Forward, Scars of War Dot Ethiopia’s Amhara Region.”
[xxxix] Ibid.
[xl] Declan Walsh and Abdi Latif Dahir, “Why Is Ethiopia at War in the Tigray Region?,” The New York Times, December 14, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/article/ethiopia-tigray-conflict-explained.html.
[xli] Alex Gatopoulos, “How Armed Drones May Have Helped Turn the Tide in Ethiopia’s War,” Al Jazeera, December 10, 2021, https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2021/12/10/how-armed-drones-may-have-helped-turn-tide-in-ethiopia-conflict.
[xlii] Associated Press, “‘I Just Cry.’”
[xliii] Grey, “As Government Offensive Pushes Forward, Scars of War Dot Ethiopia’s Amhara Region.”
[xliv] Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC) and Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), “Joint Investigation into Alleged Violations of International Human Rights, Humanitarian and Refugee Law Committed by All Parties to the Conflict in the Tigray Region of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia,” Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), November 3, 2021, 5, https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/ET/OHCHR-EHRC-Tigray-Report.pdf.
[xlv] Nadine Ansorg and Eleanor Gordon, “Co-Operation, Contestation and Complexity in Post-Conflict Security Sector Reform,” Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 13, no. 1 (January 1, 2019): 2, https://doi.org/10.1080/17502977.2018.1516392.
[xlvi] Ansorg and Gordon, 2.
[xlvii] Albrecht Schnabel and Hans-Georg Ehrhart, eds., Security Sector Reform and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding (Tokyo ; New York: United Nations University Press, 2005), 8.
[xlviii] Daniel Bar-Tal et al., “Peace Education in Societies Involved in Intractable Conflicts,” in Handbook on Peace Education (Routledge Handbooks Online, 2009), 23, https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203837993.ch3.
[xlix] Ibid, 21.
[l] Ibid, 22.
[li] Hale and Peralta, “Social Media Misinformation Stokes a Worsening Civil War in Ethiopia”; European Institute of Peace, “Fake News Misinformation and Hate Speech in Ethiopia: A Vulnerability Assessment | EIP,” April 12, 2021, 3, https://www.eip.org/publication/fake-news-misinformation-and-hate-speech-in-ethiopia-a-vulnerability-assessment/.
[lii] Hale and Peralta, “Social Media Misinformation Stokes a Worsening Civil War in Ethiopia.”
[liii] Ibid.
[liv] Internet Society, “Ethiopia Internet Development Conference 2020,” Internet Society (blog), 2020, https://www.internetsociety.org/events/ethiopia-internet-development-conference-2020/.
[lv] European Institute of Peace, “Fake News Misinformation and Hate Speech in Ethiopia,” 4.
[lvi] Amnesty International, “Ethiopia: The Massacre in Axum,” 5.
[lvii] Amnesty International, “Ethiopia: The Massacre in Axum”; Human Rights Watch, “Ethiopia: Eritrean Forces Massacre Tigray Civilians,” Human Rights Watch (blog), March 5, 2021, https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/03/05/ethiopia-eritrean-forces-massacre-tigray-civilians.
[lviii] European Institute of Peace, “Fake News Misinformation and Hate Speech in Ethiopia,” 8.
[lix] Ibid, 8.
[lx] Ibid, 14.
[lxi] Ibid, 6.
[lxii] Bar-Tal et al., “Peace Education in Societies Involved in Intractable Conflicts,” 30.
[lxiii] Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, New rev. ed, Penguin Education (London: Penguin Books, 1996), 79.
[lxiv] European Institute of Peace, “Fake News Misinformation and Hate Speech in Ethiopia,” 6.
[lxv] Ibid, 8.
[lxvi] Internet Society, “Ethiopia Internet Development Conference 2020.”
[lxvii] European Institute of Peace, “Fake News Misinformation and Hate Speech in Ethiopia,” 6.
[lxviii] African Men for Sexual Health and Rights and Coalition of African Lesbians, “Violence Based on Perceived or Real Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity in Africa,” AVAC, October 8, 2014, 6, https://www.avac.org/resource/violence-based-perceived-or-real-sexual-orientation-and-gender-identity-africa.
[lxix] European Institute of Peace, “Fake News Misinformation and Hate Speech in Ethiopia,” 6.
[lxx] Ibid, 15–16.
[lxxi] Keating, “The Information Age Retreats From the Battlefield.”
[lxxii] Ibid.
[lxxiii] “Record Number of Journalists Jailed Worldwide,” Committee to Protect Journalists (blog), December 15, 2020, https://cpj.org/reports/2020/12/record-number-journalists-jailed-imprisoned/; Keating, “The Information Age Retreats From the Battlefield.”
[lxxiv] European Institute of Peace, “Fake News Misinformation and Hate Speech in Ethiopia,” 14.
[lxxv] Ibid, 7.
[lxxvi] Victoria De Leon, “Tigrayans Living in Denver Reflect on Year-Long War in Ethiopia,” KUSA.com, November 5, 2021, https://www.9news.com/article/news/community/voices-of-change/tigrayans-denver-war-ethiopia/73-0167b8d6-6c99-46d7-a6b4-77d483832107.
[lxxvii] De Leon.
[lxxviii] US Census Bureau, “New Report Offers Close-Up Look at Five Groups,” Census.gov, December 21, 2017, https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2017/12/sub-saharan-caribbean-population.html; Misty Showalter, “Inside Washington D.C.’s ‘Little Ethiopia,’” CNN, October 22, 2010, http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/africa/10/22/little.ethiopia.washington/index.html.
[lxxix] Catherine Schoichet, “Ethiopia’s War Is Echoing on the Streets of Washington,” CNN, November 9, 2021, https://www.cnn.com/2021/11/09/us/ethiopia-conflict-ethiopian-americans/index.html.
[lxxx] De Leon, “Tigrayans Living in Denver Reflect on Year-Long War in Ethiopia.”
[lxxxi] De Leon.
[lxxxii] Schoichet, “Ethiopia’s War Is Echoing on the Streets of Washington.”
[lxxxiii] Schoichet.
[lxxxiv] “Ethiopians Protest in Washington, DC to Protest Biden’s Executive Order,” Borkena Ethiopian News (blog), September 28, 2021, https://borkena.com/2021/09/27/ethiopians-protest-in-washington-dc-to-protest-bidens-executive-order/.
[lxxxv] “Ethiopians Protest in Washington, DC to Protest Biden’s Executive Order.”
[lxxxvi] “Protest against Amhara Genocide in Washington DC,” Borkena Ethiopian News (blog), April 7, 2021, https://borkena.com/2021/04/06/amhara-genocide-protest-in-washington-dc/.
[lxxxvii] Associated Press, “‘I Just Cry.’”
[lxxxviii] Associated Press, “Ethiopia’s Ruling Party Wins National Election In Landslide.”
[lxxxix] Ibid.
[xc] Ibid.
[xci] “Ethiopia – Constitutional Framework | Britannica.”
[xcii] Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries, 2nd ed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012),ix.
[xciii] “Ethiopia – Constitutional Framework | Britannica.”
[xciv] Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy, 3.
[xcv] Associated Press, “Ethiopia’s Ruling Party Wins National Election In Landslide.”
[xcvi] Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC) and Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), “Joint Investigation into Alleged Violations of International Human Rights, Humanitarian and Refugee Law Committed by All Parties to the Conflict in the Tigray Region of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia,” 5–6.
[xcvii] Agence France-Presse in Addis Ababa, “Ethiopia”; Committee to Protect Journalists, “CPJ Welcomes Release of Ethiopian Journalist Temerat Negara after 4 Months in Prison,” Committee to Protect Journalists (blog), April 6, 2022, https://cpj.org/2022/04/cpj-welcomes-release-of-ethiopian-journalist-temerat-negara-after-4-months-in-prison/; Lizzy Davies, “First Food Aid for 100 Days Enters Tigray under ‘Humanitarian Truce,’” The Guardian, April 1, 2022, sec. Global development, https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2022/apr/01/first-food-aid-for-100-days-enters-tigray-under-humanitarian-truce.
[xcviii] Fred Harter, “Ethiopia’s Fragile Truce over Tigray Conflict Threatened by Lack of Promised Aid,” The Independent, April 22, 2022, https://www.independent.co.uk/independentpremium/world/ethiopia-tigray-peace-truce-civil-war-b2062782.html.
[xcix] Bar-Tal et al., “Peace Education in Societies Involved in Intractable Conflicts,” 21.
[c] Jeremy Sarkin, “Achieving Reconciliation in Divided Societies: Comparing the Approaches in Timor-Leste, South Africa and Rwanda,” SSRN Scholarly Paper (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, October 13, 2008), 17, https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1283737.
[ci] Ibid, 22.
[cii] Ibid.
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