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By Rachel Silverboard
The Trump administration’s use of tariffs to coerce countries to end conflict marks a distinct application of the trade tool with ineffective outcomes.
Introduction
The Trump Administration’s use of tariffs in conflict resolution represents an unprecedented deployment of trade remedy in compelling third parties to resolve interstate conflicts. Historically, tariffs retaliated against unfair trade practices, protected industries, and produced leverage in trade negotiations.i U.S. trade policy has also offered concessions and preferential treatment to allies, punished or signaled political displeasure, and set standards in the global economic system.ii The economic tools the U.S. commonly employs to coerce peace are sanctions, sanctions relief, and aid conditionality.iii The U.S. has relied on economic sanctions such as trade embargoes to coerce states for hundreds of years, and the use of broad, unilateral sanctions as a foreign policy tool surged almost tenfold over the past two decades.iv However, the Trump Administration’s tariffs on Russia, India, Pakistan, Cambodia, and Thailand in 2025 instead seek to induce disputing parties to resolve interstate conflict. This departure presents an opportunity to examine whether tariffs effectively achieve conflict resolution and the costs and benefits for the implementing party.
This paper examines the Trump Administration’s unprecedented trend of employing tariffs to coerce belligerent parties towards peace. It evaluates whether tariffs succeeded or failed in inducing conflict resolution, compares the application and rationale of tariffs in these cases and within the Administration’s wider trade policy, and analyzes the costs, benefits, and implicit goals shaping their use. Guiding this assessment is an overarching research question: Can tariffs effectively pressure disputing parties to make peace? In answering this question, the cost-effectiveness and objectives of the tariff strategy are also assessed to determine whether tariff-based coercion should continue and identify ways to strengthen tariff policy for managing global security and interstate conflict.
Methodology
This study analyzes three recent cases: the Trump Administration’s secondary tariffs on Russia’s trade partners, the Administration’s threat of tariffs against India and Pakistan, and the Administration’s threat of tariffs against Cambodia and Thailand. For each case, I evaluate three hypotheses to identify patterns in the U.S.’s motivations, strategies, costs, and benefits, as well as decide on the policy’s success or failure. I establish the geopolitical context and the stated and implicit goals of coercion, identify any policy changes and the degree of de-escalation, while also considering alternative explanations for the outcome of each case.
Case Studies
Case 1: Secondary tariffs and the Russia-Ukraine Conflict
In July 2025, President Trump announced that if Russia and Ukraine did not reach a peace deal by August 8, 2025, the U.S. would impose 100% secondary tariffs targeting Russia’s trade partners who are mainly importers of Russian oil.v In effect, any country that trades with Russia would face a 100% tax on their imports to the U.S., in addition to any existing or future tariffs.vi Over the past decade, Russian oil and gas profits accounted for between 30% and 50% of Russia’s total federal budget revenue; the sector currently constitutes 20% of Russian GDP on average.vii Oil and gas are Russia’s biggest exports, and Russia is the world’s third largest oil producer.viii Discontinued purchases of oil and gas would devastate Russia’s economy and reduce its ability to finance the war in Ukraine.ix
India is the only country that received a secondary tariff from importing Russian oil, a 25% duty stacked on top of an existing 25% “reciprocal” tariff on Indian imports.x The secondary tariff was far less than the threatened rate of 100%.xi Critically, the Administration failed to punish other major importers of Russian oil and gas including China, Turkey, and the European Union (EU).xii India’s imports of Russian oil declined significantly in November 2025.xiii However, this decline occurred during new sanctions against Russian oil and gas giants Rosneft, Lukoil, and their subsidiaries, which account for 60% of India’s imports, and over two months after the secondary tariff’s introduction.xiv President Trump claimed that India “agreed to stop buying Russian Oil” as part of the February 2, 2026 trade deal which removes the secondary tariff, but Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has not confirmed this commitment.xv
Case 2: The threat of tariffs against India and Pakistan
The Trump Administration’s involvement in the hostilities between India and Pakistan in April and May 2025 represents another case where the Administration attempted to coerce peace using tariffs. After a deadly terrorist attack in India’s Jammu and Kashmir in April 2025, the Indian government responded by blaming Pakistan and launching military strikes into Pakistan and Pakistan-administered Kashmir.xvi The two countries abruptly declared a ceasefire on May 10, 2025, after four days of escalating military strikes, though the U.S. and India dispute the reasoning behind it.xvii
President Trump announced the ceasefire on social media even before official statements from India or Pakistan.xviii India has not acknowledged U.S. involvement, but Pakistan credited U.S. diplomatic overtures in the days leading up to the ceasefire in sealing the accord.xix In the months since the ceasefire, President Trump repeatedly claimed responsibility for settling the tension between India and Pakistan, contending that he threatened the countries with 350% tariffs if they did not de-escalate.xx In this case, the tariff was not actually applied to either country as the conflict was resolved soon after the alleged tariff threat. While the ceasefire has largely held, other factors in the crisis diplomacy undertaken by the U.S.—including high-level phone calls between Indian and Pakistan officials and Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Vice President J.D. Vance—overshadow President Trump’s more recent claims about the tariff threat.xxi
Case 3: The threat of tariffs against Cambodia and Thailand
The final case involving a tariff threat made by the Trump Administration is in the border conflict between Cambodia and Thailand, which has flared sporadically since July 2025. The clashes along the Thai-Cambodian border stem from a century-old dispute.xxii The border contestation escalated in July 2025 when artillery exchanges killed civilians and both sides launched media campaigns blaming one another.xxiii The Trump Administration tied the conflict to the countries’ ongoing trade negotiations over President Trump’s reciprocal tariffs, with President Trump threatening to block trade deals unless the fighting ceased.xxiv Following the ceasefire reached on July 28, both countries received reduced tariff rates in the Administration’s July 31 trade deal announcement.xxv After President Trump oversaw the official signing of an expanded ceasefire agreement in October 2025, tensions between Cambodia and Thailand flared again with Thailand suspending the ceasefire deal in November 2025.xxvi President Trump again threatened to impose tariffs on Thailand and briefly suspended the ongoing bilateral tariff negotiations, but Thailand claimed that talks had resumed the next day.xxvii The ceasefire was disrupted by strikes occurring along the disputed border as recent as December 26, 2025,xxviii but a fragile ceasefire beginning December 27, 2025 has reportedly held after talks hosted in China.xxix
This case displays two applications during the conflict: tariff relief resulting from the first ceasefire and, later, a renewed tariff threat.xxx The ongoing trade negotiations amplified the tariff threat for the receiving parties. The success of the Trump Administration’s tariffs in this case is debatable. Though President Trump publicly claimed responsibility for resolving the conflict as recently as December 2025,xxxi the tariff rate of 19% achieved by both countries after the July ceasefire has held despite later clashes.xxxii However, China played a more significant role than the U.S. in the December 27 ceasefire, which remains volatile.xxxiii
Assumptions and Hypotheses
The following cost-benefit analyses and hypotheses proceed from several core assumptions: that tariffs can serve as political or diplomatic leverage when the United States holds meaningful economic influence; that targeted states value economic security enough for tariff pressure to affect political decision-making and potentially de-escalate conflict; that observed responses can be plausibly attributed to tariff pressure rather than other forms of coercion; and that recent Trump Administration tariffs framed as conflict-resolution tools may also reflect alternative strategic objectives.
This assessment examines three hypotheses across the selected case studies. First, tariffs alone function as an effective instrument for incentivizing disputing parties to de-escalate and reach a peaceful settlement, stemming from President Trump’s repeated claims that his tariff threats pressured disputing parties to resolve their conflicts.xxxiv Second, tariff-based coercion is cost-effective for the implementing party (the U.S.). Third, the Trump Administration employs tariffs to pressure disputing parties toward peace in pursuit of implicit foreign policy goals.
Cost-Benefit Analysis
Basic trade theory and historical evidence demonstrate tariffs impose economic costs and distort trade by causing imports to be more expensive.xxxv For the imposition of tariffs to be cost-effective, the implementing party must accept higher prices for domestic consumersxxxvi or be insulated from the tariffed country’s imports.xxxvii There must be little risk of retaliation as tariffs often trigger harmful trade conflicts.xxxviii The implementing party must judge that issuing a crediblexxxix tariff threat against the disputing parties is worth ultimately carrying out or there must be little risk of reputational damage from failing to follow through. For the tariffs to be cost effective for the U.S. in these cases, the Administration must view the expected benefits received from the peace as greater than the costs incurred by the tariffs.
Expected and Actual Costs for the U.S.
The Trump Administration believes that exporters pay the additional costs for goods associated with import tariffs, tariffs have no correlation with inflation, reduced imports to the U.S. from the tariff are beneficial rather than harmful, and tariffs only have a temporary effect on overall price levels.xl Therefore, the widely-agreed upon economic costs and negative trade distortion that tariffs produce cannot be included in the U.S.’s expected costs of imposing the tariff.xli The costs that the Administration may have expected are a temporary increase in domestic prices,xlii reduced credibility if the tariffs fail, retaliation, and the complication of ceasefire negotiations with Russiaxliii or ongoing reciprocal trade negotiations with India, Pakistan, Cambodia, and Thailand.xliv In the case of the secondary tariffs on Russia, it is evident that the Administration expected there to be costs too high to endure from imposing tariffs on other major purchasers of Russian oil besides India.xlv Prohibitive costs explain why the Administration has not imposed the secondary tariffs on China, the EU, or Turkey.
The actual costs for the U.S. in the India-Pakistan case, the Cambodia-Thailand case, and the Russia case differ due to distinct tariff applications. In both the India-Pakistan case and the Cambodia-Thailand case, the tariff was not imposed; hence, there were no direct economic costs. However, by agreeing to reduce the tariff rate for both Thailand and Cambodia in their reciprocal trade deals after the ceasefire, the Administration gave up some of its negotiating leverage over both countries due to the higher tariff rate.xlvi President Trump’s claims about the tariff threat since the India-Pakistan ceasefire have engendered major diplomatic tensions with India, with India publicly rejecting the notion that the U.S. played a role.xlvii India disputing Trump’s claims and the inconsistency in the Administration’s crisis messaging also undermine U.S. credibility.
In the Cambodia-Thailand case and the Russia case, the failure of the tariff to end the conflict and limited follow-through by the Administration produces reputation costsxlviii for the U.S. The actual costs to the U.S. from the additional 25% tariff on India were distributional:xlix the tariff made non-exempted Indian goods more expensive for U.S. importers, and the tariffs cut Indian exports to the U.S. by 18–24% relative to other destinations, reducing the variety of products available to U.S. consumers.l However, the Trump Administration was willing to accept price increases from the additional tariff on India.li Additionally, the tariff exemption for major Indian imports like electronics and pharmaceuticals buffered the U.S. economy from the tariff increase.lii The U.S. is insulated from retaliation because its trade with Russia is negligible. India, Pakistan, Cambodia, and Thailand are all unlikely to raise tariffs on U.S. goods because of the trade deal negotiations.
Expected and Actual Benefits to the U.S.
The U.S. expected that the tariffs, aligned with the Administration’s economic strategy, would prompt rapid conflict de-escalation without meaningful U.S. concessions or military involvement and produce leverage in ongoing trade negotiations.liii The Trump Administration prioritized the psychological benefit from serving as international dispute mediator, demonstrated through President Trump’s claims about all three conflicts.liv President Trump sought domestic and international political capital by appearing tough on bad actors and creating a visible, zero-sum tool to show voters measurable action.
In the Russia case, the Trump Administration demonstrated opposition to Russian aggression by levying secondary tariffs through IEEPA.lv By applying the 25% tariff on India, the Administration demonstrated a marginal level of follow-though and placed pressure on other Russian trade partners. In the India-Pakistan case, the largest benefit to the U.S. was the prompt ceasefire. Trump claimed that “trade is great for settling wars,”lvi and Pakistan lauded his involvement, indicating a benefit to U.S.-Pakistan relations.lvii In the Thailand-Cambodia case, the reduced tariff rate offered after the ceasefire allowed President Trump to derive an additional reputational benefit from the conclusion of both the ceasefirelviii and trade deal.lix Both countries welcomed U.S. involvement in this case, providing a boost to U.S.-Thai and U.S.-Cambodian relations.lx
Net Outcomes
Across all three cases, the actual economic costs remained limited; the tariff threats in the India-Pakistan and Thailand-Cambodia cases were never implemented, and the secondary tariffs on Russia’s trade partners were narrow. The most meaningful costs instead manifested as diplomatic friction with India, reputational damage from Trump’s exaggerated claims, and the failure of the tariff to produce enduring conflict resolution in two cases. The benefits to the U.S. were similarly modest and mostly constitute short-term reputational boosts. The tariff threats also generated leverage in ongoing trade negotiations, reinforcing the Administration’s broader economic strategy. However, the U.S. already possessed substantial negotiating leverage, indicating diminishing returns.
In the cases of the secondary tariffs on Russia and Cambodia-Thailand, the failure of the tariff in achieving the policy objective outweighs the benefits. Despite President Trump’s claims of peacemaking, U.S. credibility suffers from these failures and undermines the coercive use of tariffs. Additionally, the reputation gains and positive boost to U.S.-Pakistan relations in the India-Pakistan case are outweighed by the fragility of the India-Pakistan trucelxi and erosion of the U.S.’s relationship with India—an increasingly key trade and strategic partner.lxii
Evaluation of Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1: Tariffs alone function as an effective instrument for incentivizing disputing parties to de-escalate and reach a peaceful settlement.
Six months after the secondary tariffs on Russia were deployed, Russia and Ukraine have failed to negotiate a ceasefire.lxiii Russia has continued its assaultlxiv and the U.S. undermined its secondary tariffs in some recent peace plans it proposed that favored Russia.lxv Further, the U.S. has deployed substantial new economic sanctions,lxvi indicating that the tariff mechanism alone lacked the coercive leverage necessary to induce de-escalation. Hypothesis 1 is rejected in this case.
While the India-Pakistan ceasefire concluded in May 2025 has largely held, evidence suggests that other diplomatic pressures significantly contributed to the ceasefire. Secretary of State Marco Rubio continually engaged with the Pakistani military, offering to assist in resolving the conflict through diplomatic talks. Vice President J.D. Vance encouraged de-escalation in contact with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi.lxvii The crisis diplomacy employed by Secretary Rubio and Vice President Vance outweigh the purported tariff threat in producing the ceasefire.lxviii Hypothesis 1 is rejected in this case.
Until December 26, 2025, aggression between Thailand and Cambodia continued, leaving President Trump’s ceasefire in precarity.lxix The tariff threat alone did not produce an enduring resolution to the conflict, and the December 27 ceasefire and border dispute remain unstable. Additionally, other factors such as the threat to remove Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) opportunities likely also factored into the initial ceasefire agreement. ASEAN/Chinese mediation probably played a larger role in December 2025 ceasefire than President Trump’s initial tariff threats.lxx Hypothesis 1 is rejected in this case.
Hypothesis 2: Tariff-based coercion is cost-effective for the implementing party.
In the case of secondary tariffs on Russia, because the U.S. has incurred (limited) economic costs from the 25% tariff applied to imports from India without any progress in Russia-Ukraine peace negotiations, the tariff was not cost-effective. The Administration’s shortfall in universal implementation undermined the tariffs’ effectiveness as a coercive tool, producing costs greater than benefits.lxxi Hypothesis 2 is rejected in this case.
Tariff-based coercion was not cost-effective for the U.S. in the India-Pakistan case, either. The ceasefire allowed President Trump to claim a short-term foreign policy success, but his assertions generated significant backlash from India, straining bilateral relations.lxxii The strain delayed the trade deal the countries ultimately reached, representing greater long-term costs than benefits. Hypothesis 2 is rejected in this case.
The strongest evidence to reject Hypothesis 2 is in the Cambodia-Thailand case as the U.S. gave up significant negotiating leverage by reducing the tariff rate for both countries despite the ceasefire later breaking down.lxxiii The reputational costs to the U.S. resulting from the ceasefire breaches negate any short-term diplomatic gains made with ASEAN countries.lxxiv The U.S. again failed to follow through on the threat, further weakening tariffs’ coercive utility. Hypothesis 2 is rejected in this case.
Hypothesis 3: The Trump Administration employs tariffs to pressure disputing parties toward peace in pursuit of implicit foreign policy goals.
In the Russia case, the Administration aimed to reduce Russia’s lethality on the battlefield.lxxv But, if universally applied, tariffs would have cut the flow of Russian oil and gas to global markets, pushing global oil prices higher and incentivizing countries to replace those imports with higher-priced U.S. oil.lxxvi The U.S. also intended to advance its geopolitical interests, such as limiting India’s energy leverage and signaling toughness on Russia to allies without derailing ongoing trade negotiations with key partners who are also major importers of Russian oil and gas.lxxvii Hypothesis 3 is accepted in this case.
While the U.S. has a clear national security objective in de-escalating armed conflict between two nuclear powers, the tariff threatened against India in the India-Pakistan case also allowed the U.S. to exercise leverage over a key strategic and trade partner.lxxviii However, evidence suggests that U.S. involvement in this case was for the stated purpose of de-escalation between India and Pakistan.lxxix After initial distance, Administration officials’ engagement in crisis diplomacy after receiving new intelligence suggests that the security calculus shifted, heightening the incentive to prioritize de-escalation over other foreign policy concerns.lxxx Hypothesis 3 is rejected in this case.
In the Thailand-Cambodia case, the reduction in tariff rates following the ceasefire enabled President Trump to secure not only the stated goal of conflict de-escalation, but also an additional reputational gain with ASEAN countries and China from the negotiation of both the ceasefire and associated trade deals.lxxxi Hypothesis 3 is accepted in this case.
Analysis and Discussion of Findings
Across the three case studies, tariffs alone were not sufficient to compel disputing parties to de-escalate, despite President Trump’s claims that his trade policy has resolved conflicts.lxxxii While ceasefires were achieved—with limited success—in two of the three cases, broader diplomatic engagement rather than the economic pressure of the tariff largely drove the incentive for the parties to de-escalate. Further, in the Russia case no lasting peace has been achieved, and the current temporary ceasefire between Cambodia and Thailand remains volatile.
While the economic costs were limited for the U.S., particularly when tariffs were not implemented, the political and reputational costs suggest that tariff-based coercion was not cost-effective. Further, the lack of follow-through and selective application of the tariff in the Thailand-Cambodia and the Russia cases undermines the tariff’s coercive power.
The cases also largely demonstrate that conflict resolution was not the sincere or sole goal of the tariffs. The U.S. leveraged the tariffs in each of the cases to advance alternative strategic goals, including strengthening leverage in trade negotiations, signaling resolve to rivals, and enhancing President Trump’s domestic and international reputation. Additionally, the Administration has repeatedly stated its economic goal for imposing tariffs on countries around the globe is to rebalance trade, suggesting that the Administration’s imposition or threat of tariffs in these cases also served to reduce bilateral trade deficits, revive domestic manufacturing, and increase government revenue.lxxxiii In March 2026 the Trump Administration temporary lifted sanctions on some Russian oil—including barrels bound for India—to temper rising global oil prices due to conflict in the Middle East.lxxxiv This move further demonstrates the lack of sustained commitment to placing economic pressure on Russia to resolve the conflict with Ukraine in favor of advancing other strategic objectives.
Conclusion
The cost-benefit analysis and hypothesis testing of these three case studies examine if tariffs are cost-effective and successful tools in conflict de-escalation. Tariffs can provide modest benefits of short-term reputational gains, added but diminishing returns on negotiating leverage, and initial conflict de-escalation if there is significant trade at stake. However, these positive outcomes were outweighed by the damage to credibility and strategic relationships. Tariffs may serve as a tool in a broader coercive strategy, but the cases of secondary tariffs on Russia, the threat of tariffs in the India-Pakistan conflict, and the threat of tariffs in the Thailand-Cambodia conflict demonstrate that tariffs are limited as a standalone instrument for peace and are primarily deployed to serve overlapping reputational and geopolitical objectives.
The Administration’s continued use of tariffs to coerce peace will be unsuccessful, as in these cases, unless it can follow through on the tariff when peace is not achieved or deteriorates. Tariffs must be paired with consistent enforcement, broader diplomatic engagement, and applied instead of other tools only when the U.S. possesses significant economic leverage over the receiving country.lxxxv The tariff threats would be stronger if they were not made in the context of existing high tariff rates because the diminishing returns of additional tariffs award the Administration less leverage. Without these adjustments, using tariffs as a coercive tool for the purpose of conflict-resolution remains symbolic and largely ineffective rather than shaping the behavior of the conflicting parties in a durable way.
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ABOUT THE AUTHOR(S)
Rachel Silverboard
Rachel Silverboard recently graduated from the School of International Service with a M.A. in International Affairs, U.S. Foreign Policy and National Security. She is interested in international trade policy, economic diplomacy, and the Latin American region.
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