North Korean Sanctions are not leading to Denuclearization

(Image Source: Flickr; https://tinyurl.com/3mn74tcf)

By Jordyn Brambley

Sanctions imposed on the DPRK to curtail its nuclear program have not succeeded in their goal of nonproliferation and nuclear disarmament.

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 In 2003, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) became the first and only country to withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), stating that the International Atomic Energy Agency and NPT “were servants and tools” of the United States’ hostile policy against the DPRK.[i]  While the DPRK’s official withdrawal statement said that they “have no intention to produce nuclear weapons,” by 2006, the DPRK had produced its first nuclear weapons test.[ii] This marked the beginning of a game of cat and mouse as the international community, especially the United States, attempted to denuclearize the DPRK.

The DPRK sees its nuclear arsenal as the key for securing its survival. The collapse of the Soviet Union and China’s economic pivot to capitalism put strain on the DPRK’s old alliances, leaving the country more isolated than during the Cold War.[iii] Furthermore, the DPRK follows the principle of Juche, or self-reliance, which rejects relying on external security guarantees. These factors have increased the DPRK’s need to protect itself through nuclear proliferation.[iv]  The United States, Australia, Japan, South Korea and the European Union have all employed economic sanctions in an attempt to curb the DPRK’s nuclear policy,[v] with the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) producing nine resolutions that imposed sanctions on the DPRK between 2006-2017.^[vi] These sanctions cover a wide range of items, including luxury goods, small arms, heavy weaponry coal, and iron. They exist to inhibit the DPRK’s ability to sell iron, helicopters, and statues, or to export minerals like copper or zinc. They target the DPRK’s financial capabilities by denying bulk transfers of cash, freezing assets, and restricting the DPRK’s ability to use the international banking system.[vii] Despite these sanctions, the DPRK has continued to pursue its nuclear ambitions over two decades later. South Korean President Lee Jae Myung stated in his January 2026 public address that the DPRK is now capable of producing materials for 10-20 nuclear weapons a year.^[viii] The continued advancement of the DPRK’s nuclear program despite this comprehensive sanctions regime raises the question: do these sanctions even work?

Traditional sanctions have been a mixed bag, with many sanctions hurting the population more than the regime in charge.[ix] In response to growing concerns about the effectiveness and unintended consequences of broad-based sanctions, the United Nations in the 1990s began shifting toward more targeted approaches.[x] The UN Security Council (UNSC) began adopting the concept of targeted sanctions, or “smart sanctions,” in which a nation or the international community targets specific actors within a regime.^[xi] The UNSC wanted to ensure that the use of sanctions would not hurt the population, recognizing that authoritarian leaders are often less responsive to societal suffering. Targeted sanctions would hopefully bring the DPRK to the negotiating table. Famously, the DPRK and the Clinton administration made the Geneva Agreement, the Bush Administration engaged in the Six Party Talks, and President Donald Trump met with Kim Jung-Un twice, all in the hopes of finding a compromise or deal to curb the DPRK’s nuclear proliferation.[xii] So far, none of these talks have produced the desired result of nuclear disarmament and the sanctions remain the central policy tool for curtailing proliferation.

Sanctions are failing on several fronts. Firstly, the DPRK can circumvent sanctions through illicit means. Starting in the 1990s, the DPRK began to develop its online hacking capabilities.^[xiii] Since then, the sophistication of DPRK hacking has only increased, and according to a UN Panel of Experts in 2019, the DPRK has stolen over $2 billion through cybercrimes.[xiv] For example, the DPRK successfully hacked the Bangladesh Bank in 2016 and stole $81 million in reserve currency from the nation: it is linked to “similar attacks in over 20 countries.”[xv] The DPRK has also been targeting crypto, making up around 65% of crypto currency theft from 2017-2018, and according to one UN report earned $571 million from cryptocurrency thefts.[xvi] More recently, DPRK hackers were able to steal over $2 billion in cryptocurrency in 2025 alone.[xvii] South Korea estimates that the DPRK has as many as 6,800 cyber professionals for these illicit means.[xviii] By developing its hacking capabilities, the DPRK has developed an advanced digital means of evading sanctions and continuing funding of its nuclear arsenal.

The DPRK has also engaged in various maritime activities to avoid sanctions using techniques like “flags of convenience, misidentification or false registration, offshore ownership, and shell-firm owners, managers, and insurers.”^[xix] In other words, the DPRK has been registering boats in other countries to help avoid sanctions and detection. These DPRK ships are often importing petroleum or exporting goods like coal, which the DPRK uses to continue powering its nuclear program.[xx] A recent example was in 2021: the boat “Shun Fa,” which was sailing under a Mongolian flag, turned out to be the ship Billion No. 18 — a ship that was sanctioned by the UN for delivering oil to the DPRK.[xxi] The most recent round of UN sanctions targeted boat insuring groups and Protection and Indemnity (P&I) clubs. This proved effective, as insurance groups took extra steps to make sure they were not covering DPRK vessels to avoid being punished for violating the sanctions.^[xxii] Insurance is necessary to dock at most ports leaving DPRK, so uninsured vessels theoretically cannot smuggle goods across the globe.[xxiii] Smuggling is expensive for the DPRK, as the risks associated with it increase the costs of imports and decrease the costs of exports due to concerns about being caught.[xxiv] It is estimated that the DPRK only made $370 million in 2019 from sanction-evading coal exports which is down from the $1.19 billion it made in 2016.[xxv] While these sanctions have certainly impacted the DPRK’s economy, they have not successfully stopped the ability of the regime to ensure not only its economic survival, but also its ability to continue nuclear proliferation.

Secondly, not all countries enforce their sanctions against the DPRK. China has, over time, become the DPRK’s main trading partner, accounting for over 90% of trade with the DPRK.^[xxvi] The US has accused Russia of ignoring sanctions and allowing companies to continue oil trade with the DPRK.^[xxvii] Russia originally was supportive of sanctions on the DPRK, voting in favor of the nine sanctions currently in place.[xxviii] However, Russia pivoted to being more critical of the sanctions regime, suggesting in 2018 that the UN should relax sanctions. In 2024, Russia vetoed the renewal of the UN Panel of Experts (POE) that oversaw DPRK sanctions compliance.[xxix] The Ukraine War has only increased the trade between Russia and the DPRK, as the DPRK has been sending ammunition, supplies, and even military personnel to Russia’s aid.^[xxx] These opportunities have boosted the DPRK’s sluggish economy, with a 3% growth in GDP seen in 2024.^[xxxi] It is reported that Russia traded over a million barrels of oil to the DPRK in 2024 alone.[xxxii] In 2025, the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team (MSMT), which was formed after Russia vetoed the UN POE on the DPRK, reported that the current war time trade between Russia and the DPRK was in violation of UN sanctions.[xxxiii] The MSMT was created outside of the UN system with the express focus of monitoring compliance with UN sanctions against the DPRK.[xxxiv] It has 11 members: the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, and Japan.[xxxv]

Thirdly, the regime is insulated from the negative effects of sanctions on its population to a greater extent than many other authoritarian regimes. This is due to the hereditary and theocratic nature of the state, which renders the sanctions’ internal social and political pressures largely ineffective. Leadership is passed down through the Kim family and former leaders are deified as “the eternal sun.”^[xxxvi] This system, which places the ruling family at the core of the nation’s identity, makes it far more difficult for sanctions to create enough popular pressure to overthrow the Kims, as the same will for change seen in other regimes is suppressed. Moreover, some scholars argue that sanctions have created a “rally-around-the-flag” effect, inadvertently strengthening the regime by allowing it to project itself as a victim of attacks from the outside world.^[xxxvii]

These three factors have put the international community in a difficult position. The DPRK regime’s ability to adapt its trade networks to evade sanctions, the country’s ideology of self-reliance, and inconsistent enforcement of sanctions by other countries, has allowed the DPRK to evade sanctions to the point of advancing its nuclear weapons program. The DPRK’s six nuclear tests between 2006 and 2017 underscore this reality.^[xxxviii] Although the most recent round of UN sanctions succeeded in halting further tests, they have not prevented The DPRK from continuing to build its nuclear arsenal. Going forward, if the US wishes to bring The DPRK to the table on nuclear weapons, it will not be by sanctions alone. The US government should explore other options for ending the current stalemate.

One idea is the “China Model,” in which the DPRK begins the process of liberalizing its economy.[xxxix] The China Model is the process in which China took to continue the authority of the Communist Party while liberalizing its economic system under Deng Xiaoping in the 1980s.[xl] The model still gives the communist party strong control over the economy with large state-owned enterprises and vast amounts of wealth centralized in the government.[xli] The China Model would give the DRPK regime the added security of a fully functioning economy along with tight controls for the party to remain in charge. This economic development could help the regime feel more stable and reduce their nuclear development.

Additionally, any decision regarding denuclearization of the DPRK should be made regionally with a focus on coordination with China, since it is the main trading partner of the DPRK. The global community is too large to tackle the issue of DPRK nuclearization on its own as it requires more finesse than the larger community can provide.[xlii]  The UN, while effective in implementing sanctions, has proven to be ineffective in curtailing the DPRK’s behavior in part due to the politics of its permanent members. A multilateral, informal forum of East Asian actors, China, Russia, the US, South Korea, Japan and the DPRK, would provide the DPRK regime its much-needed legitimacy as a regional actor while not committing any one nation to a legally binding commitment. Past denuclearization talks often failed because negotiators expected quick, definitive agreements, which raised the political risks and domestic pressure on the countries involved. Alternatively, an informal regional forum requires less political capital while encouraging dialogue.

While no single approach is guaranteed to succeed, the goal of denuclearization can only be achieved by sustained commitment from regional actors and the DPRK to overcome decades of division and mistrust.

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[i] Sangtu Ko, “International Sanctions on North Korea: A Two‐Level Solution,” Pacific Focus 34, no. 1 (2019): 55–71, https://doi.org/10.1111/pafo.12133; “Text of North Korea’s Statement on NPT Withdrawal,” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific – Political (London), January 10, 2003, 449013560, p. 1, ProQuest Central.

[ii] BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific – Political, “Text of North Korea’s Statement on NPT Withdrawal”; Institute of Korean Studies and Robert E. Kelly, “In Defense of North Korea Sanctions,” Korea Observer – Institute of Korean Studies 53, no. 2 (2022): 247–76, https://doi.org/10.29152/KOIKS.2022.53.2.247.

[iii] Han S. Park, “Pyongyang Sees the Nuke Impasse,” Journal of Asian and African Studies 42, nos. 3–4 (2007): 245–61, https://doi.org/10.1177/0021909607076703.

[iv] Park, “Pyongyang Sees the Nuke Impasse.”

[v] “What to Know About Sanctions on North Korea | Council on Foreign Relations,” July 27, 2022, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounders/north-korea-sanctions-un-nuclear-weapons.

^[vi] Institute of Korean Studies and Kelly, “In Defense of The DPRK Sanctions.”

[vii] “UN Security Council Resolutions on North Korea | Arms Control Association,” accessed April 10, 2026, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/un-security-council-resolutions-north-korea.

^[viii] “North Produces Enough Nuclear Material a Year for 10-20 Weapons: S. Korea President,” France 24, January 21, 2026, https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20260121-north-produces-enough-nuclear-material-a-year-for-10-20-weapons-s-korea-president.

[ix] Robert Huish, “Making Sanctions Smart Again: Why Maritime Sanctions Have Worked against North Korea,” Asia Policy (Seattle) 13, no. 3 (2018): 42–48, 2095704028, pp. 42–48, International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS); PAIS Index; ProQuest Central.

[x] Huish, “Making Sanctions Smart Again: Why Maritime Sanctions Have Worked against North Korea.”

^[xi] Robert Huish, “Making Sanctions Smart Again: Why Maritime Sanctions Have Worked against The DPRK,” Asia Policy (Seattle) 13, no. 3 (2018): 42–48, 2095704028, pp. 42–48, International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS); PAIS Index; ProQuest Central.

[xii] Huish, “Making Sanctions Smart Again: Why Maritime Sanctions Have Worked against North Korea”; Inyeop Lee, “Rethinking Economic Sanctions on North Korea: Why Crippling Economic Sanctions Will Not Make North Korea Denuclearize,” Korea Observer – Institute of Korean Studies 53, no. 1 (2022): 47–73, https://doi.org/10.29152/KOIKS.2022.53.1.47.

^[xiii] Daniel A. Pinkston, “The DPRK’s Objectives and Activities in Cyberspace,” Asia Policy (Seattle) 15, no. 2 (2020): 76–83, 2399206819, pp. 76–83, International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS); PAIS Index; ProQuest Central.

[xiv] Min-hyung Kim, “North Korea’s Cyber Capabilities and Their Implications for International Security,” Sustainability 14, no. 3 (2022): 1744, https://doi.org/10.3390/su14031744.

[xv] Kim, “North Korea’s Cyber Capabilities and Their Implications for International Security.”

[xvi] Kim, “North Korea’s Cyber Capabilities and Their Implications for International Security.”

[xvii] “North Korean Hackers Stealing Record Sums, Researchers Say,” October 7, 2025, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cwy8z7wxe03o.

[xviii] Kim, “North Korea’s Cyber Capabilities and Their Implications for International Security.”

^[xix] Robert Huish, “The Failure of Maritime Sanctions Enforcement against The DPRK,” Asia Policy (Seattle), no. 23 (January 2017): 131–52, 2178520278, pp. 131–52, International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS); PAIS Index; ProQuest Central.

[xx] Erin Hale, “New Zealand Spy Plane Reports Possible North Korea Sanctions Breach at Sea,” Al Jazeera, accessed May 2, 2026, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/4/28/new-zealand-spy-plane-reports-possible-north-korea-sanctions-breach-at-sea.

[xxi] Ahn Sung-mi, “North Korea Keeps Developing Nuclear, Missile Programs: UN Experts,” The Korea Herald, October 5, 2021, https://www.koreaherald.com/article/2700848.

^[xxii] Huish, “Making Sanctions Smart Again: Why Maritime Sanctions Have Worked against The DPRK.”

[xxiii] Huish, “Making Sanctions Smart Again: Why Maritime Sanctions Have Worked against North Korea.”

[xxiv] Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein, “The Complicated Truth about Sanctions on North Korea – East Asia Forum,” North Korea, East Asia Forum Quarterly: Volume 15, Number 2, 2023 15, no. 2 (2023): 30–32.

[xxv] Silberstein, “The Complicated Truth about Sanctions on North Korea – East Asia Forum.”

^[xxvi] Rüdiger Frank, “Economic Sanctions against The DPRK: The Wrong Way to Achieve the Wrong Goal?,” Asia Policy (Seattle) 13, no. 3 (2018): 5–12, 2095704079, pp. 5–12, International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS); PAIS Index; ProQuest Central.

^[xxvii] Jungyeop Woo, “How to Make International Sanctions on The DPRK Effective Cooperation or Coercion?,” Korea Observer – Institute of Korean Studies 51, no. 1 (2020): 53–69, https://doi.org/10.29152/KOIKS.2020.51.1.53.

[xxviii] Institute of Korean Studies and Kelly, “In Defense of North Korea Sanctions.”

[xxix] Jungyeop Woo, “How to Make International Sanctions on North Korea Effective Cooperation or Coercion?,” Korea Observer – Institute of Korean Studies 51, no. 1 (2020): 53–69, https://doi.org/10.29152/KOIKS.2020.51.1.53; Victor Cha and Ellen Kim, Russia’s Veto: Dismembering the UN Sanctions Regime on North Korea, March 29, 2024, https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-veto-dismembering-un-sanctions-regime-north-korea.

^[xxx]“How The DPRK Has Bolstered Russia’s War in Ukraine | Council on Foreign Relations,” November 25, 2025, https://www.cfr.org/articles/how-north-korea-has-bolstered-russias-war-ukraine.

^[xxxi] Ju-min Park, “The DPRK Posts Fastest Growth in 8 Years in 2024, Driven by Russia Ties, Seoul Says,” China, Reuters, August 29, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/north-korea-posts-fastest-growth-8-years-2024-driven-by-russia-ties-seoul-says-2025-08-29/.

[xxxii] “How North Korea Has Bolstered Russia’s War in Ukraine | Council on Foreign Relations,” November 25, 2025, https://www.cfr.org/articles/how-north-korea-has-bolstered-russias-war-ukraine.

[xxxiii] Edith M. Lederer, “US and Allies Accuse North Korea and Russia of Flagrantly Violating UN Sanctions in Military Deals,” AP News, May 30, 2025, https://apnews.com/article/north-korea-russia-un-sanctions-ukraine-us-3ada38bfc312ccd4b9bb6551bb671195.

[xxxiv] Karl Dewey, “A New Mechanism for North Korean Sanctions Monitoring,” IISS, December 13, 2024, https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/online-analysis/2024/12/a-new-mechanism-for-north-korean-sanctions-monitoring/.

[xxxv] Dewey, “A New Mechanism for North Korean Sanctions Monitoring.”

^[xxxvi] Ko, “International Sanctions on The DPRK.”

^[xxxvii] Zani, “Sanctions against The DPRK.”

^[xxxviii] Zani, “Sanctions against The DPRK.”

[xxxix] Lee, “Rethinking Economic Sanctions on North Korea.”

[xxxix] Ko, “International Sanctions on North Korea.”

[xl] Tsugami Toshiya, “The ‘China Model’— Merits and Demerits, A Review of the Last 20 Years of the Chinese Economy,” Asia-Pacific Review 31, no. 2 (2024): 50–80, https://doi.org/10.1080/13439006.2024.2397237.

[xli] Toshiya, “The ‘China Model’— Merits and Demerits, A Review of the Last 20 Years of the Chinese Economy.”

 

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR(S)

Jordyn Brambley