Violence as Strategy: The Sinaloa Cartel and the Assassination of Mexican Mayors  

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By: Carolyn Adkins, Nicholas Gelston, and Georgia Nelson 

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Executive Summary

Mayoral assassinations represent a critical intersection of political violence, governance, and societal instability in Mexico. Despite municipal policing and security efforts to protect mayors, municipal governments face an exorbitant number of assassinations carried out by cartels who seek to gain control or impose retaliatory measures toward the governmental authority that threatens their activities. In tandem, at the local level, the Mexican justice system proves to be systematically ineffectual in punishing cartels and criminal organizations that commit political violence. This research explores the historical context, scope, and causation of mayoral assassinations carried out by the Sinaloa Cartel in Sinaloa, Sonora, Durango, Baja California, and Baja California Sur states.

The deliberate targeting of elected officials suggests a more troubling reality: the cartels’ intentions to control government decision-making. Municipal mayors in high-value areas – locations and routes of strategic importance to cartel operations – exercise oversight of municipal resources, thereby becoming targets when they do not exercise their power toward cartel advantage. This is a pattern identified as “interest entrenchment” (a term defined more fully later). Mayors are responsible for municipal police and collaborating with law enforcement to combat crime in their jurisdictions while complying with gubernatorial directives and federal goals. Cartels have a documented history of retaliating against municipal governments that investigate their illegal activities.

The Mexican government has attempted to address political violence by providing bodyguards; however, those running for municipal positions are usually the last to receive proper security measures and are the most vulnerable to assassinations. Making matters worse is Mexico’s “weak criminal justice system, where only one in 10 murder investigations results in a conviction, and only 10 percent of cases are even brought before a judge by a prosecutor.” ^[1] In response to repeated assassinations, solutions to date propose the need to separate municipal governments from cartel influence and advocate for a clear demarcation between legitimate governance and organized crime.

Historical Context

The history of the Sinaloa Cartel informs current dynamics and the broader implications for organized crime in Mexico. The Sinaloa Cartel emerged from the remnants of the Guadalajara Cartel in the early 1990s with well-known figures such as Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán and Ismael “El Mayo” Zambada at its helm. The cartel is structured to allow for operational autonomy among its factions, which enables them to maintain a significant presence in various regions of Mexico, particularly in the “Golden Triangle” – an area comprising Sinaloa, Chihuahua, and Durango states – known for poppy and marijuana cultivation.^[2]

The arrest of El Mayo in July 2024 precipitated a rift within the Sinaloa Cartel, resulting in internal leadership disputes and increased violence and tensions with other cartels. The internal conflict created opportunities for rival organizations to exploit such turmoil and pursue territorial gains. In September 2024, authorities recorded the highest levels of violence involving non-state actors over the last six years. Governor Rubén Moya of Sinaloa cited the rise in violence because of El Mayo’s arrest three months prior.^[3] The Sinaloa Cartel’s ongoing fragmentation highlights its significance as a major player in Mexico’s drug trade as other cartels contend for its lucrative territory.

A report from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) on the Sinaloa Cartel illustrates the ever-changing territorial control and influence among criminal groups in Mexico. The arrest of El Mayo triggered a violent power struggle between two main factions: “Los Chapitos” sub-factions led by the four sons of El Chapo, and those loyal to El Mayo.^[4] The ACLED map (Figure 1) highlights the Sinaloa Cartel’s presence and dominance, as well as regions where rival groups are attempting to overtake it. Fragmentation within the cartel presents opportunities for other cartels to assert dominance in contested territories. This reorganization not only affects the dynamics of drug trafficking but also causes a growth in overall violence and instability. Between July 2024 and March 2025, cartel targeting of civilians and cartel clashes nearly quadrupled compared to the previous eight months.^[5]

Figure 1: ACLED map of Sinaloa Cartel presence in Mexico and documented violent events from January 2018 to March 2025.

The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) remarks that “the Sinaloa Cartel

remains one of the most powerful drug trafficking organizations in the world, controlling a significant share of the cocaine and methamphetamine entering the United States.”^[6] The Sinaloa Cartel dominates Mexican border states and consequently is affected by Mexican state government policies that attempt to limit border trafficking (i.e., Baja California and Sonora). In response to growing surveillance, the Sinaloa Cartel has adapted its operations by utilizing technology and sophisticated logistics to evade capture. A 2023 Wilson Center study notes “the cartel has invested in advanced communication technologies and has developed a more decentralized structure, allowing it to operate more effectively despite ongoing government crackdowns.”^[7]

As the cartel adapts to new technologies, it runs more sophisticated operations with fewer people on the ground. However, this raises concerns about the cartel’s ability to get away with more serious crimes like political assassinations. In recent decades, mayoral assassinations in Mexico have become increasingly frequent, particularly in states like Sinaloa, Sonora, Durango, Baja California, and Baja California Sur, and the assassinations are often attributed to cartels.

Sinaloa Cartel Territories

The State of Sinaloa is the heartland of the Sinaloa Cartel, where municipal governments face significant challenges in maintaining order. News reports indicate that “at least 23 candidates were killed during the electoral process leading up to the 2021 elections. This trend continued into 2024, with the murder of mayoral candidate Jorge Huerta Cabrera just days before the elections.”^[8] The military has been deployed to combat cartel violence, but its effectiveness is questionable. A 2022 Mexican government report indicates that despite military presence, violence continued to escalate, with over one thousand homicides linked to organized crime in Sinaloa that year. Municipal officials express frustration at military presence, stating that it “has not translated into a reduction in violence; instead, it often leads to further confrontations with cartel members.”^[9] Due to the Sinaloa Cartel’s historical dominance in this area, the state is a harrowing example of cartel violence.

It is not just mayoral candidates who are at risk; individuals working in the judicial system are also frequently targeted by the cartel. A report from the Mexican government indicates that “many judges and prosecutors are either directly threatened by cartels or are complicit in their operations, leading to a culture of impunity.”^[10] It is common for individuals within law enforcement and the judicial system to accept bribes. Consequently, there is a pervasive lack of liability for criminal activities; victims are discouraged from reporting crimes, and public trust in legal institutions is heavily eroded.
The state of Sonora has also seen a rise in political violence, specifically the assassinations of mayors and mayoral candidates. In 2022, Sonora was the target of several high-profile assassinations, including a mayoral candidate killed during a campaign event.^[11] The military was deployed to restore order, but the municipal government reported that they were outmatched by cartel firepower and resources. International Crisis Group (ICG) expounds these observations in their report, writing “the military’s efforts have been hampered by a lack of coordination with municipal law enforcement, leading to gaps in security that cartels exploit.”^[12] This federal-municipal disconnection makes it difficult to combat well-organized cartels effectively.

Sonora faces challenges like Sinaloa with a judicial system that ineffectively combats cartel-related violence. The ICG report highlights that “witness intimidation and the fear of reprisals from cartels have led to a significant decrease in the willingness of individuals to testify or cooperate with law enforcement.”^[13] The assassination of municipal officials and candidates creates fear and silence that prevents judicial processes from being successful.

In the state of Durango, violence is attributed frequently to power struggles between the Sinaloa Cartel and other cartels. There have been multiple assassinations of municipal politicians in Durango, most recently documented in 2023. The Durango judicial system is ill-equipped to handle assassinations of this nature, as it is plagued by inefficiencies and resource constraints. Municipal courts struggle to handle the volume of cases, which delays trials and sentencing. A recent report notes that “the judicial backlog has reached alarming levels, with many cases involving cartel violence remaining unresolved for years.”^[14] Case backlogs and trial delays undermine the possibility of prosecution and reassure the cartels that they can operate with impunity.

Baja California’s proximity to the United States border makes it a strategic location for trafficking, which further complicates the safety of municipal government officials. In 2023, reports documented “several candidates [that] were targeted and killed, reflecting the broader pattern of violence against politicians in Mexico.”^[15] While not as heavily impacted as its northern counterpart, Baja California Sur also experiences political violence. As recently as 2024, “the assassination of a municipal candidate raised concerns about the safety of politicians in the region, as organized crime continues to exert influence over municipal governance.”^[16] ​​Baja California and Baja California Sur face significant challenges in their judicial systems due to cartel influence. The region’s proximity to the U.S. border facilitates human and drug trafficking, leading to increased violence and military responses. Municipal courts struggle to prosecute drug-related crimes effectively due to corruption and intimidation. Since the early 2000s, the conflict between municipal governments and cartels has escalated in Sinaloa, Sonora, Durango, Baja California, and Baja California Sur. Military involvement has exacerbated corruption and violence rather than provide resolutions.

Problem Identification, Scope, and Variation

Criminal Targeting of Municipal Governments

Despite municipal policing and security efforts to protect aspiring and incumbent mayors, Mexican municipal governments still face an exorbitant number of mayoral assassinations, largely carried out by cartels who seek to gain control or impose retaliatory measures for governance that threaten their activities. The targeted killing of municipal mayors is one of the clearest indicators of state fragility and criminal penetration into democratic governance, a term identified here as “interest entrenchment.” More specifically, mayors in high-value areas exercise oversight of municipal resources, thereby becoming targets when they fail to use their power to advance cartel interests. This is a pattern of interest entrenchment which will be explored as a causal factor in mayoral assassinations.

Municipal governments hold strategic importance because mayors control the most immediate layers of governance: police command, contract procurement, public works budgets, land-use decisions, and business licensing. The International Crisis Group emphasizes that municipalities have become “contested political prizes,” where control allows cartels to govern through coercion rather than evade state authority. When mayors act against criminal interests, they are placed at exceptional risk. The assassination of Mayor Lilia Gema García Soto illustrates this dynamic. García Soto initiated investigations into the misappropriation of hurricane relief funds, theft of public revenues, forged municipal records, and illegal taxation of wood. Shortly after opening these inquiries, she was killed. State prosecutors confirmed her death was directly tied to the corruption schemes she attempted to dismantle.^[17] García Soto’s murder reflects a broader pattern of retaliation, as she was the second mayor killed in Oaxaca in 2025.^[18] Despite municipal policing efforts and federal candidate protection protocols, municipal governments continue to face high levels of assassination and coercion from drug cartels and criminal organizations that seek to shape or control municipal authority.^[19] Meanwhile, the Mexican criminal justice system remains structurally incapable of deterring this violence, creating a political environment in which assassinations carry strategic value and little legal consequence.^[20]

The June 2024 elections were among the most violent in Mexico’s democratic era. At least thirty-nine political candidates were assassinated in the months leading up to elections, most of whom were competing at municipal levels.^[21] Oscar Lopez writes for The Nation:

“Even just running for office can be deadly: The week before the Mexico City murders, a mayoral candidate in the state of Veracruz was gunned down alongside four other people, including her own daughter. Throughout the 2024 election cycle, 18 mayoral candidates or aspiring candidates were assassinated. Meanwhile, during former President Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s term, at least 87 mayors, former mayors, and mayoral candidates were killed.”

President Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador publicly acknowledged that cartels frequently seek to decide who becomes mayor, entrenching their interests in politics by either promoting their preferred candidates or by assassinating rivals who resist criminal control: “They make an agreement and say, ‘this person is going to be mayor; we don’t want anyone else to register to run,’ and anybody who does, well, they know what to expect.”^[22] In a recent attempt to curb rampant political violence, the federal government deployed bodyguards. Approximately two hundred and fifty candidates received bodyguards during the 2024 election period, yet municipal candidates—who face the highest rates of assassination—were typically the last to receive security.^[23] This discrepancy illustrates a systemic failure to allocate protection according to municipal-level vulnerability.

Criminal Fragmentation and Strategic Violence

As multiple groups compete for territorial control, elected officials become leveraging points in inter-cartel conflict.^[24] A study conducted by Gutiérrez-Romero demonstrates that the assassination of municipal officials is more likely in regions where criminal organizations are fragmented rather than consolidated. Assassinations in these contexts serve strategic functions: preventing rivals from establishing government-linked protection networks, forcing alliances, or punishing non-cooperation.^[25] Additional research indicates that fragmentation itself is often fueled by leadership arrests, splintering, and internal disputes, which intensify competition and increase the likelihood that political figures are targeted to assert control over municipal governance.^[26]

The geographic distribution of mayoral assassinations corresponds closely with states that consistently rank among the least peaceful in Mexico. The Mexico Peace Index ranks Sinaloa (#22 of 32), Sonora (#23 of 32), and Baja California (#29 of 32) as the least peaceful states.^[27] These states also happen to be key corridors for drug trafficking and extortion economies where multiple cartels, such as the Sinaloa Cartel, Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG), and regional splinter groups, compete for territorial control. In such environments, municipal governments are critical levers for managing policing priorities, regulating transport routes, and sanctioning commercial activity, making municipal officials highly vulnerable to coercion. The result is a setting in which criminal governance becomes entrenched in municipal administration, as mayors are pressured, co-opted, or removed to ensure uninterrupted revenue streams and territorial dominance.

Interest entrenchment is evident across the various economies in which cartels operate. Cartels have diversified beyond drug trafficking into extortion, fuel theft, illegal logging and mining, agricultural racketeering, and narcotics sales.^[28] These activities are inherently territorial and require stable municipal control. Accordingly, cartels depend on the ability to influence, coerce, or remove local officials who threaten profit streams.^[29] As criminal organizations seek to maintain territorial control but are refused by municipal leaders to facilitate, Mexican mayors in many cases become targets of intimidation or assassination.

Impunity and Systemic Justice Failure

Severe structural weaknesses in Mexico’s criminal justice system reinforce patterns of assassination against municipal officials. Human Rights Watch reports that only one in ten homicide investigations result in a conviction, and prosecutors in multiple states do not have access to effective or operational witness protection mechanisms.^[30] In many jurisdictions, witness protection laws exist in formal statutes but are not implemented in practice, which leaves individuals who cooperate with authorities exposed to retaliation. The lack of meaningful prosecutorial capacity and absence of reliable protections create a political environment in which assassination becomes a rational and predictable instrument to control municipal governments.^[31]

Democratic Erosion

The assassination of mayors is not merely a security issue; it is a profound crisis of governance. If criminal coercion determines who governs, then formal elections cannot be considered meaningfully democratic. When municipal officials cannot govern without cartel approval, local democracy becomes a façade. Mexican security analyst Eduardo Guerrero observes, “Democracy in Mexico is corroding… the electoral system is being perverted and corrupted.”^[32] Beyond the direct removal of elected leaders, cartels also manipulate candidate selection, intimidate political parties, and coerce voters, reshaping municipal political competition long before election day. In many regions, political offices effectively become subject to criminal “veto power,” where cartels decide who is allowed to run, who is forced to withdraw, and who is permitted to survive in office.^[33] Cartel interest entrenchment undermines the core principles of democratic accountability and citizen representation, thereby reducing municipal governments to extensions of criminal authority rather than legitimate public institutions.

Causation

Mayoral assassinations can be best understood as a crucial part of cartels’ strategies to secure political influence in the Mexican political system. When cartel interests are not met by those in power, they retaliate through violence to gain control and increase the costs of governing them. This violent strategy is dubbed “interest entrenchment,” whereby cartels attempt to penetrate levels of governance to maintain their influence. The Sinaloa Cartel has been accused of providing compensation to political actors who govern with cartel interests in mind.^[34] Cartel interest in Mexican politics is a storied history throughout the twentieth and the twenty-first centuries, and it is even more evident in the assassinations of mayors throughout the country.

The rise in cartel activity beyond trafficking marijuana poses a significant problem for the state. In the early 2000s, this issue was so drastic that former President Felipe Calderón launched a nationwide militarized initiative to eliminate cartel leaders. Until this time, the Mexican military had been a neutral entity, never involved in civic life. Military deployment did not, however, curb the cartel violence. Cartels fractured as their leaders were arrested or killed, and civilians paid a heavy price. Internal cartel violence erupted and spilled into the streets in a way it had never done before.

In tandem, the Mexican judicial system is not equipped with the financial resources or peoplepower to prosecute crimes, and this gap permits cartels to commit grievous crimes, like political assassinations, and remain unprosecuted. The 2024 constitutional reform attempts to address judicial inefficiency but has thus far catalyzed an extreme backlog of cases and, at its core, is not the root cause of the problem.

Interest entrenchment

Cartels seek to solve the issue of their political non-representation by committing mayoral assassinations. Andreas Schedler situates this violence as one that is committed by “quasi-extra-societal actors (‘los narcos’) who kill their competitors (as well as their defectors)” and notes that “violence against municipal officials, for instance, promises to give criminal organizations control over municipal law enforcement and access to public revenue.”^[35] Thus, violence becomes the go-to strategy for securing access at the municipal level.

Cartel violence and the strategy of political violence have been seeping into the public arena since Mexico’s democratic reformation in 2000, when Vincente Fox (of the Partido Acción Nacional) was elected. A new political system under Fox, and the erosion of the one-party system under the PRI, caused the traditionally natured cartels to splinter and vie for dominance in the U.S.-Mexico border towns through which they could traffic narcotics. Until this pivotal moment, cartels were “subordinate partners to political patrons” and, thus, they were protected from prosecution and competition; however, “as these protections broke down,… the cartels ‘emancipated’ themselves by creating their autonomous military capacities…[and] they strike to recapture state agencies through the time-tested combination of corruption and violence.”^[36] Cartels resorted to a more overt form of political control when the long-standing political party (Partido Acción Nacional) of the twentieth century was not re-elected. Today, violence ensures cooperation by sending a clear message: if a political actor is not with them, they are against them.

In this way, cartel interests are entrenched in the political landscape, and it is in the best interest of a mayoral candidate or current mayor to avert policies that interfere with cartel activities (i.e., drug trafficking, extortion, kidnap for ransom). Even if a mayor is not actively threatening cartel activity and maintains a neutral position, the potential for them and their team to be killed is equally as likely and dangerous.

Trejo and Ley write that cartels “use coercion and corruption to influence municipal electoral processes, the municipal provision of security, the allocation of public resources and the degree of participation of civil society organizations.”^[37] The Sinaloa Cartel has a documented history of sustained interest entrenchment. Since the end of 2006, President Calderón’s administration (PAN party) has been accused of protecting or colluding with the Sinaloa Cartel. The most salient reasoning for this government collusion stems from the federal government’s endeavor to capture or kill cartel leaders (referred to as the “kingpin” strategy). When PAN assumed the presidency in 2000, the leaders of the Tijuana Cartel, the Gulf Cartel, Los Zetas, and the Juárez Cartel were killed or captured. The three leaders of the Sinaloa Cartel, – “El Chapo,” “El Mayo,” and “El Azul” – however, remained free. An NPR investigation reveals that arrests of Sinaloa Cartel members between 2006 and 2011 constituted only twelve percent of all captures and directly contradicted the Mexican government’s public estimation of twenty-four percent.^[38]

In 2022, investigative journalist Anabel Hernández found evidence of an electoral narco-pact between the Sinaloa Cartel and the Morena party.^[39] The pact was reportedly made in advance of municipal and state elections in Sinaloa. Hernández claims the agreement was made between Iván Guzmán on behalf of the Cartel and a member of the Morena party, in which the Cartel agreed to provide electoral support for Morena candidates in Sinaloa in exchange for agreeing not to target them, including via arrest warrants issued for extradition purposes. As Morena candidates win municipal and state elections, the Sinaloa Cartel secures its influence in those territories, reinforcing its entrenchment of sustained interest in Mexican politics.

Kingpin Strategy

To severely curb cartel freedom and influence, the Mexican government chose to target cartel leadership.^[40] The “kingpin” strategy aimed to disrupt cartel organization; however, the top-down approach unintendedly induced internecine conflict and destabilized municipal power structures, making it easier for cartels to assert influence over municipal governments and mayors. Calderón et al. write, “there are substantial…increases in all types of violence…following the neutralization of a leader. There is hence strong evidence indicating that captures of capos have strong ‘hydra’ effects in the municipality where these take place.”^[41] And while the leaders of cartels are captured or killed, members of the cartels are left to fill the gap and leads to an escalation of violence. This is evident in the present-day leadership arrangements of the Sinaloa Cartel, where there exist at least two leadership structures: the loyalists of “El Mayo,” and the four sons of “El Chapo,” collectively called “Los Chapitos.” In August 2024, violence renewed between the two factions over an alleged betrayal, beginning with the murder of seven people in Elota, Sinaloa.^[42] The Sinaloa Cartel is an example of how the government’s kingpin strategy only served to further increase cartel entrenchment and the use of violence to do so.

Military deployment also contributes to this internecine violence. In 2009, the Mexican army assigned 48,750 men to combat narcotics syndicate.^[43] The kingpin strategy made cartel-related violence more volatile for citizens as cartels became heavily fragmented. During Calderón’s presidency (2006-2012), the violence associated with combating cartels claimed more than 47,000 lives, and drug-related violence rose by three hundred percent.^[44] Many scholars argue that the surge of violence — homicides in particular — was directly caused by the military deployment authorized by the Calderón administration.

Scholars also connect this failed approach to mayoral assassinations. Laura Blume writes that assassinations are more likely in states with more criminal pluralization and demonstrates a strong statistical relationship between the increase in assassinations and the increase in political pluralization and criminal fragmentation.^[45] She addresses how mayors are pulled into this entanglement, writing “…when criminal syndicates fragment, even cooperating politicians are at risk of getting caught in the midst…At the same time, heightened electoral competition and rising support for opposition parties increase the chances of politicians being compelled to accept illicit money.”^[46] Ultimately, the kingpin strategy exacerbated Mexican cartel activity by precipitating cartels to compete for territorial dominance, making mayoral assassination an effective tool for asserting control and influence.

Ineffective Judicial System

An ineffective and underfunded judicial system permits cartel violence against mayors to continue. There remain few checks and balances that hold individuals within the judicial system and arrested individuals accountable for their actions. About ninety percent of all homicides remain unsolved in Mexico, and a report of the 2023 calendar year highlights a rate of twenty-four homicides per one-hundred thousand inhabitants.^[47] These unsolved homicides go beyond failing to carry out justice; they also signal to cartels that assassinations and violent means of influencing the government are likely to go unchecked.

The main driver of this outstanding metric lies with the people responsible for conducting investigations and prosecuting crimes. State-level prosecutors lack basic resources like time, money, and adequately trained staff to support their cases. Tyler Mattiace writes for Human Rights Watch that “Investigators and forensic technicians lack the training and basic resources needed to do key parts of their jobs, like securing crime scenes, analyzing evidence, or identifying and storing human remains.”^[48] These are essential elements for preserving a crime scene and for collecting and storing evidence. Without them, there is very little chance a prosecutor can build a case against criminals and organizations. As a result of this organizational failure, a staggeringly low number of open investigations make it to the courtroom. In 2022, prosecutors opened 2.2 million investigations; only 238,000 made it before a judge. It is no surprise, then, that in a survey of forty-eight political candidate murders, forty-five cases produced no information about the suspect or their motives three months following the murders.^[49] This level of negligence allows criminals to fly under the radar, even concerning crimes as serious as homicide and assassination.

Coupled with inadequate resources and organization, Mexican prosecutors’ offices are not held to high internal standards. Arbitrary hiring and promotion systems deter qualified candidates, while oversight mechanisms, like internal affairs bureaus and anti-corruption offices, lack independence and resources necessary to stop abuses.^[50] This chronic failure of accountability ensures that political assassinations remain a low-risk strategy for cartels, especially when prosecutors are not qualified and cannot thoroughly investigate them.

The Mexican presidency under Former President Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) tried to take a pass at this issue, but, like Fox, failed to produce an effective strategy against corruption or violence. Instead, AMLO spent a great deal of his recent term condemning the judicial system and was an adamant supporter of the successful 2024 constitutional reform that reshaped the judicial system.^[51] The judicial overhaul modifies judicial appointments to be elected positions, requiring two large-scale elections for which voters must elect 2,700 judges and 4,000 judges, respectively.^[52] This judicial reform was born out of condemnation and only worsened the issue, allowing assassinations to remain low-risk and high-reward.

The first unforeseen issue with this reform is that elections place an enormous burden on voters, thereby deterring people from voting because they do not think judgeships affect them, or there are too many candidates that it becomes an overwhelming task. The 2025 election had the lowest recorded participation rate since the 1990s (thirteen percent voter turnout), and electoral observers documented the prevalence of partisan guides instructing voters which boxes to fill in.

Secondly, in the immediate aftermath of the amendment’s implementation, case backlog began to grow as judicial proceedings slowed due to protests and a steep learning curve for newly appointed judges: “The elimination of the Supreme Court’s subject-specific chamber means that all matters must now be decided by the full bench, compounding further delays and affecting the efficiency of the judiciary.”^[53] Regardless of the reform’s intention to democratize state judicial bodies, the implementation only serves to contribute to the millions of unsolved cases and, most importantly, does not address the crux of the issue, which lies in providing better financial and human resources to state-level prosecutors.

Altogether, the causation of Mexican mayoral assassinations can be attributed to cartel interest entrenchment, top-down militarized strategies, and judicial incapacity. These issues form a negative feedback loop that reinforces the system that allows political violence at the municipal level. Cartels employ assassination to secure interest where cooperation does not exist, while the government employs a “kingpin” strategy, which encourages gun fights over cooperation. This persistence of violence is only further enabled by the weak judicial system, which is unable to prosecute millions of cases, therefore reducing the cost of assassinations. As a result, mayoral assassinations are the outcome of institutional and political failures that allow impunity and encourage entrenchment.

Conclusion

To conclude, mayoral assassinations can best be understood as a crucial part of the Sinaloa Cartel’s strategy to secure political influence in the Mexican political system. Municipal governments hold strategic importance because mayors control the most immediate layers of governance: police command, contract procurement, public works budgets, land-use decisions, and business licensing. Municipal mayors in high-value areas exercise oversight over these municipal resources, thereby becoming targets when they fail to use their power to advance cartel interests. When their interests are not met by those in power, they retaliate through violence to gain control and increase the costs of governing against them. This strategy, termed “interest entrenchment,” is one of the clearest indicators of state fragility and criminal penetration into democratic governance.

Despite municipal policing efforts and federal candidate protection protocols, municipal governments continue to face high levels of assassination and coercion from drug cartels and criminal organizations that seek to shape or control municipal authority. The Mexican criminal justice system remains structurally incapable of deterring this violence and creates a political environment in which assassinations carry strategic value and little legal consequence.^[54] The municipal justice systems in Mexican states are marred by many issues and inefficiencies. State-level prosecutors lack basic resources like time, money, and adequately trained staff to support their cases. Coupled with inadequate resources and organization, Mexican prosecutors’ offices are not held to high internal standards. Unsolved homicides go beyond failing to carry out justice; they also signal to cartels that assassinations and violent means of influencing the government are likely to go unchecked.

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